Fair use and file sharing in research and education by Wang, Yueyue
University of Southampton Research Repository
ePrints Soton
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial 
research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be 
reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing 
from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold 
commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the 
copyright holders.
  
 When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g.
AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", University of Southampton, name 
of the University School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 
FACULTY OF LAW, ARTS & SOCIAL SCIENCES 
School of Law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fair Use and File Sharing in Research and Education 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Yueyue Wang 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
March 2009 
 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 
ABSTRACT 
FACULTY OF LAW, ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
FAIR USE AND FILE SHARING IN RESEARCH AND EDUCATION 
by Yueyue Wang 
 
This work was inspired by the well-ventilated current problems around the use of digital file 
sharing technologies and their promotion of infringement of copyright leading to the alleged 
destruction  of  entertainment  industries.  Different  legal  systems  have  applied  different 
analyses to such problems, and there is no clear and coherent answer to the question of 
whether file sharing, especially in the form of peer-to-peer (P2P), is legal. The particular 
focus  of  this  thesis  flows  from  the  realisation  that  litigation  around  file  sharing  has 
uniformly explored it from the perspective of users downloading entertainment materials 
such as music and videos. Comparatively little attention has been paid to whether research 
and  educational  users  have,  or  should  have,  rights  to  use  the  same  digital  file  sharing 
technologies to access copyright materials important to their work.  If digital file sharing is 
declared illegal by the courts at the behest of the entertainment industries, then what will 
happen to research and educational users of these networks? 
   
To explore this key problem, this thesis focuses on how fair use doctrine, the most important 
exception  and  limitation  to  copyright,  has  transferred  from  the  traditional  copyright 
environment into the context of digital file sharing. By undertaking a study of relevant 
legislation and cases, such as the well known Napster, Grokster and  MP3.com, the “who” 
issue, namely, who is the party entitled to benefit from a fair use defence will be highlighted. 
 
Having established that fair use as a defence operates ineffectively in the digital file sharing 
environment,  the  thesis  then  looks  at  existing  alternative  or  “fared”  use  models,  and 
particularly the disadvantages of “fared” use system in serving research and educational file 
sharing.  Finally the thesis turns to what is termed the “voluntary model”: a model in which 
copyright owners make their works available to academic users for free, via an institutional 
repository, the authors gaining non-pecuniary benefits while the commercial publisher being 
cut out as a “middleman”. Although future work to develop the details of this approach 
would be required, the thesis asserts this is a promising way towards ensuring access to 
copyright works in research and education thus benefiting society, whilst at the same time 
establishing fair compensation to authors for their efforts.   i 
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Part I. Background Issues 
 
Chapter 1. Background to the Problem of File Sharing in Research 
and Education 
 
Sharing  matters  in  society  because  it  encourages  socially  beneficial,  culturally  significant 
exchange of resources
1. Defined as the action of dividing and apportioning in shares between 
two or more recipients
2, sharing occurs in almost all aspects of human social life — in a narrow 
sense, it refers to joint or alternating use of a physically finite good, such as splitting a cookie 
between two persons; in a broader sense, it may also include exchanging something which can 
be  regarded  as  an  impersonal  and  non-rivalrous  good,  such  as  swapping  information  on  a 
website  with  millions  of  people.    It  is  generally  recognised  that  changed  technological 
circumstances have further expanded the concept of sharing.
3 For example, the emergence of 
Internet technology led to the phrase “file sharing” in the digital context, which is altering the 
way people share knowledge. As Professor Paliwala states, the networked information sharing 
culture promotes knowledge users to become active partners in file sharing.
4  
 
Since  Napster
5  elevated  “file  sharing”  to  a  buzz  word  in  news  reports,  newspapers,  and 
magazines in 1999, file sharing technology, especially in the form of peer-to-peer (P2P) file 
                                                        
1 Sharing is a common usage in both anthropology and economics literatures. Sociologists argue that 
sharing is the very core of social lives, such as in the information, culture, education, computation, 
and communication sectors. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, “The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective 
Action and Law”, Law, Economics and Public Policy, No. 281(2002). See also, Yochai Benkler, 
“Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic 
Production”,  Yale  Law  Journal,  Vol.  114  (2005)  at  274-275.  See  also,  Gunilla  Wilden-Wulff, 
Challenge of Knowledge Sharing in Practice: A Social Approach, Oxford: Chandos Publishing Ltd. 
(2007). 
2 “Sharing” is the present participle of share. “Share” refers to giving a part or portion of a larger 
amount which is divided among, or contributed by a number of people. Concise Oxford English 
Dictionary, New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 11
th ed. (2006) at 1323. 
3 Technology may not determine the level of sharing, but it does provide a platform for sharing social 
resources  in  new  ways,  such  as  that  digital  technology  makes  it  possible  to  share  impersonal 
information through websites. See Yochai Benkler, supra note 1, at 278. 
4 Abdul Paliwala, “Free Culture, Global Commons and Social Justice in Information Technology 
Diffusion”, Journal of Information Law and Technology, Vol. 1 (2006) at 23. 
5  See  A&M  Records,  Inc.  v.  Napster,  Inc.,  No.  00-16401,  U.S,  D.C.  No.  CV-99-05183-MPH. 
[Hereinafter, Napster, in brief].   7 
sharing, has been met with hostility and panic
6.  Most previous research and litigation on file 
sharing  technology  has  been  concerned  with  commercial  content  in  use  on  file  sharing 
networks.
7 The disputes over encouraging academic content file sharing systems
8 deserve special 
attention, given that a number of systems applying file sharing in research and education have 
been  designed,  such  as  eduCommons
9,  SETI@home
10,  and  Edutella
11. These  allow  users  to 
share text, audio, and video files stored on computers to support learning and research. Perhaps 
it is time to seek equilibrium in accommodating restrictive copyright protection and efficient use 
of resources via file sharing technology in the domains of research and education.   
 
Chapter 1 focuses on the background of the problems explored by this thesis.  Section 1 begins 
with  an  introduction  to  the  definition  of  file  sharing  on  the  Internet.  By  tracing  the  major 
developments in file sharing technology, the social and legal implications of this technology are 
identified and discussed.  Section 2 highlights the potential of applying file sharing technology 
                                                        
6 P2P technology has mainly been criticised for decreasing sales of CDs, copyright infringement and 
network security problems. See, e.g., Rafael Rob and Joel Waldfogel, “Piracy on the High C’S: Music 
Downloading, Sales Displacement, and Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students”, Journal of 
Law and Economics, Vol. XLIX (2006) at 29-62. See also, Rafael Rob and Joel Waldfogel, “Piracy 
on the Silver Screen”, NBER Working Paper, No.12010 (2006) (Concluding that illegal downloads 
through P2P have had a negative impact on content providers’ revenues, especially as regards the 
music industry). See also, RIAA, Recording Industry Association of America: 2002 Yearend 
Statistics, “In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9 percent, from 882 million to 
803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent”. Available at 
http://www.riaa.com/news/marketingdata/pdf/year_end_2002.pdf  However, some others argued that 
file sharing does not reduce and might increase sales, See, e.g., Felix Oberholzer and Koleman 
Strumpf, “The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis”, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 115 (2007) at 1-42. 
7 See, e.g., most research and litigation criticise that the application of P2P technology has decreased 
sales of CDs, DVDs, and copyright infringement. See, e.g., Patricia Akester and Francisco Lima, 
“Copyright and P2P: Law, Economics and Patterns of Evolution”, E.I.P.R. Vol. 28 (11) (2006) at 576. 
See also, Stan J. Liebowitz, “File sharing: Creative Destruction or just Plain Destruction?” Journal of 
Law and Economics, Vol. 49(1) (2006) at 1-28. See, Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media 
Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity, The Penguin Press 
(2004) at 68-73. See also, MGM Inc v. Grokster Ltd 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. April, 2003). 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162-1166 (9
th Cir. 2004). MGM 
Inc. v. Grokster Ltd al Supreme Court (04-0480), 545 U.S., 125 s. Ct. 2764 (2005) [Hereinafter, 
Grokster, in brief]. 
8 Some file sharing software and systems are regarded as illegal. See, e.g., Napster, supra note 5. 
9 “EduCommons” is an open system for creating, sharing, and reusing educational content and 
discourse to support learning. It is run by OSLO Group in the Department of Instructional 
Technology at Utah State University. Available at http://educommons.sourceforge.net/  
10 SETI@home is a network system using thousands of Internet-connected personal computers to 
help in the search for extraterrestrial intelligence. Available at http://setiathome.ssl.berkeley.edu/  
11 “Edutella” is developing a P2P network for the exchange of educational resources between German 
universities, Swedish universities, Stanford University, and others. Available at 
http://edutella.jxta.org/    8 
in the context of research and education, which are considered as different judging from most 
current file sharing debates concerning copyright infringing applications.  Section 3 explores the 
essential reasons why academic file sharing deserves particular copyright protection through a 
comparison with general file sharing. To that end, the problems related to applying “fair use” 
doctrine in academic file sharing are considered. 
 
1.1 File Sharing: Someone Knows What I Want to Know 
 
Someone knows what I want to know. Someone has the information I want. If I 
can find her, I can learn it from her. She will share it with me.
12  
— Jessica Litman 
1.1.1 What is File Sharing? 
Sharing files is not as simple as Litman describes. Indeed confusion exists about “sharing” files 
due to the fact that information can be shared with others by various means. She transfers the file 
on  a  diskette;  or  sends  it  to  me  by  email. Also,  I  can  receive  the  file  from  her  via  a  P2P 
communication network such as MSN Messenger; or by P2P file sharing networks directly (e.g., 
I can obtain a song from her hard drive via KaZaA
13 network).  Herein lies the problem: what 
kinds of information sharing should be used to define the term “file sharing”?   The definition of 
the “file” shared is also open to interpretation. An OECD study described that file sharers are 
now commonly trading full movies and software programs, whereas pioneering P2P programs 
such as Napster only allowed for the trade of MP3 audio files
14.  The following narrative seeks 
to expound which issues have been raised to constitute file sharing, especially in the Internet era. 
 
Advances in technology enable new concepts of the “file”. The definition of a “file” being 
shared has been extended in response to specific technological conditions, which have changed 
                                                        
12 Jessica Litman, “Sharing and Stealing” (2003) at 5, available at, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=472141.  
13 See http://www.kazaa.com/us/index.htm 
14 See OECD Information Technology Outlook 2004: Peer To Peer Networks In OECD Countries, 
Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (2004) at Chapter 5.   9 
dramatically  over  the  last  two  decades.    Until  the  end  of  the  1960s,  the  dominant  way  of 
obtaining  and  exchanging  information  was  through  “tangible”  technology,  in  which  the 
information  was  stored  and  transferred  in  a  non-digital  form,  i.e.,  “hard  copy”,  such  as 
photocopying articles on paper, recording magnetic particles on a tape, and so on.  The term file 
sharing at that time mainly referred to exchanging files
15 in the physical genres outlined above.  
 
Digital technology, however, is changing the situation of formerly physical resource swapping 
genres.  Internet  technology  poses  two  sets  of  developing  conditions  which  mandate  the 
conceptual evolution of file sharing. Instead of traditional tangible file sharing media such as 
paper, tape or diskette, transfer of information on the Internet is in the form of digitised flow.  
The data flow form of resource swapping, inherent within which is a more effective and efficient 
way of information exchange, raises difficulties in identifying the real purpose in use of the 
copyrighted work. Thus, there is a much greater degree of difficulty in detecting the purpose of 
downloading unspecified data which may or may not be a copyright work, and may or may not 
have educational or entertainment content, than verifying the aim of a student photocopying an 
academic article in a library for his assignment. Therefore, there is a loss of identifiable context. 
 
Another significant change in the context of file sharing, inherent in Internet technology, lies in 
the dramatically enhanced speed of sharing information. The Ninth Circuit Court provided the 
information  that  in  1999  approximately  10,000  music  files  were  “shared”  per  second  using 
Napster, and that more than 100 users attempted to log onto the Napster server every second. 
Napster’s  popularity  amounted  to  a  figure  of  75  million  users  by  the  end  of  2000.
16   This 
statement highlights the impossibility that traditional non-digital files could be shared amongst 
such a vast number of people in such a short time, given that digital files can be copied promptly 
unlimited times through the Internet. In these new circumstances, the term “file” in the context 
of “sharing” has been confirmed by further definition as a collection of digital data processed via 
                                                        
15 “File” here means “a folder or box for keeping loose papers or documents together and in order”. 
See Concise Oxford English Dictionary, supra note 2, at 530. (It is one of the traditional definitions of 
“file”, especially before the term “computer file” emerged.) 
16 See Napster, supra note 5, at 4108.   10 
computer  programs
17,  rather than  as  pertained  beforehand  just  as  tangible documents. Thus, 
digital files, including all kinds of digital information files, such as MP3 files, audio files, and 
video files, have been included within the term “file” in the context of digital sharing. 
 
There are different schools of thought as to how the term “sharing” can best be explained. On the 
one hand some people advocate that sharing is always involved in matters that are related to 
allocating. Richard Parsons, the CEO of Time-Warner, argues, whatever use is involved in P2P 
networks, it equates to “online shoplifting” rather than “file sharing”
18. Similarly, David Kendall 
says, “The word file sharing…[is] not really sharing at all, because if I share a piece of cake with 
you, we’re each doing with a little less---I have half a piece and you have half a piece. This 
doesn’t hold true for digital distribution since I don’t lose anything by ‘sharing’ with you.”
19  
Nevertheless, digital file sharing is more like sharing ideas, rather than like sharing a cake. 
Being treated as tangible property, the slices of cake can be allocated to each person in order to 
be “shared”, while ideas are intellectual property which does not necessarily lose a part when 
being shared among people, as with digital distributing. The use of “blogs”
20 (or weblogs) is an 
illustrative example. When people post hyperlinked ongoing diaries into the blog, and readers of 
the blog write in to contribute their own comments, they are “sharing” information on the blog 
but nobody loses anything
21. That is to say, splitting and apportioning are not necessary for 
digital file  sharing. When a digital file is offered to  Internet, non-rivalrous sharing happens 
among network users. 
 
From a technical perspective, file sharing in a network takes two forms: uploading files and 
                                                        
17 “File” is a collection of data or programs stored under a single computing identifying name. See 
Napster, supra note 5, at 530. 
18  See  Richard  Parson,  “Ensuring  Content  Protection  in  the  Digital  Age:  Hearing  before  the 
Subcomm”, Telecommunications of the House Commerce Comm., 107
th Cong. 30 (2002). (According 
to him, “The popular term for trafficking in copyright works---“file sharing”---is a misnomer. It isn’t 
sharing. It is online shoplifting.”) 
19 David Kendall, Copyright in Cyberspace, Brigance Lecture to Wabash College (2002) 
available at http://www.copyrightassembly.org/briefing/DEKWabashSpeech4.htm  
20 “Blog”, also known as weblog, means a personal website on which an individual records opinions, 
links to other sites, etc. on a regular basis. See Concise Oxford English Dictionary, supra note 2, at 
1636. 
21 Andrew Ross Sorkin, “Building a Web Media Empire on a Daily Dose of Fresh Links”, New York 
Times (Nov. 17, 2003). Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/17/technology/17blog.html. 
See also Lawrence Lessig, “The New Road to the White House: How Grassroots Blogs are 
Transforming Presidential Politics”, Wired, 11.11 (2003) at 136.   11 
downloading files
22. There is no clear consensus as to which form should be adopted to define 
“sharing” digital files and this in turn has meant that there are many different expectations of 
what file sharing constitutes. Those who use a broad definition of file sharing claim that general 
participation  in  the  network,  either  downloading  or  uploading,  or  both,  can  be  regarded  as 
sharing
23. Others prefer to think that file sharing is merely the behaviour of posting one’s files to 
the network for other network members to download, i.e., uploading files. By distinguishing 
“file sharing” from “file swapping”
24, Strahilevitz explains that file sharing is “making one’s 
files  available  for  others  to  download,”
25  e.g.,  making  the  media  files  on  one’s  hard  drive 
available to other members of the network, whereas Litman defined file sharing as “posting 
information on the net,”
26 such as the use of a weblog.  
 
To avoid any confusion in the following narrative, it is necessary to define our terms.  In order to 
clarify the definition of “file sharing” used in this thesis, I make a distinction between two 
separate uses of the word “file” which can mean both “the file being shared outside network”, 
such as paper documents and information stored on a tape, and “the file being shared inside 
network”, i.e., those digital files only being exchanged in a network, even if in a small local area 
network. Herein, the term “file” refers to digital files shared on a network.  As to the phrase 
“sharing”, a general definition of file sharing will be adopted.  Thus, whether one only posts the 
information on a website or just downloads files from a blog or social networking site such as 
MySpace, or whether the file is made available to thousands of people via a peer-to-peer (P2P) 
network
27  (e.g.,  sharing  a  popular  song  on  KaZaA  network)  or  shared  between  two  friends 
                                                        
22  “Downloading”  means  copying  data  from  one  computer  system  to  another  or  to  a  disc. 
“Uploading” refers to transfer data to a larger computer system, so that others can access it, i.e., 
“making available”. See Concise Oxford English Dictionary, supra note 2, at 431, 1589.  
23 See, e.g., Ralf Steinmetz and Klaus Wehrle, Peer-to-Peer Systems and Applications (Lecture Notes 
in Computer Science), Springer Publisher, 1
st ed. (2005).  
24 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on 
the File-Swapping Networks”, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 89 (2003) at 14. (Strahilevitz uses “file 
swapping” referring to general participation in the network, including a downloader, an uploader, or 
both of them). 
25 Ibid.  
26 See Litman, supra note 12, at 23. 
27 “Peer-to-Peer” is defined as “a collaborative technology premised on individual users voluntarily 
making  computer  resources  available,  including  resources  such  as  files,  computing  services,  and 
network bandwidth, through their internet connections”. A peer-to-peer (P2P) network refers to the 
computer  network  which  uses  diverse  connectivity  between  participants  in  a  network  and  the 
cumulative bandwidth of network participants rather than conventional centralised resources where a   12 
through Instant Messaging (IM) services such as MSN Messenger; these will all be considered 
as “file sharing” in this thesis. 
1.1.2. Technologies of File Sharing  
From  the  earliest  Internet—  ARPANET
28—  to  the  latest  pure  peer-to-peer
29  system,  the 
evolution of file sharing technology has paralleled the growth of Internet. It is also worthy to 
note  that  the  burgeoning  of  file  sharing  networks  has  been  challenging  legal  practice.  The 
following traces the inception and further development of file sharing technology, and its impact 
on legal evolution, especially in the context of copyright law practice. 
 
From  the  copyright  perspective,  a  primary  conflict  between  file  sharing  technology  and 
copyright law lies in, on the one hand, file sharing networks providing incentives and platforms 
to  the  free  flow  of  ideas,  knowledge  and  information,  whereas  the  fundamental  purpose  of 
copyright  law  is  to  prevent  unauthorised  free  flow  of  authors’  creations. This  collision  has 
triggered  judicial  responses  and  legislative  initiatives,  leading  to  debates  on  legal  problems 
derived from file sharing technology. 
1.1.2.1. The Early Internet as File Sharing Tool (1969-1995) 
ARPANET, the earliest Internet established, was not a client/server system but rather a P2P 
                                                                                                                                                            
relatively low number of servers provide the core value to a service or application. It is a sub-set of 
file  sharing  technology.    See,  Javed  I.Khan  and Adam  Wierzbicki,  “Foundation  of  Peer-to-Peer 
Computing”, Elsevier Journal of Computer Communication, Vol. 31 (2) (2008). See also, Kenneth A. 
Berman  and  Fred  S.  Annexstein,  “An  Educational  Tool  for  the  21
st  Century:  Peer-to-Peer 
Computing”, NSF Grant and Ohio Board of Regents’ Research Investment (2005) at 1. 
28  “ARPANET”  is  the  earliest  Internet  model  which  was  created  by  the  United  States  Defense 
Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) in 1969. It is a P2P model rather than a client/server 
system. See Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc. Arlinton VA, A History of the ARPANET: The First 
Decade, Pentagon Reports (1981). 
29 P2P network is divided into three types: pure P2P, hybrid P2P and mixed P2P. Pure P2P means a 
network where there is no central server or router, but peer act as clients and servers (e.g., Freenet, 
Ian Clarke, “Freenet: a Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System” (2006) 
available at, http://www.ecse.rpi.edu/Homepages/shivkuma/teaching/sp2001/readings/freenet.pdf.).  
Hybrid P2P refers to a network which owns a central server while it does not substantially store files 
(e.g., Napster, supra note 5). Mixed P2P is a P2P system which has a central server but is anonymous 
(e.g., Gnutella network. See Grokster, supra note 7). See also, Charlotte Waelde and Lilian Edwards, 
“Online Intermediaries and Liability for Copyright Infringement”, WIPO SEMINAR ON 
COPYRIGHT AND INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES (2005) available at 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/2005/wipo_iis/en/presentations/doc/wipo_iis_05_ledwards_cwaelde.do
c   13 
model.
30 Created by the United States Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) in 
1969,  ARPANET  served  as  a  test  bed  for  new  networking  technologies,  linking  many 
universities and research centers. The first two nodes that formed the ARPANET were UCLA 
and the Stanford Research Institute, followed shortly thereafter by the University of Utah. The 
backbone of the ARPANET consisted of packet-switching computers, which were called IMPs 
(Interface Message Processors). The IMPs were connected by, for the time, superfast 56 Kbit/s 
lines
31. Conventional computers with appropriate communications software were then connected 
to these IMP nodes. As shown in Figure 1
32 below, the main purpose of ARPANET was to allow 
every node to share information through the network on an equal partner basis. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Prof. Peter Kirstein describes the revolutionary architecture of the Arpanet 
 
 
In the following years, the Internet became more established and complicated. With the growth 
of ARPANET, Usenet system was established in 1979, allowing “two machines on the Usenet 
network to discover new newsgroups efficiently and exchange new messages in each group”
33.  
                                                        
30 See supra 28, 29. 
31 See Peter Kirstein, “Internet, Web, What’s Next Conference?”, European Organisation for Nuclear 
Reserch, Geneva, available at http://www.funet.fi/index/FUNET/history/internet/en/arpanet.html.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Andy Oram ed. Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Power of Disruptive Technologies, O’Reilly and   14 
Granting that most of the network users were researchers and the users were not too many in 
number to be controlled, neither ARPENET nor Usenet called copyright into question.  In short, 
the earliest file sharing model preferred a pure P2P process.  However, this pure decentralised 
file  sharing  technology  was  not  suitable  for  the  radical  explosion  of  the  Internet  in  the 
subsequent year of 1994. 
1.1.2.2. Web-Based File Sharing: Client/Server Model of the Internet (1995-1999)  
The rapid growth of network technology led to a massive increase in access to the Internet 
throughout general society during 1994. Millions of ordinary citizens rather than just computer 
researchers began accessing Internet resources. Since then the Internet has transformed “from a 
quiet geek utopia into a bustling mass medium”
34, a medium for people to send emails, browse 
web pages, and purchase goods. The change introduced by the Internet resulted in an alteration 
to network architecture, in which the client/server model replaced the equal node framework.  
 
The client/server protocol is a straightforward model for information sharing. The ISP (Internet 
service  provider)  provides  and  controls  the  pattern  of  publishing  or  uploading  information. 
Correspondingly,  the  client  just  simply  connects  to  a  central  server,  downloads  data,  and 
disconnects. As  demonstrated  in  Figure  2,
35  in  a  client/server  network,  the  client  sends  his 
request to the central server, then the server searches its index to find out whether there is an 
answer or not and feeds back to the client.  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Associates, Inc., U.S. (2001) at 3. 
34 Ibid, at 5. 
35 See Thom Gillespie, “P2P: Technically Speaking, It’ll Rock Your World”, Café TECHNOS Maître 
d¹Igital. Available at http://www.indiana.edu/~slizzard/p2p/index.html    15 
 
Figure 2. The current Client/Server Model 
 
File sharing by the client/server model is not an equal system. In the process of client/server file 
sharing the ISPs are in charge of the information provided on the website and govern the transfer 
of information to the clients, while the clients just need to know how to ask a question and listen 
for a response. 
 
On such a centralised file sharing model, it is relatively easy to detect information sources and to 
clarify  liabilities  involved  in  copyright  issues.  For  instance,  the  MP3.com  Case
36  involves 
decisions about copyright liability of online service providers. As we can see from detailed 
analysis in Chapter 3
37, in the MP3.com Case it was decided that MP3.com, an online music 
subscription provider, was liable for copyright infringement on the ground that it made copies of 
copyright  protected  works  for  its  own  commercial  purpose  with  knowledge  of  the  direct 
infringement.  
 
1.1.2.3. Peer-to-Peer Applications in File Sharing  
Compared to the web-based file sharing model, P2P technology gave rise to a revolution in the 
                                                        
36 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). [Hereinafter, 
MP3.com, in brief]. 
37 See Chapter 3, at 118.    16 
ways people exchange information. Although the earliest application of P2P technology---Instant 
Messaging was launched in 1988
38, the greater impacts of P2P technology were not widely 
realised  until  2000  when  Napster  became  a  popular  website  across  the  whole  world.  As 
discussed  below,  the  specific  characteristics  of  P2P  technology  has  created  serious  legal 
problems and raised questions relative to copyright practice. 
 
1.1.2.3.1. P2P Communications:Pre-Napster 
 
The graph shown in Figure 3 will be very familiar to Microsoft Windows users, demonstrating 
the  conversation  window  of  MSN  Messenger,  one  of  the  most  famous  instant-messaging 
communications in the world. Since the first modern Internet-based instant messaging system--- 
ICQ (“I seek you”) ---emerged in 1996, there have been more than 200 million users spread 
among a half-dozen major IM services such as ICQ, Yahoo! Messenger, Windows Messenger.
39 
In spite of the fact that most users have no idea that the Instant Messaging (IM) services are 
based  on  P2P  technology,  Instant  Messaging  has  become  the  most  popular  browser-based 
messaging program in modern technology. 
                                                        
38 Howard Rheingold, “The Virtual Community”, Homesteading On the Electronic Frontier (1988). 
Jakko Oikarinen wrote the original IRC program, a multi-user, synchronous communications tool 
designed to work over Internet. At first, it was tested on a local community of twenty users and then 
installed throughout the Finnish national network and ultimately the Scandinavian portion of Internet. 
IRC--the  software  needed  to  access  the  medium,  as  well  as  word  of  its  attractions--propagated 
throughout  the  wider  Internet  by  the  end  of  1988.  By  the  early  1990s,  there  were  hundreds  of 
channels and thousands of people chatting across the Net, twenty-four hours a day. Available at 
http://www.rheingold.com/vc/book/6.html. 
 
39 Michael Miller, Discovering P2P, Sybex Inc.,U.S. (2001) at 24.   17 
 
Figure 3. MSN Messenger Conversation Window 
 
The basic function of IM, as shown in Figure 3 above, is one-to-one conversation by creating 
multiple-user real-time chats. IM users typically exchange text messages in the conversation, 
which appear in the other user’s IM client software virtually instantaneously.  Some IM servers 
also allow users to communicate via voice or full-motion video such as the MSN’s Webcam and 
Audio services.  Moreover, users are permitted to send digital files back and forth, which include 
not only text files (.txt files) but also music and movie files (e.g., .mp3, .avi. .wma, .rm files, 
etc.).  In the above instance, if Yueyue clicked the “accept” button in the above example, the file 
named hello.rtf would be transferred from John’s computer to Yueyue’s. Additionally, if she 
clicked  the  button  “save  as”,  it  would  be  stored  in  her  computer  hard  drive  via  the  route 
assigned.   
 
Compared to client/server  Internet services,  IM networks have two distinguishable technical 
characteristics: the lack of a central server and the use of a friends list.  On the one hand, unlike 
traditional  Internet  services,  IM  services  do  not  rely  on  chat  servers  to  host  chat  rooms  or 
channels where users could exchange messages in real time. Instead, the messages flow from   18 
one user to another directly without a central server being involved.  Rather than storing or 
interfering  with  the  individual  messages,  central  servers  are  only  to  log  users  onto  an  IM 
network. In other words, IM central servers are just “to keep track of who is online and what 
their unique IP addresses are”, so that IM network remains essentially P2P in nature
40. Figure 4 
below shows how the ICQ IM system works. 
    
Figure 4. How ICQ Works 
 
On the other hand, the use of a friend list guarantees that information can only be shared with 
usually personally known contacts. When MSN Messenger is launched, you will see the client 
window shown in Figure 5. It is easy to recognise the identities of the friend buddies in the 
contact list by their email addresses; contacts can also be cut off or deleted freely. To add a user 
to the contact list, start by clicking the “Add a contact” button.  If the user specified has a 
Microsoft Passport, the contact will be added to the contact list after he fills in the information 
required  in  the  dialog  box.  Otherwise,  he  will  be  notified  to  wait  for  the  user’s  feedback.  
Generally, the prerequisite to adding or being added to a user’s contact list is acquiring his or her 
email address. This requirement limits the information transferring by IM services to “between 
friends”.  
 
                                                        
40 See Miller, supra note 39, at 214.   19 
 
Figure 5. MSN Friends Contact List 
 
 
1.1.2.3.2. P2P File Sharing: From Napster to Grokster: 
 
The Napster Story 
Even though its life may have been short, Napster was the most popular word of the Internet in 
the year 2000
41.  The original purpose of Shawn Fanning in creating the Napster software in 
1999 was just to provide music fans a place to search for, share and exchange music files with 
others. However, Napster turned out to be remarkably popular very quickly. According to the 
figures provided by the Ninth Circuit Court, in 1999 around 10,000 music files were “shared” 
per second via Napster network and more than 100 users attempted to log onto the Napster 
server every second. By the end of 2000 Napster’s popularity involved 75 million users.
42  A 
little  more  than  half  of  these  were  in  the  United  States,  while  there  were  significant  user 
populations  in  the  United  Kingdom,  Canada, Australia,  Germany  and  some  other  European 
                                                        
41See Clay Shirky, Listening to Napster, in Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing The Benefits of A Disruptive 
Technology, Andy Oram ed. (2001) at 21, 26. (Napster “has contributed to illegal copying on a scale 
that is without precedent”). See also, Karl Taro Greenfeld, “Meet the Napster”, Times (2000) at 60 (in 
this article, it was suggested that [Napster] had already ranks among the greatest Internet applications 
ever, [and]…Napster site was the fastest growing in history.)   
42 See Napster, supra note 5, at 4108.    20 
countries.
43 
 
Compared  to  web-based  file  sharing  models,  exchanging  files  on  Napster  was  very 
straightforward.    Napster  facilitated  several  supporting  services,  such  as  the  MusicShare 
software,  Napster’s  network  servers  and  server-side  software.  A  centralised  index  of  files 
available for sharing was hosted on Napster’s central servers.
44 The user request for a particular 
file was routed through the music index. Crucially, music files listed on the index were hosted on 
end users’ computers, not on Napster’s central servers. When the music file requested was found 
in the index, the file was transferred from the host computer to the computer of the Napster user 
seeking the file directly. Figure 6
45 below shows how Napster worked. Instead of being posted, 
hosted, or served by Napster servers, all MP3 files on the Napster network were stored on 
member PCs. This is clearly an application of P2P file sharing technology. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The Graph of How Napster Works 
 
 
                                                        
43 “Jupiter Media Metrx Reports Multi-Country Napster Usage Statistics for February 2001”, LEXIS 
PR Newswire (April 5, 2001). 
44 Damien Riehl, “Peer-to-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella, and Freenet Create a 
Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?” William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27 (2001) at 1761, 1766. 
45 See P2P Networks (TCD 4BA2 Project 2002/2003). Available at 
http://ntrg.cs.tcd.ie/undergrad/4ba2.02-03/Intro.html ,   21 
In  the  area  of  intellectual  property  law,  Napster’s  decentralised  file-host  design  creates  a 
situation in which previously accepted notions such as ISPs’ liability have been challenged. As 
discussed in Chapter 3
46, Napster’s special technical design gave rise to its fatal legal error.  In 
2000, Napster was sued in the first P2P case that was eventually heard by the U.S. court, brought 
by owners of copyright musical works. In brief, the Court chose to protect the copyright owner, 
i.e., the record company’s interests, at the expense of the innovative technology pioneered by 
Napster.  It  concluded  that  Napster  was  liable  for  contributory  and  vicarious  copyright 
infringement for its end-users’ direct copyright infringement activities,
47 on the grounds that 
Napster  was  “engaging  in,  or  facilitating  others  in  copying,  downloading,  uploading, 
transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs’ copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings, 
protected by either federal or state law, without express permission of the right owner.”
48  
 
Grokster 
In  2003,  the  Grokster  case
49  caused  a  second  wave  of  discussion  about  the  use  of  P2P 
technology in file sharing. Gnutella
50, the file sharing program used in Grokster, was released 
over the Internet one year after Napster’s creation.
51 Allowing users to share files in any format, 
Gnutella’s network is more versatile than Napster’s.
52  Designed to “create self-perpetuating 
networks that grow independent of any single company’s involvement”
53, Gnutella is a typical 
P2P  network  using  “supernode”
54  architecture.    Compared  to  Napster,  Grokster’s  Gnutella 
network does not rely on any central server to store files or the file catalog. Instead, all the 
computers connected to the network function as mini-servers, i.e., “nodes”, by which a number 
                                                        
46 See Chapter 3, at 109-111. 
47 See Napster, supra note 5, at 4230-4233.   
48 See Napster, supra note 5, at 4223. 
49 See Grokster, supra note 7. 
50 See http://www.gnutella.com/.  
51  Gnen  Kan,  “Gnutella  and  GoneSilent.com:  on  Lessons  from  Gnutella  for  Peer-to  Peer 
Technologies”, supra note 33, at 94- 95.  See also Riehl, supra note 44, at 1774. 
52 See Grokster, supra note 7, at 94 - 122. 
53 See Miller, supra note 39, at 133. 
54 “Node” is defined as “a connection endpoint in a network, often a computer or the network client-
server application, depending on one’s perspective---physical or virtual”.  See Bo Leuf, Peer to Peer, 
Collaboration  and  Sharing  Over  the  Internet,  Boston:  Pearson  Education,  Inc.  (2002).    In 
comparison,  “Supernode”  is  defined  as  “a  peer  computer  that  has  above-average  bandwidth  and 
processing  capacity”,  and  “any  peer  on  the  network  can  become  a  supernode  if  it  meets  the 
appropriate processing power, bandwidth, and latency requirements”. See Oram, supra note 33, at 
157.    22 
of selected computers on the network form an indexing server, i.e., “supernodes”.  
 
The way a Grokster’s user searches for files is different to that of Napster’s, given that there is 
no  centralised  file  index  in  the  Grokster  network.   After  downloading  and  logging  into  the 
Grokster’s network, the user’s computer will be linked to a large number of easily accessible 
local supernodes and on to individual users. When the user sends his request for files using a 
search phrase such as an artist’s name, album title, song name, etc., the query will be transferred 
to the other computers to which it is connected. Then these computers will in turn send the 
request to others to which they are linked, and so on.
55  Once the desired file is found on 
someone’s computer, a peer-to-peer connection will be established between the requester’s and 
the host’s computers on the network and the files are then transferred directly between the two 
user’s  computers.  The  following  illustration
56  (Figure  7)  is  a  snapshot  of  a  Grokster  peer 
network, in which every tiny circle signifies a node or an end-user computer in the network, and 
the black spot is a supernode. In other words, Grokster is a truly decentralised P2P protocol 
which neither hosts files nor compiles a central index of files. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. How Grokster Works 
 
                                                        
55 See Lawrence Lessig, “Expert Report of Professor Lawrence Lessig Pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure Vol. 26 (a) (2) (B)”, available at: 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/publications/details/957/.  
56 See An Atlas of Cyberspace, available at http://www.cybergeography.org/atlas/more_topology.html.    23 
This decentralised structure made Grokster less likely to be liable for a legal challenge than 
Napster  was
57.  The  Ninth  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  held  that  Grokster  was  not  liable  for 
contributory or vicarious copyright infringement as the system itself might be used for both 
substantial infringing and non-infringing copying activities. In other words, Grokster network 
did  not  constitute  an  infringement  because  “Plaintiffs’  notices  of  infringing  conducts  [were] 
irrelevant, since they arrive[d] when Defendants d[id] nothing to facilitate, and [could] not do 
anything  to  stop,  the  alleged  infringement  of  specific  copyrighted  content”.
58  However,  the 
Supreme Court went on to import the “inducement” theory, claiming that it was an indirect 
copyright infringement when Grokster intended to distribute a device which was intended to 
induce copyright infringement.
59  
 
1.1.2.3.3. Freenet, Tor and BitTorrent: Post-Napster P2P File Sharing 
 
Freenet 
Freenet, a third generation P2P network emerged in 1999 at the University of Edinburgh in 
Scotland.  This was designed to enable a “distributed decentralised information storage and 
retrieval  system”
60.    Freenet’s  network  was  planned  to  contain  a  self-organising  and  self-
governing infrastructure.
61  One of the characteristics which make Freenet distinct is its open, 
completely decentralised system design.  At its core, Freenet is designed to be untraceable and 
uncontrollable. Similar to the Gnutella protocol, the entire Freenet network is housed across the 
peers.      However,  Freenet  adopts  a  very  different  file  distribution  design  from  previously 
distributed protocol such as Gnutella.     Under Gnutella network, the two nodes are immediately 
connected with each other once the requested file is found and the transfer is then direct, point-
                                                        
57 See Maureen Daly, “Life after Grokster: Analysis of US and European Approaches to File sharing”, 
E.I.P.R, Vol. 29(8) (2007) at 319-324. See also, Patricia Akester, “Copyright and the P2P Challenge”, 
E.I.P.R. Vol. 27(3) (2005) at 106-112. See, Robert E. Litan, “Law and Policy in the Age of the 
Internet”, Duke L.J. Vol. 1045 (50) (2001) at 1068-1069. 
58 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd al, 380 F.3d 1154, 1162-1166 (9
th Cir. 
2004) at 36(a). 
59 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd al, Supreme Court (04-0480) 545 U.S., 
125 s. Ct. 2764 (2005) at 486. 
60 See Michael, supra note 39, at 99. 
61 See Ian J. Taylor and Andrew Harrison, From P2P to Web Services and Grids: peers in a Client/ 
Server World, Springer Publisher (2004) at 36. See, Gale Reference Team, Ascom certifies FreeNET 
voice-over-Wi-Fi solution with Trapeze Networks (BUSINESS): An article from: Wi-Fi Wireless LAN, 
Thomson Gale Publisher (2007). See also, Michael, supra note 39, at 24.   24 
to-point.  In  contrast,  under  the  Freenet  network,  a  request  for  a  file  is  propagated  through 
neighbouring nodes, and once the file is located it is returned along the same path.  As shown in 
Figure 8 below, when a request is fulfilled, the file is passed along from peer to peer until it 
arrives at the requester’s computer, rather than being transferred from the host computer to the 
requester’s directly. 
 
Figure 8. The process of a request transfer on the Freenet network 
 
On the other hand, file transfer through Freenet work is anonymous. The files are propagated 
from Freesite (i.e., Freenet node) to Freesite without the knowledge of either end user
62. A file 
might reside on one computer today and a different computer tomorrow.  Therefore, there is no 
way that anyone (even the owner of a host computer) can recognise where a request came from, 
beyond the most immediate node, so that it is almost impossible to determine which end user 
issues any particular request. In other words, no computer in a Freenet network will know where 
a file is physically hosted at any given point in time. Thus, Freenet claims that the file sharing 
can not be tapped, traced, or monitored. The inability to physically locate any given file makes 
Freenet a censorship-proof file sharing network.
63 
 
Another unique character of the Freenet lies in the fact that the network cannot be shut down 
                                                        
62 The reason that nobody can track the file shared on the Freenet network lies in two technical design 
features of Freenet. Firstly, files shared on the Freenet are downloaded and uploaded in small chunks 
from multiple sources, rather than as a whole. Secondly, the use of encryption technology ensures 
anonymity in communications between nodes so that even a host sharing a file cannot identify what 
file is uploading or storing.  See, e.g., Roemer R, “The Digital Evolution: Freenet and the Future of 
Copyright on the Internet”, UCLA Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 5 (2002). See also, Natheniel 
S. Good, Usability and privacy: a study of KaZaA P2P file sharing, New York: ACM Publisher 
(2003). 
63 See Michael, supra note 39, at 184-185.   25 
technically. Once a file has been posted onto a Freesite, it can neither be forcibly removed nor 
edited by anyone, even the person who uploads the file. The file will not disappear until it falls 
into disuse
64. (That is, if nobody requests the file for a given period, the file will eventually be 
discarded from the network automatically). In other words, the Freenet network cannot be shut 
down by any individual, company or government organisation.  
 
With respect to technical advantages, Freenet benefits much more from its decentralised and 
anonymous design than Napster or Grokster. The users of Freenet are able to swap digital files 
without  exposing  either  a  vulnerable  central  database  of  nodes  or  data.  The  encryption 
technology adopted ensures anonymity in Freenet user communication. In addition, the inbuilt 
redundancy feature of the technical design, which has the effect that files shared on Freenet are 
downloaded and uploaded not as a whole, but in small chunks from multiple sources, prevents 
Freenet system from being shut down.  However, Freenet also has its possible disadvantages. 
From a technical point of view, the greatest weakness of Freenet is the “updating-disabled” 
problem. That is to say, the file on Freenet cannot be changed or revised once it is put on the 
network. Moreover, the “free” Freenet comes at the cost of speed. The decentralised design 
requires more bandwidth to run the file sharing system, which posits obstacles for the speed of, 
browsing websites. A Freenet user narrated his experience browsing Freenet-based websites, 
“they are slow, slow, slow: I am on broadband and I felt like I was back in 9600 days”
65. To 
deploy design trade-offs between anonymity and usability, more-satisfactory P2P file sharing 
schemes like Tor and BitTorrent have been created, providing users with more safety, privacy, 
and anonymity online. 
 
Tor 
Supported by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Tor is a toolset improving anonymity in 
web browsing and publishing, instant messaging, IRC, and more. As described in the report of 
EFF, the idea behind Tor is similar to “using a twisty, hard-to-follow route in order to throw off 
                                                        
64 See, Michael,supra note 39, at 185. See also, “Policy Debate: Should Napster and similar MP3 
distribution mechanisms be banned?” South Western Economics Resource Center (2003) Available at, 
http://www.swcollege.com/bef/policy_debates/napster.html.  
65 Ibid.   26 
somebody  who  is  tailing  you—and  then  periodically  erasing  your  footprints”
66.  Figure  9
67 
demonstrates that files on the Tor network are routed in a random pathway through several 
servers, rather than taking a direct transfer, such that no middleman can inspect where the files 
originate nor where they are going. 
 
 
Figure 9. Tor Network System 
 
 
BitTorrent 
 
In  2001  BitTorrent,
68  as  a  new  P2P  file  sharing  communication  protocol  was  designed  and 
released. Under BitTorrent, each user (i.e., the peer) is able to prepare, request and transfer any 
file over the network. A file distributed through BitTorrent is treated as a number of identically-
sized pieces. On requesting a particular file, the BitTorrent user will receive a list of peers 
currently transferring pieces of the file. Such a group of peers connected to each other to share 
the pieces of a file is named a Swarm. Instead of downloading files directly or indirectly from 
the original file distributor, BitTorrent peers trade pieces of the file with one another within a 
swarm. This specific technical design makes it hard to trace the route through which a file is 
                                                        
66 See, Tor: Overview (June 2005), available at http://tor.eff.org/overview.html.  
67 Ibid. 
68 See BitTorrent Website, http://www.bittorrent.com/. Bram Cohen, “Incentives Build robustness in 
BitTorrent” (May 22, 2003), available at, http://www.BitTorrent.org/BitTorrentecon.pdf. (Accessed 
February 23, 2008). See also, Carment Carmack, “How Stuff Works: How BitTorrent Works”, 
http://www.computer.howstuffworks.com/BitTorrent.htm. (Accessed February 23, 2008).    27 
shared. Thus, it is even more difficult to define copyright liability on such networks. 
 
The enhanced usability of anonymous file-sharing through post-Napster P2P networks tends to 
attract  more  users,  which  also  aroused  panic  in  the  entertainment  industry.  Since  2004,  the 
Motion  Picture  Association  of  America  (MPAA)  and  International  Federation  of  the 
Phonographic Industry (IFPI) have brought a large number of search engines and news groups 
affiliated with BitTorrent networks, such as EliteTorrents, SuprNova.org, eDonkey, LokiTorrent 
and TorrentSpy, to court.
69 The primary legal question is whether BitTorrent itself should be 
liable for the direct infringements committed by its end-users. The Courts were all in favour of 
copyrightholders, so that sites like EliteTorents have been shut down for being cataloguing tools 
for users to search and download copyrighted digital content.  
 
Since the Napster and Grokster case, courts around the world have had to address the questions 
of  whether,  and  to  what  degree,  file  sharing  technology  intermediaries  may  be  liable  for 
copyright infringing activities generated by their services. In a Korean case in 2005, the Court 
granted  Soribada,  the  operator  of  a  P2P  service,  be  held  liable  for  copyright  infringement 
because it had aided their users’ direct infringing activity.
70  In September 2005, the Federal 
Court of Australia concluded that the defendants, who supplied the Kazaa software to authorise 
public  copying  of  protected  content  without  copyright  owners’  agreement,  were  liable  for 
copyright breach.
71 Further, the Taipei District Court held that the local P2P subscription service, 
Kuro,  be  convicted  for  criminal  copyright  infringement  in  September  2005.
72  With  the 
                                                        
69 See, e.g., Columbia Pictures, et. Al. v. Justin Bunnell, et.al., 245 F.R.D. 443 (C.D.Cal. 2007). See 
also, Drew Cullen, “SuprNova.org ends, not with a bang but a whimper” (2004) available at, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/19/suprnova_stops_torrents/. Jan Libbenga, “Dutch Raid 
eDonkey sites, seize servers” (2004) available at, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/15/dutch_raid_against_edonkey_sites/. See, “Federal Law 
Enforcement Announces Crackdown on P2P Piracy Network”, News Release, U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcements (May 25, 2005) available at, 
http://www.boingboing.net/images/EliteTorrents.pdf. See , John Borland, “Feds Shut Down Bit- 
Torrent Hub”, CNET NEWS.COM (May 25, 2005) available at,   
http://news.com.com/Feds+shut+down+BitTorrent+hub/2100-1028_3-5720541.   
70 See Korean Association of Phonogram Producers v. Soribada Inc., Seoul District Court (August 
29, 2005) Docket No. 2004 Ka Hap 3491. 
71 See also, Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd. V. Sharman License Holdings Ltd. [2005] Federal 
Court of Australia, F.C.A. 1242. 
72 See Taipei District Court Procuratorate v. Chen Kuo-hua  & Chen Kuo-hsiung, Taipei District   28 
development of technology, this ongoing file sharing trend keeps, and will keep on, challenging 
the relationship between technology and law. 
 
1.1.3. Pros and Cons of File Sharing 
It  is generally recognised that the invention of digital file sharing technology has presented 
society  with  opportunities  for  inexpensive  information  exchange,  enhanced  environment  for 
“free speech” and more efficient way for knowledge dissemination. 
 
First,  application  of  file  sharing  technology  helps  to  reduce  the  cost  of  file  sharing.  In  the 
entertainment industry, the application of file sharing technology allows that the entertainment 
system “will [be] delivered more efficiently.”
73  Through investigating the revenues of music 
CDs’ in the U.S. market,  Fisher analyses cogently  the current allocation of revenues of the 
entertainment industry in the US, and concluded that almost half of file sharing costs may be 
avoided with the application of digital file sharing networks.
74   
 
These  potential  savings  can  also  be  expected  in  research  and  educational  file  sharing.    For 
instance, the development of technology has eliminated conventional publishing entry barrier, 
and provided content creators and owners, i.e., authors, educators and professionals with the 
opportunity  to  present  their  works  directly  to  the  public.    LULU.COM
75  is  such  a  self-
publishing
76 platform.  It is “not a publisher, but a digital marketplace”.
77  By using LULU’s 
                                                                                                                                                            
Court (September 21, 2005) 2003 Su-Tzu No. 2146. 
73 William W. Fisher, Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment, Stanford 
University Press (2004) at 18. 
74 See Fisher, supra note 73, at 18-20. (As Fisher states in this book; in the US around 39% of the 
music CD’s cost is collected by the retailers, 14% by publishing company as salaries, 8% is spent on 
marketing, 8% is paid to disc manufacture, 5% is used to cover “Artist and Repertoire” expenses, 
12% is for recording music while only 4% is disbursed to rightsholders of the musical compositions.  
In practice, the average price of a music CD in US is $18. -but if the CD disc only costs $1.44 or so, 
and the music recording is about $2.16, then the payment for the artists is no more than $0.72.  That 
is to say, all the work it takes to create the songs, make the CD, and burn the album only costs $4.28, 
while more than $13 is appropriated by traditional retailers, publishers, and so on.) 
75 See LULU.COM website, available at, http://www.lulu.com/uk/about/index.php 
76 “Self-publishing” refers to the way to publish books and other materials by the authors of the 
works directly, without the intervention of established, third-party publishers. The main feature of 
self-publishing is the absence of traditional publishers. Instead, the content creator and/or owner are 
completely in charge of editing, printing, marketing and distributing the material to consumers. See,   29 
tools to format and upload their works, content creators and owners are able to print out and 
distribute their books, videos, CDs, DVDs, and reports to as many people around the world as 
they like. According to LULU’s survey, 80% of all creator revenue can be collected by self-
publishers, and millions of pounds has already been settled.
78  On the other hand, decreased 
publishing  costs  may  also  reduce  market  prices  of  the  content,  which  in  turn  may  allow  a 
reduction in the content prices paid by research and educational users. For example, the market 
price  of  the  book  “The  Computer  in  Court”  is  £8.78,  while  the  downloading  price  on 
LULU.COM is only £5.50.  
 
It  is  interesting  to  mention  that  the  emergence  of  this  author  self-controlled  file  sharing  is 
challenging  the  status  of  traditional  publishers,  especially  in  the  context  of  research  and 
educational  file  sharing.
79  Contemporary  open  license  movements,  such  as  Open Access  to 
Knowledge (A2K)
80 and Creative Commons (CC)
81,  have been encouraging academic authors 
to give away their copyright content without the intervention of publishers.
82 Certain state or 
public  regulations  have  also  been  adopted  to  reduce  the  impact  of  traditional  commercial 
publishers  on  content  distribution.
83  Thus,  the  question  here  lies  in  whether  conventional 
publishers will still be necessary in digital academic file sharing; if not, how can an effective 
                                                                                                                                                            
Federick S. Lane, The Decency Wars: The Campaign to Cleanse American Culture, Amherst, New 
York: Prometheus Books (2006) at 99. 
77 See LULU.COM, supra note 75.  
78 See LULU.COM, supra note 75. 
79 See, e.g., Ronan Deazley, “Publishers be Damned! Some Thoughts on the Science and Technology 
Committee’s Report on Scientific Publication”, E.I.P.R., Vol. 25(3) (2005) at 97-105.  See also, House 
of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Scientific Publications: Free for all? 10
th Report 
of Session 2003-2004, London: The Stationery Office Ltd. (2004). 
80  “Open  Access  to  Knowledge”  (A2K)  movement  is  a  loose  collective  of  society  groups, 
governments and individuals converging on the idea that human knowledge and cultural heritage 
belong  to  the  scientific  community,  claiming  to  minimise  limitations  presented  by  traditional 
licensing in the context of the digital file sharing world. 
81 “Creative Commons” (CC) is a project aiming to enable copyright owners to grant some of their 
rights to the public, while retaining others through open content licensing protocols, and thereby 
promote information reutilisation and dissemination for the purposes of creativity and innovation.  
See, “OAK Law Report Number 1: Creating a legal framework for copyright management of open 
access within the Australian academic and research sector”, Report for the Department of Education 
Science and Training (DEST), Australia (August 2006) at 110. 
82 See Chapter 5, at 179-186. 
83 See, e.g., public levy scheme, also known as “levies”, “tariffs” and “taxes” collected on file sharing 
goods and services, has been used in at least 42 countries to facilitate the evolution of new media 
technology.    30 
academic self-publishing system be built up? Chapter 4 and 5 will discuss such problems in 
details. 
 
Second, file sharing technology is also observed as a way to supply users with a wider range of 
information choices, greater digital resource accessibility, and increased interoperability.  File 
sharing  networks  provide  users  with  more  access  to  and  choice  of  information  than  any 
traditional industry could do
84. You may not be aware of it, but a large number of people are 
actively seeding, searching, sharing and downloading digital files which include all kinds of 
content (e.g., .txt, .jpg, .wma, etc.) from digital file sharing networks.  From a monophonic copy 
of Blonde On Blonde
85 to “Original Not Re-released” underlined Frank Zappa albums, it is not 
exaggerating to say that you can find any entertainment files you would wish for on file sharing 
networks.  It  is  estimated  that  the  amount  of  data  now  swapped  on  P2P  networks  is  about 
“equivalent to a full third of all present Internet traffic”
86.  Greater information accessibility may 
also benefit academic users of file sharing networks. As we can see from the example scenarios 
2 and 3 discussed in Part 1.3.1,
87 the application of academic file sharing architectures may offer 
more “hidden” research and educational content to scholars, researchers and students, in order to 
further enhance academic information sharing and dissemination.  
 
In contrast to traditional resource exchange methodology, file sharing technology provides users 
with more interoperability, best illustrated in the application of P2P networks. For instance, with 
a music file downloaded from Napster or a law book downloaded from LULU.COM, you may 
play/read it on your laptop, send it to your friends by email, or even upload it to some networks 
to share it with more people.  However, certain specific technical tools such as DRM may limit 
the  ways  users  share  information.  Apple’s  iTunes  FairPlay  technology  is  an  example.  As 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4,
88 iTune central server controls what files users receive and 
                                                        
84 See, e.g., According to the Ninth Circuit Court report in 1999 approximately 10,000 music files 
were “shared” per second using Napster. See Napster, supra note 5, at 4108. 
85 “Blonde On Blonde”, the first epic rock record of Bob Dylan, was produced in 1966. The song was 
famous as a devilishly playful and unapologetic pro-drug anthem. 
86 Luigi Canali De Rossi, “Why P2P File Sharing Is Good: The P2P Manifesto” (2005) available at 
http://www.masternewmedia.org/2005/01/17/why_p2p_file_sharing_is.htm.  
87 See Part 1.3.1.2, at 46-50.  
88 See Chapter 4, at 166-171.   31 
decides where those files are going to, so that the songs listed on the iTune website can only be 
downloaded and played on iPod MP3 players. 
 
Third, file sharing system may promote creation of more knowledge and artistic works. In the 
process  of  applying  file  sharing  technology,  the  Recording  Industry Association  of America 
(RIAA) has been promoting a belief in the delinquency of file sharing in copyright infringement 
by advising that the application of file sharing decreases artists’ motivation to creativity.
89 This 
statement indicates promoting artists’ creativity deserves particular attention, as failure to protect 
artists’ rights has a negative impact on cultural evolution.  In fact, there is evidence to undermine 
this assertion of the RIAA.  A variety of reports evinces that file sharing technology increases, 
rather than decreases, creation of knowledge and artistic works
90. In the context of digital file 
sharing, there are clear advantages for some artists, especially those who are not very famous. 
Instead of criticising the new technology for copyright infringement, these artists advise that the 
file sharing network is a good way for them to distribute their works and to publicise themselves 
as well. For example, Franz Ferdinand star Alex Kapranos claimed, rather than hindered their 
progress, file sharing was adopted to “help [them] as a band in getting established”
91.  
 
The development of Open Access movement demonstrates that file sharing is also welcome in 
the academic arena, as it offers obscure authors more chances of disseminating their ideas in an 
efficient and convenient way.
92 Compared to traditional academic publishing which typically 
takes several  months or even longer for a submitted paper to appear in print,
93 file sharing 
networks make it easy and efficient for academic authors to share their ideas. 
 
                                                        
89 See e.g., Napster, supra note 5; Grokster, supra note 7. 
90 See e.g., from an investigation in his store named Twist and Shout in Denver, Paul Epstein reached 
the conclusion that P2P file sharing “really turns a lot of kids on to the music”. See Janis Ian, “The 
Internet Debacle: An Alternative View”, Performing Songwriter Magazine (2002). Similarly, Michael 
K.  Powell,  Chairman  Federal  Communications  Commission,  wrote  to  RIAA  to  explain  that  his 
teenage daughter and son were encouraged to buy a CD after downloading and listening to the music 
from  file  sharing  networks.  See  Katie  Dean,  “Record  Stores:  We’re  Fine  Thanks”,  Wired  News 
(March 20, 2004) available at, 
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,62742,00.html?tw=wn_story_related 
91 See, “Franz Ferdinand Star Lectures on File Sharing”, available at 
http://www.nme.com/news/108349.htm  
92 See Chapter 5, at 179-186. 
93 See Chapter 5, at 213-214.   32 
Finally, the technology may generate a social space which enhances freedom of speech. The 
anonymity and easy accessibility of file sharing technology has already blurred the distinction 
between authors and readers, so that it is possible to promulgate a society which guarantees 
“everyone publishes” and “everyone consumes”
94 without the intervention of any government or 
organisation. As Fisher states in his “Semiotic Democracy” theory, the new core of information 
sharing means that ordinary citizens can be positive attendants instead of being the “altogether 
passive, uncritical recipients of the creations of the cultural industry”.
95   
 
On  the  one  hand,  anonymity  in  publishing  and  disseminating  information  on  file  sharing 
networks functions as via Freenet, Tor or BitTorrent,
96 etc., to relieve authors from a fear of 
political  persecution  or  social  evaluation.  This  is  inherently  of  advantage  for  academic  file 
sharing.  As one of the principle human rights, freedom of speech is essential to the mission of 
academia. It is generally recognised that external repression from political groups or authorities 
may  control  and  mislead  the  flow  of  information,  prevent  academic  communication,  and 
obstruct  the  development  of  knowledge.
97  Anonymity  in  file  sharing  technology  helps  to 
guarantee academic freedom of speech.  For example, no matter wherever you are, even if there 
is Internet censorship and filtering
98, once you have downloaded the Freenet software, you are 
equipped to express your own opinion regarding, say, political interference in Iraq, without the 
fear of being identified or censored.  Moreover, a lack of centralised control in some file sharing 
networks such as Freenet or BitTorrent makes it impossible to forcibly delete or remove any files 
on the networks. In other words, with file sharing technology, you can express your opinion 
freely, and even governments do not have the capability of deleting your information from the 
                                                        
94 See Andy Oram, supra note 33, at 11. 
95 See Fisher, supra note 73, at 28-30. 
96 See Chapter 1, Part 1.1.2.3.3, at 23-27. 
97 See Bruce E. Johansen, Silenced!: Academic Freedom, Scientific Inquiry, and the First Amendment 
under Siege in America, Praeger Publishers (2007). See also, Evan Gerstmann and Matthew Streb, 
Academic Freedom at the Dawn of a New Century: How Terrorism, Governments, and Culture Wars 
Impact Free Speech, Stanford University Press, 1
st ed. (2006). 
98 See, e.g., In China, the government restricts the use of the Internet through a system of filters to 
effectively assist government policy. See, “Freedom of Expression and the Internet in China”, 
available at, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/china-bck-0701.htm. See also, Jonathan Zittrain 
and Benjamin Edelman, “Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering in China”, Berkman Center for 
Internet and Society, Harvard Law School, available at 
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/isp/digital%20cops/papers/zittrain_hacktivism.pdf.    33 
network. Thus, file sharing technology makes people “more engaged, less alienated”.
99    
 
In parallel, the application of file sharing removes economic limitations for ordinary people to 
express their ideas. When Tarnation
100, the first feature-length film edited on iMovie
101 was 
shown at the Sundance Festival, its entire cost was $218.32; this surprised the whole world
102. 
Since then many have made their own digital “movies” and posted them on networks to share 
with others. The emergence of recent Blog
103 and YouTube
104 technology makes it even cheaper 
to share user-generated content
105. Compared to the high creative and distributing costs in the 
traditional forms of entertainment industry, file sharing technology provides ordinary people 
another  opportunity  to  express  their  ideas  freely.    As  Mark  Stefik  explains,  file  sharing 
technology provides authors and publishers “more, not less, control over their work”
106.  
 
Notwithstanding  these  benefits,  this  new  technical  invention  has  opened  up  new  social 
challenges which concern groups of people subsequently damaged by file sharing technology.  
For instance, because of its total lack of filtering or controls, P2P networks have been used to 
store and swap pornographic and other harmful files. According to research by Jon Orwant, 
approximately “15.6% of media data stored on Freenet are pornographic, and around 53.8% of 
                                                        
99 See Fisher, supra note 73, at 31. 
100 “Tarnation” was a movie made by Jonathan Caouette with his digital video player to describe the 
family relationship and love between an insane mother and her son. See http://www.i-saw-
tarnation.com/. 
101 See http://www.apple.com/support/imovie/  
102 Jason Silverman, “Here’s the Price of Fame: $218.32”, Wired news (Jan 20, 2004) available at 
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,619700,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_2.  
103 “Blog” is a website where entries are commonly displayed in reverse chronological order. Blogs 
normally provide commentary or news on a particular subject. Until December 2007, there have been 
more than 112 million blogs, which covers entertainment, academic, news and all other social topics. 
See, “Welcome to Technorati” (2007) available at, http://technorati.com/about, 
104 “YouTube” is a video sharing website where users may upload, view and download video clips. 
YouTube was created in 2005, and it hosted about 6.1 million videos in August 2006. By February 
2008, there are about 73,5000,000 videos and 2,750,000 user channels on YouTube search. See, Lee 
Gomes, “Will All of Us Get Our 15 Minutes on a YouTube Video?” The Wall Street Journal Online 
(2006).  
105 “User-Generated Content (UGC)” refers to various kinds of media content, publicly available, that 
are produced by end-users. See Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media 
Collide, New York: New York University Press (2002). See also, Organisation of Economy Co-
operation and Development, “Participative Web: User-Generated Content”, DSTI/ICCP/IE 
(2006)7/FINAL (2006). 
106 Mark Stefik, “Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge 
us to Rethink Digital Publishing”, Berkley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 12 (1997) at 137.   34 
current files consist of sex, drugs, and rock “n” roll images or videos”.
107   The personal and 
national  security  risks  resulted  from  the  application  of  file  sharing  networks  also  deserves 
particular attention. Without centralised servers, neither governments nor other organisations 
have the capability of tracking or deleting the information spread on file sharing networks, so 
that many companies and governments are worried about illegal information leak on networks. 
Concerned with this issue, both the Senate Judiciary Committee and House Government Reform 
Committee  in  the  US  have  been  trying  to  deal  with  the  “dark  side”  of  file  sharing.
108 
Nevertheless, the balance to be struck between protecting information security and applying file 
sharing technology may prove to be a long-term struggle given the burgeoning of anonymous 
file sharing technology. 
 
The loss of revenues to rightsholders is one of the most important disadvantages of applying file 
sharing technology. Previous research has demonstrated that illegal downloading through file 
sharing  networks  may  have  a  negative  impact  on  content  providers’  revenues,  especially  as 
regards  the  music  industry.
109  Hence,  as  indicated  in  Napster
110  and  Grokster
111  cases, 
rightsholders seem desperate to close down file sharing networks.  As a technology, file sharing 
architecture itself is value-neutral. There is a correct concern in this thesis with how to use file 
sharing technology appropriately and legally for the benefit of society without undue cost to 
some parts of society, mainly rightsholders. This thesis provides a case study on file sharing in a 
very special copyright environment —research and education — to discuss how the interest of 
the  public  in  innovative  technology  may  be  balanced  against  the  detrimental  results  for 
rightsholders deriving from file sharing technology. 
 
                                                        
107 See Jon Orwant, “What’s on Freenet?” Available at, 
http://www.openp2p.com/pub/a/p2p/2000/11/21/freenetcontent.html 
108 See, e.g., the US Senate Committee of Judiciary has organised a series of hearings to deal with the 
conflict between applying  file sharing and protecting  national and personal security. Available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=623.  See  also, Athan  Good  and Aaron  Krekelberg,  The 
Dark Side of a Bright Idea: Could Personal and National Security Risks Compromise the Potential of 
P2P File sharing Networks, Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington D.C. (2003). 
109 See supra note 6. 
110 See supra note 5. 
111 See supra note 7.   35 
1.2 File Sharing in Research and Education 
Granting the rationale that research and education can generate socially beneficial, culturally 
significant knowledge dissemination, file sharing in that context enhances these public interests. 
We define this concept in detail at Part 1.3.1. below,  comparing it with general (including 
entertainment) file sharing. In entertainment file sharing, the main concern is on enforcing the 
right of rightsholders to receive revenue from the use of their copyright works.  “Rightsholders” 
in  this  thesis  refer  to  the main  body  which  holds  the  copyright,  including  not  only  content 
creators (i.e., authors and artists), but also intermediaries who have acquired rights from authors 
and  publishers.    Theoretically,  in  a  market  economy  system,  such  balance  can  be  obtained 
through  the  mechanism  of  free  markets  guided  by  a  free  price  system.
112    However, 
“stakeholders”
113 in the field of academic file sharing are more complex in scope and definition. 
According  to  Deazley,
114  they  include  rightsholders  (e.g.,  authors,  commercial  and  non-
commercial publishers etc) and public organisations which may serve to protect public interests 
(e.g., universities, libraries, collecting societies and government, etc.). Imbalance among these 
stakeholders’ interests may have a negative impact on academic resources used by university 
students, and even the wider public interest.
115 Thus, in this thesis I will analyse file sharing as 
used in the context of research and education, in search of an equilibrium between the public 
interest and rightsholders’ benefits. 
1.2.1 Research and Education Defined 
The word “education” stems from the Latin educare, meaning “leading out” or “leading forth”, 
                                                        
112 See Michael L. McKinney, Environmental Science: Systems and Solutions, Jones and Bartlett 
Publishers 1
st ed. (2003) at 481. See also, Peter Wyatee, Property Valuation: In an Economic Context, 
Wiley-Blackwell Publishers (2007). See Takis Fotopoulos, The Multidimensional Crisis and Inclusive 
Democracy, Gordios Athens (2005) at 49. 
113 See Uma Suthersanen,  “Copyright and Educational Policies: A Stakeholder Analysis”, Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 23(4) (2003) at 585-609. See also, Ronan Deazley, supra note 79, at 1. 
114 See Ronan Deazley, supra note 79. 
115  See,  e.g.,  As  evidenced  in  the  Science  and  Technology  Committee’s  Report  on  Scientific 
Publications, within the last ten years, journal production has increased 1/3, and the average price 
increase of 58% between 1998 and 2003, while library budgets have declined in real terms. Thus, the 
problem here is “as the cost of gaining access to academic research increases, the ability of the whole 
of the academic community to access the research which it produces decreases”. See Ronan Deazley, 
supra  note  79,  at  29.  See  Mesure  Susie,  “Reed  Elsevier  Sees  Net  Revenues  Soaring”,  The 
Independent (August 6, 2004).   36 
to suggest the scope for further development and expansion.  “Education” is broadly defined as a 
social science which encompasses teaching and the learning of specific skills, in addition to 
something less tangible but more profound, such as the imparting of knowledge, good judgment 
and  wisdom
116.  It  indicates  the  many  pathways  open  to  individuals  to  derive  benefits  from 
lessons and materials from any social activities. Whether via the classroom teaching or by family 
education  or  even  lessons  derived  from  the  struggles  of  daily  life,  all  can  be  regarded  as 
“education”.  In a narrower sense, education is clearly profiled when “society or a group or an 
individual sets up a curriculum to educate people, usually the young”
117. In other words, the 
phrase “education” applies to the teaching and learning process based on educational institutions 
and  for  educational  purposes.  Educational  institutions,  according  to  the  definition  used  by 
SULAIR (Stanford University Library and Academic Information Resources), include K- 12 
schools, colleges, universities, and some other nonprofit institutions such as libraries, museums, 
and hospitals when they are engaged in nonprofit instructional, research, or scholarly activities 
for  educational  purposes
118.  Educational  purposes  mean  non-commercial  teaching,  study  or 
investigation at non-profit educational institutions.
119   
 
The origin of the word “research” indicates one of its fundamental characteristics: the middle 
French  language  recherche  literally  means  “to  investigate  thoroughly”.  The  Concise  Oxford 
English  Dictionary  defines  “Research  [as]  the  systematic  investigation  into  and  study  of 
materials and sources in order to establish facts and reach new conclusions”.
120  The essence of 
research, as the foundation of the scientific method, is to discover a particular subject by a “self-
correcting” process.  Generally, research is divided into “basic research” and “applied research”.  
Basic  research,  which  is  also  called  pure  research  or  fundamental  research,  refers  to  the 
theoretical understanding and exploration of the relationships among variables
121. Basic research 
                                                        
116 See Dictionary, supra note 2, at 455. 
117 Ibid. 
118 See “Stanford University Library and Academic Information Resources”, available at 
http://fairuse.stanford.edu/Copyright_and_Fair_Use_Overview/chapter7/7-b.html#1.  
119 Ibid. (According to SULAIR reports, educational purposes include: non-commercial instruction or 
curriculum based teaching by educators to students at nonprofit educational institutions; planned non-
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is aimed at discovering and providing theoretical foundation for further applied research, rather 
than towards an end in practice.  Applied research is, in turn, more focused on solving specific, 
practical problems, but is usually based on the results of basic research. In other words, the 
purpose of basic research is to “gain” knowledge for its own sake; while applied research is to 
describe the knowledge gained by basic research through a concrete example.
122  Considering 
the  analysis  in  this  thesis  is  mainly  developed  for  higher  education,  the  term  research  and 
education when used in this thesis will be defined as formal research and educational behaviours 
without  commercial  profit  purposes,  involving  classroom  teaching,  professional  research,  or 
schooling, especially in the context of higher education. 
 
Given  that  this  thesis  is  based  on  the  relationship  between  file  sharing  technology  and 
intellectual property law principles, the most appropriate definition originates from a copyright 
law perspective.  Copyright law begins with the basic principle that the copyright owner has 
exclusive rights to many uses of a copyrighted work, notably rights to reproduce, distribute, 
make derivative works, and publicly perform or show the work.
123 The exclusive rights of the 
owner, however, are not unlimited. As stated in the United States Constitution, “ The Congress 
shall have the power…[T]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries…
124”.    The  fields  of  education  and  research  deserve  particular  attention  when 
limiting copyright protection for owners, given that failure to secure this area has a negative 
impact  on  the  progress  of  science  and  social  development.  This  is  especially  so  when  the 
importance of research and education has at present been recognised within many copyright 
legislations, such as those of the U.S.A. and the U.K. Both have adopted statutes with explicit 
copyright exceptions and limitations in the domain of education and research.  For example, in 
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the UK CDPA (1988)
125, Sections 29 to 36A state that fair dealing defence includes “research 
and  private  study
126,  criticism,  review  and  news  reporting
127,  things  done  for  purposes  of 
instruction or examination
128, anthologies for educational use
129, performing, playing or showing 
work  in  course  of  activities  of  an  educational  establishment
130,  recording  by  educational 
establishments of broadcasts and cable programmes
131, and reprographic copying by educational 
establishments of passages from published work
132”.  The U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 also has 
limitations  on  exclusive  rights  in  research  and  education,  such  as  Section  107  of  the  Act 
indicates that, “the fair use of a copyrighted work, […] for purposes such as criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, 
is not an infringement of copyright.”  Additionally, in the four factors to determine whether the 
use made of a work in a particular case is a fair use, according to the US 1976 Act, “whether 
such  use  is  of  a  commercial  nature  or  is  for  nonprofit  educational  purposes” 
133should  be 
considered. 
 
At least two factors, according to the U.S. and the U.K. copyright limitations on research and 
education listed above, have led to the definition of research and education within copyright law. 
Firstly,  non-commercial  or  non-profit  nature  is  one  essential  characteristic  of  research  and 
education. In Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp.
134, Kinko’s was held to be a copyright 
infringer for selling photocopied book chapters to students without the agreement of copyright 
owners. The commercial purpose of Kinko’s copying and its direct effect on the market for the 
books resulted in its failure in the lawsuit. Kinko case indicates that research and education 
applied in copyright law requires nonprofit or non-commercial use. Even with non-commercial 
use, however, it does not follow that the copyright work can be used entirely freely, and for free. 
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For example, in assembling a coursepack, the instructor should be responsible for obtaining 
clearance  for  the  coursepack.  Failure  to  do  so  may  constitute  an  infringement  without  a 
coursepack permission agreement from the copyright owner. The instructors are usually required 
to pay an agreed sum of money to gain this permission agreement. In addition, students also 
have  to  pay  for  the  coursepacks,  rather  than  obtaining  them  for  free.  The  only  specific 
requirement is that pupils cannot be charged “more than the actual cost of photocopying”
135 in 
order to employ the material within fair use.   
1.2.2 Technologies of File Sharing in Research and Education  
As discussed above, advances in technology drive new conceptions of file sharing. Looking back 
over the historical record, at least three models have been adopted in sharing content related to 
research and education, with each categorised according to the specific technological conditions 
relied on. Corresponding to technologies of file sharing discussed in Part 1.1.2
136, these three 
models of file sharing in the context of research and education include “the paper-based file 
sharing model”, “the web-based file sharing model”, and “the P2P file sharing model”.  Each of 
the  models  has  its  benefits  and  limitations,  and  each  of  them  originates  from  the  specific 
technical context. The last two models reliant on digital technology, i.e., the web-based file 
sharing model and the P2P file sharing model, are the main concerns of this thesis.   
 
1.2.2.1. The Paper-Based File Sharing Model  
For the purposes of this thesis, “the paper-based file sharing model” refers to those traditional 
approaches which involve physical resource swapping methods.   Under such a model, academic 
content  typically  takes  the  form  of  articles  presented  in  professional  journals,  magazines  or 
books, in order to be disseminated.  Nature,
137  for example, is a prominent scientific journal. As 
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Information Resources, available at, 
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137 “Nature” is an international weekly journal of science, which publishes full-length research papers 
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a weekly publication which claims a readership of over 300,000 senior scientists and executives 
and  over  600,000  total  readers
138,  Nature  has  been  serving  as  an  important  forum  for  the 
introduction and presentation of new advanced and original research across a wide range of 
scientific fields.  
 
1.2.2.2. The Web-Based File Sharing Model 
The web-based academic content sharing model, as exemplified by online journals, has been in 
existence for two decades. In fact, such a model is a replica of conventional paper-based system 
in the digital world.  Similar to peer-review procedure in the context of traditional publishing 
environment, online journals adopt a process of “subjecting an author’s scholarly work or ideas 
to the scrutiny of others who are experts in the field”
139.  For instance, SCRIPT-ed is the online 
journal of the AHRC Research Centre for Studies in Intellectual Property and Technology Law 
based in the School of Law at the University of Edinburgh. The Editorial Board is assisted by an 
advisor  board  of  internationally-renowned  experts  drawn  from  the  disciplines  of  intellectual 
property, information technology, medical law, artificial intelligence, communications law and 
E-commerce.   In  the  case of  proposed  publications,  an  editor  sends  the  submitted  article  to 
researchers  or  scholars  who  are  experts  in  the  specific  area.  These  referees  each  return  an 
evaluation  of  the  work,  suggesting  how  the  article  can  be  improved.  Referees’  evaluations 
usually decide whether an article can be published.   
 
1.2.2.3. The P2P File Sharing Model 
In the new world of peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing, a number of intermediaries less obvious than 
“hosts”  have  been  introduced,  which  have  to  some  extent  changed  the  way  people  achieve 
academic content.  As discussed in Part 1.1.2.3
140, P2P intermediaries do not typically host or 
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transmit academic files. Instead, they enable users who have downloaded certain P2P software to 
then swap and share academic files stored in their own computers. Let us take a look at an 
example  of  academic  file  sharing  network.  LionShare
141  is  an  innovative  P2P  technology 
proposed and developed by Penn State University, MIT and British Columbia’s Simon Fraser 
University  in  Canada,  the  aim  of  which  is  to  facilitate  legitimate  file  sharing  tools  for  the 
exchange  of  “academic,  personal  and  work-related  materials  among  institutions  around  the 
world”
142.  Technically, LionShare protocol is a hybrid P2P structure.  As shown in Figure 10,
143 
there  are  three  basic  elements  in  LionShare  topology:  Peer,  PeerServer  and  the  supporting 
networking.  The  end-users  of  LionShare  (e.g.,  the  Peers)  share  and  swap  files  equally  and 
locally.  Users  have  the  ability  to  upload  and  manage  files  and  metadata  located  on  the 
PeerServer. When queries are initiated on the LionShare network, files stored on the PeerServer 
are listed in the same manner as files shared locally running on the LionShare Peer client. As to 
the LionShare Network, it basically remains the same structure to that of Gnutella. Any peer can 
be the host to run on a local file sharing network when peers connect to the LionShare.  Thus, 
LionShare is designed on the basis of both decentralised structure and centralised topology, since 
it is intended to share files including education and research related content, rather than more 
“general purpose” Internet file sharing
144. 
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                   Figure 10. LionShare Topology 
 
As  discussed  in  detail  in  Chapter  5
145,  each  of  the  models  has  its  own  advantages  and 
disadvantages.  Generally  speaking,  the  application  of  digital  file  sharing,  especially  P2P 
technology, in the context of research and education provides our scholars, faculty and students 
with more opportunities to access academic content, more efficient ways of sharing ideas, and 
more effective control of the files being shared.  However, there are some critical concerns about 
the practicality of such file sharing systems. As with the traditional paper-based file sharing, the 
web-based  academic  file  sharing  model  also  suffers  from  low  efficiency,  proneness  to  bias, 
potentially anti-innovatory effects, and inability to detect fraud.
146 For P2P file sharing, on the 
other hand, the questions as to whether academic content shared on P2P systems is reliable, and 
how academic authors can collect remedies, either substantial or unsubstantial, from sharing 
their copyright works, deserve further research.
147 
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1.3  Fair  Use  and  File  Sharing  in  Research  and  Education:  The 
Problem 
 
The  application  of  file  sharing  technology  in  research  and  education  has  presented  many 
opportunities for academia. Such an important issue, however, is almost neglected or avoided in 
legal  practice.  Recent  file  sharing  lawsuits,  such  as  MP3.Com
148  and  Napster,
149  have  all 
emphasised  the  copyright  infringement  caused  by  the  application  of  file  sharing  networks, 
ignoring potential lawful uses of such systems.  Through comparing academic uses with general 
applications of file sharing technology, we can analyse the reasons that academic file sharing 
deserves particular copyright attention. 
1.3.1 Academic File Sharing v. General File Sharing  
Academic file sharing may be considered as an application of file sharing technology, but it can 
be distinguished from general file sharing, especially entertainment file sharing, in a number of 
ways.   For the purposes of this thesis, the application of file sharing can be categorised as 
“academic file sharing” and “general file sharing”. Academic file sharing refers to those digital 
file sharing networks which mainly involve research and educational content dissemination and 
exchange, while other uses of fair sharing technology, especially in the form of entertainment 
file sharing are considered as general file sharing.  The following is an illustrative summary of 
how academic file sharing can be differentiated and may assist in understanding why it may 
require special copyright protection. We consider these issues in depth in Chapter 2 and 3. 
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  General File sharing  Academic File sharing 
Purposes  Obtain  entertainment  files  for 
free, or less than market price, or 
if out of catalogue
150 
Improve academic communication 
and knowledge dissemination
151 
Social/Cultural 
Influences 
Carelessness  in  copyright 
infringement
152 
Public interest / Social benefits
153 
Economic Influences  Copyright  rightsholders’  loss  in 
market interest
154 
Public  rights  of  access  to 
knowledge 
Legal Influences  Potential  copyright 
infringement
155 
Fair use doctrine
156 
      
Figure 11.  Comparison between General File Sharing and Academic File Sharing 
 
 
 
1.3.1.1. General File Sharing 
 
Since the emergence of file sharing technology, most  people who engage in file sharing on 
Internet have swapped entertainment files, such as music files or movies. A number of academic 
papers have asserted that an incredibly large amount of copyright files have been shared through 
general file sharing.
157 It is reported that 2.79 billion files had been transferred in February of 
2001 and by August of that year the files transferred on four leading Napster replacement (i.e., 
FastTrack, Audiogalaxy,  iMesh  and  Gnutella)  had  reached  above  3.05  billion  per  month.
158  
Kwok’s  study  on  Gnutella  downloading  trends  highlighted  a  continuing  increase  in  queries 
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specifying video and audio files, from 25.09% in 2002, to 35.20% in 2004.
159 More recently, 
BigChampagne LCC has found that around one billion songs a month were being traded on 
illegal file sharing networks in 2007.
160   
 
The large-scale phenomenon of copyright works being shared through file sharing networks has 
a negative impact on rightsholders’ market interest. The data collected by National Association 
of Recording Merchandisers shows that “while overall music purchases increased in 2005 to 
more  than  a  billion  transactions  from  817  million  transactions  in  2004,  the  share  of  those 
purchases that were on CD fell to 650 million in 2005, or 36 percent of total sales, from 708 
million, or 39 percent of total sales, in 2004”.
161  An article posted in the Wall Street Journal 
found that CD sales have dropped 20% since 2006.
162 Thus, the music industry, along with other 
media such as film and TV are having a difficult time adapting to the digital age. 
 
In  order  to  maintain  their  market  interest,  entertainment  industries  have  initiated  copyright 
litigations  against  file-sharers  and  file  sharing  intermediares  since  1999.   Recent  cases,  like 
MP3.Com
163, or Napster,
164 as well as Grokster
165, have highlighted the conflict between general 
file sharing and copyright rightsholders’ interest. These were discussed in details below.
166 
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1.3.1.2. Academic File Sharing: The Social Benefits 
As detailed and discussed in Chapter 5
167, access to educational and social information helps to 
serve the public interest. With academic file sharing, students, faculty and scholars have more 
opportunities to access academic content, more efficient ways to share information, and more 
effective  control  over  the  files  being  shared.    The  following  will  explore  several  scenarios 
experienced  by  faculty  and  students  in  their  research  and  education  practice,  in  order  to 
demonstrate  how  academic  file  sharing  can  encourage  academic  communications,  speed 
scientific discoveries, and promote social progress. Please note that in these scenarios, copyright 
problems are not considered. In other words, let us imagine all involved in these scenarios wish 
to share their works with others freely. 
 
Scenario 1.   
 
Mary,  a  lecturer  of  Intellectual  Property  Law  in  Edinburgh  Law  School,  is  assembling  her 
course materials for the LLM course. In order to compile a list including fifty U.K. and U.S 
.cases  related  to  moral  rights,  she  spent  almost  two  days  searching  cases  in  libraries  and 
various  websites.  Meantime,  Julia,  an  Intellectual  Property  Law  lecturer  of  Southampton 
University, is also spending the same amount of time in case searching. Several lecturers and 
professors in colleges have also duplicated this task. If Mary and Julia have never met before, is 
there any possibility they might communicate with and without academic file sharing networks? 
 
Under the current circumstances, there are two options to allow Mary and Julia to fulfill the task. 
On the one hand, each of them has to spend the same amount of time and energy searching for 
the cases individually.  Alternatively, it would seem to be more efficient to communicate with 
their colleagues by asking for help. For a faculty member who works in the same department or 
in a related field, the other member in search of information would likely be inclined to ask for 
help if she knew someone had it. At the same time, the faculty member who owns a personal 
collection  of  information  might  well  be  happy  to  share  what  they  already  had  if  need  be 
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known.
168 Nevertheless, faculty members may not have much opportunity to obtain information 
from others’ personal content collections. For instance, it may be difficult for Mary and Julia to 
acknowledge each other and agree to cooperate.  As far as existing ways of sharing information 
go,  most  faculty  members  would  be  unlikely  to  have  access  to  a  large  number  of  personal 
collections in traditional practice.   
 
With the application of file sharing networks, a faculty member may easily introduce and make 
his personal collection accessible to people with similar academic interests, and easily access 
others’ collections. In Mary and Julia’s example, they can find each other’s collection in file 
sharing networks such as LionShare, and hence they may be able to discuss and cooperate with 
each other. In this sense, file sharing in research and education field could reduce “the amount of 
man-hours required assembling media for lesson plans”.
169 
 
Scenario 2. 
 
A History of Utah class has an assignment to outline “who the significant mountain men in 
Utah's History where and what impact mountain men had upon the region”
170. Over the past few 
years some students who attended the same course have undertaken the research within the 
related field, and they have valuable class notes about the topic.  
 
In general practice, the current students are going to spend much time in material searching and 
sorting.  As  happens  to  many  students,  some  textbooks  and  journal  materials  they  require, 
especially the older versions of books, might be out of stock in the students’ library. For those 
students  who  have  already  researched  in  this  topic,  it is  hard  to  find  ways  of  sharing  their 
collections with others even if they would be happy to use this as an opportunity to share their 
achievements and obtain feedback. 
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The academic file sharing network would allow previous students to provide their used class 
notes  or  essays  to  a  group  of  current  students  granted  access.  In  addition,  through  the 
employment of new technology, the group of current students would also exchange information 
they have with each other, thus most likely encouraging discussion amongst people with such as 
these similar interests. In this case, the author does not suggest a short-cut for students to finish 
their assignments. Here is a solution for encouraging academic communications, for saving time, 
and also for enhancing the capability of free expression. 
 
Scenario 3. 
 
Rose, a professor of Architecture Department, collected thousands of digital photographs and 
pictures about carved statues smaller than 1 inch in size from all round Europe. She uses some 
of them for classroom teaching but most of the images have not been seen by other faculty and 
scholars. 
 
This is a typical phenomena performed by thousands of faculty and scholars. Many scholars 
have personal academic collections that contain surprising content, and who are eager to share 
information with others. In current practice, however, few specific and safe academic networks 
have  been  explored  in  order  to  alleviate  what  amounts  to  a  matchmaking  problem.    The 
application of academic file sharing architectures would provide Rose and other scholars with an 
easy way to share her photography collection with those who share similar academic interests. 
 
The  incentives  for  providing  more  “hidden”
171  academic  content  to  instructors,  scholars, 
researchers and students suggest that allowing scenarios mentioned above into practice should 
not be surprising. On the one hand, there are a huge number of target populations who are 
interested in and able to benefit from academic file sharing. For example with academic images 
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sharing,  the  evidence  stated  in  the  Vision  Image  User  Study  (VIUS)
172  reports  is  very 
impressive. 75.4 percent of faculty and 55 percent of students admitted that they use images in 
some digital forms for educational and research purposes. More than 62 percent of faculty and 
more than 56 percent of students agreed or strongly agreed the effect and efficiency of such file 
sharing systems
173.  Moreover, target populations are expected to increase. According to the 
VIUS Reports, more than 25 percent of faculty and 33 percent of students plan to increase their 
use of digital and analog images
174. 
 
On the other hand, the amount of potential academic file sharing content is surprising. A survey 
conducted  by  Penn  State’s Teaching  and  Learning  with Technology  unit
175,  which  extracted 
random samplings of 2500 Penn State faculty and teaching assistants, reported that 51 percent of 
faculty reported having a personal collection of digital images used for professional purposes. 
According to the VIUS survey, 44.1 of faculty reported that they “personally maintain or oversee 
the maintenance of a collection of analog or digital images for professional use”.
176 Additionally, 
a  significant  percentage  of  students  keep  personal  collections  of  educational  content.  For 
instance, 23.9 percent of the students attending the VIUS survey have personal collections of 
pictures or photographs for “educational or research” use.
177 The VIUS Reports also indicate the 
desire  of  people  to  share  individual  collections  with  others. Around  33.5  percent  of  faculty 
responded positively to sharing digital images, and even more say that “they would be willing to 
share”  if  some  conditions  are  fulfilled
178.  Those  with  their  personal  collections  of  digital 
educational and research content are and will be important potential users for and of academic 
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174 Ibid. 
175 Jim Kerlin, “FACAC Faculty Survey 2002”, available at: 
http://tlt.its.psu.edu/surveys/spring2002/faculty2002.html 
176 See VIUS Reports 2.3, supra note 173. 
177 See VIUS Reports 2.4 General Survey of Students, question #12. Available at: 
http://www.libraries.psu.edu/vius/2.4.pdf. 
178See VIUS Executive Summary Report, available at: 
http://www.libraries.psu.edu/vius/Executive%20Summary.pdf.   50 
file sharing networks.  
 
Although academic file sharing architecture is  still  in  its early stage, the application of file 
sharing  technology  in  research  and  education,  such  as  with  LionShare  and  EduCommons, 
provides supporting actions and interfaces towards positive academic content exchange.   
 
1.3.2 Fair Use and Academic File Sharing  
Based on the belief that the application of file sharing technology in research and education may 
help to generate dissemination of knowledge without interfering with the incentives and rewards 
that  copyright  provides  to  authors  and  owners,  academic  file  sharing  deserves  particular 
protection.  Of the various defences which an academic file sharing defendant may rely on when 
sued for copyright infringement, perhaps the most well-known one is fair use doctrine in U.S. 
copyright law, also known as fair dealing doctrine in UK copyright legislation. 
 
It is prudent here to define the term “fair use” in this thesis, where it is used in a broad sense. 
“Fair use” in this thesis refers to an exception which a user may rely on when sued for copyright 
infringement.  Broadly speaking, there are three different approaches that have been taken to the 
provision of copyright exceptions in current legislations. The first approach is to provide general 
worded exceptions, such as general fair use doctrine in the US law
179. The second approach, as 
exemplified by French Code de la propriété intellectuelle
180, is to provide a well-defined and 
specified limitation to copyright law. The third approach, as with UK fair dealing defence
181, not 
only  involves  statutory  definition  of  fair  dealing  doctrine,  but  also  admits  a  case-by-case 
examining system. Here, we use “fair use” as a general term to embrace all three copyright 
exceptions. These will be discussed in detail below.
182 
 
Such principles have also been discussed in worldwide case law.  In the UK case of Sillitoe and 
                                                        
179 See United States Copyright Act 1976, Section 107. 
180 See Code de la propriété intellectuelle,L.122-5. 
181 See UK Copyright, Design and Patent Act (CDPA) 1988, Section 29 (1). 
182 See Chapter 2, Part 2.4, at 83.   51 
Others v. McGraw-Hill Book Co.(UK) Ltd., [1983] F.S.R. 545,
183 the Court granted that the 
importer and distributor of study aids “could not avail themselves of the exceptions of [fair 
dealing doctrine] since they were not engaged in private study or research but were merely 
facilitating this for others”.
184  Similarly, the Court in University of London Press v. University 
Tutorial Press [1916]
185 interpreted that the use of an educational institution was not for the 
purpose of private study.  A Canadian Supreme Court decision
186 defines that the fair dealing 
exception “is open to those who can show that their dealings with a copyrighted work were for 
the purpose of research or private study”.  The decision of General Division of the Federal Court 
of Australia in the case of De Garis and Another v Neville Jeffress Pidler Pty Ltd (1990) 37 FCR 
99,
187 and the New Zealand Court decision in Longman Group Ltd. v. Carrington Technical 
Institute Board of Governors, [1991] 2 NZLR 574,
188 further extended the relationship between 
research and education with fair use doctrine.  
 
In copyright history, the issue of fair use doctrine has been at the very heart of the copyright 
debate. On the one hand, if rightsholders’ exclusive rights expand without fair use, this could 
lead towards copyright oppression and monopoly.
189 On the other hand, too many exceptions 
may damage the rightsholders’ financial revenues, arguably undermining a creative motivation 
factor.
190 Thus, fair use doctrine has been struggling in balancing rightsholders’ benefits and 
public interests, in regard to the purposes of research and education. 
                                                        
183 See Sillitoe and Others v. McGraw-Hill Book Co. (U.K.) Ltd. [1983] F.S.R. 545 (Ch. D.) 
184 Ibid.  
185 See University of London Press v. University Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch. 601. 
186 See CCH V. Law Society of Upper Canada [2004] SCC 13. 
187 See De Garis and Another v Neville Jeffress Pidler Pty Ltd (1990) 37 FCR 99. (In this case, the 
Court decided to extend the principle in Sillitoe to a situation where a commercial enterprise actively 
monitored  certain  subjects  in  the  news  and  provided  clients  with  photocopies  of  related  media 
articles.) 
188 See Longman Group Ltd. v. Carrington Technical Institute Board of Governors [1991] 2 NZLR 
574  (H.C.)  (This  case  concluded  that  the  use  for  research  or  private  study  must  be  that  of  the 
compiler.) 
189 See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, “A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use”, William Mitchell and 
Mary Law Review, Vol. 45 (2004) at 1525. See also, William W. Fisher, “Reconstructing The Fair 
Use Doctrine”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 101 (1988) at 1659. See, Wendy Gordon, “Fair Use as 
Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors”. 
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 82 (1982) at 1600. See also, William F. Paltry and Richard A. Posner, 
“Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred”, California Law Review, Vol. 92 (2004) at 
1639 
190 See e.g., Pierre N. Leval, “Toward a Fair Use Standard”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 103 (1990) at 
1105. See also, Neil Turkewitz, “Copyright, Fair Use and the Public Interest” (2004) available at, 
http://www.culturalpolicy.org/commons/comment-print.cfm?ID=22.   52 
The  recent  attempts  by  digital  music  swapping  pioneers
191  demonstrate  that  changing 
technological circumstances have sharpened the dramatic conflict between rightsholders’ interest 
and fair use practice.  As we shall see in Part II, there is no consensus of opinion on whether, 
how, and to what extent the fair use doctrine is integral to digital file sharing legal practice.  This 
thesis therefore intends to contribute to the theoretical understanding of fair use doctrine in 
practice in the context of digital file sharing. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
The problem this chapter addresses is summarised below: 
 
We defined the use of “file sharing” in this thesis. Defined as “the digital file being shared inside 
a network, whether downloaded, uploaded, or both”, file sharing here includes web-based file 
sharing and P2P file sharing models. Following, the evolution of file sharing technology helps us 
to keep track of how file sharing technology came into being and continues to influence the 
development  of  legal  practice. As a  neutral  technology,  file  sharing  itself  is  not  a  problem. 
Deserving of particular attention is how the new technology might be used appropriately to 
maintain the balance between the benefits of rightsholders’ and public interest in the context of 
research and education. 
 
A focus on file sharing in the context of research and education is used in this thesis.  “Research 
and  education”  is  clarified  as  “research  and  education  behaviour  without  commercial  profit 
purposes”.  Three research and education file sharing models were highlighted for review —
Nature, SCRIPT-ed, and LionShare, with major emphasis and focus on the last two as digital file 
sharing venues as, respectively, examples of web-based academic file sharing, and P2P academic 
file sharing. 
 
Subsequently, there followed a review of the new opportunities in academic areas which file 
sharing technology brings. In the comparison between academic file sharing and general file 
                                                        
191 See,e.g, MP3.com, Napster, Grokster, supra note 5, 7, 36.   53 
sharing, especially in the form of entertainment file sharing, there is a body of evidence noting 
the ways and opportunities this technology affords us to promote academic communication, 
social knowledge dissemination, and in the wider public interest. 
 
Thus can we nurture the idea that, as a neutral technology which can benefit society, file sharing 
in research and education deserves protection?  In fact, current copyright legislation already 
justifies exceptions to guarantee the public interest in legitimate access to make use of, and 
exchange copyright protected works.  Of the various copyright doctrines, fair use/fair dealing is 
the most well-known defence an academic file sharing defendant may rely on when sued for 
copyright infringement.  
 
The fair use/fair dealing doctrine has emerged from the conflict between protecting copyright 
owners’ exclusive rights and preventing such rights from being monopolistic. Witnessed by the 
numerous debates about how to define this doctrine, the development of file sharing technology 
has served to complicate the situation further.  As we shall see from Part 2., recent case laws 
have been too focused on regulating the infringing use of the technology, impeding the use of 
fair  use  doctrine  in  lawful  file  sharing  applications,  such  as  academic  file  sharing.  These 
problems will be subject to scrutiny in the following chapter. 
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Part II.  Fair Use and File Sharing     
 
 
Chapter 2. The Baseline: Fair Use Doctrine and Legal Practice 
 
In Chapter 1, it has been established that scholars and researchers can benefit from use of file 
sharing technologies for socially beneficial purposes, such as creating knowledge and assisting 
learning.  Fair  use  is  the  basic  means  by  which  copyright  law  prevents  the  “tyranny  of 
copyright”
1  and  inspires  the  “creative  system”
2  of  authors  and  copyright  owners,  striking  a 
balance between socially beneficial uses of copyright materials, and the interests of rightsholders 
to receive a return on their work.  
 
Fair use doctrine has been described as the most troublesome copyright principle
3 due to its 
flexibility and uncertainty in legal practice.  As mentioned in Chapter 1
4, the term “fair use” in 
this  thesis  refers  to  an  exception  that  a  defendant  may  rely  on  when  sued  for  copyright 
infringement, no matter whether it is named “fair use” in U.S. Copyright Act or “fair dealing” 
within U.K. copyright law.    Since the first judge-defined concept of fair use arose in 1841
5, 
generations of scholars, judges and lawyers have struggled to balance rightsholders’ benefits 
                                                        
1 See Robert S. Boynton, “The Tyranny of Copyright”, New York Times (January 5, 2004). See also, 
Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture 
and  Control  Creativity,  Penguin  Publisher  (2004).  See  Daniel  Harris,  “Fair  Use Act:  Reforming 
Digital  Copyright”,  E-Commerce  Law  and  Policy,  Vol.  9(3)  (2007)  at  12-13.  See  also,  Marketa 
Trimble Landova, “The Potential Worldwide Application of the US Fair Use Defence”, E.I.P.R Vol. 
30(1)  (2008)  at  38-40.  See,  Matthew  Sag,  “God  in  the  Machine: A  New  Structural Analysis  of 
Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine”, Michigan Telecommunication Technology Law Review, Vol. 11 (1) 
(2005) at 1. Yochai Benkler, “Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain”, New York University Law Review, Vol.74 (1999) at 354. 
2 See Lessig, supra note 1, at 130. 
3 See Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661,662 (2d Cir.1939). (This fair use case was one of 
the typical cases to measure the unique complexity and difficulty of fair use doctrine analysed by 
Justice Story.) See, Folsom v. Marsh, 9F.Cas. 342, 344-345 (Cir. Ct.Mass. 1841). (Dellar stated that 
Justice Story's formulation (9 F. Cas. at 348) did not differ much from the 1976 codification by 
Congress in   Section 107 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.   107). 
4 See Chapter 1, Part 1.3.2, at 50. 
5 Folsom v. Marsh, 9F.Cas. 348 (Cir. Ct.Mass. 1841) supra note 3. (In Folsom, Justice Story stated 
that courts should “look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the 
materials used and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale or diminish the profits or 
supersede the objects of the original work”, which turned out to be the foundation of the four-factor 
fair use doctrine in the United States Copy Act, 1976).   55 
with the public interest, “with little success”.
6  Most cases originated in the USA and focused on 
a  dispute  about  the  meaning  of  the  four-factor  listed  in  Section  107  of  the  United  States 
Copyright Act 1976, i.e., the purpose and character of the use
7, the nature of the copyrighted 
work
8, the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole
9, and the effect of its use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work
10.  Recent 
P2P music swapping cases, such as MP3.Com
11, Napster,
12 and Grokster
13, have highlighted the 
uncertainty of fair use in the context of changing technology. 
 
Different countries have adopted different policies to define fair use doctrine, resulting in wide 
variations in practice between and even within legal systems.   For instance, some treaties such 
as  the  Berne  Convention  require  the  countries  of  the  Union  “shall”  adopt  limitations  and 
exceptions on the “right of reproduction” of copyright owners in their legislations
14.  Others 
leave the member states or contract parties with an “option”, compared with the “mandate” on 
copyright fair use.  European Union Directives, such as the EC Information Society Directive
15, 
                                                        
6  See  Michael  J.  Madison,  “A  Pattern-Oriented Approach  to  Fair  Use”,  William  and  Mary  Law 
Review, Vol. 45 (2004) at 1525. See also, Willian W. Fisher, “Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine”, 
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 101 (1988) at 1659. See, Melissa De Zwart, “A Historical Analysis of the 
Birth of Fair Dealing and Fair Use: Lessons for the Digital Age”, I.P.Q. Vol. 1 (2007) at 60-91. See 
also, Tony Ballard, “Fair Use and Fair Dealing”, Entertainment Law Review, Vol. 17(8) (2006) at 
239-241. See, Wendy Gordon, “Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of 
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors”, Columbia Law Review, Vol.82 (1982) at 1600. See also, 
William F. Patry and Richard A. Posner, “Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred”, 
California Law Review, Vol. 92 (2004) at 1639. 
7 See e.g., Newspaper Licensing Agency v. Marks & Spencer [2000] 4 All ER 239,257, CA. See also, 
Pro Sieben Media v. Carlton Television [1999] FSR 610,620. 
8 See e.g., Hyder Park v. Yelland [2000] EMLR 363,378. (This case was to establish whether it could 
be fair dealing to use a work that had not been published). 
9 See e.g., Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84, 94-95. (The case was related to a parishioner quoting 
an epitaph on a tombstone in the churchyard). See also, Zamacois v. Douville [1943] 2 DLR 257, 
which stated that the copying of an entire work was not fair dealing. 
10 See e.g., Newspaper Licensing Agency v. Marks & Spencer, supra note 7. (The decision of the case 
indicated  that  the  commercial  benefit  driven  by  the  defendant  could  be  a  factor  to  against  fair 
dealing). 
11 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (SDNY). [Hereinafter, MP3.com, 
in brief] 
12 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9
th Cir. 2001). [Hereinafter, Napster, in 
brief] 
13 See MGM Inc v. Grokster Ltd 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. April, 2003). MGM Inc. v. Grokster 
Ltd al Supreme Court (04-0480)  545 U.S., 125 s. Ct. 2764 (2005)  See also, Grokster, certiorari to 
the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit, No. 04-480. (June 27, 2005). [Hereinafter, 
Grokster, in brief] 
14 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886, Article 9. See also, 
Article  13  of Agreements  of Trade-Related Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights.  [Hereinafter, 
TRIPs, in brief] 
15 See Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the   56 
Council Directive on Rental Right
16, and EC Database Directive
17, are well-known examples in 
which fair use exceptions and limitations are stated as something which “may” be adopted by 
“Member States” within the rights related to intellectual property.  The lack of harmonisation in 
adopting fair use leads to difficulties in examining what fair use doctrine implies or embodies, 
and how to practice it in legal practice. 
 
Within current legislative practice there are three legal regimes regarding legitimate access to, 
and making use of, copyright works. The first, known as open-ended doctrine approach, is to set 
out a general doctrine of fair use, such as the fair use within the United States Copyright Act
18 
and the Philippine Intellectual Property Code 1997
19. According to this approach, “[as long as] 
the court is satisfied that the use is fair, there will be no infringement”.
20 The second approach 
deploys an exhaustive enumerated list to define and explain the fair use conduct. This exhaustive 
enumerated approach has been adopted in most civil law legislations, for example, Article L122-
5 of Code de la propriété intellectuelle
21.   The “fair dealing” approach is the third type applied 
to most common law countries such as the U.K.  When considering a copyright infringement 
case, the UK court not only adopts statutory description about fair dealing conducts, but also 
makes the decision on a case-by-case basis.  Compared to the first two approaches, the fair 
                                                                                                                                                            
harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Article 5 
(O.J.2001 L 167/010) [Hereinafter, EC Information Directive, in brief] 
16 See Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right and on 
certain  rights  related  to  copyright  in  the  field  of  intellectual  property  (O.J.1992  L  346/61) 
[Hereinafter, EC Rental Directive, in brief] 
17 See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the 
legal protection of databases (O.J. 1996 L 077/20).  
18 See Section 107 of the United States Copyright Act 1976. 
19 See Section 185 of the Philippine Intellectual Property Code 1997. 
20 See Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, New York: Oxford University 
Press Inc., 4
th ed. (2003) at 194. [Hereinafter, Bently, Intellectual Property Law, in brief] 
21 See Article L112-5 of Code de la propriété intellectuelle which states that, “Once a work has been 
published, the author cannot prevent:  
1. Private family perfomances.  
2. Copies for the private and personal use of the copier. This provision does not apply to works of 
art, computer programs (where a single safeguard copy is allowed, Art. L122-6-1-II) and databases.  
3. In cases where the name of the author and the source are clearly indicated,  
a) Analyses and short citations justified by the critical, polemical, scientific or pedagogical 
nature of the work.  
b) Press reviews.  
c) Diffusion of public speeches as current news.  
d) Reproductions of works of art in catalogues for auctions in France (subject to regulatory 
restrictions).  
4. Parody, pastiche and caricature, "taking into account the usage of the genre".  
5. Acts necessary to access a database within the limits of the agreed use.   57 
dealing approach is a middle ground way to fair use doctrine. Each approach has its advantages 
and drawbacks in legal practice. 
 
Conflict  within  fair  use  doctrine  has  always  existed,  leading  to  the  current  dilemma  of 
interpreting copyright’s fair use for copyright practitioners, scholars and judges. We analyse here 
the position of fair use doctrine in copyright law mainly through examining the architecture of 
fair use legislation and policies in the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union 
and other international conventions.  
 
Accordingly, this chapter includes: 
1.  The history and evolution of fair use in copyright law as an important doctrine towards 
protecting social benefits and public interests. 
2.  The justification of fair use doctrine, emphasising that an essential of fair use is to keep a 
balance between rightsholders’ benefits and public interests.  
3.  Policy issues which arose in constructing general legal systems for fair use, by examining 
the disharmony on adopting fair use doctrine. In other words, we will explore the conflict 
between the “ought” fair use (“shall”) and “is” fair use (“may”) issues. The “three-step 
test” of fair use provided in the Berne Convention will also be examined. 
4.  The  three  legal  regimes  in  practicing  fair  use  —  the  open-ended  approach,  which  is 
applied in the U.S. and the Philippines; the restricted approach, as embodied in almost all 
civil law countries; as well as the fair dealing doctrine adopted in most common law 
legislations such as is found in the U.K— will also be discussed. 
5.  Through analysing the conflicts existing in current fair use policies and legal practice, the 
flexibility and uncertainty of current fair use legal system will be highlighted. We will end 
in asking if it is possible, and how, to realise fair use in the context of digital file sharing. 
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2.1 Granting Exceptions to Exclusive Rights: History of Fair Use 
Doctrine 
 
As a “basic limitation on the rightsholders’ right to control copying of their work”,
22 fair use 
doctrine emerged early in the history of modern copyright law.  The first copyright statute, the 
Statute of Anne
23, appeared in Britain in 1709, granting the author for a limited duration a 
temporary monopoly right to control copying of their works and gaining economic returns. The 
economic principles embodied in the Anne Statute became the foundation for modern copyright 
law.
24  However, in order to achieve a balance between the incentive to creation and restriction 
on knowledge dissemination, a “tradeoff”
25 was sought to prevent authors’ exclusive rights from 
over-expanding. Fair use doctrine emerged from tradeoff. 
 
Fair use doctrine was initially rooted in early English cases, where the defence was known as 
“fair abridgment”. Gyles v. Wilcox
26 was one of the earliest cases where this concept was a 
significant factor.  Lord Chancellor Hardwicke addressed the defence of abridgment that “Where 
books are colorable shortened only, they are undoubtedly within the meaning of the [copyright 
act], and are mere evasions of the statute, and cannot be called an abridgment…. But this must 
not  be  carried  so  far  as  to  restrain  persons  from  making  a  real  and  fair  abridgment;  for 
abridgments may, with great propriety, be called a new book, because not only the paper and 
print, but the invention, learning, and judgment of the author is shown in them, and in many 
                                                        
22 See Robin D.Gross, “Understanding Your Rights: the Public’s Rights of Fair use”, available at 
http://www.eff.org/cafe/gross1.html. (In his articles, Robin advocates fair use rights in digital media, 
by stating that “[fair use] tries to balance the interests---the competing legitimate interests---between 
the copyrightsholder and the public, which needs to have access to information to be able to share 
ideas. The copyright law does not give total control to the copyrightsholder over what they choose to 
allow or permit. There is an intentional breathing space.”) 
23 The Statute of Anne (short title Copyright Act 1709 8 Anne c.19) was the first British copyright 
law, enacted in 1709 and entering into force on April 10, 1710. It is generally considered to be the 
first  fully-fledged  copyright  law.  See,  Eaton  S.  Drone,  A  Treatise  on  the  Law  of  Property  in 
Intellectual Productions, Little Brown Co. (1879).  
24 See, Elliot Aaret, “Access Denied: The Limits of Fair Use”, Journal of Washington D.C. Bar for 
Lawyer  (2003).  See  also,  Dietrich  A.  Loeber,  “‘Socialist’  Features  of  Soviet  Copyright  Law”, 
Columbia  Journal  of  Transnational  Law,  Vol.  23  (1984)  at  297-313.  Johseph  Lowenstein,  The 
Author’s Due: Printing and the Prehistory of Copyright, University of Chicago Press (2002). 
25 Christopher Sprigman, “The Mouse That Ate the Public Domain: Disney, the Copyright Term 
Extension Act and Eldred v. Ashcroft” (2002) available at: 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020305_sprigman.html.  
26 Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 141 (1740) (No. 130).   59 
cases are extremely useful, though in some instances prejudicial, by mistaking and curtailing the 
sense of an author.”
27 The decision granted that the use of a copyright protected work would be 
original only if organised in a creative and inventive way wherein it could promote learning 
rather  than  exploitation  of the  original  work.   Other  early  English  cases  also  embodied  the 
earliest fair use doctrine, for example, in Dodsley v. Kinnersley
28 the market factor was taken 
into account for the first time, and also for the first time, the amount of the work taken by a 
second author was discussed.  A more significant case is Cary v. Kersley
29, which moved the 
term “fair abridgment” to the conceptual in a more applicable modern sense “fair use”. In Cary, 
the plaintiff composed an itinerary “The Book of Roads”, while the defendant published a similar 
work which included some information bearing a strong resemblance to the plaintiff’s work, 
such as the names of certain places. Lord Ellenborough decided, “[T]hat part of the work of one 
author is found in another, is not of itself piracy, or sufficient to support an action; a man may 
fairly  adopt  part  of  the  work  of  another:  he  may  so  make  use  of  another’s  labors  for  the 
promotion of science, and the benefit of the public. … but having done so, the question will be, 
[w]as the matter so taken used fairly with that view”.
30 The word “fair use” is a derivative of 
“used fairly”.  
 
The U.S.  1841  case Folsom  v.  Marsh
31  is  generally  considered  to  be  the  foundation  of  the 
modern term of fair use in the U.S., in which the court considered whether it was a copyright 
infringement when the Reverend Charles W. Upham used President Washington’s letters in his 
book. Justice Story rejected the fair use defence for the following reasons, “reviewer[s] may 
fairly cite largely from the original work, if his design be really and truly to use the passages for 
the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism. On the other hand, it is as clear, that if he thus cites 
the most important parts of the work, with a view, not to criticize, but to supersede the use of the 
                                                        
27 Ibid. 
28 Dodsley v. Kinnersley, 27 Eng. Rep. 270, 271 (cn. 1761). In this case, plaintiffs as assignees of 
Samuel Johnson published a two volume work of Johnson’s fiction, while defendant printed one-
tenth of the work in the Grand Magazine of Magazines. The court decided that the copying activity of 
defendant was a fair abridgment for one thing, only one-tenth of the plaintiffs’ work was taken by the 
defendant, which was appropriate. For the other thing, the plaintiffs had already published the volume 
so that the market of plaintiffs would not be influenced by defendant’s act. 
29 Cary v. Kearsley, 107 Eng. Rep. 679, 681-682 (1802) 4 Esp, 168, 170. 
30 Ibid. 
31 See Folsom v. Marsh, supra note 3.   60 
original work, and substitute the review for it, such a use will be deemed in law a piracy”.
32 The 
multifactor test was suggested the first time by Justice Story, which was stated as the court “must 
often, … look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the 
materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supersede the objects, of the original work”
33.  Since then, Justice Story’s language has been 
quoted  and  used  to  explain  fair  use  cases  for  over  150  years  until  the  same  factors  for 
determining “fair use” were codified in amendments to the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976
34.  
 
Current U.S. Copyright law contains the four factors that courts use most often in determining 
fair use. Congress intended that the factors to be considered in every case, so that Section 107 of 
the U.S. Copyright Act states that “ in determining whether the use made of a work in any 
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include …”.  However, ‘judge-
made’ law conventionality has also been applied in fair use doctrine practice. As stated in Sony 
case, “the courts must be free to adopt the doctrine to particular situations on a case by case 
basis”.
35 Thus, to decide a particular case, the court may consider other factors in addition to the 
four principle factors listed in Section 107.  Additionally, the United States Constitution also 
defines the fair use doctrine as the promotion of “the Progress of Science and useful Arts”
36. In 
the long history of coexistence of copyright and Constitutional rights, there has always been the 
potential for conflicts. 
 
International conventions and regional directives have also impacted on the evolution of fair use 
doctrine. For instance, the  famous “three-step test” for fair use was addressed in  the Berne 
Convention
37, which has been used in TRIPs
38, and Rome Convention
39, as well as a series of 
                                                        
32 Ibid. at 342. 
33 Ibid. 
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US 417, 78 L Ed 2d 574, 104 S Ct774, reh den (US) 80 L Ed 2d 148, 104 S Ct 1619 [No. 81-1687]. 
[Hereinafter, Sony, in brief]. 
36 See the United States Constitute, Part I.1.8. 
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EC Directives, such as the EC Information Society Directive
40, the EC Rental Directive
41, and so 
on.  EC Directives, such as EC Information Society Directive, also influence fair use legislation 
and practice within member states. For example, the UK CDPA 1988
42 limits its fair use acts to 
three categories, i.e., fair dealing for the purposes of research and private study (Section 29), fair 
dealing for the purposes of criticism or review (Section 30 (1)), and fair dealing for the purposes 
of reporting current events (Section 30 (2)), as in the “exhaustive enumeration” requirement of 
the EC Information Directive.  
 
Worldwide legislation and policy of fair use doctrine is beset by a lack of harmonisation, which 
results in diversity in the justification and practice of fair use doctrine. In the following subpart, 
the issue of justifying fair use doctrine specifically applicable to the file sharing environment 
will be subjected to an evaluation. 
 
2.2 Justifications for Fair Use in File Sharing 
Considering that fair use doctrine has the potential to inhibit rightsholders’ control on copyright 
works,  it  is  appropriate  to  revisit  its  legitimacy.  The  issue  of  whether  and  why  fair  use  is 
desirable is of importance to us all.  Fair use has had an eventful history as one of the most 
contested and troublesome doctrines in copyright law. In response to critics, at least four basic 
schools of thoughts have been used to explain the essentials of fair use doctrine.   
 
Firstly, there are those who assert that fair use represents “a copyright owners’ implied or tacit 
consent”
43. According to this premise, fair use defence can be “conceived as based on authors’ 
implied  consent  to  reasonable  uses  of  their  works”.
44 As  exemplified  in  a  large  number  of 
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40 See EC Information Directive, supra note 15. 
41 See EC Rental Directive, supra note 16. 
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copyright lawsuits, however, this argument falls down because in practice copyright owners 
rarely if ever intend to share their labour without permission, even if for the purposes of research 
and/or education.
45  Richard Adelstain describes that, “linking fair use to the copyright owners’ 
consent, implied or otherwise, to the infringement is a serious and unwarranted departure from 
well-settled notions of private property”
46. It is “manifestly a fiction”
47 that rightsholders would 
like to “license critical reviews or lampoons of their own products”
48.   
 
Secondly, some authors claim that certain statutory factors, such as the four particular conditions 
of fair use listed in Section 107 of U.S. Copyright Act, are the requisites of fair use. Judge Leval, 
for example, states that fair use is a determination of considering the four statutory factors.
49  
Weinreb starts from the premise that “copyright is property and that ordinarily the copyright 
owner’s reasons for withholding permission to copy need not conform to any public purpose”
50, 
asserting that “a standard of fairness”
51 which is based on “the exercise of great judicial skill [,] 
or art”
52 is the essence of fair use.  Of particular note, although fair use is a legal defence being 
adopted within copyright lawsuits, it is in theory far beyond a statutory defence.  Analogising 
from Lessig’s theory, factors “[Law, social norms, market and the code] are distinct, yet they are 
plainly interdependent. Each can support or oppose the others…. Some constraints make others 
possible;  others  make  some  impossible.  Constraints  work  together,  though  they  function 
differently  and  the  effect  of  each  is  distinct.  Norms  constrain  through  the  stigma  that  a 
community imposes; markets constrain through the price that they exact; architectures constrain 
through  the  physical  burdens  they  impose;  and  law  constrains  through  the  punishment  it 
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Economics, Vol. 5 (1985) at 228.  
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592.  
49 Pierre N. Leval, “Toward a Fair Use Standard”, Harvard Law Review, Vol.103 (1990) at 1105-
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51 Ibid. at 1161. 
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threatens.”
53  Lessig’s theory seeks to demonstrate that the four factors —law, social norms, 
architecture and markets— work together to constrain society. Each of the constraints plays an 
equal influence, and each of them is also relevant to others. At one time the law might be more 
influential, but the other factors should not be neglected.  Thus, fair use as a legal doctrine 
originates from a wider social, economic and technical background, rather than simply being a 
simply statutory regulation. In other words, when considering the essential of fair use doctrine, 
we should examine fundamentals and justifications beyond “the exercise of great judicial skill [,] 
or art”
54. 
 
As more broadly accepted justifications, another two theories justifying fair use doctrine, i.e., the 
market failure theory and the public interest justification, deserve particular attention. Borrowing 
Weinreb’s social value theory,
55 I prefer to revisit “fairness” from a macroscopic perspective, 
considering the controls of the balance between the public interest and rightsholders’ private 
benefits. 
 
2.2.1. For Rightsholders’ Interests: Market Failure Justification for Fair Use 
For  almost  twenty  years,  a  market-based  analysis  of  copyright’s  limitations  and  exceptions, 
which  justifies  fair  use  given  copyright’s  underlying  economic  rationale
56,  has  become  pre-
eminent regarding fair use doctrine.  The theory is based on the premise that no matter which 
approach to practising fair use is used, the basic principle is that the use is not intended to trade 
off copyright owners’ commercial interests for social reasons. As Douglas Bennett remarks, any 
use is not supposed to “significantly undercut what the creator or publisher might gain from 
commercial sale of the work”.
57  
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54 See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair, supra note 50. 
55 See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair, supra note 50, at 1137-1161. 
56  See  Raymond  Shih  Ray  Ku,  “Consumers  and  Creative  Destruction:  Fair  Use  Beyond  Market 
Failure”, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol.2 (2003) at 18.  See also, Wendy Gordon, Fair Use 
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57 See Douglas Bennett, “Fair Use in Digital Environments: The Work of the Conference on Fair Use 
(CONFU)”,  National  Federation  of  Abstracting  and  Information  Services,  Philadelphia  (1996) 
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2.2.1.1. Summary of Market Failure Theory 
Empirical  evidence  bases  market  failure  justification  to  copyright  exceptions  resting  on  the 
theory that fair use doctrine stems from a legal response to market failure. That is, fair use 
emerges where a positive economic use would not occur for any reason.
58  
 
According  to  those  advocating  market  failure  theory,  there  are  two  instances  where  market 
failure  can  be  related  to  fair  use  doctrine.    Firstly,  the  enactment  of  copyright  laws  and 
regulations results from market failure, exemplified by the issues pertaining to authors and free 
riders. In economic terms, copyright law arises as a response to a variant of market failure which 
originates from the “public goods”
59 characteristics of copyright content
60. Given the fact that 
“creating a work can cost authors a good deal, whereas copying a work costs free riders
61 very 
little”
62, lack of protection to copyright works may reduce the authors’ incentive to produce, 
which in turn leads to fewer resources being created in the public interest than their social merit 
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60 See Gordon, “Fair Use as Market Failure”, supra note 6, at 1610. The basis of copyright is closely 
related to these two features of public goods. Once a copyrighted work is created and disseminated in 
public, the content in the work such as words or digital data can be used by anyone without affecting 
others’ access to the work. There are many economic disputes on how the public good theory is 
embodied in intellectual property law.  See also, e.g., William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, “An 
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law”, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. xviii (1989) at 325. See also, 
Hall R. Varian, “Market for Information Goods” (1998) available at, 
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/japan/.  
61 “Free rider” is an important market failure resulted from the public goods theory. It refers to “actors 
who consume more than their fair share of a resource, or shoulder less than a fair share of the costs of 
its  production”.  See  George  Bailey,  “Free  Riders,  Givers,  and  Heavy  Users:  Predicting  listener 
support  for  public  radio”,  Journal  of  Broadcasting  and  Electronic  Media,  Broadcast  Education 
Association (2004). 
62 See Weinreb, supra note 50.   65 
would otherwise warrant
63.  As a response to market failure, copyright laws and regulations have 
been enacted to “restrain the spontaneity of men where but for it there would be nothing of any 
kind to hinder their doing as they saw fit”
64.  Hence copyright may be seen to temper the inertial 
effect of market failure, whereby creative endeavours may otherwise not occur in the sphere of 
public interest and greater good. 
 
Second, the market failure caused by unconstrained copyright presupposes a need for fair use. 
Over-expansion of copyright would lead to copyright owners monopolising the market. Should 
monopoly occur, many socially beneficial uses of copyright works will not take place.  In order 
to prevent this consequence of market failure, fair use may be imposed whenever the “social 
value … outweighs any detriment to the artist”
65 to balance the copyright owners’ right and the 
social benefit.
66 As Gordon suggests, fair use will “permit uncompensated transfers that are 
socially desirable but not capable of effectuation through the market”
67. 
 
This market failure approach has influenced current academic discourse. Tom Bell argues that 
fair use should have a reduced scope given that DRM “radically reduce[s] the transaction costs 
of licensing access to copyright works” as a response to market failure
68.  Trotter Hardy posits 
that  “a  private  property  copyright  regime”  would  be  the  best  rule  in  cyberspace  because 
transaction cost in cyberspace “appears to be falling quite rapidly”.
69  Market failure approach 
has also had repercussions for copyright policy. For instance, the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act  (DMCA)  remarks  that  it  is  illegal  to  circumvent  DRM  technologies  even  if  the 
circumvention is for the purpose of making fair use of copyright works.
70   Moreover, the market 
failure justification of fair use doctrine has also been embodied in legal practice.  The courts 
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have imported economic elements into significant fair use decisions. For example, in Computer 
Association  International  v.  Altai,  Inc.,
71  the  Court  cited  and  drew  reasoning  from  several 
economically-oriented articles on copyright protection for software.
72 In Cambell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc.,
73 the Court employed market failure theory to establish that a parody was a fair use 
because it would not replace the original in the market.  Of note is that market failure theory has 
penetrated research and educational areas.   For instance, in Texaco,
74 Texaco’s unauthorised 
photocopying of copyrighted articles from scientific journals for their research staff was found 
not to constitute fair use, granting the loss of rightsholders’  market interest caused by such 
copyright behaviour.  In Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc.,
75 the 
Courts dismissed the fair use claim of a copy shop selling course packs assigned by University 
of Michigan professors, based on the market loss of rightsholders.  
2.2.1.2. Questioning Market Failure Approach in File Sharing Practice 
In defining fair use doctrine, the justification for the market failure approach suffers much from 
its  economic  basis  and  origin.    In  a  1982  paper  entitled  “Fair  Use  as  Market  Failure:  A 
Structural  and  Economic  Analysis  of  the  ‘Betamax’  Case  and  Its  Predecessors”,  Gordon  is 
highly recommendatory of  the “three-part test” for determining fair use doctrine.
76  Gordon 
asserts that fair use be awarded to the defendant who is sued for copyright infringement when 
“(1) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to defendant is socially desirable; and (3) an 
award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff copyright 
owner”.
77  In other words, the first element of the test ensures that no fair use exception should 
be applied without a good cause, i.e., market failure; the second element requires that the fair use 
behaviour is supposed to have valuable social effects; the third warrants that a use of copyright 
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works cannot be awarded as fair use if the use hurts the “incentive-creating” purpose of the 
copyright law.
78  Analysing the drawbacks of Gordon’s “three-step” test in justifying fair use 
doctrine demonstrates that the rightsholders’ benefit is “neither the only kind of problem to 
which fair use responds nor the only kind of problem to which fair use should respond”
79. 
 
First of all, market failure theory may not take full account of the presence of social benefits 
which are supposed to be achieved by application of fair use doctrine. In the article “Redefining 
The Market Failure Approach to Fair Use In An Era of Copyright Permission Systems”, Loren 
argues that the public interest, as the source of Congress’ power to enact copyright, is pre-
eminent in fair use doctrine.  The view that fair use exists where “there is not an efficient market 
for remuneration to the copyright owner”
80 neglects that “copyright law is vested with a public 
interest”.
81 The limits of the market based approach is also argued by Francesco Parisi as “an 
exogenous reduction of transaction costs would limit the scope and application of the defence of 
fair  use”  if  indeed  fair  use  doctrine  is  regarded  as  being  based  on  transaction  costs
82.  
Recognising social benefits as a fundamental purpose of fair use is important because it is more 
consistent with the essential of copyright law and it represents a crucial competing concept to 
market failure. 
 
Second, the market failure approach to fair use has significantly narrowed its application in the 
context of file sharing.  The first precondition for fair use in file sharing practice, i.e., “market 
failure  must  be  present”,  has  been  challenged. According  to  Gordon  and  Bell,
83  the  social 
benefits stemming from the use of copyright works do not necessarily compel it to be within a 
fair use.  If a sufficient market for a transfer could be built up, or the parties could reach an 
agreement for the transfer, there would be no place for fair use doctrine.  For instance, even 
though it serves the social value of education and research, the conduct of a lecturer making 
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course-packs for his students cannot be deemed as a fair use, on the ground that there is a 
possibility that he or his students will be able to raise sufficient funds to purchase permission 
from  copyright  owners,  and  a  way  exists  for  collecting  such  financial  compensation  via 
collecting agencies.
84  As phrased in explanation of this, “only where the desired transfer of 
resource use is unlikely to take place spontaneously, or where special circumstances such as 
market flaws impair the market’s ordinary ability to serve as a measure of how resources should 
be allocated, is there an economic need for allowing non-consensual transfer”.
85  However, the 
rightsholders’ lack of reluctance towards licence making use of all copyright works indicates that 
market failure does not always exist in file sharing practice. For example, in both Napster and 
MP3.com, the courts concluded that the use of copyright works was not fair on the ground that 
the  use  “harms  the  rightsholders’  attempts  to  charge  for  the  same  downloads”.
86  Thus,  the 
absence of market failure in file sharing practice “weighed heavily against fair use doctrine”
87. 
 
Conversely, the special characteristics of file sharing technology increase the possibility of harm 
to the copyright owners’ incentives, which is against the third element of the test. The substantial 
injury hurdle element lies at the heart of the balance between social benefits gained from the fair 
use behaviour and the potential harm to authors’ incentives. Gordon suggests that, “[f]air use 
should be denied whenever a substantial injury appears that will impair incentives”.
88 Legal 
practice  up  to  present,  however,  is  much  more  complicated  than  Gordon  describes.    Under 
complete market failure
89 circumstances fair use should be allowed on the grounds that “no 
incentive purpose would be served by giving plaintiff protection, … and no disincentive would 
                                                        
84 “Collecting agencies”, also known as collecting societies, refer to organisations that administer the 
rights for the benefits of authors and/or copyright owners by authorising various specified uses of 
their members’ works. See Bently and Sherman, supra note 18, at 268. 
85 Ibid., at 1615. 
86 See Napster, supra note 12, at 1017. 
87 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, supra note 6. 
88 See Gordon, supra note 6, at 1618. 
89 Gordon divides market failure into two parts: “complete market failure”, and “intermediate market 
failure”. The former refers to the situation that no transaction will happen at all because of high 
transaction costs, i.e., neither the copyright owner nor the potential user can benefit from copyright 
enforcement, even if fair use was not allowed. The latter means in some cases, the market cannot be 
relied on for all desirable transactions, but rather some of the exchanges would possibly take place. 
For instance, giving fair use to those who download articles in a book from file sharing networks 
would generate free riders; however, those who download copyrighted content from academic file 
sharing networks for research or teaching purposes may deserve the protection of fair use doctrine. 
See Gordon, supra note 6, at 1618.   69 
be created by allowing defendant fair use”.
90 It is to say that, in complete market failure cases, 
fair use should be awarded only if the first two elements of the test were satisfied, i.e., a market 
failure is present, as well as social value of the use is justified.  In contrast, in instances of 
intermediate  market  failure
91,  both  allowing  and  denying  fair  use  have  shortcomings.  For 
example, allowing fair use to those who download articles from file sharing networks would 
generate  free  riders;  however,  downloading  copyrighted  content  from  academic  file  sharing 
networks for research or teaching purposes perhaps deserves the protection of fair use doctrine.  
To  solve  this  conflict,  the  negative  effect  of  the  use  should  be  considered  carefully  when 
allowing a fair use defence. In other words, fair use should not be awarded if the behaviour 
harms the authors’ incentives for creation.  However, given the special characteristics
92 of file 
sharing technology, harm to authors’ incentives to creation is more likely to happen than within 
traditional copyright environment. For example, a lecturer who makes use of an article in a 
published book for his instantaneous classroom teaching, such as copying the article in course 
notes or making use of the article in PowerPoint, would fall within the fair use defence, despite 
the possibility that the student may not then need to buy the book to obtain the article. The 
justification of scale lies in the rationale that the impact of the use does not substantially harm 
the copyright owner’s incentive to create, based on the fact that the number of potential free-
riders in the case, namely, those who attend the lecture without intention of purchasing the book, 
is too small, compared to millions of free-riders in file sharing networks, to harm the owner’s 
market.  Comparatively, if the lecturer uploads the article to an academic file sharing network, 
the  dramatically  enhanced  information  sharing  speed  by  the  Internet  technology
93  may 
disseminate the article to thousands of people, whether it is for research or study purposes. The 
copyright  owner’s  monetary  interests  would  be  damaged  if  a  large  number  of  these  people 
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became  free-riders
94,  which  in  turn  could  arguably  be  held  to  harm  authors’  incentives  for 
creation. Thus, file sharing technology highlights difficulties in detecting the real purpose and 
character behind the use of the copyrighted work, and in consequence increases the possibility of 
harm  to  copyright  owners’  incentives.   According  to Gordon’s  test,  this  substantial  harm  to 
copyright owners’ incentives may lead to failure in applying fair use doctrine.   
 
Thirdly, market failure theory does not distinguish between the author’s incentives and those of 
the distributor.  Copyright is designed to protect both the author and the distributor. The artist’s 
incentives to create, however, have been overshadowed by the incentives of the distributor in 
legal practice.  Recent research shows that the overwhelming majority of artists are included 
under  the  term  “multiple  job-holders”
95,  creating  new  works  for  both  pecuniary  and  non-
pecuniary reasons. Most of them earn their living by means other than royalties from the sale of 
music.
96 In some cases, “unrestricted consumer copying may have a marginally negative or even 
a  positive  impact  upon  an  artist’s  financial  incentives  to  create”
97.    For  example,  Franz 
Ferdinand musician Alex Kapranos claimed, rather than hindering their progress, that sharing 
their works on P2P networks was adopted to “help [them] as a band in getting established”
98. 
Their  experience  indicated  that  allowing  use  of  copyright  works  is  not  necessarily  directly 
connected or proportional to reducing authors’ incentives to create. This is especially relevant in 
file  sharing  practice  given  that  in  P2P  environment,  the  distributor  is  largely  unnecessary.  
According to Gordon’s work, market failure occurs “if the creators of intellectual productions 
were given no rights to control the use made of their works, [such that] they … would lack an 
appropriate  level  of  incentive  to  create,  …  [likewise]  fewer  resources  would  be  devoted  to 
intellectual productions than their social merit would warrant”
99. If the author’s incentives to 
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a Sample of College Students” (2004) available at, 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~lcabral/ioday/Piracy_March082005.pdf.  
95 See Ruth Towse, “Copyright and Creativity in the Cultural Industries” (2001) available at, 
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97 See Ryan, supra note 72, at 28. 
98 See “Franz Ferdinand Star Lectures on File Sharing”, available at, 
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create were not adversely influenced by the consumer’s copying, the premise of Gordon’s test 
would collapse.  
 
Thus,  the  market  failure  theory  originated  from  economic  basis  and  consideration  can  not 
sufficiently justify fair use doctrine in the context of file sharing. 
 
2.2.2. For Social Benefits: The Public Interest Justification for Fair Use 
As previously indicated, fair use is a socially beneficial and culturally significant copyright 
exception. The public interest in fair use has justified the inclusion of the defence in a number of 
legislations. For example, Section 171(3) of the CDPA affirms that by stating; “[N]othing in this 
Part affects any rule of law preventing or restricting the enforcement of copyright, on grounds of 
public interest or otherwise”.
100  Section 225 (3) of the New Zealand Copyright Act 1994 is 
virtually identical to S.171 (3) by stating that “ [N]othing in this Act affects any rule of law 
preventing  or  restricting  the  enforcement  of  copyright,  on  grounds  of  public  interest  or 
otherwise”.
101  Case law has also emphasised the importance of public interest justification when 
applying fair use doctrine.  For instance, in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,
102 the Court granted that 
“[C]opyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to 
creative works”. In Mazer v. Stein,
103 the Court decided that “The economic philosophy behind 
the  clause  empowering  Congress  to  grant  patents  and  copyrights  is  the  conviction  that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare 
through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts’.”  This principle has 
also achieved judicial approval in other countries, such as Canada
104 and Australia
105.  
 
Fair use doctrine is of special value in encouraging information transfer and promoting social 
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development.
106 It is especially apposite in research and education, where users of copyright 
works,  such  as  teachers,  students  and  scholars  draw  on  the  work  of  others  in  reviewing, 
criticising,  or  advancing  new  arguments  or  fresh  insights. As Justice  Sandra Day  O’Conner 
states, making use of copyright materials without seeking permission from the rightsholders is 
“to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”
107 so as to achieve “the advancement of 
learning and knowledge”.
108 
 
The  fair  use  exception  also  prevents  the  potential  danger  of  rightsholders’  monopolising 
information.  Copyright  law  was  designed  to  “reward  an  author  for  the  effort  expended  in 
creating  a  work  and  giving  it  to  the  public”
109.  In  this  way,  granting  copyright  owners  an 
exclusive right to reproduce, distribute and perform their works, is similar to “the repayment of a 
debt”
110,  which  intuitively  is  seen  to  serve  as  a  device  to  incentivise  authors’  innovation.  
However, unconstrained exclusive rights may prevent many socially beneficial uses of copyright 
works from taking place. For instance, if a copyright owner overcharged for citing his works, 
users would have to give up or avoid making use of the work. This effect in turn discourages 
“good uses”, such as scholars advancing new theories, reviewers criticising, artists performing 
parodies, lecturers using words or text to teach, and students citing paragraphs in their essays.  
Thus, the relatively balanced application of fair use is intended to prevent copyright owners from 
behaving as the allegorical greedy candle manufacturers asking the government to block the sun 
in order to increase their sales
111.  
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It is interesting to note that fair use also offers protection to some related public interests. As 
Hugenholtz argues, fair use expresses the concern “to guarantee fundamental freedoms”
112, such 
as  freedom  of  expression,  information,  freedom  of  the  press  and  the  right  to  privacy.    For 
example, with the protection of fair use, one does not have to ask for permission to make use of 
a  copyrighted  work  for  private  study
113,  or  make  for  domestic  use  a  recording  of  a  TV 
programme
114.  In addition, fair use enables criticism or review of copyright works under certain 
circumstances
115 without permission, freeing the expression of opinions without undue fear of 
economic or legal redress. 
 
Public interest justification here is used in a narrow sense. It “merely prevents the claimant from 
enforcing copyright against the defendant”
116, without denying copyright protection to the work 
as a whole.  The rationale for this justification lies in the belief copyright not only reflects on 
extending  the  protection  of  rightsholders,  but  also  serves  the  public  by  facilitating  the 
propagation  of  information  within  the  population  without  recourse  to  permission  from 
rightsholders. All interests concerned must be carefully balanced within fair use doctrine. In 
other words, fair use is to serve as a mechanism “offer[ing] a means of balancing the exclusive 
right of a copyrightsholder with the public’s interest in dissemination of information”.
117  In 
copyright practice, however, fair use has always struggled to survive. 
 
2.2.3. The Essential of Fair Use: Striking a Balance between Social Benefits and 
Rightsholders’ Interests 
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During the history of copyright law, the struggle to balance social benefit and rightsholders’ 
interest has been embodied in both theoretical discourse and legal practice of fair use doctrine. 
 
On the one hand, theoretical evidence suggests conflict between the two elements in fair use 
practice. In a 2001 paper entitled “Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use”
118, Wendy J. 
Gordon suggests there is a dichotomy between the “excuse and justification” of fair use doctrine. 
Gordon asserts that fair use cases can be usefully divided into two categories --- justification of 
fair use and excuse of fair use.  The “justification” category corresponds to instances “where 
economic norms themselves fail to provide suitable criteria for resolving a dispute”
119, which 
arise when we “would not object if others emulated a defendant’s lack of permission and/or lack 
of compensation”
120.  For example, if a woman breaks an assailant’s arm to repel a violent 
attack, she would not be held liable for the arm-break on the ground that the use of the force was 
“justified”.    In  contrast,  the  “excuse”  of  fair  use  identifies  cases  “where  economic  norms 
appropriately  govern,  but  there  is  a  failure  of  perfect  market  conditions”
121,  which  happens 
“when something occurs that we do not want to have emulated, but which we allow without 
imposing  liability  because  of  the  particular  facts  of  that  case”
122.    For  instance,  the  above-
mentioned woman may not be liable for breaking the arm because she was delusional in thinking 
she was being attacked, considering certain relative factors such as the particular circumstances 
of the attack occur, the purposes and functioning of criminal law. In this case, her action is not 
legally justified; instead, the law “chooses not to impose a criminal sanction”
123 for other valid 
reasons.  
 
Borrowing  Gordon’s  theory,  we  will  examine  how  the  theoretical  context  regarding  social 
benefit  and  rightsholders’  market  interest  is  structured.   As  with  Gordon’s  commentary,  the 
social benefit function is an analysis of how fair use doctrine as an important copyright principle 
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can make sense of, and eventually bring to a form of order, the development of public domains 
such as education, research and scholarship into the category of something “we would not object 
if others emulated”
124. In this sense, the social benefit function can be regarded as a justification 
in the law of fair use, which is not easily influenced by changes in circumstances.  On the 
contrary, environment changes are closely relevant to the rightsholders’ market interests, given 
that “market” is built up on the tension between supply and demand, which is in reality a system 
prone to great variations. For example, when applying fair use defence, if market failure occurs, 
copyright law has to allow for fair use practice to work around this; however, if the excusing 
circumstances, i.e., market failure, disappear, “fair use should and does disappear”
125.  In fair use 
practice, the social benefit is a justification while the rightsholders’ market interests are more 
likely to be an excuse. Being an excuse, rightsholders’ market interests’ fluctuation is likely to 
result in the failure of applying fair use defence.  
 
Additionally,  fair  use  legal  practice  also  highlights  the  contested  history  in  balancing  social 
function and private interests. For instance, in Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp.
126, the 
court refused Kinko’s claim for fair use on the ground that the course-packs directly competed 
with the potential sales of the original books as assigned for the students, even though most of 
the works were related to history, sociology and other fields of study, a factor weighting in 
favour of knowledge advance.  Another example is Encyclopaedia Britannica Educational Corp. 
v. Crooks,
127 in spite of the fact that the court was largely sympathetic with the educational 
purpose, the defendant were not able to benefit from fair use defence given that the educational 
motion pictures and videos directly competed with the plaintiff’s market for selling or licensing 
copies to schools.  This is especially applicable, in the case of file sharing practice, given that the 
rightsholders’ market interest has been dramatically influenced due to the special characteristics 
of  file  sharing  technology.    Napster  court  rejected  fair  use  claims  by  finding  that  the 
rightsholders “had expended considerable funds and effort to commence Internet sales and the 
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licensing of digital downloads”
128, such that Napster’s use of copyright works would “harm the 
rightsholders’ attempts to charge for the same downloads”
129. Similarly, MP3.com did not benefit 
from fair use defence either, on the ground that “any allegedly positive impact of defendant’s 
activities on plaintiffs’ prior market in no way frees defendant to usurp a further market that 
directly derives from reproduction of plaintiffs’ copyright works”.
130 
 
Notable within this balanced model is that, although it seems as simple as a normal form of 
regulation, it has never been applied perfectly in practice.  There are a number of potential 
encumbrances to introducing the principle into legal practice, such as to what extent copyright 
owners’  interest  should  be protected;  and  how,  if  at  all,  they  can  be  dealt  with  by  fair  use 
doctrine without “significantly” undercutting public interest.  It is clear that no exact answers 
can be provided to these questions, when one considers that all the relevant factors, such as 
public interest and copyright owners’ rights, are not measurable with precision. In this sense, we 
can say that current fair use legislation is directed towards balancing non-quantifiable social 
benefits and market interest. In other words, in the age of conventional copyright media, fair use 
doctrine “arguably does what it is supposed to do”.
131 Given that different interpretations of the 
doctrine may lead to inconsistent comprehensions and practices, the following discussion on 
current fair use policy issues and legal regimes serves to demonstrate that there is a considerable 
room for debate and discretion within jurisdictions over the meaning and practice of fair use. 
 
2.3. General Policy Issues Embodied in Fair Use Doctrine 
 
2.3.1. The “Ought” Question or The “May” Question 
General policy background to the fair use doctrine, which is based on a series of international 
conventions and regional directives, is examined in this section. Towards a full understanding of 
fair use policies embedded in these conventions, the analytic device from David G. Post, namely, 
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the dichotomy of “Ought” and “Is”
132 is illustrative to consider. Hence, we first concentrate on 
different policies of fair use doctrine, i.e., whether fair use ought to be or may be applied in 
copyright legislation; then the “three-step test”, an essential principle of applying exceptions to 
copyright of domestic laws in international level will be analysed. 
2.3.1.1.  The  “Ought”  Question:  Permitted  Uses  of  Copyright  Works  in  Berne  and 
TRIPs 
Faced with the complicated issues within protecting “the rights of authors in their literary and 
artistic works [in an effective and uniform manner]”
133 as well as preventing these rights from 
being monopolised, the Berne Convention and the TRIPs expressly allow for certain permitted 
uses of copyright works notwithstanding authors’ exclusive rights. 
 
Article 9 (2) of Berne 1971 states that “ [i]t shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of 
the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such 
reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author”.  The “Three-Step Test” set out in this provision, 
which  has  turned  into  an  essential  principle  defining  fair  use  in  many  legislations,  will  be 
discussed in detail later.  What is notable here is the application of the word “shall” in the 
provision.  Generally, “shall” within the legal language of obligation has a mandatory rather than 
a permissive meaning
134. Thus, it follows that the decision as to whether or not to legislate an 
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exception to its copyright law is not free for Member States to choose, but an obligation for the 
state, i.e., Member States “ought” to have fair use articles in their copyright law.  In addition, 
Article 10 also makes it mandatory for Member States to permit the users to quote from an 
already published copyrighted work without permission and compensation provided that the 
quotations are “fair” and “the sources are attributed”
135. 
 
The principle that fair use doctrine “ought” to be applied in legislation is also incorporated in 
Agreements of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
136. As stated in 
Article 13 of TRIPs, Members of WTO “shall confine limitations or exceptions to the exclusive 
rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder”. Article 13 is drafted to 
“comply with”
137 the Berne Convention (1971) and to reuse the “Three-Step Test”. As a result, 
TRIPs  also  confirms  that  its  member  states  “ought”  to  apply  the  fair  use  doctrine  to  their 
copyright laws.  Compared to Article 9 (2) of Berne, however, Article 13 of TRIPs is much 
broader in scope for the following two reasons.  Firstly, TRIPs focuses on confining limitations 
or exceptions to all “exclusive rights”
138, whereas Article 9 of Berne only circumscribes the 
“reproduction right”
139.  Another textual difference which deserves mention is that Article 9 (2) 
of Berne refers to the “unreasonable prejudice … of the author”, while Article 13(2) of TRIPs 
restricts its “limitations or exceptions to … the right holder”. The author is usually the first 
owner of the copyright, so that Berne does not extend its exceptions to the third parties who are 
assigned the copyright by the first owner. As Sam Ricketson states, “it would be possible for an 
exception that would otherwise fail under Article 9 (2) of Berne 1971 to withstand scrutiny 
under Article 13 of WTO/TRIPs”
140.  
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2.3.1.2.  The  “May”  Question:  Permitted  Uses  of  Copyright  Works  in  Some  Other 
Treaties 
However, fair use has not been regarded as an obligation in all legislations. There are some 
international laws and regional treaties which only offer member states or contracting parties the 
option  to  choose  whether  or  not,  and  to  what  extent,  they  include  acts  of  fair  use  in  their 
domestic  copyright  legislations.   Accordingly,  it  follows  that  we  should  direct  our  attention 
towards directives and international conventions which describe fair use as something member 
states or contract parties “may”
141 but not “shall” deploy in their domestic laws and regulations. 
There are three categories of permitted uses contained in these international and regional laws 
and conventions. 
 
2.2.1.2.1. Contract Parties/Member States “may” adopt “Three-step Test” 
 
WTO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 1996 expressly confers that the Contracting Parties may provide 
limitations or exceptions in their domestic laws provided the “Three-step Test” set out in the 
Berne Convention is met.  Article 10 (1) of WCT 1996 states as follows, “Contracting Parties 
may, in their national legislation, provide for limitations of or exceptions to the rights granted to 
authors of literary and artistic works under this Treaty in certain special cases that do not conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the author”. In these situations, Contract Parties or Member States are permitted not to admit 
copyright limitation of certain works even if the three factors in the Test are fulfilled. 
 
2.2.1.2.2. Contracting Parties/Member States “may” provide limitations on some kind of uses 
 
In  certain  cases,  Contracting  Parties  or  Member  States  are  free  to  provide  exceptions  or 
limitations to copyright in their domestic laws and regulations, provided that the range of the 
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exceptions or limitations falls under specific categories. Hence the decision as to whether or not 
to permit an exception or limitation rests with the individual country, but to what extent to define 
the exception should be limited to a particular category.  Article 15 (1) of the Rome Convention 
1961
142 makes it clear that Contracting States may protect “private use; use of short excerpts in 
connection  with  the  reporting  of  current  events;  ephemeral  fixation  by  a  broadcasting 
organization  by  means  of  its  own  facilities  and  for  its  own  broadcasts;  use  solely  for  the 
purposes of teaching or scientific research”.
143 The similar textual description also can be found 
in Article 10 of Council Directive of Rental Rights (EEC) 1992.
144 Compared to the permitted 
uses of copyright works in WCT, the Rome Convention and the Rental Rights Directive deploy a 
more limited and strict approach. In other words, some acts which would be regarded as “fair 
dealing” in WCT might fail to be accepted as such in the Rome Convention or the Rental Rights 
Directive.  
 
2.2.1.2.3.  Contract  Parties/  Member  States  “may”  choose  exceptions  from  an  exhaustive 
enumeration  
 
Additionally,  some  international  conventions  and  regional  directives  provide  an  exhaustive 
enumeration of copyright exceptions and limitations to Member States or Contracting Parties. In 
these situations, the permitted uses of copyright works adopted in Member States’ domestic laws 
and regulations are limited within the enumerated list.  EC Information Society Directive is an 
example. Article 5 read with Recital 32 permits Member States to allow third parties to use 
copyright protected works provided the use is consistent with “the following cases” listed in 
Article 5 (2) and 5 (3).
145 It is noteworthy that “the following cases” are “exhaustive”. In other 
words, Member States are free to create exceptions for fair use as they wish, but only within the 
acts listed in the exhaustive enumeration. Compared to the first two categories, the act of fair use 
under the third category is the most restricted. 
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2.3.2 The Three-Step Test: An Essential Principle for Fair Use Doctrine 
The “three-step test” was not recognised as a feature of international copyright law until 1967 
when it was adopted in Article 9 (2) of the Stockholm Act of the Berne Convention
146. Main 
Committee  I  of  the  Berne  Convention  accepted  the  following  text  as  Article  9  (2)  of  the 
Stockholm Act in 1967: 
 
(2)  It  shall  be  a  matter  for  legislation  in  the  countries  of  the  Union  to  permit  the 
reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does 
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the author. 
 
Since then the “three-step test”, namely, “ in certain special cases”, “not conflict with a normal 
exploitation  of  the  work”  and  “  not  unreasonably  prejudice  the  legitimate  interests  of  the 
author”, has been adopted in the TRIPs Agreement
147, the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 1996 
148, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996 (WPPT)
149. 
 
Following  debates  over  the  meaning  and  interpretation  of  the  three  elements,  WTO  Panel 
Reports
150  interpreted  that  the  first  step  in  any  exception  or  limitation  adopted  in  national 
copyright  laws  and  regulations  should  “be  clearly  defined  and  be  narrow  in  its  scope  and 
reach”
151, whether the purpose of the exception is for public policy or exceptional circumstance 
justifying the exception. Some scholars argue that the first step in the three-step test is practically 
meaningless, given the fact that few countries would consider arbitration in determining whether 
the exception is “special”, on the one hand; any exception to copyright could be regarded as 
“special” for any exception would “arguably be limited in its field of application”, on the other 
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hand”.
152  However, the significance of the first step lies in the principle that any exception to 
copyright should be limited to a reasonable scope in order to prevent national laws from taking 
advantage of copyright exceptions to unduly restrict the rights of rightsholders.  
 
The  second  step of  the  test  model  means  that  any  exception  to  copyright  rights  should  not 
conflict with the uses of a work from which the copyrightsholder can exact economic benefits, 
whether existing or potential. Neither should the exception limit certain non-economic benefits, 
such as public interest and cultural benefit. This opinion is highlighted by the WTO Panel Report 
as follows: 
 
“[I]t appears that one way of measuring the normative connotation of normal exploitation is to 
consider, in addition to those forms of exploitation that currently generate significant or tangible 
revenue, those forms of exploitation which, with a certain degree of likelihood and plausibility, 
could acquire considerable economic or practical importance.”
153 
 
The  third  step  is  perhaps  the  most  disputable.  As  described  in  the  observation  of  the 
Swedish/BIRPI Programme, there was “the considerable difficulty of finding a formula capable 
of safeguarding the legitimate interests of the author while having a sufficient margin of freedom 
to the national legislation to satisfy important social or cultural needs”.
154 According to WTO 
Panel  Report,
155  the  third  step  is  proposed  any  exception  to  copyright  should  not  limit  the 
authors’ and successors’ economic and moral interests, unless the purpose of the use is for public 
interests or some other interests justified by national laws. Moreover, “unreasonable prejudice” 
may  be  excluded  in  specific  cases,  such  as  with  payment  of  a  reasonable  amount  of 
remuneration.    The  three-step  test  has  become  the  foundation  for  almost  all  exceptions  to 
copyright  at  international  level.  National  laws  and  regulations  on  practice  regarding  the 
exceptions exhibit differences. 
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“Fragmented  Copyright,  Fragmented  Management:  Proposals  to  Defrag  Copyright  Management”, 
Canada Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2 (2003) at 15.  
153 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 150, at 6.118. 
154 See Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm, supra note 146, at 113. 
155 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 150, at 6.229.   83 
2.4. Legal Regimes of Fair Use Doctrine 
Almost all countries have long sought to achieve a balance between rightsholders’ interests and 
exceptions to their exclusive rights through careful consideration of the way in which fair use 
doctrine can be carried out in practice.  Generally speaking, approaches adopted into national 
laws  on  the  practice  of  fair  use  doctrine  can  be  divided  into  three  styles:  the  “open-ended 
provisions” exemplified by the U.S. Copyright Act 1976; the “exhaustive enumeration lists” 
applied in most civil law legislations; and the “fair dealing” approach adopted in most common 
law countries such as the U.K. 
2.4.1 The Open-ended Approach: The U.S. and Philippines Examples 
As the name indicates, the “open-ended approach” does not deploy specific or narrowly drawn 
exceptions, but balance statutory elements on a case-by-case basis. In practice, the approach 
means that the use of a copyrighted work may be regarded as a fair use only if “the court is 
satisfied that the use is fair”
156.  The United States and the Philippines are the only countries with 
such an unrestricted fair use doctrine. 
 
The following is the full text of Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, which sets out 
the fair use statute in the U.S. copyright law: 
 
Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair Use 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, 
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords of by any other means specified in 
that  section,  for  purposes  such  as  criticism,  comment,  news  reporting,  teaching  (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. 
 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to 
be considered shall include--- 
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1.  the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature 
or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
2.  the nature of the copyrighted work; 
3.  the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and 
4.  the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
 
The four factors suggested in Section 107, i.e., the purpose and character of the use, the nature of 
the copied work, the amount and substantiality, as well as the effect upon work’s value, need to 
be considered together when courts are evaluating a use of copyright works. For example, in 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
157, the judge states that “all [four factor] are to be explored, 
and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright”.   
 
Similar  fair  use  system  has  also  been  adopted  in Section  185  of  the Philippine  Intellectual 
Property Code 1997, which states that 
 
    185.1 The fair use of a copyrighted work for criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
including multiple copies for classroom use, scholarship, research, and similar 
purposes is not an infringement of copyright. …. 
        In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is fair use, the 
factors to be considered shall include: 
a)  The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for non-profit education purposes; 
b)  The nature of the copyrighted work; 
c)  The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and  
d)  The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.
158  
 
The advantage of the open-ended approach is derived mainly from the flexibility in analysing 
cases, especially in the circumstances of rapidly developing Internet technology. Hence, new 
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kinds of uses can be considered on a case-by-case basis, rather than struggling to adapt current 
legislation to changing technological or social circumstances.  However, the most controversial 
opinion  about  this  approach  explores  the  difficulty  in  predicting  the  legal  outcome  of  a 
behaviour.  For instance, when assessing whether the use is a fair use of the original work, the 
general principle holds that the less amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyright work as a whole, the more likely that the sample will be considered fair use.  
However, in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters
159, the use of less than 400 words 
from President Ford’s memoir by a news magazine was concluded to represent infringement 
because the words substantially represented “the heart of the book”. Conversely, the substantial 
copying of entire programs in Sony case was upheld as fair use.  
 
A typical example reflecting the uncertainty of the open-ended fair use model, especially in the 
context  of  digital  file  sharing,  are  the  issues  which  arose  in  “time/space-shifting”  case  law.  
Faced with the invention of the “time-shifting” machine Betamax, the Sony
160 Court imported 
the  staple  article  doctrine  from  patent  law  to  limit  how  far  copyright  law  could  reach  into 
technology  markets.    The  Court  concluded  that  the  noncommercial  home  use  recording  of 
television programs over the public airwaves was a fair use of copyright works and did not 
constitute copyright infringement, by analysing the purpose of the use as well as the market 
effect  of  the  application  of  the  machine.    In  another  seminal  space-shifting  case  RIAA  v. 
Diamond Multimedia,
161 the court held that space-shifting introduced by Rio MP3 player could 
be regarded as fair use, given that “[Rio] only makes copies in order to render portable those 
files that already reside on a user’s hard drive, [… so that] such copying is a paradigmatic non-
commercial personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the [AHRA] Act”.
162  However, 
some other cases failed to claim time/space-shifting as fair use. For instance, in the context of 
My.MP3.com service, the transformative “space shift” argument was rejected, considering that 
MP3 made the copies for its own commercial purpose with knowledge of the direct copyright 
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infringement.
163  In Napster, time/space-shifting was not granted as fair use when time/space-
shifted copy is available for distribution to millions of other users of the Napster network.
164  
Contrary to Napster’s interpretation, Grokster
165 reaffirmed the Sony rule by emphasising that 
distributing  certain  copyright  works  permitted  by  rightsholders  or  for  the  public  interest  is 
“substantial noninfringing”. Details of these cases will be discussed below.
166 
 
From  above,  the  unpredictability  within  fair  use  case  law  advances  an  inconsistency  and 
uncertainty in legal practice. Nimmer
167 surveyed sixty litigated cases on the application of fair 
use doctrine between 1994 and 2003 and arrived at the conclusion that the four factors in the 
U.S. fair use doctrine “are not outcome-determinative, either individually or collectively”
168. 
According to Nimmer’s statistics, the four factors corresponded to the conclusion of fair use in 
only 55%, 42%, 57% and 51% of cases respectively
169. As he observed, two-fifth of the cases 
upheld fair use and three-fifth denied its existence, i.e., “[J]udges enter findings as to the four 
factors in support of their ultimate fair use determination less than half the time”
170.  Moreover, 
even in the cases in which the four factors incline in favour of fair use, almost 90% of them do 
not  have  “predictive  value”
171,  but  stem  from  “the  malleability  of  the  fair  use  factors”
172. 
Nimmer’s  study  verifies  that  fair  use  doctrine  does  not  work  predictably  in  legal  practice. 
Although litigated cases may not represent a “broader universe of fair use disputes”
173, it is 
meaningful to demonstrate that there is a gap between fair use doctrine and legal practice.  
2.4.2 The Exhaustive Enumerated Approach: Fair Use in Civil Law 
In contrast, there is the other constrained fair use deployment by the means of an “exhaustive 
enumerated list” of causes for exceptions that permits courts little room to interpret fair use 
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doctrine.  Most civil law countries have adopted this “exhaustive enumerated approach”, which 
allows for very well defined and specified exceptions and limitations to copyright law through 
an exhaustive enumerated list of causes for exceptions. According to the list, certain clear uses 
are permitted without authorisation, justification for fairness, or judicial interpretation. There are 
several civil law examples for the enumeration approach. 
 
Article L122-5 of Code de la propriété intellectuelle defines the exceptions to French copyright 
law, which are strictly confined to categories in a narrow list including certain private uses, such 
as  private  family  performances,  private  and  personal  copying,  press  reviews,  current  news 
reporting, etc.
174 As described by Andre Lucas, French users clearly have no rights to use the 
copyrighted  work  except  those  listed  under  copyright  law.
175    Similar  application  of  the 
enumerated list is embodied in German copyright law
176. Section VI of German Copyright Act 
grants users freedom to use copyright works provided certain conditions are fulfilled, such as the 
use of copyright works in school broadcasts, in public speech, and for administration of justice 
or  public  safety.
177   An  interesting  principle  for  copyright  exception  in  French  and German 
copyright law is the “public’s right to information”, which was highlighted in a French case
178. 
The French Court suggested that it was a valid defence for infringement that it was to be within 
the remit of “public’s right to information”, under Article 10.1 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.  
 
There also exists a detailed list of exceptions to copyright in Dutch copyright law
179. Article 15 
to Article 25a of their Copyright Act focuses on exceptions for private use. Additionally, there 
are  exceptions  on  quotations
180,  for  either  government  use
181  or  public  education
182.  Some 
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exceptions specific to the field of fine arts are also mentioned. For instance, Article 19 (1) states 
that, “The reproduction of a portrait by or on behalf of the person portrayed or, after his death, 
by or on behalf of his relatives, shall not be deemed an infringement of copyright”.  
 
In Chinese Copyright Law, exceptions are also provided for certain private use, such as for 
quotations, use by libraries and archives, and translation for private study and teaching also. 
What is worthy of note in Chinese Copyright Law is the enumeration list for those to whom the 
exceptions  may  be  applied. Article  22  and  23  define  that  the  exceptions  to  rights  shall  be 
“applicable to the rights of publishers, performers, producers of sound recordings and video 
recordings, radio stations and television stations”
183, as well as the copyright owners. 
 
Under  the  “exhaustive  enumerated”  approach,  the  defined  and  specified  exceptions  and 
limitations to copyright law in a constrained manner allows little room for judicial interpretation, 
which can potentially lead to a lack of flexibility in applying textual laws and regulations in 
practice.  Once a new situation beyond the current legislation emerges, the legislation has to 
catch  up  to  restore  the  balance  between  existing  laws  and  new  circumstances  with  legal 
implications. A negotiated settlement might be a long drawn out affair.  For example, it generally 
takes four standard procedures, including “bringing forth a proposal, making a draft, submitting 
the draft for examination and approval, examining and approving the draft, adopting a law and 
promulgating the law”
184, to formulate a new legal document or laws to apply to a changing 
legal situation in China.  
 
The formation of the French law on copyright and related rights, named as DADVSI (loi relative 
au Droit d’Auteur et aux Droits Voisins dans law Socitete de l’Information)
185, is also relevant to 
consider in this aspect. From initial draft to the final Constitutional Council decision, the French 
Parliament took more than three years to pass the law,
186 which introduces the legal mechanisms 
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to  protect  and  enforce  technical  protection  measures  for  copyright  works  (i.e.,  TPMs  or 
DRMs),
187  challenging  consumers’  fair  usage  rights  originated  from  Code  de  la  propriété 
intellectuelle L112-5.
188  During the prolonged pending period, the Courts encountered many 
incidents arising from the uncertainty around this situation. For instance, in the case UFC Que-
Choisir c/Universal Pictures Video Fr. SEV, Films Alain Sarde, Studio Canal,
189 the Paris Court 
of  Appeal  decided  that  the  copyright  protection  on  DVDs  (Content  Scrambling  System) 
prevented the French consumers from exercising their fair usage rights. In another contrasting 
case, the Cour de Cassation up held an appeal by the DVD makers, granting that DRM could be 
applied “to prevent copying which may cause an unjustified damage to the legitimate interests of 
authors”.
190 
 
2.4.3 The Fair Dealing Doctrine: UK Example 
Most other common law countries except the United States and the Philippines have adopted a 
doctrine known as fair dealing, which is defined in a limited manner through a non-exhaustive 
enumerated list of situations where certain “dealing” with a copyrighted work is permitted, while 
also leaving some room for judicial interpretation to justify the “fairness” of the use. 
 
This  model  originates  from  the  UK  Copyright  Act  of  1911,
191  which  consists  of  a  list  of 
conditions where dealing is regarded as fair.  On the one hand, under UK copyright law, the 
specific purposes of a fair “dealing” behavior are restricted to research or private study, criticism 
or  review,  reporting  current  events,  archives  and  libraries,  and  use  by  visually  impaired 
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readers
192.  On the other hand, when determining the fairness of the dealing, the UK courts apply 
a criteria similar to the US fair use doctrine, in which a number of factors such as if the work is 
unpublished
193, the way to obtain the work
194, the amount and substantiality taken from the 
work
195,  the  use  made  of  the  work
196,  motives  for  the  dealing
197,  and  consequences  of  the 
dealing
198, are considered inclusively by the courts.
199  There are slight differences in scope 
between different jurisdictions about fair dealing defence. For instance, the UK copyright law 
does not grant commercial use of a database for the purposes of research as a fair dealing.
200 By 
contrast,  in  the  case  CCH  v.  Law  Society  of  Upper  Canada,  the  Canadian  Supreme  Court 
decision defines the research in a very broad manner, which clearly states that certain for-profit 
research can also be fair dealing.
201  
 
Compared to the open-ended, flexible and potentially adaptive fair use exceptions under U.S. 
law, the UK fair dealing provision is more restricted in legal practice. We might consider Google 
Book Library project
202 as an example of how intermediary copying could fare under U.S. and 
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U.K. law. As discussed in Chapter 3,
203 a series of lawsuits have been launched in the U.S. by 
rightsholders against Google Book Library Project, which intends to digitise the world’s books, 
making them fully searchable.  Facing up to the legal challenge,
204 Google claims that its project 
falls  under  the  scope  of  fair  use.  Scholars  undertook  an  interesting  analysis  on  different 
situations Google may encounter under U.S. and U.K. copyright law.
205  According to them, 
Google “at least has a good arguable case under U.S. copyright law”
206, given the fact that (1) 
the  purpose  of  Google’s  use  is  not  for  commercial  interests.  In  the  case of Google  Search, 
Google does not earn revenue even if a user subsequently purchases the work via deep links;
207 
(2)  the  market  impact  caused  by  Google’s  use  is  small  as  overall  sales  and  rightsholders’ 
royalties would likely increase, based on Amazon’s “Search Inside” practice. 
208  
 
Considering the legality of this project under U.K. copyright law, it is expected that rightsholders 
could be optimistic about winning a copyright infringement claim. The UK CDPA explicitly 
provides that copies may be made by someone other than the end-user for the purposes of “non-
commercial research or private study”
209, only provided that person “does not know or does not 
have reason to know”
210 that “more than one copy of the same material [will] be provided at the 
same time”.
211  Google is unlikely to satisfy this criterion on the ground that: (1) Google Book 
Library aims to offer copyrighted information to a hugely varied number of users; and (2) the 
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fundamental purposes of Google Book Library is for “informational uses”,
212 which does not fit 
within the scope of “non-commercial research or private study”
213 as understood within current 
UK  copyright  law.  Thus,  it  then  follows  that  providing  a  searchable  e-index  of  works  to 
researchers is not a fair dealing under UK copyright law, even though it may benefit research 
enormously.
214   
 
 
2.5. Conflicts in Current Fair Use Policy and Legal Practice 
 
It is generally recognised that any law or regulation cannot operate in a vacuum.  Incorporating 
fair  use  doctrine  into  international  policies  and  domestic  laws  has  played  a  crucial  role  in 
protecting access to knowledge, as well as in promoting free trade and sustainable innovation on 
an  international  scale
215.  The  issues  surrounding  a  national  scheme  of  fair  use  should  be 
considered from a variety of different angles, such as that the national law must conform to its 
international copyright obligations, domestic policies on fair use should not be obstacles for free 
trade with other countries, and that fair use legislation should be coherent with other domestic 
legal doctrines. Hence, national law of fair use should not only be consistent with international 
standards
216 in its own domain, but also be coherent with other domestic legal doctrines.  The 
current outstanding issue, however, is the variability in the degree of application of fair use, 
especially  in  the  context  of  new  technology,  which  stems  from  the  confusing  relationship 
between different international policies and national laws encompassing fair use doctrine.  As 
Weinreb argued, the current fair use statute “[is] not the embodiment of copyright’s blended 
nature, but a placeholder for all manner of arguments about limits”
217, so that it has become “too 
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many things to too many people to be of much specific value to anyone”.
218 
 
In illustration via U.S. Copyright Act, the following analyses substantive defects of fair use 
policies and legal practices; thereafter the specific issues within adopting fair use doctrine into 
the  file  sharing  environment  will  be  discussed.    To  clarify  substantive  conflicts  existing  in 
current fair use policies and laws, I will classify the problem related to fair use practice into 
“internal conflict” and “external conflict”. The internal problem refers to problems existing in 
different fair use statutes and provisions, whether at international or domestic level. By contrast, 
external problems have to do with the relationship between fair use and other legal doctrines, 
for instance, the long-term conflict between fair use doctrine and the first Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
 
2.5.1. A Case Study of the Internal Conflict: WTO Dispute on Section 110 (5) of 
the U.S. Copyright Act  
As  mentioned  above,  the  lack  of  harmonisation  among  international  policies  and  laws  may 
provide Member States with different explanations on fair use doctrine, leading to confusion for 
Member  States  when  deploying  fair  use  doctrine  in  their  own  domestic  copyright  laws  and 
regulations. The WTO Dispute on Section 110 (5) of the U.S. Copyright Act
219 demonstrates the 
internal problems from inconsistent policies on fair use doctrine.  
 
In October 1998, the US passed its Fairness in Music Licensing Act amendments to Section 110 
                                                        
218 See Madison, supra note 216. 
219 See, WTO Panel Report, supra note 150. According to Article 33 of Berne Convention, “Any 
dispute between two or more countries of the Union concerning the interpretation or application of 
this Convention, not settled by negotiation, may, by any one of the countries concerned, be brought 
before the International Court of Justice by application in conformity with the Statute of the Court, 
unless the countries concerned agree on some other method of settlement. The country bringing the 
dispute before the Court shall inform the International Bureau; the International Bureau shall bring 
the  matter  to  the  attention  of  the  other  countries  of  the  Union.”  As  a  result,  The  European 
Communities ("EC") initiated WTO panel proceedings against the U.S. for alleged incompatibility 
between Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 ("Act") and the 1971 Berne Convention 
("Convention")  as  incorporated  into  the  TRIPS  Agreement  ("TRIPS").  Para.  1.2,  1.7  and  3.1. 
Available at, http://www.asil.org/ilib/ilib0319.htm#04.    94 
(5) of its Copyright Act 1976,
220 which states that in certain places such as bars, shops and 
restaurants, the displays of copyrighted radio or television programmes on their  premises is 
permitted, and the users of the copyright works do not have to obtain prior permission, nor have 
to  pay  a  fee  for  such  use.   On April  21, 1997,  the  European Commission  (EC) received  a 
complaint  from  the  Irish  Music  Rights  Organization  (IMRO)
221  and  GESAC
222  to  question 
Section 110 (5) of the U.S. Copyright Act by claiming that the provisions in Section 110 (5) 
offended Article 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention 1971 as incorporated by reference into Article 
9 (1) of TRIPs.  
 
The EC argued that Section 110 (5) does not meet the requirement of Article 11bis(2) of the 
Berne Convention 1971, which permits exceptions to the exclusive right to authorise broadcasts, 
public  performances  and  public  communications  of  musical  works  provided  that  “equitable 
remuneration be paid”, given that Section 110 (5) was drafted as a “no permission/no payment 
exception”. However, the U.S denied Section 110 (5) breached Berne 1971, on the ground that 
the “homestyle exception” complied with Article 13 of TRIPs. They claimed that Article 13 
operated as an overriding, independent measure through which to assess any permitted uses 
contained in domestic legislation, because Article 13 of TRIPs applied even in cases in which the 
particular use was specifically provided for under Berne 1971.  
 
The WTO Panel granted a preliminary injunction in favour of the EC. It concluded that Section 
110 (5) (b) did breach the Berne Convention, given that rightsholders would suffer economic 
prejudice when the non-dramatic musical works were transmitted in public, as the right-holders 
normally expect a license to be sought for such use.
223 At the same time, Section 110 (5) (a) was 
                                                        
220 See Section 110 (5) of U.S. Copyright Act 1976, which states, “communication of a transmission 
embodying a performance or display of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a single 
receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes, unless- (a) a direct charge is made to 
see or hear the transmission; (b) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the public”. 
221  IMRO  is  a  collection  society  to  administer,  license  and  enforce  the  rights  of  its  member 
composers, publishers, lyricists and arrangers as well. See, Commission Decision of 11 December 
1998, under the provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No. 3286/94 concerning section 110(5) of the 
Copyright Act of theUnited States of America (notified under document C(1998) 4033) 1998 O.J. (L 
346) at 60. 
222 GESAC is the Groupment Europeen des Societes d'Auteurs et Compositeurs (Euorpean Group of 
the Societies of Authors and Composers) which has a membership around 480,000 rightsholders. 
223 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 150, at 6.66.   95 
affirmed as not conflicting with TRIPs because it “was limited to special cases, i.e., dramatic 
musical works”. Furthermore, for these special dramatic musical works, the Panel agreed, right-
holders did not usually license the public transmission of the works so they had suffered little 
economic damages.  
 
The American experience demonstrates that, firstly, internal problems are concerned with the 
relationship between international policies on fair use. In this case, it is crucial to interpret the 
connection between  the  Berne  Convention  and TRIPs,  given  that  the US  argued it  was  not 
breaching the Berne Convention because its provision met the dictates of Article 13 of TRIPs. 
According to the WTP Panel’s decision, there is a general principle to interpret the texts of 
different treaties in a way that any conflicting issues can be reconciled. In their words, “[O]ne 
should avoid interpreting the TRIPS Agreement to mean something different than the Berne 
Convention except where this is explicitly provided for”
224.  Secondly, the relationship between 
domestic  fair  use  laws  and  international  policies  also  deserves  particular  attention. Through 
applying  the  “minor  exceptions”
225  doctrine,  the  Panel  concluded  that  the  US  “homestyle” 
exception belonged to “minor exceptions”. Hence, it is not necessary for the US to follow the 
model in Berne Convention in fashioning an exception, but rather, as a government, the US 
“may choose between different options for limiting the right in question, including use free of 
charge and without an authorisation by the rights holder.”
226  
2.5.2.  An  External  Problem  Examination:  Fair  Use  and  the  U.S.  First 
Amendment 
The external problem originates from the unclear relationship between fair use and other legal 
doctrines.  An  effective  and  efficient  intellectual  property  law  system,  which  presupposes 
coherent and compatible legal doctrines and practices, depends on individuals feeling that they 
                                                        
224 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 150, at 6.66. 
225  The  ‘minor  exceptions’  doctrine  applies  to  the  rights  of  public  performance,  recitation, 
broadcasting,  recording  and  cinematography.  What  exceptions  can  be  made  in  respect  of  the 
translation right recognized under Berne 1971 is less clear. For more complete review of both the 
express  and  implied  exceptions  under  Berne  1971.  See  also,  Ricketson,  S.,  “WIPO  Study  on 
Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Environment”, SCCR/9/7 
Report for the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (June 2003) available at: 
www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2003/sccr/pdf/sccr_9_7.pdf.  
226 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 150, at 6.88.   96 
will not be confused by the relationship between one legal doctrine and others. In other words, 
the application of fair use  should not conflict with other legal principles or doctrines in an 
“ideal”  jurisprudence.    It  is,  however,  possible  to  see  the  lack  of  clarity  in  the  relationship 
between fair use and the doctrine of compulsory and statutory licenses
227; between fair use and 
the “circumvention of technological protection measures”
228; and between fair use and the use of 
ARM  (Automated  Rights  Management)  or  DRM  (Digital  Rights  Management)
229.  The 
incompatible relationship between fair use and the First Amendment of the U.S Constitution 
demonstrates the external problem. 
 
Copyright has a long history of uneasy co-existence with the First Amendment. Before the 1976 
General Copyright Revision, the division between copyright and private lives was relatively 
clear. As Alan Latman describes, “private use is completely outside the scope and intent of 
restriction by copyright”.
230 The developed technological circumstance, however, have altered 
the previous accommodation. To prevent or minimise economic damage resulting from the rapid 
emergence of cheap personal copying methods provided by innovative new technologies, the 
copyright  industries  revisited  the  conflict  between  copyright  and  the  First Amendment  once 
again. They argued that, for a public domain of some sort to be maintained, copyright law must 
consider the constitutional requirement in the first place.
231  
 
Two typical cases, from among a number of cases, will amply demonstrate the inevitably direct 
conflict between fair use doctrine and the First Amendment. The first, Universal City Studios v. 
Reimerdes,
232    known  as  the  DeCSS  case,  presented  the  first  real  challenge  to  the  anti-
                                                        
227 See Section 114,115,119 and 121 of the US Copyright Act 1976. 
228 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Section 1202 of Title 17. See also, Severine Dusollier, 
“Electrifying the Fence: The Legal Protection of Technological Measures for Protecting Copyright, 
Cet article a Ete publie dans”, E.I.P.R., Vol. 6 (1999) at 285-297. See also, J.Carlos Ferna Andez-
Molina, “Law against the Circumvention of Copyright Technological Protection”, Emerald Journal of 
Documents, Vol. 95(1) (2003) at 41-68. 
229 See Tom W. Bell, “Fair Use v. Fared”, supra note 43. See also, John S. Erickson, “Fair Use, DRM 
and Trusted Computer”, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 46(4) (2003) at 34-39. 
230 See Sony case, supra note 22.          . 
231 See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, “Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One View of the 
Public Domain”, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 73 (2004) at 297. See also, John Tehranian, “Fair Use? 
The Triumph  of  Natural-Law  Copyright”,  University  of  Christopher  Davis  Law  Review, Vol.  38 
(2005) at 465. 
232  See  UNIVERSAL  CITY  STUDIOS,  INC.,  et  al.,  Plaintiffs  v.  Shawn  C.  REIMERDES,  et  al.,   97 
circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA). In DeCSS, 
defendants Web site owners claimed that the behaviour of promulgating the software DeCSS, 
which was to decode the scrambled signal on the plaintiff’s DVDs though the Internet, was a fair 
use under Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act. They also argued that the “anti-circumvention 
provisions”  of  the  DMCA  violated  their  freedom  of  expression  guaranteed  by  the  First 
Amendment. However, the court ordered an injunction in favour of the plaintiffs. It noted that 
the plaintiffs had suffered irreparable harm because of the defendants’ action violating their 
copyright works, such that the fair use defence needs be rejected.  Moreover, the Supreme Court 
made  clear  that  DMCA  as  applied  to  posting  and  linking  of  computer  programs  does  not 
contravene the First Amendment, by stating that one who "engages in some conduct that is 
clearly proscribed [by the challenged statute] cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as 
applied to the conduct of others."
233  From the DeCSS cases, we can see the First Amendment 
would not hold in favour of copyright as “an important capacity to contribute toward a system of 
free expression”
234, but pay more attention to the new technological circumstances. In other 
words, the point is that “the sheltered place copyright once enjoyed under the constitution has 
gone”.
235 Thus, the conflict between applying fair use in new technological circumstances and 
maintaining constitutional rights becomes more complicated. 
 
Another case illustrating the incoherent relationship between fair use and the First Amendment is 
Sun Trust v. Houghton-Mifflin Company
236, i.e., the “Wind Done Gone” case, in which the 11
th 
Circuit  Court,  for  the  first  time,  overturned  a  preliminary  injunction  grounded  in  the  First 
Amendment.
237The  Court  addressed  that  there  are  “[c]onflicting  interests  that  must  be 
accommodated in drawing a definitional balance” between copyright and the First Amendment. 
In establishing this balance "[o]n the copyright side, economic encouragement for creators must 
be  preserved  and  the  privacy  of  unpublished  works  recognised.  Freedom  of  speech  [in 
                                                                                                                                                            
Defendants, 111 F.Supp.2d 294 (SDNY 2000). 
233 Ibid. 
234 David Lange and Jennifer Lange Anderson, “Copyright, Fair Use and Transformative Critical 
Appropriation”, The Conference on the Public Domain, Duke Law School (2001) at 135. 
235 Ibid. 
236 See Sun Trust v. Houghton Mifflin Company, 136 F.Supp. 2d 1357, DC. (vacated by 11
th Cir)  
(May, 2001). 
237 See David Lange and Jennifer Lange Anderson, supra note 234.   98 
contradistinction] requires the preservation of a meaningful public or democratic dialogue, as 
well as the uses of speech as a safety valve against violent acts, and as an end in itself”.  
 
From the above, it is evident that legal practice is much exercised by the internal and external 
problems related to fair use legislation. In fact, some scholars question whether the current fair 
use legislations are capable of determining the outcome of copyright cases, especially in the 
environment of new technology. Michael Madison indicates the doctrine is “so fragmented as to 
make it useless as a predictive device”, and “abstract to the point of incoherence”
238. Kenneth 
Crews also describes fair use as “among the most hopelessly vague of legal standards, [causing] 
ample confusion among[st] lawyers and lay persons alike, who often need to understand its 
nuances and live by its tenuous and fragile principles”
239.   
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
For those using copyright protected materials for research and educational purposes, fair use 
doctrine  is  the  most  important  copyright  exception  they  may  rely  on  against  rightsholders’ 
exclusive rights. This leads to a need for fair use doctrine to safeguard the public interest and 
protect  rightsholders’  legitimate  benefits  in  a  desirable  environment.  However,  since  the 
emergence of fair use doctrine, its flexibility and uncertainty in legal practice has made the 
doctrine a disputable topic. 
 
In seeking fundamental reasons for such flexibility and uncertainty in fair use practice, it is 
necessary to recall the general policy issues and legal regimes of fair use doctrine.  From above, 
disharmony between international policies and domestic laws has resulted in internal problems 
(e.g., the WTO Panel Dispute on the relationship between the Berne Convention and TRIPs), 
and external confusions (such as the subtle connection arising from contradiction resolution 
between  fair  use  copyright  law  and  the  First  Amendment)  in  placing  fair  use  into  settled 
practice.  
                                                        
238 See Michael Madison, “A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use”, supra note 6, at 1525,1587.  
239 See Kenneth D. Crews, “The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair Use Guidelines”, Ohio State 
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The  impact  of  digital  file  sharing  on  domestic  fair  use  legislations  also  deserves  particular 
attention, given the multiplicity of current legal approaches of deploying fair use. Whether by 
“open-ended” approach, “exhaustive enumerated list” or “fair dealing” doctrine, such diversity 
serves to emphasise that any one of the legal systems is less than perfect for fair use practice. In 
other  words,  fair  use  as  a legal  principle  is  not  clear and  consistent  in  either  legislation  or 
practice in these circumstances as outlined.   
 
The following chapter is an analysis of how digital file sharing development challenges fair use 
practice, with the aim of evaluating the potential and/or actual role of fair use defence and the 
problems encountered in the context of file sharing. 
   100 
 
Chapter 3. Fair Use and File Sharing 
 
Adapting  copyright  protection  in  the  context  of  digital  file  sharing  does  not  only  involve 
extending  protection  for  rightsholders.  The  public  interest  is  both  the  reason  for  granting 
protection and also on providing argument for limiting it.
1 As recognised in previous chapters, 
fair use is a safety valve in the copyright system allowing access to copyright works without the 
author’s consent in certain limited circumstances where it serves the public interest. However, 
flexibility originating from international policies and domestic legislation on fair use doctrine 
has  resulted  in  uncertainty  and  unpredictability  in  copyright  practice.    Since  there  is  no 
consensus of opinion on whether and how fair use defence should be applied in digital file 
sharing, this chapter will examine the interpretation of fair use doctrine in the context of file 
sharing through case studies, and thereby help to address essential questions in solving the fair 
use dilemma in digital file sharing: whether, and why, the application of fair use doctrine shrinks 
with the growth of file sharing? 
 
In this Chapter, I will: 
(1)  Address the “Who” issue of fair use doctrine in traditional copyright environment, i.e., the 
principal party who may be entitled to benefit from fair use defence. 
 
(2)  Discuss the reasoning behind, and the extent of how far the “Who” issue has moved into the 
context of file sharing. Focusing on whether technology intermediaries are involved in direct 
copying activities, I categorise the cases as those involving technology intermediaries whose 
users  make  the  copies  and  may  have  defence  of  fair  use  (as  exemplified  by  Napster,
2 
Grokster
3 and BitTorrent lawsuits
4), and those where fair use defence is claimed by the file 
                                                        
1 Chrisophe Geiger, “Copyright and Free Access to Information: for a fair use of interests in a 
globalised world”, E.I.P.R., Vol. 28(7) (2006) at 366-373. See also, Gillian Davis, “Copyright and the 
Public Interest”, Model Legal Studies, Sweet and Maxwell, 2
nd ed. (2002). See also, Pamela 
Samuelson, “Economic and Constitutional Influences on Copyright Law in the United States”, U.S. 
Intellectual Property Law and Policy, Edward Elgar Publishing, 1
st ed. (2006) at 164-204. 
2 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9
th Cir. 2001). [Hereinafter, Napster, in 
brief] 
3 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc v. Grokster Ltd 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. April,   101 
sharing intermediaries making copies themselves for users who may have fair use rights 
(such as MP3.com
5 and Google Book Library Project cases
6).  
 
(3)  Finally,  I  will  explore  if  the  public  interest  can  ever  be  reconciled  with  rightsholders’ 
interests under fair use doctrine as currently conceived. In particular, the reasons behind an 
imbalance between social benefits and rightsholders’ interests in the context of file sharing 
will be examined. 
 
3.1.  The  “Who”  Issue—Taking  Advantage  of  Fair  Use  in  the 
Traditional Copyright Environment 
 
As any court will consider whether the defendant is entitled to benefit from fair use defence, i.e., 
the “who” question, at the initial stage of a copyright infringement case, the following seeks to 
define who is entitled to the advantage of fair use defence in the age of the printing press. 
3.1.1. The Primary Infringer 
In most cases, the person who makes direct use of the copyright work, namely, the primary 
infringer, would claim for fair use defence.   According to Bently and Sherman,  for a fair 
dealing defence, “it is important to note that all that is meant by dealing is that the defendant has 
made use of the work”
7. This principle is also embodied in some statutes. For example, Section 
107 of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 states that fair use is applied to “the use made of a 
work”
8.  UK copyright law describes fair dealing as “specif[ied] acts which may be done in 
                                                                                                                                                            
2003) [Hereinafter, Grokster District, in brief]. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 
380 F.3d 1154, 1162-1166 (9
th Cir. 2004) [Hereinafter, Grokster 9
th Cir., in brief]. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd al Supreme Court (04-0480), 545 U.S., 125 s. Ct. 2764 (2005) 
[Hereinafter, Grokster Supreme, in brief]. 
4 See e.g., See Columbia Pictures, et. al. v. Justin Bunnell, et.al, 245 F.R.D. 443 (C.D. Cal. 2007) 
(August 24, 2007). 
5 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (SDNY). [Hereinafter, MP3.com, 
in brief] 
6 See e.g., The Author’s Guild v. Google, No.05-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y.) filed (Sep 20, 2005). See also, 
McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. v. Google, No.05-CV-8881 (S.D.N.Y) filed (Oct 19, 2005). 
7 Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, New York: Oxford University Press 
Inc., 4
th ed. (2003) at 194. [Hereinafter, Bently, Intellectual Property Law, in brief] 
8 See Section 107 of U.S. Copyright Act 1976.   102 
relation to copyright”, as stated in Section 28 (1) of CDPA
9.   
 
Current case law, in addition, identifies the primary infringer as a main body benefitting from 
fair use defence.  For instance, in deciding whether a defendant falls within the protection of fair 
use doctrine, the courts have to construe the purpose for which the work has been used. As 
Chadwick pointed out in Newspaper Licensing Agency v. Marks & Spencer
10, “the purpose for 
which the copying is done … can be brought within a liberal interpretation of the phrase ‘for the 
purpose’ of [the infringement]”
11. Implicit in this, the specific purposes of the dealing should be 
examined according to the subjective motives of the primary infringer
12. The decision of Hyde 
Park v. Yelland 
13 shows that the court must “judge the fairness by the objective standard of 
whether  a  fair  minded  and  honest  person  would  have  dealt  with  the  copyright  work  in  the 
manner”. Thus, the dealing could be regarded as fair dealing as long as the primary infringer can 
show that “they were acting benevolently or were motivated by some altruistic or noble cause”.
14  
 
Other factors
15 in deciding a fair use case are also related to the primary infringer’s activities, 
either directly or indirectly. For example, fair use is less likely to be applicable if the primary 
infringer obtained the copyrighted work by illegal means such as stealing or leaking.
16  The fact 
that the primary infringer used more than half of a work may lead to failure in claiming for fair 
dealing defence, on the ground that exacting “too many and too long”
17 of the copyrighted work 
is not regarded as being fair.  The commercial benefits derived from the primary infringer’s use 
made of a copyrighted work, whether the nature of the work is in favour of fair use, will weigh 
                                                        
9 See Section 28(1) of UK Copyright, Design and Patent Act 1988 [Hereinafter, CDPA, in brief]. 
10 See Newspaper Licensing Agency v. Marks and Spencer [2000] 4 All ER 239, 257 
11 Ibid. at 75. See also, Pro Sieben Media v. Carlton Television [1999] FSR 610, 620. 
12 See Bently, Intellectual Property Law, supra note 7, at 195. 
13 See Hyde Park v. Yelland [2000] EMLR 363, 379, at 36 (CA). 
14 See Bently, Intellectual Property Law, supra note 7, at 197. 
15 As Bently explains, these factors influencing the determination whether a dealing is fair include the 
method by which the copyrighted work has been obtained, the amount and substantiality of the work 
being taken, the use made of the work, the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work, and whether there are other means with less intrusion on copyright owners’ 
rights provided as well. See Bently, Intellectual Property Law, supra note 7, 195-198. 
16 The method of obtaining the copyrighted work used by the primary infringer is an element 
considered by the court in deciding a fair use case. See Beloff v. Pressdram [1973] 1 All ER 241. 
17 The amount taken from the copyrighted work is another element which has influence on the court’s 
decision. See Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84. Lord Denning MR said the court “must consider the 
number and extent of the extracts” in determining whether a use made of the work is fair.   103 
against fair use defence, as embodied in Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp.
18  
 
The  above  analysis  demonstrates  that  the  primary  infringer  is  generally  recognised,  both  in 
literal statute and in legal practice, as the main body allowed the advantage of fair use defence. 
In brief, the primary infringer is one party who can claim for and benefit from the fair use 
defence in a copyright infringement case. 
3.1.2. Copying by Third Parties 
The primary infringer, it is generally held, is the one who does the illegal copying directly. In 
certain circumstances, however, third parties may be involved in copyright infringing behaviour, 
i.e., the primary actor may be a person other than the alleged defendant.  There might be a case, 
for instance, where an agent such as a research assistant or a librarian “makes and supplies a 
copy of an article in a periodical”
19 for researchers or students. Therefore, it is not necessary for 
the behaviour resulting in the copyright infringement to be undertaken by the defendant himself.  
 
At least two factors, where the direct infringing activity is done by a third party, have to be 
considered for the fair use defence to be applied. That the copying activity must be for the 
defendant’s own research or study is the first, as shown in the case Sillitoe v. McGraw Hill Book 
Co.
20.  The  Sillitoe  court  suggested  that  the  defendants  “could  not  avail  themselves  of  the 
exceptions of [fair dealing doctrine] since they were not engaged in private study or research but 
were merely facilitating this for others”
21.  Secondly, a defendant cannot claim for fair dealing if 
the person performing the copying knows or has reason to know that more than one copy of the 
material will be provided.
22 Thus it follows that copying by a third party other than a defendant 
                                                        
18 See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In Kinko 
case, the court held that Kinko’s infringed copyrights because the copying was for commercial 
purposes, which had a direct effect on the market for the books, in spite of the fact that most of the 
works were for “course packs”---a factor is indeed in favor of fair use. [Hereinafter, Kinko, in brief] 
19 See Section 37-38 of CDPA 1988.  
20 See Sillitoe v. McGraw Hill Book Co. [1983] FSR 545.  
21 See Sillitoe v. McGraw Hill Book Co. [1983] FSR, at 545. See also, Longman Group v. Carrington 
Technical Institute [1991] 2 NZLR 574 (CANZ).  
22 See Section 29(3)(b) of CDPA 1988, “in any other case, the person doing the copying knows or has 
reason to believe that it will result in copies of substantially the same material being provided to more 
than one person at substantially the same time and for substantially the same purpose”, the copying is 
not fair dealing.   104 
is not a fair dealing if the third party knows or has reason to know that the copying will lead to 
copies of the same material being provided to more than one person at substantially the same 
time and for substantially the same purpose. For example, the teacher cannot use fair dealing 
defence when he makes multiple course packs for his students. 
 
From the above, it is possible to apply fair use defence to the researcher or student, despite the 
fact that the alleged infringement is accomplished by a third party, only if the copying is for the 
researcher or student’s own research or study; and there is no more than one substantial copy 
being provided at the same time for the same purpose. 
3.1.3. Copying for Third Parties 
The fair use/dealing defence applicable to the librarian deserves particular attention, given that 
the special role of the librarian, as a primary actor who actions the alleged infringement for a 
third party, is similar to a technology intermediary. In other words, the librarian is entitled to 
apply  for  fair  dealing  defence,  although  he  merely  provides  a  platform  for  the  alleged 
infringement with his direct copying activities.    
 
The  U.S.  Copyright  Act  grants  libraries  and  archives  an  explicit  exemption  for  copyright 
infringement, provided that the library copy is (1) to make no more than three copies; (2) made 
by a library or archive or by employees of such acting within the scope of their employment; (3) 
not be associated with any commercial purposes; (4) to be copied from a public collection; (5) 
include a notice of copyright.
23  Similar library exemption can also be found in UK CDPA. The 
CDPA 1988 provides librarians of any prescribed library with a number of fair dealing defence
24. 
Section 38-39 of CDPA allows the librarian of a prescribed, non-profit library to “make and 
supply a copy of an article in a periodical or parts of published works”, on conditions that: (1) [It 
is] for purposes of research or private study
25; (2) no more than one copy of the same material 
[will be] provided at the same time
26; and (3) a cost no less than the actual cost is required
27.  
                                                        
23 See 17 U.S. Copyright Act § 101, 108(b)-(e) (2000). 
24 See Section 37-39 of CDPA 1988. 
25 See UK CDPA 1988, Section 38 (2) (a), and Section 39(2) (a). 
26 See UK CDPA 1988, Section 38 (2) (b), and Section 39(2) (b).   105 
It  is  noteworthy  that  current  copyright  legislation  confirms  that  the  library  exemption  only 
applies to physical libraries. For example, Section 105-109 of Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
1998  clarifies  that  “digital  libraries  and  archives  that  exist  only  in  the  virtual  (rather  than 
physical) sense on … the Internet” do not fall within the library copyright exemption.
28 The UK 
CDPA  1988  provides  librarians  of  “prescribed,  non-profit  libraries”  with  the  fair  dealing 
defence.
29 Libraries are defined by the Secretary of State as iter alia school, university, and local 
authority  libraries.
30  Thus,  the  online  searching  and  index  service  such  as  Google  Library 
project, as discussed below, may be excluded from such exemption.
31 
 
In summary, there are three categories of individual who may be considered eligible to use fair 
use defence in traditional copyright environment: the primary infringer, the researcher or student 
not directly involved in the alleged infringement, and the librarian copying for third parties.  
 
3.2. The “Who?” Issue --- Fair Use in File Sharing Circumstances 
 
The above discussion on fair use is mainly based on traditional copyright industries, including 
the  basic  copyright  industries  such  as  newspapers  and  periodicals,  book  publishing,  music 
publishing and the copyright-related industries such as radio and television.
32 However, with 
innovative usages of new technologies, the situation has been significantly altered.  In contrast to 
traditional copyright situations, the parties to which fair use doctrine has been applied in the 
                                                                                                                                                            
27 See UK CDPA 1988, Section 38 (2) (c), and Section 39(2) (c). 
28 See U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998, Section 105-109.  
29 See UK CDPA 1988 Section 37. See Copyright (Librarians and Archivists) (Copying of Copyright 
Material) Regulations 1989 (SI 1989/1212).  
30 See UK CDPA 1988 Section 37(1) (a).  
31 See Part 3.2.2.2, at 117. 
32 Some people divide copyright industries into four groups, i.e., the core copyright industries, the 
partial copyright industries, the distribution industries, and the copyright-related industries. See 
Stephen E. Siwek, “Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy”, International Intellectual Property 
Alliance (2002) available at: http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2002_SIWEK_FULL.pdf.  (The report defines 
copyright industries as the core copyright industries such as “newspapers and periodicals, book 
publishing and related industries, music publishing, radio and television broadcasting, cable 
television, records and tapes, motion pictures, theatrical productions, advertising and computer 
software and data processing”; the partial industries including “part of whose products are copyright 
materials. These industries range from fabric to business forms to architecture”; the distribute 
industries, such as transportation services, libraries, and wholesale and retail trade involved in the 
distribution of copyrighted products; the copyright-related industries, for example, those that produce 
and distribute products that are used wholly or principally in conjunction with copyright materials, 
such as computers, radios, televisions, and consumer recording and listening devices.)    106 
context of digital file sharing are mainly divided into two categories: the primary infringer, 
namely, end-users of file sharing networks uploading, downloading, or distributing copyright 
works without copyright owners’ permission, and the file sharing intermediary,  namely, file 
sharing tool providers.   
 
Applying fair use defence to the primary infringer in file sharing networks is similar to its usage 
in the traditional copyright environment. The issues around whether the primary infringer is 
entitled to benefit from fair use doctrine can be considered from different aspects, such as the 
purpose of the use, the amount taken from the copyright works, and the market effect resulted 
from the primary infringing activities, amongst others. 
 
The role of file sharing intermediaries in the application of fair use defence deserves particular 
attention. The special nature and function of file sharing intermediaries has been reflected in, and 
also serves to highlight the difference between file sharing providers, and traditional third party 
copying intermediaries. As demonstrated in the cases below, there exist two types of file sharing 
intermediaries being involved into copyright lawsuits. The first type includes those whose users 
make the copies and may have defense of fair use, as evidenced in Napster
33and Grokster
34. 
Unlike traditional copying intermediaries,  these file sharing intermediaries offer the primary 
infringer a technical platform, which is not involved in any direct infringing conducts. Thus the 
problem emerges as being whether and how a party who is neither the primary infringer nor the 
primary actor of the alleged infringement is supposed to exercise fair use defence. The second, 
exemplified by MP3.com
35 and Google Library Project
36, claim fair use for their own copying 
activities to serve users who may have fair use rights. These file sharing intermediaries provide 
the alleged infringer with direct copying activities, which is a parallel with those copying for 
third parties in the traditional copyright environment.  
 
                                                        
33 See Napster, supra note 2. 
34 See Grokster, supra note 3. 
35 See MP3.com, supra note 5. 
36 See Google Library Project, Part 3.2.2.2, at 118.   107 
The aim of this subpart is to examine the dramatic conflict existing in fair use practice in the 
context of digital file sharing, and consider how fair use doctrine has responded to these new 
challenges. Recent cases illustrate endeavours which have been deployed to adopt fair use into 
the new technological environment. 
3.2.1. End-Users / Technology Intermediaries Whose Users Make the Copies and 
May Have Defense of Fair Use  
In Chapter 1, we established that file-sharing systems have legal and socially beneficial uses, 
especially for research and educational users. File sharing networks have potential technical 
advantages  for  the  distribution  of  information,  and  this  would  otherwise  be  possible  for 
researchers to use them access in a more effective and efficient way for their private study, 
research or classroom teaching. As the scenarios listed in Chapter 1 show
37, faculty, students and 
scholars  can  rapidly  access  valuable  information,  reduce  man-hours  and  man-labour,  and 
distribute their works freely using academic file sharing technologies, if their uses of copyright 
works are allowed fair use.  However, “[a]nalogue-era exceptions to copyright do not apply 
easily to the Internet environment”
38. Current case law indicates that it is proving difficult for 
defendants to take advantage of the fair use doctrine in the context of digital file sharing. 
 
3.2.1.1. Sony: Fair Use Encountering New Technology 
As  a  landmark  decision  for  applying  fair  use  to  a  new  technological  environment,  Sony
39 
deserves particular attention by highlighting the uncertainty of the applicability of fair use in the 
context of new technology. 
Sony concerned the problem of whether creators of new technologies capable of infringing uses 
should be liable for users’ subsequent infringing activities. As regards the emergence of Betamax 
videocassette  recorder,  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  borrowed  the  “staple  article  of  commerce” 
                                                        
37 See Chapter 1, Part 1.3.1.2, at 46. 
38 See Daniel J. Gervais, “Towards a New Core International Copyright Norm: The Reverse Three-
Step Test”, Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review, Vol. 1(9) (2005) at 27. 
39 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc, 480 F. Supp 429 (C.D.Cal 1979), rev’d 
659 F 2d 963 (9
th Cir 1981), rev’d 464 US 417 (1984). [Hereinafter, Sony, in brief].   108 
standard from patent law and held that the sale of the Betamax or any other articles of commerce 
which  are  capable  of  copying  copyright  protected  works  does  not  constitute  contributory 
infringement,  if  “the  product  is  widely  used  for  legitimate,  unobjectionable  purposes”  or  is 
“capable of substantial non infringing uses”.
40  
In Sony, a principle non-infringing use of the Betamax of taping television programs to watch 
later, i.e., “time-shifting”, was granted as a fair use, given the fact that there was little evidence 
that  the  use  of  Betamax  would  harm  or  potentially  harm  rightsholders’  market  interests. 
According to the Court, firstly, “time-shifting [is] a noncommercial [and] nonprofit activity”
41. 
There  was  no  evidence  to  demonstrate  that  television  advertising  revenues,  motion  picture 
attendance, video-tape rentals or any other potential market interests of the rightsholders’ were 
diminished arising from the application of Betamax.
42 Secondly, the Court noted that there was 
possibility  that  time-shifting  would  “aid  plaintiffs  rather  than  harm  them”  by  expanding 
audiences to include those unable to watch the initial broadcast of a program.
43 Therefore, it was 
concluded that “home-shifting of [copyrighted] programs is legitimate fair use”
44, on the ground 
that the time-shifting video recording machine did not indicate “any likelihood of non-minimal 
harm to the potential market for, or the value of, copyright works”
45. Thus, this was indicative 
that “[c]ongress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability” to support “major 
technological innovations [that] alter the market for copyright materials”.
46  
Different explanations on the Sony decision lead to debates over adopting Sony principle to 
following  cases.  As  Travis  discussed,  a  broad  reading  of  Sony  suggests  that  developing  a 
technology with potential to serve copyright infringing activities is not an infringement, unless 
the  technology  is  not  capable  of  substantial  non-infringing  uses,  regardless  of  whether  the 
technology  developer  “knows  or  should  have  reason  to  know”
47  the  infringement.
48  In  a 
                                                        
40 See Sony, supra note 39, at 442. 
41 See Sony, supra note 39, at 497. 
42 See Sony, supra note 39, at 456. 
43 See Sony, supra note 39, at 453-454. 
44 See Sony, supra note 39, at 454-460 
45 See Sony, supra note 39, at 456-464. 
46 See Sony case, supra note 22, at 417, 431. 
47 See Sony, supra note 39, at 464, 431. 
48 See Hannibal Travid, “Google Book Search and Fair Use: iTunes for Authors, or Napster for 
Books?” University of Miami Law Review, Vol. 61 (2006). See, e.g., Grokster, supra note 3.   109 
narrower  sense,  a  market-orientated  explanation  favoured  by  rightsholders  states  that  Sony 
represents  a  “staple  article  of  commerce  doctrine”  which  does  not  apply  where  the  new 
technology  serves  commercial  copying,  where  the  principal  use  is  to  assist  unlicensed 
reproducion, display or distribution of copyright works to unauthorised persons, or where the use 
of  such  technology  harms  or  potentially  harms  rightsholders’  market  interest.
49 As  analysed 
below, this narrow explanation of Sony decision has been embodied in Napster, Grokster and 
MP3.com cases. 
3.2.1.2. The Napster Case 
Napster
50 was the first case examining fair use doctrine in P2P networks eventually heard by the 
U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal in 2001. In Napster’s case, the “harm to [rightsholders’] 
established market [and] the right to develop alternative markets”
51 finally resulted in Napster’s 
failure in claiming fair use defence.  
Initially, it is necessary to consider whether the primary infringer, i.e., the Napster end-user, is 
entitled  to  benefit  from  fair  use  defence.    Unlike  the  Betamax  consumers,  the  majority  of 
Napster  end-users  were  found  by  the  Court  to  be  “copying,  downloading,  uploading, 
transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs’ copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings 
protected by either federal or state law, without express permission of the rights owner”,
52 which 
constitutes direct infringement of copyright owners’ rights. In other words, according to the 
Courts, Napster users are engaged in direct copyright infringement while the Sony consumers’ 
home-shifting behaviour is not related to infringement. Thus, the Napster users cannot benefit 
from the protection of fair use doctrine.  
With respect to the role of Napster as a technical intermediary in applying fair use defence, the 
Ninth Circuit took the opposite road to the Sony decision by refusing to explore the connections 
between fair use and the “staple article of commerce doctrine. The Court rejected Napster’s 
                                                        
49 See, e.g., Napster, supra note 2. See also, Brief of Amici Curiae Office of the Commissioner of 
Baseball, et al. in support of petitioners, see Grokster Supreme, supra note 3. 
50 See Napster, supra note 2, at 919, 920. 
51 See Napster, supra note 2, at 1043. 
52 See Napster, supra note 2, at 4222.   110 
argument that its users’ activity of using plaintiff’s copyright works amounted to fair use of the 
material for “at least” two reasons.
53  Firstly, the use of the Napster network was deemed to have 
harmed the market, given the data provided by the Jay Report which stated “evidence of lost 
sales  attributable  to  college  use  to  be  probative  of  irreparable  harm  for  purposes  of  the 
preliminary injunction  motion”.
54 Secondly, the Court considered that Napster commercially 
used the entire copyright works to enjoy a financial benefit as “financial benefit exists where the 
availability of infringing material ‘act as a draw’ for customers … [whereas] Napster’s future 
revenue  is  directly  dependent  upon  increases  in  user  base’.
55  Thus,  being  a  technical 
intermediary  deriving  a  commercial  benefit  from  the  primary  infringement,  Napster  lost  its 
chance of claiming fair use defence for its end-users. 
The other factor which might have been considered in applying fair use defence to Napster is 
whether the Napster P2P technology was “space-shifting”.  Independently of the Sony decision, 
the Napster court did not follow the “staple article of commercial doctrine”, but read the P2P 
network technically. It operated in a very restrictive manner to differentiate between the Napster 
P2P technology and the “shifting” analyses of Sony
56 and Diamond
57.  According to the Court, 
the Napster P2P technology is not a fair use because “the methods of shifting [in P2P networks] 
… simultaneously involve distribution of the copyright material to the general public; …[rather 
than] only to the original user”.
58 In other words, the method of shifting the copyright material in 
Napster networks is not “fair”, so that Napster end-users’ infringing activities cannot reside 
within fair use. 
In Napster, as analysed above, neither the end-user nor the technology intermediary applied the 
fair use doctrine successfully. On the one hand, the primary infringer is not entitled to fair use 
                                                        
53 See Napster, supra note 2, at 4229. 
54 See Napster, supra note 2, at 4234. 
55 See Napster, supra note 2, at 919, 920, 1021. 
56 See Sony, supra note 39 (In this case, a video tape recorder machine Betamax, which is regarded as 
a “time-shifting” machine, was held as a fair use). 
57 See RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia System, Inc., 180 F. 3D 1072 (9
th Cir. 1999) [Hereinafter, 
Diamond, in brief] (In this case, a portable MP3 player Rio was regarded as “space-shifting” on the 
ground that it only made copies in order to render portable. This “space-shifting” technology was 
held by the Court as a paradigmatic noncommercial personal use, so that “space-shifting” was a fair 
use.) 
58 See Napster, supra note 2, at 4239.   111 
defence, given that they did illegally copy and distribute copyright works. On the other hand, the 
file sharing technology provider, namely, Napster as technical intermediary, failed to claim fair 
use defence either, considering the commercial benefit derived from the technology, and the 
technical  contribution  to  the  primary  infringement.  As  the  Court  declared,  “having  digital 
downloads available for free on the Napster system necessarily harms the copyright holders’ 
attempts  to  charge  for  the  same  download”,
59  and  “any  allegedly  positive  impact  […]  on 
plaintiffs’ prior market in no way frees [the] defendant to usurp a further market that directly 
derives from reproduction of the plaintiffs’ copyright works”.
60 
3.2.1.3 The Grokster Case 
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the broad reading of the Sony decision in 
favour of a file sharing intermediary, Grokster, who had been sued by major motion picture 
studios, record labels, and other individual rightsholders.
61 Both the District Court and the Ninth 
Circuit  in  MGM  v.  Grokster
62  released  Grokster  from  liability  for  copyright  infringement 
because of its decentralised technical design. Unlike the centralised indexing architecture used in 
Napster, Grokster did not maintain either central servers or login process for the end-user.
63 In 
view  of  this,  the  Courts  held  that  Grokster  should  be  free  of  copyright  liability,  given  that 
Grokster did not have “reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files”, nor did it “fail to act 
on that knowledge to prevent infringement”
64.  Following the Sony decision, the Ninth Circuit 
found that the software was capable of substantial non-infringing uses, including works in the 
public domain and works authorised by rightsholders.
65 This established for the first time that 
file sharing technology was regarded as an intermediary with “substantial non-infringing” use. 
 
                                                        
59 See Napster, supra note 2, at 1469-1471. 
60 See Napster, supra note 2, at 1017. 
61 See Grokster 9
th Cir, supra note 3. 
62 See Grokster 9
th Cir. and Grokster District, supra note 3. 
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th Cir, supra note 3, at 1163. 
64 See Grokster 9
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65 See e.g., Grokster can be used for “distribut[ing] movie trailers, free songs or other non-copyright 
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domain materials, government documents, media content for which distribution is authorised, media 
content as to which the rightsholders do not object to distribution, and computer software for which 
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th Cir, supra note 3, at 1161-1162.   112 
However,  the  Supreme  Court  borrowed  another  principle  from  patent  law—the  inducement 
principle—and  formulated  a  theory  of  secondary  liability  based  on  “purposeful,  capable 
expression and conduct”.
66 According to the Court, a product distributor may be liable for the 
resulting acts of infringement by third parties using the device, if “[he] distributes a device with 
the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other 
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, going beyond mere distribution with knowledge 
of third-party action”,
67 regardless of the device’s lawful uses. Specifically, the Supreme Court 
outlined three main reasons that led to Grokster’s failure. 
 
Firstly, it held that Grokster intentionally induced or encouraged direct infringement. In the 
Court’s  analysis,  Grokster  attempted  to  “constant[ly]  refer  to  Napster”
68  in  its  company 
documents and promotional materials, targeting at former Napster users.
69 Additionally, there 
was no evidence that Grokster made any effort towards developing any filtering devices or other 
mechanisms to monitor or control the infringing use of their software.
70  
 
Secondly,  the  Court  found  that  Grokster  generated  business  and  revenue  through  selling 
advertising space, although the company received no revenue from users.
71 Especially, the Court 
argued that Grokster’s potential revenue relied on “the high volume of users and the availability 
of large amounts of commercially appealing materials”
72. 
 
Finally, based on MGM’s evidence that “nearly 90% of the files available for download on the 
Grokster were copyright works”,
73 the Supreme Court found that a substantive volume of the use 
of Grokster was a function of free access to copyrighted work. Although some non-infringing 
copying  activities  might  exist  in  Grokster,  the  Court  claimed  that  “the  remaining  10%”  of 
                                                        
66 The Grokster borrowed the inducement theory from U.S. patent law, which states that “Whoever 
actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer”. See S 271(b) U.S.C.A. 35. 
See Grokster Supreme, supra note 3, at 2078. 
67 Ibid. at 486, 410-424. 
68 Ibid. at 2781. 
69 Ibid. at 2781. 
70 Ibid. at 2781. 
71 Ibid, at 2774-2776. 
72 Ibid. at 2774-2776. 
73 Ibid. at 2772.   113 
potential non-infringing uses “should not qualify as ‘substantial’”.
74 Therefore, the Supreme 
Court denied that Grokster had made a strong evidentiary showing of “substantial non-infringing 
use”, claiming that the Ninth Circuit’s judgment rested on an erroneous understanding of Sony as 
precedent.  
 
Interestingly, the Court did not clearly address fair use in Grokster. The opinion of the Supreme 
Court ignored the assertion that “at least some of”
75 Grokster users uploading, downloading, or 
distributing authorised copyrighted files might rightly rely on fair use defence.  Justice Breyer 
argued that Grokster permitted transfer of about 10 percent of non-infringing files, a number 
similar to the 9 percent that the Court found acceptible in Sony,
76 where the issue was claimed as 
fair use. However, the majority of the Court aligned in favour of the other concurring opinion 
from  Justices  Ginsburg,  Roberts  and  Kennedy,  which  dismissed  the  evidence  of  fair  use, 
denoting that “there ha[d] been no finding of any fair use and little beyond anecdotal evidence of 
non-infringing uses”.
77 
It is noteworthy that there is a power contest between various interests involved in the new 
context of file sharing.
78 As Bowery stated, “[L]aw is a conservative force not only because of 
its ties with established power, but also because legal power contests change”.
79 The Napster 
and Grokster Court decisions highlighted the conflict between old and new modes of production 
and commercial parties in the changed social circumstances. For instance, the Napster court 
leaned conservatively towards protecting the benefits of traditional copyright holders without 
sufficiently considering the profits of Napster. According to Bowery,  
“the [Napster] judicial view is that copyright law should serve a particular culture of 
expectation: protecting the established industry’s structure and plans for development 
                                                        
74 Ibid. at 2774-2776. 
75 Ibid, at 2778. 
76 See Sony, supra note 39. 
77 See Grokster Supreme, supra note 3, at 2785-2786, Justice Ginsburg chided the Ninth Circuit for 
failing to “distinguish between uses of Grokster’s software products (which this case is about) and 
uses of peer-to-peer technology generally (which this case is not about)”. 
78 See Kathy Bowery, Law & Internet Cultures, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2005), at 
152. See also, John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press (2000). 
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of the market. Interference with these private ‘plans’ is piracy”.
80   
Comparatively, the District Court in Grokster was in favour of Grokster by affirming that “it is 
the users of the [Grokster] software who, by connecting to each other over the internet, create the 
network and provide the access and emphasizing the network dimension of the software”.
81  
However, adoption of the “inducement” theory indicated that the Grokster Supreme Court was 
pursuing a conservative approach.
82  The significant issue of power contest which has been 
involved in the digital file sharing environment deserves particular attention, since it, to some 
degree, explains the inconsistency and flexibility within file sharing legal practice. 
Thus, similar with the Napster decision, Grokster indicated that digital file sharing technology 
might  not  benefit  from  the  defence  of  fair  use.  This  was  also  held  true  even  when  the 
architecture did not provide any direct technical support for infringement, as Grokster was “not 
significantly different from companies [selling] home video recorders or copy machines, both of 
which can be and are used to infringe copyrights”
83.  By emphasising that the decentralised P2P 
technology  provider  could  not  claim  defence  of  fair  use,  Grokster  took  a  step  further  than 
Napster in removing the defence of fair use from file sharing intermediaries. 
3.2.1.4. Lawsuits against BitTorrent 
As described in Chapter 1,
84 when sharing digital files through BitTorrent, a peer first creates a 
small file called a "torrent”, which includes metadata about both the files to be shared and the 
“tracker”, i.e., the computer coordinating the file distribution. To download a specific file, peers 
need to obtain a torrent file and connect to the tracker, which identifies the peers currently 
transferring the pieces of the file. Such specific technical design takes Grokster’s decentralised 
P2P network idea to a different level by assisting end users to download parts of the same file 
from  multiple  users  simultaneously.  Similar  to  its  antecedents,  BitTorrent  has  encountered 
opposition from rightsholders due to perceived misuse of torrent technology. Although as yet 
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there  has  been  no  major  superior  court  decision  akin  to  the  Napster  or  Grokster  cases 
determining whether or not BitTorrent torrent or client sites are “illegal”, there are two separate 
‘streams’ of lawsuits against BitTorrent currently active. 
 
Firstly, rightsholders have targeted BitTorrent search sites, also known as “hubs”. These Torrent 
hubs  are  vulnerable,  being  the  cataloguing  tool  for  Torrent  files. Although  the  torrent  files 
offered on the Torrent Sites did not contain actual copies of alleged copyright material, a large 
number  of  Torrent  Sites,  such  as  EliteTorrents,  SuprNova.org,  eDonkey,  LokiTorrent  and 
TorrentSpy  have  been  closed  down  for  assisting  copyright  infringement  by  end-users.  For 
example, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) filed a lawsuit
85 in 2006 against 
search engines and news groups affiliated with BitTorrent networks. According to MPAA, the 
defendants’ website provided links to third-party sites containing BitTorrent files and links to 
files stored on the cache of defendants’ websites.  In 2007, the District Court denied defendants’ 
argument that RAM holds data for such a short duration so as not to store subject to later access 
and retrieval.
86 It was held that data stored in RAM, however temporarily, is electronically stored 
information subject to discovery under the circumstances of the instant case. Thus, the Court 
found in favour of the MPAA effectively shutting down the TorrentSpy. 
 
Following the U.S. and European precedent, BitTorrent server operators have been challenged in 
many other countries. For instance, the Australian Recording Industry Association (ARIA) has 
taken down more than 50 file sharing hubs since 2005.
87 Numerous BitTorrent hubs have also 
been sued in Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and so on.
88 
 
                                                        
85 See Columbia Pictures, et. al. v. Justin Bunnell, et.al, 245 F.R.D. 443 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (August 24, 
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http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200612130292.html. See also, HKSAR v. Chan Nai 
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Secondly, rightsholders have acted against individual end-users of Torrent sites. In November 
2004, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) launched lawsuits against 761 
people who had allegedly shared substantial amounts of copyright works.
89 In August 2005, the 
MPAA published a press release named “You Can Click, But You Can’t Hide!” to announce its 
plan to fight against individual BitTorrent file traders.
90 By then, more than 30 BitTorrent sites 
had been closed and thousands of end-users had been engaged in court.
91 Moreover, the MPAA 
started international copyright lawsuits by suing those residents outside the U.S. For instance, in 
March 2005, two British men who ran websites which allegedly once supported the BitTorrent 
P2P  application  were  threatened  by  the  MPAA  by  a  million  dollar  penalty.
92    In  addition, 
criminal  enforcement  action  has  been  taken  to  target  individuals  committing  copyright 
infringement on BitTorrent sites. For example, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal confirmed 
the 2005 decision by the Magistrates’ Court, and concluded that Chan Nai Ming, a Hong Kong 
citizen, be the first person in the world to be convicted of a crime for using BitTorrent file 
sharing.
93  In  November  2003,  two  Japanese  users  of Winny  P2P  file  sharing  program  were 
arrested by the Japan Kyoto Prefectural Police, being accused of a criminal offence for sharing 
copyright materials via Winny.
94 
 
It  is  noteworthy  to  mention  that  the  RIAA’s  latest  extensive  campaign  against  Torrent  file 
sharing has moved to textbook torrents. According to the report by the Chronicle of Higher 
Education,
95 Textbook Torrents  have  involved  a  variety  of  copyright  materials  being  shared 
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among  college  students  without  rigthsholders’  permission.  By  July  2008,  publishers  have 
“largely acted on an ad hoc basis […] and targeted the sites making the material available”.
96  
 
The post-Napster file sharing systems such as BitTorrent are much harder to sue out of their 
existence, considering the difficulty in tracking pieced torrent files and volatile trackers. There 
is, however, still the problem that legal access to research and educational materials by lawful 
users through such file sharing networks may be prejudiced.  In 2007, the US RIAA published a 
list of Top Twenty Five of universities based on the number of piracy notices which college 
administrations had issued students.
97 The pressure from entertainment industries has forced a 
large  number  of  universities  to  restrict  the  use  of  all  file  sharing  on  the  campus  computer 
network, regardless of the potential lawful use of such systems.
98           
3.2.2. Technology Intermediaries Which Make Copies Themselves for Users Who 
May Have Fair Use Rights 
Compared to Napster and Grokster, in MP3.com and Google the file sharing intermediaries did 
copy for users who may enjoy fair use defence. Thus, the fair use issues surrounding these cases 
are, to some degree, similar to those where there is copying for third parties as discussed in Part 
3.1.3
99. Hence, MP3.com and Google are not only primary infringers, making copies for their 
end-users,  but  also  the  party  pursuing  that  such  infringing  be  protected  by  the  affirmative 
defence of fair use. 
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3.2.2.1. UMG Recordings v. MP3.com 
In April 2000, the New York court held MP3.com, an online music subscription provider, liable 
for copyright infringement. MP3.com launched a service named “My.MP3.com” by purchasing 
thousands of CDs and copying the recordings on to its server, in order to replay the recordings 
for its subscribers.   
 
MP3.com argued that its service was the “functional equivalent” of storage for its subscribers’ 
CDs, given that a subscriber had to “prove” he had already owned the CD before accessing the 
MP3.com service, and so justifying its actions as fair use. The Court found in favour of the 
plantiffs on three grounds: firstly, there was sufficient evidence that the MP3.com Company was 
trying  to  “attract  as  many  subscribers  as  possible  so  as  to  draw  advertising”.
100    Secondly, 
MP3.com’s argument for transformative “space shift” was irrelevant. Unlike the portable MP3 
player discussed in Diamond
101, the Court found that MP3.com was simply another way of 
“repackage[ing] the copyright works to facilitate their transmission through another medium”
102, 
with no “new aesthetics, new insights and understandings”
103 to the original works.  Thirdly, the 
Court rejected MP3.com’s opinion that the record companies had “traditional, reasonable, or 
likely  to  be  developed”  right  to  grant  or  withhold  a  license  to  perform  such  a 
service.
104According to the Court, the licensing market “directly derives from” rightsholders’ 
exclusive  rights,  which  entitles  rightsholders  the  right  to  “curb  the  development  of  such  a 
derivative market by refusing to license a copyrighted work or by doing so only on terms the 
copyright  owner  finds  acceptable”.
105  Thus,  MP3.com’s  service  was  asserted  to  invade  the 
rightsholders’ right to license their sound recordings to others for reproduction.  
3.2.2.2. Google Library Project Lawsuits 
In  late  2004,  Google  launched  Google  Library  Project,  aiming  to  “organise  the  world’s 
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information and make it universally accessible and useful”.
106 As part of the project, Google 
Library scheme aims to digitise and make searchable the collections of institutional partners. 
However, the Project has attracted opposition from some copyright owners and publishers. In 
September 2005, the Authors Guild and several individual authors sued Google for “massive 
copyright infringement”
107. A month later, McGraw-Hill and four other publishers filed a similar 
case against Google.
108 The Google litigation catalysed  debate on whether those copying to 
promote  online  searching  and  indexing  of  literary  works  should  be  incorporated  into  those 
eligible to benefit from fair use defence. 
 
It is interesting to note that, like the conventional librarian, Google’s library digitalisation project 
aims to provide materials to end-users, i.e., copying for third parties. However, Google Library 
is not entitled to the library exemption discussed in Part 3.1.3. Firstly, the commercial nature of 
Google’s business prevents the project from claiming fair use defence. As a for-profit company, 
Google  relies  on  the  revenue  from  advertisements  displayed  on  the  book  pages.  Thus,  the 
commercial  purpose  behind  Google  Library  distinguishes  Google  from  traditional  libraries.  
Secondly, the nature of the Google online service makes it difficult to detect whether the end-
user’s request is for “research or private study”.
109 Thirdly, as analysed in Part 3.1.3.,
110 relative 
legislations have confirmed that only physical libraries are allowed to make digital copies, which 
officially excludes online searching and indexing services. 
  
Instead  of  seeking  library  exemption,  Google  claimed  that  its  project  was  the  “digital  age 
equivalent of a card catalogue with every word in the publication indexed”
111 thus to be regarded 
as within the scope of fair use. In these cases, Google argued that there was no evidence for 
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negative impact on the potential market for original copyright works, given that Google had 
sufficiently transformed the use of the copyright works. Moreover, it is argued that rightsholders 
may  potentially  benefit  from  Google’s  search  engine  linking  to  their  works.
112  The  Google 
Library litigation was much debated among scholars within copyright law. 
 
According to scholars, two divergent lines of case strategy might lead to alternative results in 
U.S. copyright law.
113 Some suggested that the trial court in New York may follow the MP3.com 
decision.
114 As noted in Part 3.2.2.1.
115, copying the copyright content into the database was not 
a “fair use” and thus constituted copyright infringement.  By contrast, Google responded that its 
copying might fall under fair use if the court was directed by Kelly v. Arriba Soft
116 decision. In 
Kelly, the defendant used a software spider to locate, store and index photographic images on the 
Internet.  These  images  were  reduced  to  “thumbnails”
117  and  linked  by  an  online  searching 
service. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the commercial purposes 
of the defendant, but upheld the Arriba’s use was “[a] transformative use of Kelly’s images 
[which] promotes the goals of information dissemination and the fair use exception”.
118 Similar 
discussion  in  favour  of  online  searching  and  indexing  services  can  be  studied  in  the  Ninth 
Circuit decision in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc.
119, where the Court found Google’s service to 
be fair use, against the District Court’s rule that use of thumbnails was copyright infringement. 
 
However, a landmark deal has been achieved by Google and the Authors Guild and Association 
of American Publishers in October 2008, aiming to resolve a number of lawsuits in the last three 
years.
120 Under the terms of the settlement, in order to allow the availability of millions of 
copyright works through Google Book Search, Google will compensate authors and publishers 
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with $125 million. It will also be responsible for establishing a non-profit Book Rights Registry 
to  guarantee  rightsholders  receive  compensation  via  subscription  services  or  advertisement 
revenue. As to individual users, they will be allowed to preview up to 20 percent of a book and 
choose to purchase it as they wish. 
 
The “biggest book deal on the U.S. publishing history”
121 may be a promising way to protect 
rightsholders’ interests in the context of digital file sharing. However, it is noteworthy that this 
settlement implies that Google has given up on the claim that its online copying activities should 
be protected by the fair use rights of end-users. In other words, fair use is disappearing from the 
Google Library scheme. 
3.2.3. The End of Fair Use in the Context of File Sharing?  
Taken together; the cases above indicate that file sharing systems are under legal duress for 
encouraging illegal copyright infringement in the context of entertainment — and as a result 
may disappear, go underground or be shunned by lawful users.  
 
There exist two groups of defendants claiming fair use defence in lawsuits against file sharing 
systems.  The  first  is  the  primary  copyright  infringer,  namely  the  end-user  of  file  sharing 
networks  who  uploads,  downloads,  and  distributes  copyright  works  without  rightsholders’ 
permission. At this point it is important to define who “the primary infringer” is. Certain file 
sharing intermediaries such as MP3.com and Google, Inc., as in above cases, may fall under the 
definition of the “primary infringer”, given that they perform the primary infringing activities on 
behalf of end-users. Considering the intermediary nature of such file sharing tool providers, 
however, I shall categorise these file sharing providers into the second group in this thesis, i.e., 
the  file  sharing  intermediaries.  Besides  those  file  sharing  intermediaries  which  make  copies 
themselves for users who may have fair use rights, such as MP3.com and Google, Inc., file 
sharing  providers  such  as  Napster,  Grokster  and  BitTorrent  have  tried  to  exercise  fair  use 
defence for their end-users. 
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In the preceding cases, it is not in dispute that the Courts did not consider there might be an 
appropriate relationship between the end-users’ conducts and the statute excuses that could be 
secured through fair use doctrine.  The Courts did not look to apply the principle of fair use to 
certain  file  sharing  end-users  when  reaching  their  determination.    It  should,  however,  be 
emphasised that this does not mean that a reasonable fair use of copyright works through file 
sharing networks does not exist.  Just as Yen stated, “[I]n practice, … people generally use [file 
sharing]  technology  to  distribute  any  kind  of  computer  [processed]  unauthorised  copies  of 
copyrighted  music  and  movies”
122.  Theoretically,  however,  “people  could  use  [file  sharing] 
technology to distribute any kind of computer file”
123, including legally authorised works.  For 
instance, file sharing network can be used by faculty, researchers and students to share research 
materials, classroom teaching notes and even their own thesis.  What the Courts suggested, 
nevertheless,  was  that  rightsholders  “have  established  direct  infringement  of  their  copyright 
works by some end-users of [file sharing technology providers’] software”
124. The relationship 
between “(some) other end-users” whose conducts fall within copyright limitations and the fair 
use doctrine has been, at this stage, set aside. 
 
Secondly,  the  relationship  between  the  file  sharing  intermediaries,  i.e.,  the  file  sharing  tool 
provider, and the fair use doctrine also posed a dilemma for the Courts.  Two kinds of file 
sharing intermediaries, as identified in above cases, have been involved in the application of fair 
use  defence  to  alleged  copyright  infringement.    First,  intermediaries  whose  users  make  the 
copies  and  may  have  defense  of  fair  use,  like  Napster,  Grokster  and  BitTorrent,  act  as 
contributory infringers for the direct infringement. The contributory  infringer  means "one[s] 
who, with knowledge of infringing activity, induce, cause or materially contribute to infringing 
conduct of another”.
125 In theory, the contributory infringer should not be entitled to benefit 
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directly from the fair use defence, given that a fair “use” or “dealing” is normally recognised as a 
direct use made of a work
126, and only related to the primary infringer.  However, the technology 
providers as contributory infringers have aroused a number of arguments to justify the end-users’ 
activities  from  a  technology  perspective.    For  example,  by  granting  that  “home-shifting  of 
[copyright] programs is legitimate fair use”
127, Sony tried to apply fair use doctrine in this new 
area of technology.  This time-shifting technology was held as fair use despite the fact that 
consumers  were  copying  entire  programs  without  the permission  of  copyright  owners. With 
regard  to  fair  use  doctrine  in  the  file  sharing  environment,  the  contributory  infringer  faces 
something  more  troublesome  than  any  facts  applied  in  the  Sony  home  recorder  case.    The 
Napster  court  found  that,  different  from  “time-shifting”  or  “space-shifting”  technology,  the 
Napster P2P network is not a fair use because “the methods of shifting [in P2P networks] … 
simultaneously involve distribution of the copyright material to the general public; …[rather 
than] only to the original user”.
128  According to the Supreme Court decision in Grokster, a 
successful claim of “substantial non-infringing use” was trumped by the “inducement” doctrine. 
The principle embodied in Grokster and BitTorrent lawsuits shows that file sharing technology 
may not benefit from the fair use doctrine regardless of whether the file sharing network is a 
centralised or decentralised model.  
The other file sharing intermediary sub-type involved in fair use defence are those appealling to 
fair use for their own primary infringing behaviour. MP3.com and Google Library Project are 
typical  examples.  Being  the  primary  infringer,  it  is  more  plausible  for  file  sharing  service 
providers such as MP3.com to claim fair use protection. Detailing the reasons for such problems 
in file sharing environment, Dogan cites that some differences between home recorders and 
digital file sharers, such as nature of the works
129, nature and scale of the copying
130, privacy 
                                                                                                                                                            
http://www.unc.edu/courses/pre2000fall/law357c/cyberprojects/spring97/spliab/iptext.htm.  
126 For instance, according to Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, fair use is applied to 
“the use made of a work. See also, Section 28 (1) of CDPA describes fair dealing as “specify acts 
which may be done in relation to copyright”. See also, Bently, Intellectual Property Law, supra note 
7, at 194. According to Bently, “it is important to note that all that is meant by dealing is that the 
defendant has made use of the work”. 
127 See Sony,supra note 39. 
128 See Napster, supra note 2, at 4239. 
129 Stacey L. Dogan, “Comment: Sony, Fair Use and File Sharing”, Case Western Reserve Law 
Review, Vol.55 (4) (2005).  According to Dogan, unlike Sony, works shared on file sharing networks 
“are not works being picked up from a public broadcast, for watching at a later time”.   124 
concerns
131, and potential market harm
132 are of notable import in evaluating file sharers’ fair use 
claims
133. In spite of scholarly debates on the alternative legal results originating from different 
interpretations  of  fair  use  in  file  sharing  systems,  the  latest  dramatic  settlement  in  Google 
Library  Project  lawsuits  have  highlighted  the  existence  of  uncertainty  in  applying  fair  use 
doctrine in the context of file sharing.  
As discussed above, developments in file sharing technology have reduced the chances of using 
fair use defence by either end-users or file sharing intermediaries. On the one hand, the end-user 
has been identified as the direct copyright infringer by Courts, although still being mindful that 
there are a minority of end-users whose conducts fall within legitimate fair use.  On the other 
hand, the file sharing intermediaries are sued, and the “fair use” defence is generally rejected. 
Thus the systems are closed down and become inaccessible even to legitimate “fair users”. In 
short, traditional conditions on which fair use doctrine remains valid have withered away in the 
context of file sharing.   
3.3. The Fair Use Problem in the Context of File Sharing Unveiled 
 
Joseph Schumpeter states  that the most “fundament impulse that  sets and keeps the society 
engine  in  motion”
134  is  not  “competition  regarding  price,  quality,  and  effort”
135,  but  rather 
“creative destruction”
136, a process “that incessantly revolutionises the economic and [social] 
structure [by] incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one”
137.  In certain 
circumstances, the development of technologies which facilitate copying and the distribution of 
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copyright works can lead to much creative destruction within the copyright system. For instance, 
the creation of new technologies such as the photocopier and VCR has already altered copyright 
legislation and practice. In this respect, Internet technology, especially file sharing systems, is 
crucial for copyright system revolution in the age of new media, given its specific technical 
characteristics. In the following, I will emphasise how sharing copyright works through file 
sharing systems has introduced a state of uncertainty into the previously relatively stable balance 
between social benefit and rightsholders’ interest in the traditional copyright environment. 
 
3.3.1. Destruction of “Purpose” for Fair Use 
 
The specific technical design for information exchange via file sharing networks, i.e., the data 
flow form of resource swapping, especially in an anonymous way, causes problems in detecting 
the real purpose and character behind use of copyright works. It is relatively straightforward to 
confirm that a student’s photocopying of an article in library is to assist his classroom studying 
or essay writing, which activity falls within fair use domain.  In contrast, when copyright works 
are distributed as bits and bytes through file sharing networks, the massive copying facilitated by 
anonymous duplication and distribution tends to be less probable to be counted as fair use on an 
individual end file-sharer basis. 
 
A notable feature of fair use doctrine is that the dealing must be fair for proper purpose, whether 
it is a purpose specifically listed in copyright legislations, for example, UK copyright law
138 
defines fair dealing for limited purposes as in research or private study
139, criticism or review
140, 
or the reporting of current events
141; or it falls within open-ended purposes, which is allowed 
under US copyright law
142.  The fact that it may be impracticable for Courts to detect the real 
purpose of a use of copyrighted work as distributed in file sharing networks is a threat to fair use 
dependant on a fair purpose. 
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3.3.2. Destruction of “Private” Use 
According to its definition in Collins Concise Dictionary (1997), the word “private” refers to 
“not widely or publicly known”, “confidential”, or “not for general or public use”.
143 This term 
as incorporated in fair use doctrine connotes that the use of the copyright works is not for 
general or public purposes. 
 
The digital environment has greatly changed the role of end-users accessing copyright works. 
For instance, a user can keep his conduct “private” if he just photocopies one chapter from an 
entire book for his own research and study purpose. However, in the digital milieu he becomes a 
distributor when he downloads or uploads the chapter through file sharing networks. As Gervais 
remarks,  the  traditional  “end-users”  now  enter  a  classification  as  “intermediaries”  by  re-
disseminating the content within file sharing networks.
144 Private use in the file sharing networks 
no longer equates to “private” in a conventional sense. 
 
In the copyright sense, the intermediary role of file sharing network users, in most cases, impacts 
negatively on copyright protection, as it is then placed beyond the domain of fair use.  This is 
especially so in some countries, such as Canada, whose copyright legislations admit private 
copying to be fair use. For instance, in CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada,
145 the court 
addressed that “the fair dealing exception … is open to those who can show that their dealings 
with a copyrighted work were for the purpose of research or private study. … ‘Research’ must be 
given  a  large  and  liberal  interpretation  in  order  to  ensure  that  users’  rights  are  not  unduly 
constrained. … [As a result,] research is not limited to non-commercial or private context”.  
Nevertheless, in the context of file sharing where any “private” copying is capable of leading to 
a “public” dissemination, re-examining and reconsidering the definition of “private” has proved 
necessary. 
 
3.3.3. Destruction of “Middlemen” 
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As discussed in Part 2.2.1.2.
146, file sharing technology separates authors’ incentives to creation 
from the recording industry and also other content distributors’ incentives. File sharing separates 
the end users’ capacity to distribute copyrighted files from the entertainment industry. Instead of 
the  entertainment  industry  distributing  copyright  works,  the  consuming  public  can  now 
distribute digital content from one end-PC to another directly through file sharing networks, 
without  need  for  middlemen.  In  this  sense,  file  sharing  threatens  “the  very  foundation  of  a 
business model based upon distributing content to the public”
147, rendering the entertainment 
industry and other content distributors potentially redundant. 
 
Without  the  capability  of  distributing  copyrighted  content  within  file  sharing  networks,  the 
entertainment industry, as one of the most important rightsholder groups, have lost control over 
third party consumers who wish to make use of copyrighted digital content.  As such, licensing 
as an effective strategy for conventional copyright industries is threatened. Although automated 
rights management (ARM) and digital rights management (DRM) provide rightsholders with a 
way to control their works with digital defensive mechanisms, such as firewalls, encryption, and 
passwords, a large number of end-users are still able to freely access copyright works without 
authentication through file sharing networks. Thus, rightsholders in the entertainment industry 
are under threat in the context of file sharing, on the ground that “online access has replaced 
distribution (of copies) with licensing”.
148  
 
3.3.4. Destruction of “Market” Interests 
One’s willingness to purchase copyright content would certainly be influenced by the chance of 
obtaining it at no extra cost
149. File sharing, therefore, is a serious threat, breaking the traditional 
copyright market. The technical characteristics of file sharing networks offer a large number of 
end-users the opportunity to upload, download, copy and distribute copyrighted content without 
properly compensating copyright owners, hence it can be assumed that rightsholders’ revenue 
                                                        
146 See Part 2.2.1.2, at 66-70. 
147 See Wendy J. Gordon, “Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors”, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 82 (1982) at 28. 
148 See Gervais, Towards a New Core International Copyright Norm, supra note 38, at 27. 
149 See Gordon, supra note 147, at 28.   128 
loss in turn will result in market imbalance. Ku states that, “[a]s the costs of copying decrease 
and more individuals are able to afford the technology necessary to copy, one can assume that 
there will be a greater number of potential copiers. So even though the copying costs for the 
initial distributors will decrease as well, they will be forced to compete with a greater number of 
copiers and copies”.
150  
 
A probability tool known as “The Long Tail Theory” can be applied to prove rightsholders’ 
market interests loss in the context of file sharing.  This was first mentioned by Chris Anderson 
in an essay named “The Long Tail”
151 which described certain business and market models such 
as Netflix
152 and Amazon.com distributing to a low-frequency or low-amplitude population. The 
long tail theory realises that traditional media offers most resource control and profits to a small 
cluster of entities, following the popular Pareto Principle
153 which states that 80% of resources 
and profits are attained by 20% of major entertainment industries.  However, the “long tail”, 
under certain circumstances, can “collectively make up a market share that rivals or exceeds the 
relatively few current bestsellers and blockbusters”
154, if the distribution is large enough.  This is 
especially so, given that the Internet technology which provides end-users with more facilities to 
attend to market activities is at present full of vitality.  As Anderson says, “[t]he theory of the 
Long Tail is that our culture and economy is increasingly shifting away from focusing on a 
relatively small number of “hits” (mainstream products and markets) at the head of the demand 
curve and toward a huge number of niches in the tail. … [,] especially online…”
155 
 
File sharing practice conforms to the long tail theory.  The basic technical characteristics of 
digital resource swapping make information exchange quicker, cheaper and more convenient.  In 
                                                        
150 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, “The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New 
Economics of Digital Technology”, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69 (2002) at 296-297. 
151 See Chris Anderson, The Long Tail: Why the Future Business is Selling Less of More, Hyperion 
Press (2006). See also, Chris Anderson, The Long Tail How Endless Choice Is Creating Unlimited 
Demand, Random House (2007). 
152 “Netfilx”, an online DVD rental service which offers over 60,000 DVDs, including many 
unpopular movies and TV series, etc... Available at, http://www.netflix.com/Default.  
153 “Pareto’s principle” is also known as the 80-20 rule, which states that 80 percent of the work is 
performed by 20 percent of the employees; or that 80 percent of the wealth is held by 20 percent of 
the population. See Alan Rushton, Handbook of Logistics and Distribution Management, Kogan Page 
Press, 2
nd ed. (2001). 
154 See Chris Anderson, “The Zen of Jeff Bezos”, Wired, Vol. 166 (January, 2005). 
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the digital world, “private use” no longer exists — traditional users of copyright works are also 
“intermediaries” who re-disseminate the content.
156 Many of the new “intermediaries”
157, as the 
entertainment  industry  worried,  have  competitively  threatened  the  established  market  and 
entertainment businesses.  Jessica Litman states that, “[digital] file trading has so far proved to 
be a far more effective distribution mechanism for a broader range of music, but is even worse 
than  the  conventional  system  at  compensating  creators”.
158  The  unsuccessful  compensating 
system  stemming  from  file  sharing  technology  in  turn  causes  an  imbalance  between  social 
benefit and right holders’ market interest in facilitating fair use doctrine.  
 
Although the idea that the market interest loss as a consequence of the file sharing is part of the 
reason that fair use doctrine has shrunk in the entertainment file sharing circumstances, it is 
necessary to emphasise that different situations may be encountered when regulating research 
and  educational  file  sharing.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  5,  a  voluntary  system  which  only 
compensates rightsholders in non-pecuniary terms has been proved to be possible in the context 
of research and educational file sharing, given the fact that the academic authors’ expectation for 
rewards  is  more  focused  on  the  academic  value  being  imposed  on  their  works  by  other 
scholars.
159 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
The  technical  design  of  file  sharing  systems  has  greatly  changed  the  way  people  share 
information. Considering the potential benefits which researchers and educational users may 
obtain  from  accessing  file  sharing  systems,  applying  fair  use  doctrine  into  file  sharing 
circumstances is strongly desirable.  The case studies above have described how fair use defence 
has struggled along in file sharing legal practice, and demonstrated that parties who are entitled 
to fair use in traditional copyright environment have been progressively losing the benefit of fair 
                                                        
156 See Daniel J. Gervais, supra note 38, 
157 See, e.g., The Ninth Circuit Court provided the figures that in 1999 approximately 10,000 music 
files were “shared” per second using Napster and more than 100 users attempted to log onto the 
Napster server every second. Napster’s popularity was 75 million users by the end of 2000. See, 
Napster, supra note 2. 
158 See Jessica Litman, “Sharing and Stealing” (2003) available at, 
http://www.quicktopic.com/25/D/cD8dwc52A3p.html.  
159 See Chapter 5, 5.4.4., at 218.   130 
use in the context of file sharing. This leads to a need for consideration of alternatives to apply 
conventional fair use doctrine to new technological circumstances.   
 
To discover effective alternatives,  the basic reasons that fair use doctrine has shrunk in the 
context of file sharing may be useful to ascertain. Specifically, the basic way for information 
exchange employed, i.e., the data flow form of resource swapping, especially in an anonymous 
form, causes troubles in detecting the real purpose and character for the use of the copyrighted 
work.  Private use in the file sharing networks, more importantly, no longer keeps “private” in a 
traditional sense. The digital environment has influenced the role of users in accessing copyright 
protected  works.  Traditional  “end-users”  have  extended  their  roles  to  function  as 
“intermediaries”  by  re-disseminating  content.
160  Thus,  the  development  of  file  sharing 
technology  has  de-constructed  the  traditional  conditions  which  fair  use  doctrine  relies  on, 
resulting in some loss of market interests for rightsholders. We can therefore imagine that when 
rightsholders’ statutory rights fall beyond control, applying exceptions or limitations to such 
rights such as the fair use doctrine in practice might well be questioned.    
 
If, as discussed above, the essential of fair use —balance between the public interest and the 
rightsholders’ benefit —having been altered in the context of file sharing, how can the existing 
fair use legal system be improved? Is there a solution to rebuild another balanced system in 
digital file sharing? The following Part will explore ways which may be helpful to re-introduce 
fair use doctrine into research and educational file sharing by analysing solutions being adopted 
in contemporary entertainment file sharing and academic file sharing practice. 
                                                        
160 Ibid.   131 
Part III Alternative Methods of Guaranteeing Fair Use for 
Educational Users in File Sharing 
 
As demonstrated in previous chapters, the issue of applying fair use/fair dealing in the context of 
file  sharing  is  controversial.  Scholars  and  politicians  have  presented  a  number  of  possible 
solutions to the conflict surrounding fair use/fair dealing doctrine.  This Part critically examines 
three  proposed  solutions  to  the  fair  use  dilemma  in  the  context  of  file  sharing,  with  each 
categorised  according  to  the  source of  compensation  for  rightsholders. These  comprise  “the 
public model”, “the private model”, and “the voluntary model”.  
 
Within this text, “the public model” refers to those approaches which involve state or public 
regulation
1. Under such a scheme, the government implements a tax or levy system on purchases 
of recordable media, in exchange for permission to allow private copying. The German pre-2008 
experience  is  an  example  of  a  public  levy.      By  comparison,  in  “the  private  model”, 
compensation  for  rightsholders  is  collected  via  private  contracts.  The  best-known  current 
example  of  the  private  model  is Apple’s  iTunes  subscription  scheme
2.    Finally,  there  is  the 
voluntary model, where authors simply give away their copyright content for free, or at most for 
non-monetary  compensation  by  obtaining  insubstantial  benefits  such  as  reaching  a  larger 
audience, or enjoying greater prestige. Contemporary open license movements, such as Open 
Access  to  Knowledge  (A2K)  and  Creative  Commons  (CC),  are  examples  of  the  voluntary 
                                                        
1 To date, the government-involved approach has been discussed in different jurisdictions. For 
example, Jörg, Reinbothe, “Compensation for Private Taping Under Sec 53(5) of the German 
Copyright Act”, International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law, Vol.12 (1981) at 36. 
See also, Ernest A. Seemann, “Sound and Video-Recording and the Copyright Law: The German 
Approach”, Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal, Vol.2 (1983) at 225. Thomas Dreier, 
“Copyright Law and Digital Exploitation of Works: The Current Copyright Landscape in the Age of 
the Internet and Multimedia” (1997) available at, 
http://library.fes.de/fulltext/stabsabteilung/00218toc.htm. Don E Tomlinson and Timothy Nielander, 
“Red Apples and Green Persimmons: A Comparative Analysis of Audio Home-Recording Royalty 
Laws in the United States and Abroad”, Mississippi College Law Review, Vol. 20 (1999) at 5. See, 
“Economic Impact Study: Private Copying Levies on Digital Equipment and Media in Europe”, 
Report Commissioned by Business Software Alliance (2003) at 3. 
2 See iTunes’s Store Term of Service, available at, http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/service.html. 
(access at Jan 15, 2008). See also, Napster Terms and Conditions, available at, 
http://www.napster.com/terms.html (April 10, 2008).   132 
model. 
 
By focusing on the advantages and limitations of each model in Chapters 4 and 5, I evaluate that 
the current public model and private models  may not be appropriate for digital file sharing 
practice for academic or educational purposes. In comparison, I suggest that the voluntary model 
is a possible solution, given emphasis on its potential to serve academic consumers. 
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Chapter 4. Current “Fared” Use Models in the Context of File 
Sharing 
 
 
Since  Napster  emerged  in  1999,  file  sharing  has  become  an  intractable  topical  issue  in 
entertainment practice. This Chapter analyses the “fared” use models, i.e., the public and private 
model approaches deployed by the entertainment industry when file sharing made collecting 
revenues for rightsholders problematic. I shall evaluate the advantages and limitations of these 
two models.  Attention will, in particular, be drawn to the inappropriateness of these models 
within academic and/or educational file sharing practice. 
 
 
4.1 The Public Model: Levies, Taxes or Tariffs 
 
The public model, also known as “levies”, “taxes” or “tariffs” collected on file sharing goods 
and services, has been used in practice for decades to facilitate the evolution of new media 
technology. It is defined as “a form of compensation for rightsholders based on the premise that 
an act of private copying cannot be licensed for practical reasons and thus causes economic harm 
to the relevant rightsholders”.
3  A distinction between “levy” and “tax” can be based on who 
collects the accumulated funds; taxes are collected by a government, while levies are received by 
a private body, such as a copyright collecting society, and examples of the way they function will 
be discussed in detail in this chapter. 
 
4.1.1 History of the Public Model 
The system of copyright levies for private copying was initiated in the 1950s in certain (mainly 
continental) legal systems, with the advent of sound recording equipment, enabling the public to 
                                                        
3 See European Commission, “Background Document: Fair Compensation for Acts of Private 
Copying”, Brussels (Feb 14, 2008).   134 
copy  copyright  protected  works  easily  and  cheaply.    Following  the  development  of  this 
technology,  a  landmark  case  in  Germany  —  GEMA  v.  Grundig
4  (GEMA)  —  established  a 
principle that private copying activity is “not beyond ... exclusive recording rights”
5 and that the 
copyrightsholder  is  entitled  to  reasonable  remuneration  “from  the  manufacturers  of  such 
recording equipment for the losses incurred through the private copying undertaken by users of 
such equipment”
6.  In 1965 a German Copyright Act, Urheberrechtsgesetz (UrhG)
7 introduced 
the world’s first statutory licence and levy for private copying in article 53
8.  Based on the 
German court decision and the 1965 German Copyright Act, the European Union’s Directive on 
the  Harmonisation  of  Certain Aspects  of  Copyright  and  Related  Rights  in  the  Information 
Society (2001/29/EC) requires that member states ensure “fair compensation” to rightsholders 
for copies made by means of digital recording equipment.
9   The incentives to alleviate the 
digital  threat  to  existing  copyright  system  have  stimulated  many  countries,  including  most 
continental European Countries
10, to settle inclusively for individual non-commercial uses of 
copyright works, on condition that levy or tax compensations are imposed for that purpose.  For 
example,  a  blank  media  levy  was  introduced  to  the  Canadian  Copyright  Act  1997,  which 
                                                        
4 See GEMA v. Grundig, Decision of May 18, 1955, I ZR 8/54, 17 BGHZ 266; 1955 GRUR 492. See 
also, GEMA Supreme Court decision of May 29, 1964, BGHZ 42M118M GYRY 1965M 104. (Since 
GEMA v. Grundig, Germany created “the most comprehensive” levies on the sale of audio and video 
recording equipment and media, copying equipment, as well as general purpose home computers.) 
5 See Economic Impact Study, supra note 1, at 6. 
6 Ibid. 
7 See Copyright Law (Urheberrechtsgesetz, UrhG), 9 September 1965, last amended on 8 May 1998. 
Available at, http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/UrhG.htm.  
8 Ibid. 
9 According to Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29/EC, Member States may provide for an exception 
on private copying. It states, “in respect of reproductions on any medium made by a natural person 
for private ends that are neither directly or indirectly commercial, on condition that the rightsholders 
receive fair compensation which takes account of the application or non-application of technological 
measures referred to in Article 6 to the work or other subject matter concerned”. 
10 According to EU Consultant Paper on Fair Compensation for Acts of Private Copying, “22 out of 
the 27 Member States in EU have imposed private copying levies on manufacturers, importers or 
distributors of analogue or digital equipment or media that allows consumers to copy”, supra note 3.  
See also, Neil Weinstock Netanel, “Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File-
Swapping and Remixing” (2002) available at, 
http://www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/knowledge_goods/netanal%20levy.pdf. See also, Glynn S. Lunney 
Jr., “The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act”, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 87 (2003) at 853. (Lunney listed private copying levy 
provisions of European Union countries in the article). See also, P.Bernt Hugenholtz, Lucia Guibault, 
and Sjoerd van Geffen, “The Future of Levies in a Digital Environment”, The Final Report of IVIR 
(2003) available at, http://www.ivir.nl/publications/other/DRM&levies-report.pdf. Peter K. Yu, “An 
Introduction to the EU Information Society Directive”, Gigalaw.com (2001) available at, 
http://gigalaw.com/articles/2001-all/yu-2001-11-all.html.    135 
imposes levies on “blank audio recording media”
11, such as CD-ROMs. Finland’s blank media 
tax is one of the highest, which charges €0.50/min for audio tapes, €0.50/min for digital audio 
players to a maximum of €15 and €0.76/min for personal video recorders to a maximum of 
€15.
12 To date, there are at least 42 countries which have a remuneration scheme for private 
copying; on the other hand, some other EC countries such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg do not have levies or taxes of this kind. 
 
4.1.2 Academic Proposals for Introducing the Public Model to Compensation for 
File Sharing 
A number of academics have proposed ways of implementing taxes, levies or tariffs on P2P file 
sharing goods and services to compensate rightsholders. For example, Neil Netanel suggested 
imposing a noncommercial use levy on P2P file swapping and remixing. As he stated, “[T]he 
levy  …  would  be  imposed  on  the  sale of  any  consumer  product  or  service  whose  value  is 
substantially enhanced by P2P file sharing”
13, such as Internet access, P2P software and services, 
computer hardware, consumer electronic devices (e.g., CD burners, MP3 players, and digital 
video recorders) used to copy, store, transmit, or perform downloaded files, and storage media 
(like blank CDs) used with those devices.  In exchange for imposing a noncommercial use levy, 
copyright law would “provide copyright immunity for individuals’ noncommercial copying and 
                                                        
11 See Section 82 of Canadian Copyright Act 1997 states that,  
“(1) Every person who, for the purpose of trade, manufactures a blank audio recording medium in 
Canada or imports a blank audio recording medium into Canada 
(a) is liable, subject to subsection (2) and section 86, to pay a levy to the collecting body on selling or 
otherwise disposing of those blank audio recording media in Canada; and 
(b) shall, in accordance with subsection 83(8), keep statements of account of the activities referred to 
in paragraph (a), as well as of exports of those blank audio recording media, and shall furnish those 
statements to the collecting body. 
(2) No levy is payable where it is a term of the sale or other disposition of the blank audio recording 
medium that the medium is to be exported from Canada, and it is exported from Canada”.  
Canada's current levies are as follows: $0.29 per unit for Audio Cassette tape (40min or longer); 
$0.77 per unit for CD-R Audio, CD-RW-Audio & MiniDisc; $0.21 per unit for CD-R, CD-RW (non 
audio). Canada also imposes a levy of “$15 on portable MP3 players with up to 10GB of non-
removable memory and $25 on devices with more capacity”. See, Copyright Board of Canada, 
“Private Copying 2003-2004”, at 56, available at, http://www.cb-cba.gc.ca/decisions/c12122003-
b.pdf.  
12 See “Private Copying Levy”, Ikookies.com, available at, http://www.ikookies.com/limitations-and-
exceptions-to-copyright/private-copying-levy.html.  
13 See Netanel, supra note 10.   136 
distribution of any expressive content that the copyrightsholder has previously released to the 
public”
14.  Additionally, individuals’ noncommercial derivative creation of such content would 
also be given immunity, provided “the derivative creator clearly identifies the underlying work 
and indicates that it has been modified”
15.  
 
In  the  book  “Promises  to  Keep”,  Fisher  provides  a  “governmentally  administered  reward 
model”
16 to make restitution for damage to rightsholders.  In his system, a creator who wishes to 
collect revenue for usage of his copyright works needs register the work with the Copyright 
Office
17. With registration, the digital copy of work would be assigned “a unique file name, 
which would be used to track transmissions of digital copies of the work”
18. Through taxes or 
levies on purchasing digital recordable audio or visual-audio media, the government would thus 
collect money to compensate registrants for permitting the public to access their works. Using 
techniques pioneered by American and European performing rights organisations and television 
rating services, a government agency would estimate the frequency with which each song and 
film was heard or watched by consumers. Each registrant would then periodically be paid by the 
agency a share of the tax revenues proportional to the relative popularity of his or her creation
19.  
According to Fisher, “[o]nce this system were in place, we would modify copyright law so as to 
eliminate most of the current prohibitions on unauthorised reproduction, distribution, adaptation, 
and  performance  of  audio  and  video  recordings.  Music  and  films  would  thus  be  readily 
available, legally, for free”
20.   
 
In the article “The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital 
Millennium  Copyright  Act”,  Glynn  Lunny  discusses  the  private  copying  levy  provisions  of 
European Union countries, and argues that a levy should be imposed on devices and digital 
                                                        
14 See Netanel, supra note 10. 
15 See Netanel, supra note 10. 
16 See William W. Fisher, Promises to Keep: Technology, Law and the Future of Entertainment, 
California: Stanford Law and Politics Press, 1
st ed. (2004) at 202. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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exchange  media  to  solve  the  problems  resulting  from  private  digital  copying
21.    Given  the 
development of Internet subscription services, Raymond Shih Ray Ku also suggests that the 
government  should  collect  statutory  levies  on  Internet  service  subscriptions  and  sales  of 
computers as well as audio and video equipment.
22  
 
However, there are academic critiques focusing on these public models. Some scholars argue 
that  private  copying  levies  may  not  generate  sufficient  compensation  to  rightsholders.  For 
instance, by arguing that setting prices and revenues in an arbitrary manner may lead to market 
failures,  such  as  an  unreasonable  royalty  rate  leading  to  insufficient  compensation  for  right 
holders, Liebowitz
23 argues questioningly around the difficulties in setting sufficient levels on 
the levies or taxes.  Others contend that intellectual property is similar to real property so that 
rightsholders should have total control over the use of their works. As Lionel
24 suggests, the 
application of DRM and ISPs makes it possible for users to be charged for downloaded works at 
rates established by the rightsholders themselves.  Other drawbacks of a levy system, such as 
inequitable  cross-subsidisation
25  and  distribution  complexities
26,  have  also  been  highlighted. 
These academic concerns regarding the public model, as discussed in 4.1.4 below, have emerged 
in digital file sharing practice. 
 
4.1.3 The Public Model Practice 
Levy  and  tax  schemes  which  can  be  applied  to  file  sharing  have  been  broadly  adopted  in 
                                                        
21 See Glynn S. Lunney Jr, supra note 10, at 853.  
22 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, “The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New 
Economic of Digital Technology”, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69 (2002) at 311-322. 
23 See S. J. Liebowitz, “Alternative Copyright Systems: The Problems with a Compulsory License”, 
IP Central Review, Vol.1 (2) (2004). 
24 See Lionel S. Sobel, “DRM as an Enabler of Business Models: ISP as Digital Retailer” (2003) 
available at, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/drm/papers/sobel-drm-btlj2003.html 
25 See, e.g., Neil Netanel argues that, “The low-volume users subsidy problem is somewhat 
overstated, however. For one, many low-volume users will happily pay a surcharge for the possibility 
of unlimited file sharing even if they do not actually engage in much file sharing. After all, consumers 
regularly buy computers with far more memory and processing capacity than they actually use … 
Further, imposing the levy will encourage some low-volume users to become high-volume users…” 
See, Netanel, supra note 10, at 67-74. 
26 See, e.g., Adrian Sterling states that Collecting Societies have been put into a monopoly position, 
where they have a position of sole responsibility for the exercise of rights in particular areas. See, 
J.A.L Sterling, World Copyright Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2
nd ed. (2003) at 504.   138 
continental European countries. By contrast, such schemes are rare in Anglo-American common 
law systems. Indeed, the current situation is polarised — at one extreme, countries like Germany 
include the statutory licence and levy “as a matter of law”
27 in their copyright law systems
28; 
while at the opposite end, there have been no reform provisions introduced into some legislation 
such as UK copyright law yet.
29  It is noteworthy that a middle ground solution, which allows 
remedies for limited private copying activities in certain circumstances while adopting a broader 
“fair use” exception to private copying, has emerged, as exemplified by US copyright law.  The 
following examines the legal background to the public model, and comprises a comparative 
study of the way in which the public levy model has permeated within three systems, namely 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
 
4.1.3.1. Private Copying Exceptions in General: International and Regional Level 
 
The legality of the public levy model is closely related to national legislations, and also modified 
by a series of international instruments and regional directives. Hence it is useful to revisit the 
provisions  for  public  levies  embodied  in  these  conventions.  Generally  speaking,  the  most 
relevant provisions in this context are the so-called private copying exceptions. 
 
The  idea  of  establishing  a  general  rule  for  countries  to  institute  permitted  exceptions  and 
limitations to authors’ exclusive rights originated from the Report of the Swedish/ BIRPI Study 
Group  1964
30.  This  suggested  “if  a  provision  on  the  subject  [of  not  making  the  Berne 
Convention to be an anomaly] is to be incorporated in the text of the Convention, a satisfactory 
                                                        
27 See Andrew F. Christie, “Private Copying License and Levy Schemes: Resolving the Paradox of 
Civilian and Common Law Approaches”, Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 116 (2004) available at, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=690521. at 6. 
28 There are at least 42 countries which adopt private copying schemes, such as Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and so on. 
See, Gillian Davies and Michele Hung, Music and Private Copying: An International Survey of the 
Problem and the Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell (2001). 
29 In the European Union, there are still three member states, i.e., the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Luxembourg, who have no current plan to adopt the private copying levy scheme. 
30 See Swedish/BIRPI Study Group Report in 1964, (amended in 1965), DA/22/2, at 47.   139 
formula will have to be found for the inevitable exceptions to this [reproduction] right”
31, given 
the fact that “exceptions that might restrict the [economic or practically important] possibilities 
open to the authors …are unacceptable”, as well as “[many] national legislations [had] already 
contain[ed] a series of exceptions,… and that it would be vain to suppose that states would … do 
away  with  these  exceptions  to  any  appreciable  extent”
32.  Eventually,  the  Berne  Convention 
accepted the following text as Article 9 (2) of the Stockholm Act in 1967: 
 
(2)  It  shall  be  a  matter  for  legislation  in  the  countries  of  the  Union  to  permit  the 
reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction 
does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. 
 
Following the Berne Convention, a model known as the “three-step test” has been adopted and 
used in the TRIPs Agreement
33, the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 1996 
34, and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996 (WPPT)
35.  The detailed analysis of such “three-step 
test” in Chapter 2
36 indicates that the legislative technique has been to sanction copying for 
private  use  in  certain  special  cases,  provided  the  use  does  not  “conflict  with  a  normal 
exploitation of the work” or “does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
author”.  Article 15(1) of the Rome Convention
37 also allows contracting States to provide for 
exceptions to “private use” in their domestic laws and regulations.  
 
At regional level, the task of deciding on limitations and exceptions to be permitted for private 
copying has also been carried out. The Council of the European Union, the European Parliament 
and  the  Commission  have  been  working  together,  in  order  to  reach  EU-wide  harmonising 
legislation  on  the  issue  of  private  copying.    The  1988  Green  Paper  on  copyright  and  the 
challenge  of  technology
38  was  the  first  step  in  EU  legislation,  driving  the  harmonisation  of 
                                                        
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 See Article 13 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). 
34 See Article 10(1) of WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 1996. 
35 See Article 16 of WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) 1996. 
36 See Chapter 2, Part 2.3.2, at 81. 
37 See Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organisations (Rome Convention) 1961. 
38 See Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology – Problems in Copyright Calling   140 
national laws on private copying in this digital information age. The Commission paper states 
that commercial piracy greatly harms the EU internal market, and notes the need to promote 
harmonising national laws on private copying in order to deal with technological change.   The 
Green Paper on copyright and related rights in the information society
39 in 1995 emphasises that 
levies  may  deliver  as  a  partial  cure  for  market  failure  and  individual  piracy  in  the  Internet 
context.      In  1999,  the  EU  Parliament  proposed  a  new  subsection  concerning  digital  home 
copying, which states “a natural person was only to reproduce digital works for private and 
purely personal use, … [and] solely for non-commercial purposes”.
40    Article 5(2) (b) of the EU 
Copyright  Directive  2001/29/EC  was  a  significant  step  towards  harmonising  the  “private 
copying  exception”  in  the  European  Union. Article  5(2)(b)  provides  an  option  for  the  EU 
Member States to adopt copyright exceptions to the reproduction right on condition that copying 
is for non-commercial “private use” and the rightsholders can receive “fair compensation”. It is 
interesting to note that the EU Commission issued Communication from the Commission to the 
European Economic and Social Committee on the Management of Copyright and Related Rights 
in  the  Internal  Market
41  in  2004  which  highlights  deficiency  in  the  current  compensatory 
systems  for  private  copying  online  by  emphasising  the  need  to  make  the  levy  collecting 
procedure  “more  transparent,  accountable,  flexible  and  efficient”
42.    Since  2005,  a series  of 
consultations  on  copying  levy  reform  have  been  included  in  the  EC  Work  Program.
43  A 
questionnaire on "Copyright levies in a converging world"
44 and a Follow-up consultation to 
stakeholders
45 was submitted for public consultation between March 2005 and July 2006 to 
ensure that later Commission proposals were technically viable, practically workable and based 
                                                                                                                                                            
for Immediate Action, COM (1988) 172. 
39 See Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, COM (1995) 382, 
final. 
40 See Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the harmonization of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, COM (1997) 0628 (O.J. 1998 C 
108/6) 
41 See Communication from the Commission to the European Economic and Social Committee on the 
management of copyright and related rights in the internal market, COM (2004) 261. 
42 Ibid. 
43 See the EC Proposal: Fair Compensation for Private Copying: copyright levies reform, 
2006/MARKT/08 (2006). 
44 See Stakeholder Consultation on copyright levies in a converging world (O.J. 2006 C 297/10) 
(2006).  
45 See The Follow-up Stakeholder Consultation on copyright levies in a converging world (June 6, 
2006 – July 14, 2006).   141 
on a bottom-up approach. On 14 February 2008, the European Commission re-launched a new 
consultation  process  on  “Fair  Compensation  for  Acts  of  Private  Copying”,
46  aiming  to 
demonstrate whether a common approach between all stakeholders can be developed. 
4.1.3.2. National Levy Schemes on Private Copying 
At national level, countries are entitled to decide whether or not, and, if so, in which form and to 
what extent their particular legal framework imposes a public levy system on private copying. 
When looking at the growth of public levy schemes throughout the world, it is apparent that the 
majority of them are in civil law countries.  The analysis of data collected in the European digital 
media and equipment market reveals that the total amount collected by this levy scheme on 
digital equipment and services has increased nearly threefold by 2006 compared to the data in 
2002
47.  
 
4.1.3.2.1. The Public Levy Permitted As a Matter of Law: The German pre-2008 Statutory 
Licence and Levy Scheme  
 
In order to analyse public levy practice in continental European copyright systems it is useful to 
start with the German copyright levy scheme, which was the first statutory licence and levy 
scheme in the world, namely, the Urheberrechtsgesetz Copyright Act (UrhG) in 1965.  Prior to 
1965, non-commercial private copying was permitted as an exception or limitation to copyright 
law  in  Germany.  Article  15(2)  of  the  Gesetz  betreffend  das  Urheberrecht  and  Werken  der 
Literatur und der Tonkunst 1901 (LUG) authorised “copying for private use … in cases where 
the purpose [was] not to gain income from the work”.
48 German Parliament justified article 15, 
                                                        
46 See Background Document on Fair Compensation for Acts of Private Copying, supra note 3. 
47 The Report of Rightscom for the Business Software Alliance reveals that levies collected on digital 
equipment and media totaled €309.39m in 2002, while it increased to €542.04m in 2004 and 
€860.92m in 2006. See Economic Impact Study, supra note 1, at 3. 
48 See Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht and Werken der Literatur und der Tonkunst 1901 (LUG), 
Reichsgesetz, (1. Januar 1902). Article 15 states,  
“Eine Vervielfältigung ohne Einwilligung des Berechtigten ist unzulässig, gleichviel durch welches 
Verfahren sie bewirkt wird; auch begründet es keinen Unterschied, ob das Werk in einem oder in 
mehreren Exemplaren vervielfältigt wird. 
 Eine Vervielfältigung zum persönlichen Gebrauch ist zulässig, wenn sie nicht den Zweck hat, aus 
dem Werke eine Einnahme zu erzielen”.     142 
stating “an individual’s private sphere must be free from claims of copyright infringement”
49. 
Nevertheless,  the  substantial  threat  to  rightsholders’  interests  caused  by  the  development  of 
audio-tape recorders opened “an enormous pair of sluice-gates”
50 to private copying.  
 
The German statutory  licence and levy system  was initially rooted  in two cases,  where the 
German  Collecting  Society  for  Musical  Performing  and  Mechanical  Reproduction  Rights 
(GEMA) commenced lawsuits against the manufacturers and retailers of tape recorder machines.  
GEMA v. Grundig (1954)
51 was one of the earliest cases to recognise the manufacturers’ liability 
in selling the equipment, which can be used for both legal and illegal copying activities.  In 
GEMA v. Grundig (1954), the Supreme Court observed that “it is irreconcilable with copyright 
law principles to assume that the protection of the private sphere plainly prohibits payment for 
his  creation  from  accruing  to  the  author  when  the  use  of  the  work  happens  in  the  private 
sphere”
52, even if “within the privacy of one’s home no one [might] injure the authors’ interests 
in personality rights, diminishing his rights of recognition or alter the author’s work”
53.  The 
decision  emphasised  that  “the  individual  enjoyment  of  the  work”
54  constitutes  the  internal 
justification of the copyrightsholder’s right of remuneration, no matter whether the enjoyment 
occurs in the public or in the domestic domain.  As a result, the Court made a decision about the 
“GEMA  notice”
55  in  1960,  stating  that  “neutral  advertising”
56  was  not  sufficient  for 
manufacturers of recorders to avoid copyright liability. Instead, they should be required to enter 
into a licensing agreement with GEMA, in order to possess an exemption from the GEMA-
notice. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
See also, Katerina Gaita and Andrew F. Christie, “Principle or Compromise? Understanding the 
Original Thinking Behind Statutory Licence and Levy Schemes for Private Copying”, Intellectual 
Property Quarterly, Vol. 8 (2004) at 442-447. 
49 See Gaita and Christie, supra note 48, at 446. See also, Ernest A. Seemann, Sound and Video-
Recording and the Copyright Law: The German Approach, supra note 1, at 244. 
50 Quoted in J. H. Spoor, W. R. Cornish and P. F. Nolan, Copies in Copyright (1980). As quoted by 
Gaita and Christie, supra note 48, at 447. 
51 See GEMA v. Grundig, 1 ZR 8/54, 17 BGHZ 266, 271,272, [1955] GRUR 492. supra note 4.  
52 Ibid, at 280. 
53 Ibid, at 275. 
54 Ibid, at 278. 
55 A “GEMA-notice” here originates from the Court decision, which ordered Grundig not to sell its 
equipment which can be used for both legal and illegal copying, without reference to possible 
copyright infringement in their advertisement and instruction. 
56 See Decision of 22 January 1960, GRUR 1960, at 340.   143 
The other significant case is GEMA’s 1964
57 lawsuit, which involved a retailer of tape recorder 
machines. In GEMA 1964, the plaintiff requested the retailers limit their customers to those who 
presented legal identification that they had signed a license with GEMA.  The Supreme Court 
decided that GEMA’s claims conflicted with the inviolability of the home guaranteed in the 
German  Constitution
58,  and  suggested  that  GEMA  might  have  an  action  against  “the 
manufacturer  of  the  equipment,  which  knowingly  aided  and  abetted  their  customers’ 
infringement of copyright”.
59 Following the Court’s decision, the Judiciary Committee of the 
German Parliament proposed imposing a levy on producers of recording equipment in 1964, 
given the fact that they “took express advantage of the popularity of home taping … and aided 
and abetted it”.
60  Since the levy scheme was officially enacted in the Copyright Act 1965, the 
Urheberrechtsgesetz (UrhG), Germany has imposed a series of private copying levies, requiring 
a payment of a statutory levy on digital media, including blank audio and audiovisual recording 
media and devices, such as printers, blank CDs and DVDs, CD burners as well as personal 
computers (PCs)
61.  For example, the detailed rate of levies applied in 2006 is listed as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
57 See Urteil des Bundesgerichtshofs vom 29, Mai 1964 – Aktz: Ib ZR 4/63, reproduced in GRUR 
02/1965, cited in Guibault, n32, at 7. 
58 See Article 13 of the German Constitution, (This article declared that the possibility of using 
neighbours, doormen, etc, was supposed to be regarded as informants). See also, Ernest A. Seemann, 
supra note 49, at 239.  
59 See Gaita and Christie, supra note 48, at 422-427. See also, Ernest A. Seemann, supra note 49, at 
243, 246.  
60 See Jörg, Reinbothe, supra note 1, at 40. 
61 See, e.g., The District Court of Munich decided that the private copying levy covered personal 
computers in 2004. See Rik Lambers, “German PC Levy”, Constitutional Code Blog, (Dec 2004), 
available at, http://constitutionalcode.blogspot.com/2004/12/german-pc-levy.html. The Court in 
Suttgart asserted that the levy applied to computer printers in 2005. See also, Rik Lambers, “German 
Court Confirms Printer Levy”, Constitutional Code Blog, (Dec 2004), available at, 
http://constitutionalcode.blogspot.com/2005/05/german-court-confirms-printer-levy.html.    144 
 
 
Media   Cost/Data   Cost/Time  
Audio Cassettes (60 minutes)   € 0.0614/hr  
VHS Cassettes (180 minutes)   € 0.087/hr  
DVD-R   € 0.174/disc  
DVD+R   € 0.174/disc  
DVD-RW   € 0.174/disc  
DVD+RW   € 0.174/disc  
Audio CD-R RW   € 0.0614/hr  
MiniDisc   € 0.0614/hr  
Data CD-R   (30% of) € 0.072/hr  
Data CD-RW   (30% of) € 0.072/hr  
DVD   € 0.174/disc  
Equipment   Cost  
Published Rate   Negotiated Rate 
(BITKOM)  
Cassette Recorder   € 1.28/unit  
VHS Recorder   € 9.21/unit  
Audio CD Recorders   € 1.28/unit  
MP3 Player Flash   € 2.56/unit  
MP3 Player HDD   € 2.56/unit  
Integrated CD-R RW Writers   € 7.50/unit   € 6.00/unit  
Combo Drives   € 7.50/unit   € 6.00/unit  
Integrated DVD Writers   € 9.21/unit   € 7.37/unit  
DVD Recorders   € 9.21/unit   € 7.37/unit  
Set top Box   € 18.42/unit   € 12.00/unit  
 
       
Figure 1. Detailed Rate on Digital Media and Equipment in Germany in 2006
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Although such a public levy scheme is still in force today in many continental countries, such as 
Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden, it is noteworthy to mention that the latest 
copyright law amendment dramatically alters the statutory private copying levy system in the 
German  Copyright  Act.  In  July  2007,  the  Lower  House  of  the  German  Federal  Parliament 
(Bundestag) passed a new copyright amendment bill. Following approval by the Upper House, a 
                                                        
62 See “Levies Collection Study: Market Value of Private Copying Levies on Digital Equipment and 
Media in Europe”, Copyright-Levies-Reform, Alliance (2006) available at, 
http://eicta.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/document1162909464.pdf, at 56.    145 
new  copyright  law  came  into  effect  on  January  1,  2008.    This  provides  a  new  scheme  to 
compensate rightsholders. According to the amendment, the amount of compensation should be 
negotiated between the collecting societies and the manufactures directly, different from the 
previous  statutory  remuneration  in  which  the  amount  of  compensation  was  determined  in  a 
detailed attachment to the Copyright Act. The rationale of the German copyright reform is to 
comply with the inflexibility resulting from the rapidity of technological developments. 
 
Understanding the Rationale and Principle behind the Public Levy Scheme 
The evolution of the public levy scheme clarifies that the public way model was a pragmatic 
solution  to  the  dilemma  between  the  development  of  technology  and  the  spread  of  private 
copying. Statutory licence and levy models have been broadly accepted in continental European 
countries  for  years,  while  few  such  schemes  exists  in  common  law.    We  will  consider  the 
original pathway of the public levy/tax scheme, in order to explore the rationale and principle 
underneath the public way model.  
 
Compared to the Anglo-American common law copyright system which emphasises “owners’ 
rights”
63,  the  continental  European  copyright  system  is  founded  on  the  primary  purpose  of 
protecting “authors’ rights”
64, a fact succinctly highlighted by the phrase “natural rights”.  The 
notion of natural rights originates from Lockean’s labour theory, which was used to justify the 
remuneration for authors in the GEMA case. According to GEMA
65, the basis of natural rights is 
related to the author’s personality which is also reflected in his works. Hence, copyright exists so 
that the author is capable of controlling the uses to which his or her work is put. In other words, 
“[T]he author’s control of his work … results from its very own nature … and merely finds 
                                                        
63 See Christie, Private Copying Licence and Levy Schemes, supra note 27, at 3-4. See also, Sam 
Ricketson and Christopher Creswell, The Law of Intellectual Property: Copyright, Designs and 
Confidential Information, Australia: Lawbook Co. (1999). See, David Lindsay, “The Law and 
Economics of Copyright, Contract and Mass Market Licenses”, Center for Copyright Study Ltd. 
(2002) available at, 
http://www.copyright.com.au/reports%20&%20papers/IssuesPaper_Lindsay.pdf.  
64 See Kevin Garnett, Gillan Davis and Gwilym Harbottle, Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, 
15
th ed, Thomson, London: Sweet & Maxwell, Vol.I (2005) at 29. See also, Manfred Rehbinder, 
Urheberrecht, Verlag C.H.Beck, Vol.13., neu bearbeitete Auflage, 2004, Xlll, 488 Seiten. See also, 
Sam Ricketson and Christopher Creswell, supra note 63, at 6.  
65 See GEMA v. Grundig, supra note 4.   146 
recognition and form through legislation”
66.   
 
The “just remuneration”
67 principle based on natural rights has also been embodied in current 
copyright legislation. For instance, article 11 of the UrhG claims that “[c]opyright protects the 
author with respect to his intellectual and personal relationship with his work, and also with 
respect to utilisation of his work. At the same time, it serves to secure a reasonable remuneration 
for the use of that work”. Article 26 and 27 of UrhG also allows for remuneration of authors for 
exploitation of their work out of their control, or where there are exemptions from copyright law 
for the purpose of public interests, such as a droite de suite
68, a right of remuneration for rental 
and lending
69 and a remuneration for reproduction and distribution in religious and educational 
uses
70. 
 
However, the basis of the public levy model reflects not only on the fruit of one’s labour. The 
GEMA  decision  impelled  the  public  levy  scheme  to  look  beyond  an  entitlement  to  “[the 
author’s] creative act”
71. The GEMA Court recognised that: 
 
The main idea recognised in copyright judicial rulings and literature, [i.e.,] the author is 
entitled to the economic fruits which derive from his work, only constitutes a minimum 
requirement for the protection of the material [rewards for] the author and is tailored to 
the system which dominates in copyright law of the commercial relaying of works. This 
idea  does not [include another  fact]  that  the author does  receive [non-monetary  or 
moral] remuneration when [the work is valued and cherished] without direct economic 
compensation.
72 
                                                        
66 See GEMA v. Grundig, supra note 4. 
67 See J. H. Spoor and Herman Cohen Jehoram, Copies in Copyright, Kluwer Law International 
Publishers (2002) at 25. In the beginning of 20
th century, Josef Kohler developed the Lockean theory 
to the immaterial nature of a work. He agreed that authors’ intellectual labours gain a natural right 
over the works, but he also suggested that “incorporeal goods are so utterly different from corporeal 
ones that they cannot be subject of a kind of ownership but only of a right sui generis, the immaterial 
property right”. Thus so, Kohler posited a general right of “just remuneration”.  
68 UrhG, article 26. 
69 UrhG, article 27. 
70 UrhG, article 46. 
71 See GEMA v. Grundig, supra note 4, at 278. 
72 See GEMA v. Grundig, supra note 4, at 282.   147 
Thus, the GEMA decision highlighted another issue entitling the author to just remuneration 
on the grounds that the remuneration right also springs from the “very enjoyment by the 
individual users of the author’s work”
73.  Gaita and Christie
74 assert that the individual user’s 
“enjoyment” as derived from the author’s work forms “a debt to the author for the fulfillment 
of their appetite for art”
75.  In other words, private copying activity is, to some degree, 
similar to a receiver’s “wrong done” to the author when the author provides his work as an 
offering, i.e., the offering indebts the receiver to the author.
76  
 
The above analysis demonstrates that the essential principle of the public way  model in 
continental  European  countries  not  only  lies  in  the  author’s  creative  behaviour,  but  also 
stems from “a debt of gratitude owed to the author”
77 by individual users of the work for 
their enjoyment derived from using the work. In summary, the author’s labour in the work 
and the user’s enjoyment from the work justify the application of public levies in continental 
European copyright systems.  
 
4.1.3.2.2. The Public Levy Not Accepted: The Special Case of the United Kingdom 
Compared to civilian law countries which emphasises authors’ natural rights and users’ wrong 
done to the author, most common law systems, such as the UK and US copyright laws, give 
primacy to the utilitarian basis for copyright protection. In the utilitarian view, copyright is a 
solution to deal with market failure, previously discussed in Chapter 2.  Given this rationale for 
copyright, we would expect that the public levy scheme might be widely adopted by common 
law countries to solve the economic problems caused by private copying.  However, the use of 
the public way model in common law copyright regimes is most uncommon. 
 
Despite recommendations to the Government in favour of such a scheme, the public levy/tax 
                                                        
73 See GEMA v. Grundig, supra note 4, at 282. (Translated by Katerina Gaita and Andrew F. Christie. 
See, Gaita and Christie. Principle or Compromise? Supra note 48. 
74 See Gaita and Christie. Principle or Compromise? Supra note 48. 
75 See Gaita and Christie. Principle or Compromise? Supra note 48. 
76 See Gaita and Christie. Principle or Compromise? Supra note 48. 
77 See GEMA v. Grundig, supra note 4, at 278.   148 
model has not been introduced in the UK so far. In 1985, a discussion paper
78 was submitted to 
the British Parliament by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, suggesting a blank tape 
levy on audio and video tapes. Similar recommendations were presented by the Government’s 
White  Paper  on  Intellectual  Property  and  Innovation
79  again  in  1986.    However,  these 
propositions have not been enacted largely due to pressure exerted by tape manufacturers and 
consumer groups
80.  
 
The  UK  copyright  system  permits  limited  exceptions  to  rightsholders’  exclusive  rights.  In 
general, the specific purposes of a fair dealing behaviour are related to research and private 
study
81, criticism, review and news reports
82, and incidental inclusion of copyright material
83.  
These exceptions do not, however, grant a general right to make copies for private use. Thus, 
there are no provisions in current UK copyright law for private copies in theory, nor a public 
levy to fund it.  The rightsholders are still entitled in principle to receive compensation for 
private use of their works, but only if they can identify whether, and by whom the private 
copying has occurred, and can effectively sue those who do so.  But given that private copying is 
difficult to detect, especially in the context of digital file sharing, where massive copying is 
facilitated by anonymous duplication and is distributed as bits and bytes through networks, there 
is, in effect, no remuneration for private copying in UK copyright practice. 
 
It is noteworthy that there is a concern, presently, that the UK exceptions are too narrow to 
protect the public interest in the context of new technology.  Recommendation 8 of Gowers 
Review of Intellectual Property suggests “introduc[ing] a limited private copying exception by 
2008 for format shifting for works published after the date that the law comes into effect,”
84 on 
the grounds that the lack of a private copying exception in the UK makes it difficult for the 
                                                        
78 See The Recording and Rental of Audio and Video Copyright Material: A consultative document,  
London: HMSO (1985) 
79 See Government’s White Paper on intellectual property and innovation, London: HMSO (April, 
1986). 
80 See “UK Government Locks European Levy”, Music and Copyright, Vol. 2 (1992) at 5. 
81 See Copyright, Design and Patent Act (CDPA) 1988, section 29. 
82 Ibid, section 30. 
83 Ibid, section 31. 
84 See Gowers Review of Intellectual Property, published with the permission of HM Treasury on 
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British public to realise that their format shifting music behaviour, such as copying music from a 
CD legitimately purchased onto a computer or MP3 player, is prohibited under the law. As 
stated by the BPI, “[W]e now need to make a clear and public distinction between [‘]for your 
own use[‘] and copying for dissemination to third parties”
85.  It is also interesting to note that the 
Review  believes  it  is  possible  to  create  a  “limited  private  copying  exception”
86  without  a 
copyright levy. According to the Review, rightsholders may collect pecuniary remedy by setting 
up a sale price which includes the economic cost of a limited private right to copy
87. However, 
setting up an adequate sale price in practice would be complicated. The arguments in favour of 
such a solution are still inconclusive. 
 
4.1.3.2.3. The Middle Ground Solution: The United States Case Study 
The private copying scheme in the United States is unique. Generally speaking, statutory levies 
on blank audio or video recording media have not been applied in the U.S., but rightsholders are 
entitled to receive remuneration in some circumstances under the Audio Home Recording Act of 
1992 (AHRA). 
 
In practice, the popularity of audio recording in the late 1980s initiated a debate on the legal 
status of digital home recording. On the one hand, the rightsholders contended that audio home 
recording  significantly  harmed  their  market  benefits.    On  the  other  hand,  digital  audio 
technology  providers  argued  that  the  development  of  digital  recording  devices  required  “a 
sufficient  degree  of  certainty  that  contributory  infringement  proceedings  would  not  be 
brought”.
88  Thus, the judicial dilemma of the audio home recording dispute would be whether 
digital audio home recording fell within the scope of fair use doctrine, whether the recording 
should be remunerated, and whether the technology should be promoted. Elkman and Christie 
                                                        
85 See Evidence from BPI to House of Commons Select Committee for Culture, Media and Sport 
Inquiry into New Media and the Creative Industries. (Quoted from Gowers Review of Intellectual 
Property, at 62). See “The BPI Announcement to House of Commons Select Committee for Culture, 
Media and Sport Inquiry into New Media and the Creative Industries” (June 2006). 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 See Saba Elkman and Andrew F. Christie, “A Negotiated Solution to Audio Home Recording? 
Lessons from the US Audio Home Recording Act of 1992”, The University of Melbourne Faculty of 
Law, Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 103 (2004) at 125.     150 
pointed out,  
 
⑴ If audio home recording was regarded as a fair use, the use of the technology “would 
not have been remunerated” and the distribution of the technology “would not have 
been restrained”; 
⑵ If audio home recording was not regarded as a fair use, the use of the technology 
“may have been remunerated via ongoing royalties or an award of damages” and the 
distribution of the technology “may have been restrained by injunction”.
89 
 
In response to these conflicting points, the US Congress enacted the Audio Home Recordings 
Act (AHRA) in 1992
90. The AHRA aims to solve the contravention by taking a “middle ground” 
path,  namely,  a  way  granting  users  a  ‘right’  to  engage  in  audio  home  recording
91,  while 
imposing a monetary compensation through a compulsory royalty
92 in place of an injunction on 
the digital audio recording technology.
93    
 
Firstly, the AHRA confers upon consumers an audio home recording “right”. Section 1008 of the 
AHRA allows use “based on the non-commercial use by a consumer for making digital …or 
analog musical recordings”.
94  Secondly, the “right” is not equal to fair use defence; instead it 
requires  compensatory  royalties  for  rightsholders’  monetary  losses  be  imposed  on  digital 
hardware and blank digital media manufacturers and importers.
95  According to Section 1003 
and 1004 of the Act, the amount of payment “shall be 2 percent and 3 percent of the transfer 
price. …  Only the first person to manufacture and distribute or import and distribute such 
device shall be required to pay the royalty with respect to such device”.  Thirdly, Section 1002 
prohibits copyright infringing actions based on “the manufacture, importation, or distribution of 
a digital audio recording device, a digital audio recording medium, and analog recording device, 
                                                        
89 Ibid, at 129. 
90 See the U.S. Audio Home Recordings Act of 1992, No. 102-563, 106 Statute 4247 (codified in Title 
17 of the U.S. Copyright Act). [Hereinafter, Audio Home Recording Act (1992), in brief]. 
91 See Audio Home Recording Act (1992), 17 USC §1008.  
92 See Audio Home Recording Act (1992), 17 USC §1003, 1004. 
93 See Audio Home Recording Act (1992), 17 USC §1002. 
94 See Audio Home Recording Act (1992), 17 USC §1008. 
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or an analog recording medium, or based on … non-commercial use by a consumer of such a 
device or medium for making digital….or analog musical recordings”
96. 
 
The levy conferred by the AHRA is very limited.  For example, §1001 (4)(A) distinguishes 
“digital audio recording medium” from “ digital audio recording device”. The former refers to a 
material object “that is primarily marketed or most commonly used by concerns for the purpose 
of making digital audio copied recordings by use of a digital audio recording device”, while the 
latter  is  defined  as  the  machine  “be[ing]  designed  or  marketed  for  the  primary  purpose  of 
making a digital audio copied recording for private use”. The AHRA is in favour of applying a 
levy on the digital audio recording medium but fails to be so in respect of digital audio recording 
devices. 
 
The AHRA resolution embodies three elements, i.e., granting a non-fair use right to use audio 
home recording, collecting remuneration for the loss resulting from audio home recording, and 
promoting lawful distribution of digital audio recorders.  However, it is noteworthy that the fair 
use exception grants a broader right to make private copies.  Based on fair use doctrine, there is 
no copyright infringement as long as the copying activity falls within fair use. On the contrary, if 
the private copying behaviour is not fair use, then it does infringe the rightsholder’s rights, and 
accordingly  the  rightsholder  deserves  certain  compensation,  either  in  the  monetary  or  non-
pecuniary terms. 
 
Compared to the UK fair dealing doctrine which is defined in a limited manner through a non-
exhaustive list of situations where the “dealing” with a copyright work is permitted while also 
leaving some room for judicial interpretation to justify the “fairness” of the use, the fair use 
approach in the U.S. means that the use of a copyright work is a fair use only if “the court is 
satisfied that the use is fair”.
97  This broader “fair use” exception has given rise to extensive 
litigation. For example, in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.
98, the United States 
                                                        
96 See Audio Home Recording Act (1992), 17 USC §1002. 
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Press Inc., 3
rd ed. (2003) at 194. 
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Supreme Court determined that the cable industry operators were not “public performers” given 
that cable retransmission “ha[d] the ability to select, procure, and propagate programs to the 
public by broadcast or rebroadcast”. As a result, the Court granted rightsholders permission to 
require compensation from the cable operators.  Fortnightly was reaffirmed in Teleprompter 
Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc
99in 1974.  § 111 Title 17
100 of the United States 
Code officially confirms that the cable operators can re-transmit over-the-air broadcast signals, 
on condition that they compensate rightsholders by paying statutory royalties. These royalties 
paid by cable operators can, to some degree, counterbalance the rightsholders’ interests with the 
cable operators’ benefits.  
 
In short, the U.S. public model may be seen as a “middle ground” model, in so far as it is 
different from either the Germany pre-2008 statutory levy model covering potentially all private 
copying activities; or the UK fair dealing model which leaves private copying to a case-by-case 
judicial interpretation without accepting public levy or taxes.  The limited levy scheme in the 
U.S. copyright law reflects the consensus within the Congress, which integrates fair use doctrine 
with remuneration for rightsholders and the lawful distribution of audio home recorders.   
 
4.1.4 Evaluating the Public Model 
4.1.4.1. Advantages of the Public Model 
The public levy model, from the evidence above, is economically and legally both viable and 
practical.  Economically, the scheme has afforded an opportunity for rightsholders to receive 
compensation without having to pursue elusive private home users. This increases the likelihood 
of  rightsholders  collecting  their  justified  monetary  reward  in  a  digital  environment  while 
allowing users non-commercial access to copyright works.  Legally, allowing private copying in 
certain circumstances will improve the clarity of the copyright law system. As Gowers Review of 
                                                        
99 See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
100 See § 111, Title 17, U.S. Code Collection.   153 
Intellectual Property
101 research demonstrates, a public levy might help to “make a clear and 
public distinction between copying for your own use and copying for dissemination to third 
parties”
102, and thus “make it clear to consumers”
103 that they are entitled to copy music for their 
own private use by moving the music from one format to another. 
 
4.1.4.2. Disadvantages Existing in the Public Model: From 1965 to Digital File Sharing 
Generally speaking, substantial drawbacks exist with the levy system: difficulty in determining 
the royalty pool; frustration of “low-volume” users
104; curtailment of “fair use” privileges; and, 
most importantly, the troublesome mechanism of collecting and fairly distributing remuneration. 
 
Firstly, there is no uniform standard about which digital recording media and devices are subject 
to public levies. For instance, current German private copying levies require payment of a levy 
on blank audio and audiovisual recording media and devices, such as printers, blank CDs and 
DVDs,  and  CD  burners  as  well  as  PCs.    By  comparison,  the  French  code  de  la  propriếtế 
intellectuelle (The French Intellectual Property Code) permits the levy to be applied to both 
blank recording media and Internet audio equipment.
105  A Dutch Court recently rejected calls 
for a music levy on USB Flash drives,
106 while Canada’s Private Copyright Collective (CPCC) 
has been trying to force a copyright tax on Secure Digital card (SD), MultiMediaCard (MMC), 
Memory Stick and other digital memory formats.
107  The various standards may have a negative 
                                                        
101 See Gowers, supra note 84. 
102 See BPI Announcement, supra note 86. 
103 See BPI Announcement, supra note 86. 
104 See, Netanel, supra note 10, at 62-77. 
105 See Article L.122-5 (2) and Article L. 211-3(2) of the French Intellectual Property Code. 
106 A Dutch industry group,SONT, proposed a tax two years ago on USB flash drives sold in the 
Netherlands. In order to obtain remedies for artists whose music would possibly be unlawfully used 
via the flash drive, SONT requested a € 0.05 levy per USB flash drive, and also proposed a levy 
variously based on storage capacity.  Naturally the Netherlands’ largest consumer organisation 
Consumentenbond protested calling the tax proposal bizarre. On 13
th March 2007, Dutch justice 
minister Hirsch Ballin rejected the SONT’s proposal. Available at, 
http://www.everythingusb.com/dutch_usb_tax_12129.html.  
107 In December 2003, a copyright tax was imposed on digital music players by the Canadian 
Copyright Board, in order to compensate artists for revenue lost to "private copying". The Copyright 
Board argued they contain recording media, specifically Flash memory and hard drives. The proposal 
was challenged by retailers. As a result, Mr. Justice Marc Noël ruled the law did not explicitly include 
digital music players' memory and hard drives among its list of recording media in December 2004. 
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impact  on  international  copyright  cooperation.  This  is  especially  relevant,  given  that  cross-
border collective management of copyright is at present recognised as one possible direction for 
collecting societies in the digital age.
108 
 
Secondly,  it  is  unclear  whether  the  tariff  collected  would  be  sufficient  to  compensate 
rightsholders. The development of technology has had a constructive impact on digital playback 
devices, creating ever cheaper devices with larger memory capacity.  For example, a 50GB 
portable hard drive is capable of storing more than 9,000 tracks
109, which enables consumers to 
store around 600 CD albums. With a typical broadband connection speed up to 50Mbit/sec, a 
typical device could transfer 20 MP3 songs per second. How much levy should be imposed on 
the manufacturer of this device?  If the levy is too onerous, say ₤10,000, customers will be 
deterred from purchasing this device, in likely consequence damaging the device manufacturer’s 
interests.    On  the  contrary,  if  the  levy  is  set  too  low,  it  is  unlikely  to  collect  sufficient 
compensation  for  rightsholders.  Generally  speaking,  royalties  are  not  set  by  law  but  by 
negotiation between the rightsholder and the user. The pre-determined royalty rate in the public 
levy  system  at  this  point  may  not  satisfy  any  party,  i.e.,  rightsholders,  users  or  the  device 
manufacturers. 
 
Thirdly, a levy system may penalise certain users “who rarely use networks”
110, namely, low-
volume users, by subsidising high-volume users.  Some scholars claim that the low-volume 
users’ subsidy problem may be overstated.  For example, Netanel states that, “[F]or one, many 
low-volume users will happily pay a surcharge for the possibility of unlimited file sharing even 
if they do not actually engage in much file sharing. After all, consumers regularly buy computers 
with far more memory and processing capacity than they actually use … Further, imposing the 
                                                                                                                                                            
submitted a new plea for an iPod tax to the Board in Feb 2007. The current tariff expires on 31 
December 2007, so it's looking to get MP3 players added to the list from 2008 onwards. Available at, 
http://www.reghardware.co.uk/2007/02/12/canada_ponders_ipod_tax_again/.  
108 See “Study on a Community Initiative on the cross-border collective management of copyright”, 
Commission working document of the EC, Brussels (July 7, 2005). 
109 See the online survey done by Last.fm, available at, 
http://www.last.fm/group/Taking+Drugs+to+Make+Music+to+Take+Drugs+to/forum/20184/_/17746
9/2.  
110 See Neil Weinstock Natenel, supra note 10.   155 
levy will encourage some low-volume users to become high-volume users….” 
111 Nevertheless, 
some others argue that, “[f]rom the users’ point of view, ‘all you can eat’ is not necessarily the 
best formula, at least not for those whose diet of copyright works is modest”
112.  
 
Fourthly, with a levy-based model private copying generally becomes legitimate, which may 
lead to a loss of control of their works by rightsholders.  On the one hand, “[the] generalisation 
of the levy technique could lead to an even greater feeling on consumers’ part that they are 
entitled  to  copy  and  ‘share’  anything  they  want”.
113 As  Glynn  S.  Lunney  expresses,  a  levy 
system  “move[s]  private  copying  from  the  margins  into  the  mainstream,  converting  private 
copying from a minor annoyance into a major threat to copyright revenues”
114.  Conversely, the 
levy-based  system  “would  create  a  licensing  culture  that  assumes  everything  should  be 
licensed”
115  on  the  basis  that  “responsibility  for  setting  prices  would  no  longer  reside  with 
rightsholders alone, subject only to the market; the government and equipment manufacturers 
would also play a central role”
116.  The licensing culture growing in parallel with the public levy 
model requires every user to pay for his use of copyright work, no matter whether the use is 
“fair” or not.   
 
Finally, but most importantly, the public levy scheme leads to difficulties in collecting and fairly 
distributing remuneration. Towards analysing issues surrounding levy collection and distribution 
problem, the copyright collecting society as a topic deserves particular attention.  Copyright 
collecting societies are agencies acting on behalf of rightsholders, which negotiate licences and 
collect  and  usually  distribute  royalties  to  the  owners.    In  the  non-digital  world,  collecting 
societies have evolved to meet this need, primarily in civilian systems. From the viewpoint of 
the rightsholder, collecting societies serve them by achieving what they cannot practically and 
economically manage for themselves, i.e. enforcement and administration of their rights. As for 
                                                        
111 See Neil Weinstock Natenel, supra note 10, at 67-74.. 
112 See Jane C. Geinsburg, “Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of Dissemination,” 
Columbia Law Review, Vol.101 (5) (2001). 
113 See Evan P. Schultz, “Jane Says”, IP Law and Business (2003) at 24.  
114 See Glynn S. Lunney Jr., The Death of Copyright, supra note 10, at 710. 
115 See Peter K. Yu, “P2P and the Future of Private Copying”, Michigan State University College of 
Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 02-08 (2004) at 45, available at, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=578568.  
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users, the collecting societies provide a service by facilitating access to copyright works and 
thereby  make it possible for users to comply with their obligations under the law to obtain 
licences  for  the  use  of  copyright  works
117.    Generally  speaking,  the  principal  role  of  all 
collecting societies is
118 - ‘to licence the use of the copyrights they manage; to monitor that use 
in order to enforce the conditions upon which the licence has been granted; and to collect and 
distribute the royalties payable as the result of licensed use’
119. 
 
Since the first copyright collecting society for creators and publishers, the Societe des Auteurs, 
Compositeurs et Editerus de Musique (SACEM), was established in France in 1851, the idea of 
setting  up  an  organisation  “which  manages  or  administers  copyright  or  rights  related  to 
copyright as its sole purpose or as one of its main purposes”
120 has been followed internationally.  
“Collecting society” has been defined by the European Union (EU) as “any organisation which 
manages or administers copyright or rights related to copyright as its sole purpose or as one of 
its main purposes”.
121   The EU document Follow-up to the Green Paper (1991)
122 issued by the 
Commission of the European Community (The Commission) first introduced the subject of the 
collective management of copyright to the European Community (EC).  The EU Green Paper in 
1995
123 emphasised concerns about “the acquisition and management of copyright collective 
rights and technical systems of identification and protection, having regard particularly to new 
multimedia works and the exploitation of works on digital networks”
124.  A follow-up paper 
                                                        
117 See Kevin Garnett, Gillian Davies and Gwilym Harbottle, Copinger & Skone James on Copyright, 
supra note 64, at 28-04. 
118 See Fry Robin, “Copyright Infringement and Collective Enforcement”, E.I.P.R., Vol.24 (11)    
(2002) at 516-524. 
119 See Kevin Garnett, Gillian Davies and Gwilym Harbottle, Copinger & Skone James on Copyright, 
supra note 64, at 28-04. 
120 See the definition of collecting societies given by the EU, Satellite and Cable Directive 93/83, Art. 
1(4). See also, the U.K CDPA 1988 defines the term as “A ‘licensing body’ means a society or other 
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objects include the granting of licences covering works of more than one author”.  
121 See The EC Directive on Copyright, Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission, EC 
Directive 93/83/EEC (O.J. 1993 L. 248/6), Article 1(4). 
122 See Follow-up to the Green Paper: Working Programme of the Commission in the field of 
copyright and neighboring rights, Commission Communication to the Council, document COM (90) 
584 final, Brussels (January 17, 1991). 
123 See Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, Brussels, COM (95) 
382 final (July 19, 1995).  
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issued in 1996
125 identified the structure and management of collective management rights
126, 
and revealed management of rights as a “Single Market” policy requiring further evaluation
127.   
Discussion  continued  through  a  series  of  EU  conferences  impelling  a  hearing  on  collective 
management  right  in  November  2000,  which  confirmed  the  view  towards  assisting  the 
Commission to determine effective action in the area.
128  In the European Parliament report 
entitled  “Report  on  a  Community  Framework  for  Collecting  Societies  for  Authors’  Rights 
(2002/2274(INI))”,
129 the important role of collective management societies as “an indispensable 
link between creators and users to facilitate users’ access to the content and circulation of works, 
as  well  as  for  the  benefit  of  the  entire  chain”  has  been  emphasised.
130    The  Commission 
announced, in its Communication published in 2004
131, that collective management rights have 
been included in Community legislation, in order to create a “true single market in this field”.
132  
The EU Commission adopted a Recommendation on Collective Cross-border Management of 
Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services
133 in 2005, aiming to apply 
the  collective  management  of  copyrights  to  online  music  services,  in  order  to  promote  the 
emergence of a new generation of cross-border commercial users of copyrights (i.e. online music 
providers). The EU Parliament in 2007
134 invited the Commission to confirm that the 2005 
                                                        
125 See Follow-up to the Green Paper on copyright and related rights in the information society, COM 
(96) 568 final, Brussels (November 20, 1996). 
126 Ibid. The follow-up Green Paper states, “the usefulness of collective management, where 
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rights (2002/2274 (INI)), A5-0478/2003, Final (December 11, 2003) (O.J. 2003 C 169/1) 
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131 See Commission from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee: The Management of Copyright and Related Rights in the Internal 
Market, COM (2004) 261 final, Brussels (April 16, 2004). 
132 Ibid. 
133 See The EU Commission’s Recommendation on collective cross-border management of copyright 
and related rights for legitimate online music services (2005/737/EC) (O.J. 2005 L 276/21). 
134 See European Parliament Resolution on the Commission recommendation of 18 October 2005, 
P6_TA-PROV (2007) 0064 (O.J. 2005 C 64/6).     158 
Recommendation  applies  exclusively  to  online  sales  of  music  recordings,  and  to  present  a 
proposal  for  a  flexible  framework  directive  with  the  purpose  of  “regulating  the  collective 
copyright management concerning cross-border online music services, while taking account of 
the specificity of the digital era and safeguarding European cultural diversity”.
135 
 
Collecting societies have played an important role in the current public levy schemes. In most 
European countries adopting private copying levies, collecting societies are authorised to set 
levy tariffs, to collect those levies and to distribute proceeds to rightsholders. For example, in 
Germany, levies for private copying had been imposed by a series of collecting societies, such as 
GEMA(for audio and video copying), VG Wort and VG Bild Kunst (for reprography). 
 
The extended collecting society scheme offers  many  advantages.  First of all, users will be 
released from their liability in copyright infringement. As Daniel Gervais explained, “users gain 
peace of mind, as they sign a contract giving them unrestricted access to a CMO’s repertoire 
apart from specified exclusions. In other words, they will not have to face a lawsuit from a 
rightsholder who turns up after the contract are signed and was neither represented nor expressly 
excluded from the system”
136.  Secondly, rightsholders are capable of controlling the use of their 
works more effectively and efficiently.  Thirdly, non-represented rightsholders also have their 
rights protected and can benefit from the remuneration they deserve, from their works being 
used for the benefit of the general public.
137  
 
As  for  any  potential  disadvantages,  the  use  of  collecting  societies  may  lead  to  the  risk  of 
dominant  position  abuse.  Adrian  Sterling  states  that  where  they  have  a  position  of  sole 
responsibility for the exercise of rights in particular areas, as is the norm, collecting societies 
find  themselves  in  a  monopoly  situation  conflicting  with  the  laws  on  competition.
138  For 
instance, there are more than 20 collecting societies in the UK; each of them has a monopoly 
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right  on  the  copyright  area  it  administers.  Although  various  legal  systems
139  have  adopted 
measures  to  control  the  monopoly  position  of  the  collectives,  a  number  of  cases  have 
arisen
140concerning the application of the EC Treaty competition rules pertaining to collecting 
societies within the European Community recently.  For example, the German performing rights 
collecting  societies  (GEMA)  was  held  to  occupy  and  abuse  a  dominant  position  in 
“discriminating  between  nationals  of  Member  States,  binding  its  members  by  unjustified 
obligations, applying certain conditions regarding publishers, applying royalties to unprotected 
works,  and  discriminating  against  foreign  importers  of  tape  machines”.
141    In  GVL  v. 
Commission,
142 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that it is an abuse of a dominant 
position to discriminate against foreign performers when claiming remuneration for broadcasting 
and public performance of records.  In the USA, the American Society of Composers, Authors 
and Publishers (ASCAP) administering the performing rights was forced to accept competition 
from Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI)
143.   
 
In addition, the application of collective copyright management may impose unnecessary costs 
on  both  consumers  and  rightsholders.  In  general,  the  burden  of  disbursing  the  high 
administrative  costs  of  operating  the  collective  societies  and  anti-trust  bodies  rests  on  both 
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Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) to determine tariff ( See U.S. Copyright Act § 801, 
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142 See GVL v. Commission, 7/82 [1983] E.C.R. 483; GVL v. Commission, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 645, 
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143 See Stanley M. Bensen, Sheila N. Kirby and Steven C.Salop, “An Economic Analysis of 
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consumers  and  rightsholders.  For  instance,  the  UK  Monopolies  and  Mergers  Commission 
(MMC),  as  the  government’s  anti-trust  body,  accepted  the  natural  monopoly  rights  of  the 
societies.  However,  it  has  been  criticised  for  the  high  administrative  costs:  in  1999,  the 
MCPS/PRS  Alliance
144  had  only  10.7%  administration  costs  compared  to  the  Korea  Music 
Copyright Association’s  (KOMCA)  at  around  22.4%.    In  addition,  collecting-licensing  may 
preclude the possibility of individual licensing in the context of digital file sharing. As discussed 
in Part 4.2, a charge on the use of iPod does not have to be collected via collecting societies, but 
be paid straight to music rightsholders probably via ISPs. 
 
4.1.4.3. New Challenges Posed in the Context of Digital File Sharing 
Apart from the insufficiencies listed above, the public model is afflicted by additional problems 
when considering the application of digital file sharing technology, compared to physical media.  
The origin of the public model arises from the levy on, or taxation of physical media. In the 
traditional media environment, collecting societies and other approaches
145 have been adopted to 
support academic information exchange.  
 
However, creating methods to collect and distribute levies and taxes has been quite problematic 
in the context of digital file sharing.  Firstly, with the public model there are difficulties in 
determining how to divide the royalty pool in the file sharing environment. In fact, the current 
recommended technologies to divide the royalty pool, such as digital watermarking
146, digital 
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sampling
147, metering software
148, and monitoring tools
149, are far from accurate and reliable.  
To be specific, as to royalty pool dividing systems, the technological background shows that in 
their capacity as directly involved downloading calculation systems, the models do not reflect 
how much end-users value the different works they access. Say an academic user downloads two 
books, reads the first and then deletes it, but reads the second one in detail and quotes certain 
paragraphs in his/her work; the two authors would receive the same reward.  Netanel states that 
subsequent uses are sometimes more important than counting initial downloads, as many of the 
initial ones are used for sampling
150. He analyses: 
 
Subsequent uses, which might entail viewing or listening to a work or copying it 
onto an MP3 player or other portable device, should be given greater weight than 
initial downloads. Metering such uses would more accurately reflect each work’s 
value to users than merely counting the number of downloads or even the number 
of  hard  copy  purchases.    Certain  types  of  works  tend  to  be  subject  to  more 
repeated viewing, reading, or listening than others, and such ongoing use is an 
important component of a work’s value. In addition, it appears that users often 
download works from P2P networks merely to determine whether they like the 
work,  not  because  the  user  knows  that  she  values  the  work  in  advance  of 
                                                                                                                                                            
message is a group of bits describing information pertaining to the signal or to the author of the signal 
(name, place, etc.). The technique takes its name from watermarking of paper or money as a security 
measure. Digital watermarking can be a form of steganography, in which data is hidden in the 
message without the end user's knowledge. See, Ingernar Cox, Matthew Miller and Jeffery Bloom, 
Digital Watermarking and Steganography, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 2
nd ed. (2007). See also, 
Matthew L. Miller, L.J.Cox and Jeffery A. Bloom, Digital Watermaking: Principles and Practices, 
Mogan Kaufmann Publishers and Academic Press (2002). 
147 “Digital sample” is an electronic process used in telecommunications for transforming a 
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creation of recorded music, sampling enables the composer, producer, or remix engineer to borrow 
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sound). Available at, http://www.tiscali.co.uk/reference/encyclopaedia/hutchinson/m0020341.html.  
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can calculate the uses of the files by end-users. See John Kelsey, Bruce Schneier, “A Peer-to-Peer 
Software Metering System”, available at, http://www.schneier.com/paper-meter-pp.pdf.  
149 “Network monitoring tool” is also called as Network Performance Monitoring Software, Computer Monitoring 
Software, Monitoring Software, Real Time Monitoring Software, and Network Monitoring Tools. It refers to software that 
provides real-time view of individual user activity on a network, as well as provides administrators 
with the ability to view the content of user-utilized applications. See Les Cottrell, “Network 
Monitoring Tools” (Oct 29, 2006) available at, http://www.slac.stanford.edu/xorg/nmtf/nmtf-
tools.html.  
150 See, Neil Weinstock Natenel, supra note 10, at 55-57.   162 
downloading
151. 
 
In a traditional copyright environment, the user’s intention to subsequently use the copyright 
work, to some degree, decides whether he will purchase the work, which in turn should accrue 
pecuniary benefits for the rightsholder of the work. However, unless an effective and efficient 
monitoring system can be created, it is difficult to determine how to divide the royalty pool in 
the context of file sharing practice. 
 
Secondly,  problems  arise  from  licensing  multimedia
152  works.  The  Information  Society  has 
changed the traditional physical media from hard copy (e.g., CDs, DVDs, recorders) to new 
formats  which comprise new types of use for copyright works. Compared to the traditional 
model where licensing of the utilisation of physical media is authorised by different collecting 
societies, the lack of a central ‘body’ capable of the licensing of multimedia works questions the 
application of traditional collective copyright management system into the digital world.  
 
Thirdly, worldwide access to copyright works via digital file sharing networks challenges the 
national  character  of  collecting  societies.  For  instance,  if  a  Belgium  user  uploads  a  British 
musician’s work to the file sharing network, and a German user downloads the work for his 
private  use,  should  the  private  copying  levy  be  collected  by  GEMA,  PRS  or  SABAM?  
Traditionally,  there  are  “reciprocal  presentation  contracts”
153  between  national  copyright 
management societies, which means “a particular national society controls within the territory 
the  entire  world  repertory  of  works”
154.  Some  international  organisations  such  as  CISAC 
(Confederation  Internationale  des  Societes  d’Auteurs  et  Compositeurs),  BIEM  (Bureau 
International  de  Edition  Mecanique)  and  IFRRO  (International  Federation  of  Reproduction 
                                                        
151 Ibid.  
152 “Multimedia” is media that uses multiple forms of information content and information processing 
(e.g. text, audio, graphics, animation, video, interactivity) to inform or entertain the (user) audience. 
Multimedia also refers to the use of (but not limited to) electronic media to store and experience 
multimedia content. Multimedia is similar to traditional mixed media in fine art, but with a broader 
scope. See Tay Vaughan, Multimedia: Making it, McGraw-Hill Osborne Media, 7
th ed. (2006). 
153 See Kevin Garnett, Johathan Rayner James, Gillian Davies, Copinger & Skone James on 
Copyright, supra note 64, at para. 28-25.   
154 See Kevin Garnett, Johathan Rayner James, Gillian Davies, Copinger & Skone James on 
Copyright, supra note 64, at para. 28-25. See also, Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, supra note 97, at 
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Rights  Organisation)  have  been  set  up  to  distribute  remunerations  to  the  international 
rightsholders.
155 However, global digital file sharing requires these collecting agency agreements 
to be worthy of re-consideration in practice. 
 
Fourthly, digital technology such as Digital Rights Management (DRM) and online licensing 
improves the feasibility of individual licensing. By facilitating identification and tracking of the 
use of works, digitisation “empower[s] right-holders to control the licensing, transform[ing] the 
collection  and  distribution  of  royalty  into  a  process  of  individual  electronic  payment”
156. 
Generally speaking, collective right management originates from the incapability of individual 
licensing  under  certain  circumstances.  If  an  effective  individual  licensing  system  became 
possible, would collecting societies have outlived their usefulness? 
 
There are different opinions as to whether collecting societies remain relevant in the file sharing 
environment. 
 
Some
157  advocate  that  an  EC  community  initiative  on  the  cross-border  collective  copyright 
management may be a possible solution to the digital file sharing problem. Based on a collecting 
society model from the radio entertainment industry, scholars
158 recommended that the collecting 
society system be adopted in the context of digital file sharing. For example, the White Paper of 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) proposed a collective licensing model, which stated 
that: 
 
[T]he music industry forms a collecting society, which then offers file sharing music fans 
the opportunity to “get legit” in exchange for a reasonable regular payment, say $5 per 
month. So long as they pay, the fans are free to keep doing what they are going to do 
                                                        
155 See Constanze Ulmer-Eilfort, Private Copying and Levies for Information and Communication: 
Technologies and Storage Media in Europe, Digital Rights Management, Berlin: Spriner-Verlag, 
(2003). 
156 See Study on a community initiative on the cross-border collective management of copyright, 
Commission working document of the EC, Brussels (July 7, 2005). 
157 Ibid.  See also, See European Parliament Resolution on the Commission recommendation of 18 
October 2005 (O.J. 2005 C.64/6) P6_TA-PROV (2007)0064. 
158 See, e.g., Fred Von Lohmann, “Voluntary Collective Licensing for Music File Sharing,” 
Communication of the ACM, Vol. 47 (10) (2004).   164 
anyway—share  the  music  they  love  using  whatever  software  they  like  on  whatever 
computer  platform  they  prefer—without  fear  of  lawsuits.  The  money  collected  gets 
divided among rights-holders based on the popularity of their music.  … In exchange, 
file sharing music fans will be free to download whatever they like, using whatever 
software works best for them. The more people share, the more money goes to rights-
holders.  The  more  competition  in  applications,  the  more  rapid  the  innovation  and 
improvement. The more freedom to fans to publish what they care about, the deeper the 
catalog[ue].
159 
 
 
In the IFPI “Simulcasting” Agreement,
160 the European Commission considered a Reciprocal 
Agreement  between  collecting  societies  in  the EEA and elsewhere. Compared to  the public 
levy/tax model exemplified by German scheme, the reciprocal agreement idea would specifically 
avoid file sharing intermediaries’ liability for their users’ copying behaviours. According to the 
Commission, the essential feature of a multi-repertoire and multi-territorial Agreement is the 
“country-of-destination”  principle.  The  application  of  the  principle  in  reciprocal  agreements 
means that “right clearance is done in one country but that remuneration is due in all countries 
where  the  simulcast  signal  can  be  received”.
161  Regarding  remuneration  distribution,  the 
Commission decided that “the tariff … w[ould] be an aggregate tariff composed of the relevant 
individual tariffs charged by each participating collecting society for simulcasting on its own 
territory … the society [also had to] take into account all the relevant national tariffs, including 
its own for the determination of a global licence fee”.
162   In practice, however, the cross-border 
licensing idea has been challenged.  There is no universally acceptable multi-repertoire and 
multi-territorial agreement for all the rightsholders who share their works online. The situation 
on  a  territory-by-territory  basis  does  not  match  the  globalised  nature  of  digital  file  sharing 
networks.    Moreover,  current  collective  rights  management  systems  do  not  offer  non-
                                                        
159 See “A Better Way Forward: Voluntary Collective Licensing of Music File Sharing”, Electronic 
Frontier Foundation White Paper (2004) available at, http://www.eff.org/share/collective-lic-wp.pdf.  
160 See European Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty 
and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, COMP/C2/38.014 (O.J. 2002 L 318/17) (October 3, 2002). 
161 Ibid, at para 21. 
162 Ibid, at para 24.
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discriminatory distribution of royalties for all rightsholders. Most existing reciprocal agreements 
do not mention that royalties collected should be distributed amongst all rightsholders in an 
equitable and non-discriminatory manner, nor do they provide practical ways of collecting and 
distributing royalties amongst Member States.  Finally, the national nature of existing collective 
management services may not be able to allow for an effective cross-border collective society 
system developing in practice. 
 
Some others propose that a legal broadband licence fee should be imposed on ISPs and other 
intermediaries to compensate rightsholders for unlawful file sharing by their customers. In 2006, 
an entertainment industry coalition in London suggested that ISPs should be responsible for their 
users’ illegal copying activities, reflecting in the payment of a license fee.
163 Thus, in the 2008 
report, the UK government considered that a flat rate “tax” might be collected via ISPs in the 
UK. According to the report, certain legal broadband subscription services, including the royalty 
share  between  mechanical,  sound  recording  and  publishing  rightsholders  and  administration 
issues, may be charged to compensate declining revenues for rightsholders.
164 However, after 
considering potential risks involved in such ISPs’ levies, no agreement has been signed yet.  The 
original fear of losing the ability to set a price for music has been largely superseded by concerns 
about setting prices too low. Once fixed, it may prove difficult to change the rate. Moreover, 
there is further concern about the possible detrimental impact on the traditional entertainment 
market, given that “unlimited legal” access to entertainment content may damage sales of CDs 
and DVDs.  
 
Others argue individual licensing will work, making a public levy unnecessary. A staff working 
document of the EC
165 suggests that online licensing and DRM technology “empower[s] right-
holders to control the licensing, transform[ing] the collection and distribution of royalty into a 
                                                        
163 See “Music Industry Proposes ISP Tax”, OUT-LAW News (2006) available at, http://www.out-
law.com/page-7104.  
164 See Andrew Orlowski, “Legal, British P2P by End of Year” (2008) available at, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/06/26/music_service_provider_talks/.  
165 See Study on a Community Initiative on the Cross-border Collective Management of Copyright, 
Commission working document of the EC, Brussels (July 7, 2005).   166 
process of individual electronic payment”
166. But the high costs of DRM prevent economically 
weaker authors from enjoying individual licensing, perceived as a significant impediment to the 
individual licensing idea. 
 
The  application  of  digital  file  sharing  highlights  difficulties  within  the  remit  of  collecting 
societies and emphasises the problems of royalty collection and distribution in the environment 
created by the adoption of new technology. 
 
4.2 The Private Model: Selling and Subscription Agreements 
 
Private contract systems have been promoted in the entertainment market as a counter to private 
copying. Initially, it is desirable to define the term “private model”.  “Private contract model” 
refers to collecting compensation for rightsholders by private agreements between users and 
rightsholders, without involving a public body imposing a levy.  Importantly, there is no clear 
consensus  on  ‘the  private  model’.    Instead  there  are  several  different  models  in  practice.   
Apple’s iTunes Music Store, the most popular global music download store, is discussed below 
as a case study.  The private model has been deployed not only in the entertainment industry, but 
also in academic and educational practice, such as Westlaw and Lexis, which require users to 
obtain  accounts  via  an  annual  subscription  in  return  for  allowing  access  to  information 
resources. 
4.2.1The Selling Contract Model: the U.S. iTunes Service 
Since the opening of the iTunes Music Store in 2003, Apple Company has provided consumers 
with a catalogue of over 500,000 tracks, including music from all four major labels
167, based on 
the business-consumer contract design
168.  Apple’s iTunes was the first service with content from 
                                                        
166 Ibid. 
167 “Major labels” refer to the “Big Four record companies” which dominate the recording market. As 
of 2006, it includes Universal Music Group, Sony BMG Music Entertainment, EMI Group, and 
Warner Music Group.   
168 See Appendix 1, iTunes Store Terms of Service, available at, 
http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/service.html. (last accessed on 18/05/2007).    167 
rightsholders to sell songs with no subscription fees. Applying the ầ la carte pricing style
169, the 
U.S. iTunes charges $0.99 per song to allow consumers to download a purchased song once; use 
the song on three computers; move the song to a portable iPod unlimited number of times; make 
unlimited CD burns, with burning the same exact playlist no more than 10 times.  
 
The iTunes business model relies upon the contract between Apple Company and the consumer 
effectively reallocating copyright entitlements.  In effect, Apple utilises two legal strategies to set 
up consumers’ rights and reliability from iTunes Music Store: agreements through contract, and 
limitations  on  rightsholders.   Apple’s  clickwrap  contract  licenses  a  limited  use  of  copyright 
works. For instance, §9(b) of iTunes Music Store Terms of Service permits users to copy a 
downloaded music file on up to three computers, and to burn an audio playlist up to seven 
times.
170  However, the agreement requires consumers to forego certain rights and defences 
under copyright law in exchange for access to the iTunes’ music. For example, §8(b) of the 
iTunes Music Service Terms requires iTunes users “not to attempt to, or to assist another person 
to, circumvent, reverse-engineer, decompile, disassemble, or otherwise tamper with any of the 
security components … for any reason whatsoever”
171. This term waives any right related to 
reverse-engineering the software consumers may have under copyright law
172.  §13(a) states that 
                                                        
169 See “Jupiter Research: Business Intelligent for Business Results”, available at, 
http://www.weblogs.jupiterresearch.com/analysts/gartenberg/archives/Jupiter%20Apple.pdf.  
170 See §9(b) of iTunes Music Store Terms of Service, see Appendix 2. 
171 See §8(b) and 9(b) of iTunes Music Service Terms, see Appendix 2. 
172 See e.g., §1201(f) of 17 United States Copyright Act, which states that: 
“(f) Reverse Engineering —  
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), a person who has lawfully obtained the 
right to use a copy of a computer program may circumvent a technological measure that effectively 
controls access to a particular portion of that program for the sole purpose of identifying and 
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(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a)(2) and (b), a person may develop and employ 
technological means to circumvent a technological measure, or to circumvent protection afforded by 
a technological measure, in order to enable the identification and analysis under paragraph (1), or 
for the purpose of enabling interoperability of an independently created computer program with other 
programs, if such means are necessary to achieve such interoperability, to the extent that doing so 
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(3) The information acquired through the acts permitted under paragraph (1), and the means 
permitted under paragraph (2), may be made available to others if the person referred to in 
paragraph (1) or (2), as the case may be, provides such information or means solely for the purpose 
of enabling interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs, and 
to the extent that doing so does not constitute infringement under this title or violate applicable law 
other than this section.    168 
the users agree “not to modify, rent, lease, loan, sell, distribute, or create derivative works” from 
downloaded  music
173.  This  provision  waives  consumers’  certain  resale  rights
174,  and 
unnecessarily distinguishes the use of iTunes songs from normal uses of copyright works, such 
as making use of the content in a book.  Moreover, Apple further retains the “right to change, 
suspend, remove, or disable access … at any time without notice”.
175  
 
This  contractual  control  over  iTunes’  music  renders  the  private  model  less  favourable  to 
consumers’ interests than under general copyright law. To clarify substantial drawbacks in the 
private contract system, I shall group the problems related to the private model into “internal 
problem” and “external conflict”. The ‘internal’ problem in this subpart refers to contradictions 
existing  in  service  terms  of  contracts.  ‘External’  problems  result  from  the  conflict  between 
technology development and fair use doctrine. 
 
4.2.2 Evaluating the Private Model 
4.2.2.1. The Internal Problem: Contract v. Fair Use 
As discussed above, private contracts entitling service providers rights to limit the use of their 
services would lead to confusion and difficulty for consumers when applying fair use defence.  
 
Apple places many restrictions in its contract limiting the consumer’s use of downloaded music.  
With regard to consumer laws, users should have the right to benefit from the digital devices 
they purchase without abusive restrictions. Protecting this aspect of “consumer rights”
176 is to 
serve  the  “interests  of  the  public”,  which  is  also  a  fundamental  principle  of  copyright  law.  
However,  some  digital  rights  management  formats  have  embedded  capabilities  to  “limit  the 
                                                                                                                                                            
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term “interoperability” means the ability of computer 
programs to exchange information, and of such programs mutually to use the information which has 
been exchanged.” 
173 See §13(a) of iTunes Music Service Terms. 
174 See Part III Digital First Sale Doctrine, United States Copyright Act 1971. 
175 See §14(b) of iTunes Music Service Terms. 
176 See Laurier Yvon Ngombe, Technical Measures of Protection versus Copyright for Private Use: Is 
the French Legal Saga Over?” E.I.P.R. Vol. 29(2) (2007) at 61-65.   169 
ways in which digital content can be used reducing the consumers’ choice”
177 generating such 
conflicts  with  consumer  protection.    Compared  to  purchasing  a  substantial  book,  iTunes’ 
consumers’  ability  to  access  the  “goods”  they  own  is  greatly  limited.   As  described  in  the 
National Research Council Study Report,  
 
“Buy a book and you own it forever; pay for a service and when the period of service is 
over, you retain nothing. The increased use of licensing seems to diminish greatly the public 
access accorded through the first-sale rule. … In the world of licensed information, ending 
a subscription to an electronic journal may mean the end of access to earlier volumes or 
editions, as well”
178 
 
Apple’s iTunes Music Store exemplifies where consumers are not appropriately fully informed 
concerning  the  limitation  imposed  by  the  application  of  service  terms.  iTunes  only  offer 
“DRMed” downloads that have limited use on selected computers.
179 Article 20 of iTunes Music 
Terms of Service states that Apple reserves the right “to update, revise, supplement […] and 
modify this Agreement and to impose new or additional rules, policies, terms or conditions on 
[consumers’] use of the Service”
180 by the FairPlay DRM system. Apple is therefore capable of 
imposing  unilateral  changes  in  conditions  of  use  on  legitimately  downloaded  files.    This 
indicative and non-exhaustive list in contract terms is prohibited by law and considered unfair.  
According to the EC Directive on unfair terms in consumer contract
181, iTunes Music Store 
Service Terms “enable the seller or supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally without 
a valid reason which is specified in the contract”
182, which breaches fundamental consumer 
rights.  The Norwegian Consumer Council presented a complaint against iTunes Music Store on 
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See Nicola Lucchi, “
Countering the Unfair Play of DRM Technologies”,
 Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal, Vol. 16 
(1) (2007). 
178 See National Research Council, “The Digital Dilemma: Intellectual Property in the Information 
Age”, Commerce on Intellectual Property, Rights and the Emerging Information Infrastructure, 
(2000) at 79-86. 
179 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, supra note 10, at 38. 
180See iTunes Music Store Terms of Service, Article 20. available at, http://www.apple.com/ca/support/itunes/legal/terms.html.    
181 See The EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 93/13/EEC, (O.J. 1993 L 95/29) 
1993. 
182 Ibid, annex letter j, letter k.   170 
January 25, 2006.
183  Considering that some of iTunes terms applied or intended to be applied in 
the conduct of business with consumers “[may] be prohibited if the terms and conditions are 
considered unfair on consumers and if general considerations call for such a prohibition”
184, Mr. 
Thon decided these terms and conditions are unreasonable and unfair by contravening Section 9a 
of the Norwegian Marketing Control Act.  Thus, Apple’s reservation of the right to unilaterally 
change the usage of agreement without notice violates the essential principles of contract law 
and consumer protection law.  
 
Also,  iTunes  Terms  of  Service  includes  language  forms  which  may  preclude  fair  use  of 
downloaded music. §13(a) of US iTunes Terms of Service requires consumers agree that “the 
service  [of  the  iTune  Music  Store],  including  but  not  limited  to  graphics,  audio  clips,  and 
editorial content, contains proprietary information and material that is owned by Apple and/or its 
licensors … and that [they] will not use such proprietary information or materials in anyway 
whatsoever except for use of the Service in compliance with the terms of this Agreement [the 
iTunes Service Terms].” According to this provision, the music files downloaded from iTunes 
music  store  are  not  supposed  to  be  used  “in  anyway  whatsoever”,  including  for  fair  use 
purposes. This conflict between contract terms and users’ rights in copyright is also embodied in 
UK and French iTunes Terms of Service.
185  
 
Additionally, the private contract model relies on the scope of rightsholders’ authorisation. In 
fact, entertainment companies may not have the right to release all the contents which consumers 
seek. For instance, an entertainment company may have the right to release a song as a CD or a 
cassette tape, but not in digital format
186. As a result, it is not equivocally clear who holds the 
rights for online releases. The situation is even more problematic regarding re-issuing out-of-
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184 Ibid. 
185 See §13 of UK iTunes Music Store Terms of Service. See also, §13 of France iTunes Store 
Conditions generales du service  
186 See John Borland, “Beatles Catalog Headed for Digital Distribution?” CNET News.com (June 8, 
2004) available at, http://www.news.com.cn//2100-1027_35228914.html.    171 
catalogue songs — songs which are old, obscure, or out-of-market. 
 
Metthew  Hilton  points  out,  “rights  and  duties  have  always  lain  at  the  heart  of  consumer 
policies”
187.  Consumers have certain fundamental rights in the digital world also, and consumer 
protection law works as a means to reduce imbalances between consumers and service providers. 
In practice, however, the use of unfair contracts and DRM technologies embedded in consumer 
products  potentially  violates  consumers’  right  to  “know  what  they  can  do  with  their  digital 
hardware and content as well as the limit of their usage”
188.  
 
4.2.2.2. The External Problem: Code v. Fair Use 
The external problem originates from the specific technical design of file sharing tools. Consider 
how Apple’s iTunes has struggled in these circumstances. Digital Right Management (DRM) 
systems deployed in Apple’s iPods have insinuated concerns regarding the interoperability of 
Apple’s machines.  By using FairPlay
189 DRM scheme, Apple requires that iTunes be the only 
store which sells music supported by iPods. Thus iPod users are not able to play downloaded 
music from retailers other than iTunes. 
 
There have been disputes on whether Apple is supposed to open its FairPlay technology platform 
to make “iTunes be we Tunes”.
190  Service providers, like Apple, would not release the FairPlay 
technology because licensing might damage their monetary benefit.  Francois Leveque asserts, 
“Compatibility is not free of charge”
191.   Apple announced that a license will generate additional 
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costs to guarantee the security of its DRM
192, in turn increasing the cost to consumers. If all 
these costs are higher than that in a non-licensing environment, “not licensing is profitable to 
Apple and in the general interests”.
193  
 
However, there are those who claim opening Apple’s FairPlay provides an opportunity to benefit 
all consumers, as well as to prevent monopoly.  Firstly, consumers are not being well-served 
when locked into specific formats by businesses as a way of maintaining market share. Chandak 
and  George  argue  that  “the  inter-operatibility  of  existing  digital  music  file  formats  will  be 
beneficial to all consumers. …[on the ground that] the new interoperable devices will … cater 
more to the needs of the consumer rather than to the pockets of big business. …[C]onsumer truly 
is the king”
194.  Secondly, EC competition law will require Apple to meet requests from other 
online music retailers by granting licenses to the FairPlay technology insofar as is necessary to 
allow supply of secured music downloads to iPod users. According to Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty
195,  as  an  undertaking within  a  dominant  position  in  a  relevant  market, Apple  has  “a 
special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair undistorted competition”
196. In legal 
practice, however, the scheme of inter-operating DRM systems is unclear as it appears within 
different legislations.  
 
It is interesting to note that the French Parliament passed the law on copyright and related rights 
on August 2006, known as DADVSI (loi relative au Droit d’Auteur et aux Droits Voisins dans la 
Societe de l’Information), which sets the principle that DRMs and TPMs “must not have the 
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§94. 
193 See Chandak and George, supra note 189. 
194 Ibid. 
195 See Article 82 of EC Treaty (ex. Article 86), stating that  
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effect of preventing effective interoperability”.
197 This is the first provision in the world seeking 
clarity  in  preventing  “the  segmentation  of  the  offer  of  cultural  goods  according  to  the 
configuration of the playing device, or that a particular good which would be only available in a 
particular online store, would also be accessible only through a certain type of player”.
198   
 
Another noteworthy development is that from April 2
nd 2007, EMI allowed its songs to be sold 
on iTunes without DRM protection for the first time
199. Despite some music companies’ critique, 
EMI  believes  without  DRM-protection,  users  can  have  the  flexibility  to  listen  to  music 
purchased from iTunes on any number of devices. Although these “ambitious frameworks”
200 
still need to be tested, the idea of dropping DRM systems deserves further attention. 
 
4.2.3 Analysis: Applying the Private Model to Academic Digital File Sharing 
The private contract model suggests an efficient way for the entertainment industry to collect 
market  rewards  for  rightsholders. Authors  trading  their  rights  to  interceding  publishers  will 
likely benefit from enhanced market price rewards. By comparison, pecuniary compensation for 
authors in the public model is lower (or likely to be so).  Through controlling market price via 
the DRM scheme and imposing certain limitations in their contracts, authors and rightsholders 
are potentially able to obtain even more reward by the private model.  The contracts or licenses 
also improve the clarity of the copyright system for the rightsholders. For example, the terms of 
the license may release Napster from potential liability of copyright, and all the while users are 
able to download music without worrying about being sued for copyright infringement.  
 
However, is  this  model workable in the context of educational and research materials? The 
private model requires payment according to the service terms or licenses. Each user of the 
                                                        
197 See Article L.331-5 of DADVSI (loi relative au Droit d’Auteur et aux Droits Voisins dans la 
Societe de l’Information). 
198 Quoted from Nicolas Jondet, “La France v. Apple: Who’s the dadvsi in DRMs?” SCRIPT-ed, Vol 
3(4) (2006) at 473-484. 
199 See, “Apple and EMI deal drops DRM”, Channel 4 News (02 April, 2007) available at, 
http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/science_technology/apple+and+emi+deal+drops+drm/37535
2.  
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service  is  charged  for  his  use,  whether  the  use  is  “fair”  or  not.  In  other  words,  certain 
information previously accessible to academic users without any charge, including academic 
information for research and education, will fall within the domain of “pay-for-use”. Academic 
information  may  then  be  less  accessible  through  being  too  expensive  for  academic  users. 
Although  authors,  publishers  and  rightsholders  are  entitled  to  pecuniary  compensation,  the 
private model challenges the application of fair use doctrine and UK fair dealing educational 
exception by failing to protect social benefits, especially academic users’ rights in copyright law.  
 
4.3 Conclusion: 
 
Today,  digital  file  sharing  technology  poses  a  serious  challenge  both  to  the  interests  of  the 
entertainment  industry,  and  the  application  of  fair  use  doctrine.  Seeking  correction, 
commentators have proposed different solutions, ranging from collecting public levies/taxes, to 
imposing private contracts.  The above analysis suggests that neither the public levy scheme, nor 
the  private  contract  model,  will  provide  ultimate  solutions  to  the  problem  of  unauthorised 
copying in the context of access to research and educational materials. 
 
The public levy model requires the payment of a levy or a tax on digital media and services. On 
the one hand, the entertainment industry is dissatisfied with the application of statutory levies or 
taxes, on the basis that the public model may not collect sufficient compensation for copyright 
holders based on a pre-set flat levy/tax rate.  On the other hand, research and educational users 
may lose their “fair” access to copyright works in the application of a public model. With the 
statutory levy/tax scheme, every user of digital equipment is charged for his use of the machine, 
whether the use is “fair” or not.   
 
The  private  model  may  present  an  effective  template  to  use  for  entertainment  file  sharing. 
However, it suffers from much the same problem as the public model. According to the private 
contract  or  agreement,  rightsholders  can  obtain  monetary  remedy  by  selling  the  copyright 
content, leaving the public no choice but to pay for use of the copyright works.  
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There are concerns about applying such “fared use” to digital file sharing, especially in the 
context  of  research  and  education.  By  setting  up  a  compulsory  payment  for  the  use  of  all 
copyright materials, the fared use proposal may hinder access to knowledge by some “fair” 
users.  For example, the fared use model requires payment based on the pre-set flat levy/tax rate 
or service licenses, so that each user is charged for his use, no matter whether it falls within the 
domain of fair use. Thus, certain information which previously was accessible to academic users 
without  any  charge  becomes  “pay-for-use”,  which  may  make  research  and  educational 
information less accessible through being too expensive for academic users. Okerson argues that 
the essential constitutive role of fair use doctrine for a democratic society is social benefits 
which can “neither be measured nor reflected in terms of consumer purchasing decisions”
201. 
David Post also states, “once tracking and payment mechanisms of [copyright materials] are in 
place, … there will [be no] place for fair use”.
202 The nature of exaggerating economic value of 
copyright materials results in incompatibility between the fared use model and fair use doctrine. 
 
Compared to these two “fared” use models above, the voluntary model offers a more promising 
basis for discussion towards restoring an appropriate equilibrium to fair use doctrine.  In the 
following  chapter,  the  question  how,  and  to  what  degree,  the  voluntary  proposal  can  be 
successfully practiced will be evaluated. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
201 See Ann Okerson, “Who Owns Digital Works”, Scientific American, Vol. 84 (1996) at 339. 
202 See Bernt Hugenholtz, Lucia Guibault, Sjoerd Van Geffen, The Future of Levies in Digital 
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Chapter 5. The Voluntary Model: An “Un-fared” Model 
 
The disadvantages of the public and private models, as outlined in Chapter 4, suggest that we 
should  consider  a  fundamental  change  in  approach  towards  solving  the  fair  use  problem  in 
academic file sharing. Specifically, this Chapter proposes that we replace the “fared” models 
with an “un-fared” strategy — a voluntary model –referring to a system where authors release 
their copyright content for “free”, thus avoiding the problem of closing down the file sharing 
“gateway”. It is noteworthy that there may be non-monetary forms of compensation, such as 
reaching larger audiences, or enhancing reputation and influence. 
 
5.1 The Voluntary Approaches: “Give it away” 
 
  The whole purpose of information is to be shared, as the purpose of bread is to be eaten. 
  — Open Access Publishing and Scholarly Societies
1 
 
5.1.1 Early Ideas about the Voluntary Model 
Scholars  have  proposed  a  number  of  ways  voluntary  contribution  may  be  collected.  Some 
suggest a Tipping Technique way, a method which allows users to target voluntary payments to 
the artist based on information embedded in a digital file
2. For instance, Fred Hapgood notes that 
voluntary payments can be targeted to specific artists or to categories of artists
3, while Joost 
Smiers asserts that specific kinds of artists can be supported by payments, dissociated from the 
use of specific works
4. Economists and sociologists have identified that the tips collected in this 
way may account to a considerable revenue, given the fact that consumers pay more than $20 
billion of tips to waiters and others every year in U.S.
5 Assuming individual file-sharers are 
                                                        
1 See “Open Access Publishing and Scholarly Societies: A Guide”, Open Society Institute (2005) 
available at, http://www.soros.org/openaccess/scholarly_guide.shtml.. 
2 See Jeff Kandt, “Tipster Technical Overview: A Napster Friendly Business Model for Musicians” 
(2002) available at, http://tipster.weblogs.com/stories/storyReader$180
. 
3 See Fred Hapgood, “Voluntary Payments” (2003), available at, http://tipster.weblogs.com/hapgood
.    
4 See Joost Smiers, “ The Business of Intellectual Property: Copyright is Wrong”, Le monde 
Diplomatique (2001) available at, http://www.en.monde-diplomatique.fr/2001/09/10copyright
.  
5 See Ofer H. Azar, “ The Social Norm of Tipping: A Review” (2002) available at,  
http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpot/0309006.html
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willing to tip a penny per song, the model will realise hundreds of millions of pounds per year 
since file-sharers trade billions of sounds on the Internet per month.  
 
Some others advocate the “ransom model”, labelling it OpenCulture
6. The intent of OpenCulture 
is to pay rightsholders by public donation for creating a digital library of free books and music. 
The public donations could be used to compensate authors; in turn, the authors must “agree to 
release their works upon payment, subject to a permanent, free-use license that runs to the public 
at  large”
7.  For  example,  The  Street  Performer  Protocol  suggested  by  Diane  Leenheer 
Zimmerman, provides authors with a platform to set a release price for the works subject to 
permanent free-use license once the asking price is met.
8  Kevin Maney envisions a hybrid 
model by combining the tipping model with pricing
9. He provides free sample to users; if the 
users wish to burn the album on a CD, they have to pay for it. Instead of a set price, Magnatune 
uses a “dynamic price”, i.e., users can pay as much as they want, with a minimum at $5 per 
album
10.  
 
With all the models proposed above, however, voluntary contributions have never yielded any 
“meaningful remuneration”
11 for rightsholders in practice. As Janet Kornblum discusses, “[T]ip 
jars aren’t likely to replace ads or other revenue sources”.
12  The risks of the early voluntary way 
model lie in its honour code foundation and operation.  In theory, the feature of an honour code 
casts scepticism on voluntary contribution models.  Economically speaking, consumers’ self-
interested nature will ultimately drive down prices and limit the production of copyright works.
13 
                                                        
6See OpenCulture, “Frequently Asked Questions” (2004) available at, 
http://www.openculture.org/About/faq.html.  
7 See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, “Authorship without Ownership: Reconsidering Incentives in a 
Digital Age”, DePaul Law Review, Vol. 52 (2003) at 126. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See Kevin Maney, “Apple’s iTunes Might Not Be Only Answer to Ending Piracy”, USA Today (Jan 
21, 2004). 
10 See Tobias Regner and Javier A. Barrier, “Magnitude: Variable Pricing for Music” (2005) available 
at, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=721596.  
11 See Neil W. Netanel, “Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-peer File 
Sharing”, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 17(1) (2003) at 76. 
12 See Janet Kornblum, “Aren’t Too Proud to Bed on the Net”, USA Today (January 8, 2002). 
13 See Peter K. Yu, “P2P and the Future of Private Copying”, Michigan State University College of 
Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 02-08 (2004) at 48. See also, Earl R. 
Brubaker, “Free Ride, Free Revelation, or Golden Rule?” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 18 
(1975) at 147.   178 
For instance, Stephen King released the first six chapters of his novel, The Plant, on the Internet 
in 2000. King used Amazon.com to collect one dollar or more from each prospective reader for 
every chapter he actually downloaded. Once 75% of those who downloaded the previous chapter 
paid for it, he promised to release the next one. Unfortunately, by the time the fourth installment 
was released, less than half of readers would pay for the downloading.  Another dominant “give 
it away” example of recent times is Radiohead’s album In Rainbows promotion.
14 In October 
2007, Radiohead surprised the entertainment industry by allowing users to pay whatever they 
wanted  for  the  album  to  obtain  the  download  version. Although  Radiohead  expected  “most 
people [would pay] a normal retail price with few trying to buy for a penny”, a survey conducted 
by Record of the Day
15 indicated that about 1/3 of users downloading the album for nothing, 
with the average price paid being £4. Considering the revenue was far less than expected, the 
band shut down the dynamic price promotion and changed to a traditional CD retailing sales 
approach by December 2007.  
 
The failure of Radiohead
16 and Stephen King
17 expressed the existence of a degree of risk, 
casting doubt on whether “honour” can realistically deliver. The emphasis on mercantile purpose 
in this model also places authors in an embarrassing situation where they have to make a choice 
between free expression and earning money. As Forrester analyst Dan O'Brien said, “I think that 
whole motto of sort of nickel-and-diming people of this per chapter basis was a mistake. Every 
chapter was another test of whether people would pay the threshold that (King) determined. I 
thought  it  got  in  the  way  of  the  relationship  between  the  writer  and  audience--it  was  too 
mercantile.”
18  
                                                        
14 See Julian Marshall, “Rainbow Warriors”, NME (Dec 8, 2007). 
15 See “Radiohead in Rainbows: What Price did You Choose? Survey Results”, Record of the Day, 
available at, http://www.whatpricedidyouchoose.com/.  
16 See supra note 15. 
17 See Janelle Brown, “Stephen King’s Horrifying Proposal” (2003) available at, 
http://www.archive.salon.com/tech/log/2000/06/13/king/print.html. See also, Stephen King, “How I 
Got That Story”, Time Europe (2000) available at, 
http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/2001/0108/king.html.  
18 See Gwendolyn Mariano, “Stephen King puts ‘The Plant’ on ice”, CNET News.com (Nov 28, 
2000), available at, http://news.com.com/Stephen+King+puts+The+Plant+on+ice/2100-1023_3-
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5.1.2 Access to Knowledge (A2K): A New Approach to the Voluntary Model 
Despite  the  failure  of  the  early  voluntary  contribution  method,  disseminating  information 
broadly  and  freely  has  always  been  desirable,  especially  with  the  rapid  growth  of  digital 
reproduction and communication technologies.  Over the last ten years scholars and researchers 
worldwide have established a movement known as Open Access (OA), in order to minimise 
limitations presented by traditional licensing in the context of the digital world. 
  
5.1.2.1. Open Access (OA) Movement 
According to the Berlin Declaration, Open Access (OA) is defined as “a comprehensive source 
of  human  knowledge  and  cultural  heritage  that  has  been  approved  by  the  scientific 
community”
19.  The  OA  movement  “springs  from  the  potential  unleashed  by  the  electronic 
medium, and by the world wide web”
20, which aims to harness information and communication 
technology advancement to enhance access to research and education material.   
 
The OA idea has been adopted and further developed in a number of international declarations. 
The  2002  Budapest  Open  Access  Initiative  (BOAI)  extended  open  access  to  peer-reviewed 
journals. The Bethesda Statement on Open Access Publishing expanded OA to primary scientific 
literature. Declarations on Access to Research Data from Public Funding opened up access 
regimes for publicly funded literature. In 2005, the Adelphi Charter on Creativity, Innovation 
and Intellectual Property listed nine principles to facilitate the use of OA for scientific material. 
 
To support the OA movement, a variety of OA policies have been endorsed by organisations 
world-wide.    For  instance,  in  the  United  Kingdom,  the  Digital  Repositories  development 
program
21  consists  of  25  projects,  aiming  to  facilitate  academic  researchers  to  share  their 
                                                        
19 See “Berlin Declaration on Open Access to Knowledge in the Sciences and Humanities” (Oct 22, 
2003) available at, http://www.zim.mpg.de/openaccess-berlin/berlindeclaration.html .  
20 See Neil Jacobs, Open Access: Key Strategic, Technical and Economic Aspects, Oxford: Chandos 
Publishing Ltd. (2006). See also, David Soloman, Developing Open Access Journals: a Practical 
Guide, Oxford: Chandos Publishing Ltd. (2008). 
21 See Digital Repositories Development Program, available at, http://digbid.com/4fyye.    180 
material. In Australia, the Australian Partnership
22 project seeks to enhance the operation and 
development of digital repositories. 
 
The essential principle of the OA movement is to open up access to research and scholarship
23. 
This movement can be regarded as a voluntary contribution model, given that the purpose of the 
movement is, to all intents, for rightsholders to release their copyright content to the public in 
furtherance of research and education. It also allows open access to work in the public domain. 
As  James  Boyle  states,  the  movement  is  working  towards  academic  contents  not  being 
“propertised”.
24  The following is a brief case study of Creative Commons licensing, in order to 
highlight the features of open content licences.  
 
5.1.2.2. Open Content Licensing: Creative Commons (CC) Case Study 
From a legal perspective, it is unlawful to reproduce or distribute copyright material unless such 
use is permitted by the copyrightsholder or authorised in certain circumstances. In the Open 
Access movement, a range of open content licences (OCL) have been developed to provide legal 
certainty  to  the  act  of  sharing  digital  content  and  grant  permissive  rights  to  users,  such  as 
AEShareNet Instant Licenses
25, Design Science License
26, GNU Free Documentation License
27, 
and Open Publication License
28.   The  most  prominent  open content  licensing  system  is  the 
Creative  Commons  (CC)  project  established  by  Professor  Lawrence  Lessig  in  Stanford 
University in 2001.  
                                                        
22 See “Australian Partnership”, available at, http://www.apsr.edu.au/ 
23 See OAK Law Report Number 1: Creating a legal framework for copyright management of open 
access within the Australian academic and research sector, Report for the Department of Education 
Science and Training (DEST), Australia (Aug 2006) at 91.[Hereinafter, OAK Law Report Number 1, 
in brief]. 
24 See James Boyle, “The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain”, 
Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol.66 (33) (2003) at 33-73. 
25 “AEShareNet licensing system” simplifies and streamlines the licensing of learning materials 
through a series of standard license conditions called “licence protocols”. All AEShareNet licences 
are built on a common heading structure. Some protocols allow negotiation and customisation of 
conditions for an individual material or licensee and others do not. Available at, 
http://www.aesharenet.com.au/coreBusiness/#Instant 
26 See, Design Science License, available at, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/dsl.html.  
27 “GNU Free Documentation License (GNU FDL or simply GFDL)” is a copyleft license for free 
documentation, designed by the Free Software Foundation (FSF) for the GNU project, available at, 
http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html.  
28 See, http://opencontent.org/openpub/.    181 
Creative Commons (CC) is a project which aims to enable rightsholders to grant some of their 
rights to the public while retaining others through open content licensing protocols and thereby 
promote  information  reutilisation  and  dissemination  for  the  purposes  of  creativity  and 
innovation. The project provides a variety of free licenses which rightsholders can use when 
releasing their copyright works on websites. Through granting copyright in the content to the 
commons, the rightsholders can determine how, and to what degree, that content can be used by 
the public
29. The project also provides RDF/XML metadata that can be used to describe the 
relationship between the license and the creative work, making the license status of the work 
machine-readable. In short, the CC idea is to “ask rightsholders to ‘licence out’ or distribute their 
material on the basis of protocols designed to enhance reusability and build on the information 
commons”.
30  
 
According to Creative Commons licence Deed,
31 two types of conditions are included in the CC 
licences.  The  first  is  the  “baseline”  rights  and  restrictions
32,  which  are  common  to  all  CC 
licences.  For example, licensees are granted the right to reproduce the work; to create and 
reproduce derivative works; to distribute, display and digitally perform the work; and, to transfer 
the work to another format
33. Licensees may not use technological protection measures to restrict 
access to the work
34. Copyright notices should always be attached to all copies of the work
35.  
These  basic  conditions  may  be  deployed  with  some  other  options,  whether  alone  or  in 
combination. According to the Creative Commons Deed, rightsholders are entitled to choose 
from among the following optional license conditions: non-commercial
36, no derivative works
37, 
                                                        
29 See Anne Fitzgerald and Brian Fitzgerald, Intellectual Property in Principle, Australia: Law Book 
Co. (2004) at 455. 
30 See OAK Law Report Number 1, supra note 23, at 110. 
31 See Creative Commons licence Deed, available at, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/. 
(last accessed at Dec 4 2006).  
32 See OAK Law Report Number 1, supra note 23, at 110. 
33 See OAK Law Report Number 1,supra note 23, at 110. 
34 See OAK Law Report Number 1,supra note 23, at 110. 
35 See OAK Law Report Number 1,supra note 23, at 110. 
36 “Non-commercial” condition refers that others are permitted to copy, distribute, display and 
perform the copyright work, or make derivative works, as long as the use is for non-commercial 
purpose only. See, Creative Commons licence Deed, supra note 31. 
37 “No derivative work” condition means others are permitted to copy, distribute, display and perform 
only exact copies of the work, but not granted to make derivative works based upon the copyright 
work. See, Creative Commons licence Deed, supra note 31.   182 
and share alike
38.   
Cases Related to the Creative Commons licence 
The Creative Commons was first tested in Court in Curry v. Audax,
39 in which podcaster Adam 
Curry sued a Dutch tabloid which published the photos licensed under the Creative Commons 
Non-commercial license but without permission from his Flickr page.  The Court held that the 
defendant would be enjoined from publishing all copyright protected photos, on the ground that 
they failed to observe the conditions that control the use by third parties of the photos as stated 
in the CC licence.  By examining Article 4 (a) and (c) of the Dutch CC licence which stipulate 
that “the user is not entitled to use the work for commercial purposes”
40, the Court found that the 
photographer’s rights had been violated by the publication of their works in the magazine, which 
was a use for commercial purposes without the rightsholders’ consent and without granting a 
“share alike”
41 license.  The Dutch Court decision is the first reported case where a court has 
ruled  on  the  enforceability  of  a  CC  licence,  confirming  that  the  conditions  mentioned  in  a 
Creative Commons licence “automatically apply to the content licensed under it, and bind users 
of such content even without expressly agreeing to, or having knowledge of, the conditions of 
the license”.
42   
 
Consequently, the debate on the validity of the CC licence has been carried on in some other 
jurisdictions.  For instance, in Sociedad General de Autores y Editores (SGAE) v. Ricardo Andres 
Utrera  Fernandez,
43    the  Spanish  Court  held  that  “the  document  alleged  by  the  defendant-
                                                        
38 “Share alike” condition states that others may distribute derivate works only under a licence 
identical to that in the original work. See, Creative Commons licence Deed, supra note 31. 
39 See Adam Curry v. Audax, Amsterdam D.C. (March 9 2006), interim measure, 334492/KG 06-176 
SR. 
40 See Article 4 of the Full Term of Creative Commons licence. Available at, 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/1.0/legalcode.  
41 Ibid. See also, “The Creative Commons Legal Code --- Public License Attribution-Noncommercial 
ShareAlike 2.0 License”. Available at, http://torrents.softwarelivre.org/COPYING.EN.  
42See Creative Commons licence Upheld by Dutch Court, Groklaw, available at, 
http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20060316052623594. (March 16, 2006). 
43 See Sociedad General de Autores y Editores (SGAE) v. Ricardo Andres Utrera Fernandez, 
761/2005, ruling nº 15/2.006. (In this case, SGAE sued Mr. Ricardo, the owner of Metropol, a disco 
bar in Badajoz, by alleging that he had failed to pay SGAE’s license fee for the public performance of 
music managed by the collecting society. The Court rejected SGAE’s claims on the ground that the 
owner of the bar questioned the validity of the SGAE as a representative for the music played in the 
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appellant in concept of free-music end user license represent only an informative piece of paper 
without any kind of signature, thus not representing any legally valuable act”.
44  In comparison, 
in the latest Spanish SGAE case which sued jazz club Birdland
45 for playing music in public 
locale without paying royalties, the judge-magistrate Luis Sanz Acosta upheld the validity of the 
CC licence: 
"...in recent years we have seen the rise of so-called "música libre" in our 
country,  very  much  an  Internet  phenomenon  as  a  medium  for  music 
distribution. From a distribution model very much circumscribed to the sale 
and  rent  of  works,  controlled  by  content  industry,  there  is  now  an  almost 
unlimited model, thanks to the global diffusion provided by the Internet, in 
which creators themselves, without industry intermediaries, can make digital 
copies of their work available to the public. This phenomenon has originated 
the coexistence of different content distribution models with regards to the new 
possibility offered by the Internet 
 
a) The traditional model, based on copyright protection, which seeks to restrict 
access and use of online content, by using negotiating formulae of restrictive 
nature and technological control measures, expressed in the so-called "Digital 
Rights Management” 
 
b) A model that provides free online access to content, on occasions allowing 
personal  use  (implicit  licensing  models),  and  in  other  situations,  the  free 
redistribution of the work, its transformation and even its public economic 
exploitation, with the only proviso of citing the source. These are models of 
public domain and general licences (General Public License), such as, for 
example,  the  Creative  Commons  licences,  which  include  a  copyleft  clause. 
 
With  this  copyleft  clause,  the  owner  allows,  by means  of  a  general  public 
licence, the transformation or modification of his work, compelling the author 
of  the  modified  work  to  make  it  available  to  the  public  with  the  same 
conditions, that is, allowing free access and further transformation. With the 
Creative Commons licences, the rights-holder reserves the right of economic 
exploitation  and  can  forbid  modifications.  It  is  vital  then  to  distinguish 
                                                        
44 Ibid. 
45 See Sociedad General de Autores y Editores(SGAE) v. establecimiento salmantino Birdland, quoted 
from Andres Guadamuz, “Spanish Jazz Club Wins Case on Copyleft Claims”, TechnoL lama (May 
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Creative Commons licences that have, and have not, the copyleft clause. In 
some  instances  there  will  be  Creative  Commons  licences  that  include  the 
copyleft clause (translation mine, traduttore = traditore)."
46 
 
The latest U.S. Creative Commons licence case, Jacobson v. Katzer,
47 further decided that CC 
licence is a valid contract rather than just a licence. Robert Jacobson participated in an open 
source project named Java Model Railroad Interface (JMRI), with the conditional licence on 
attribution to the original source of the JMRI files. Matthew Katzer operating as KAM Industries 
incorporated parts of the JMRI in their software without any change in the original JMRI files. 
In the first instance, the District Court had misinterpreted the CC licence and alleged that there 
should be no presumption of a copyright infringement claim given that the defendant did not 
need to adhere to the CC licence terms. In August 2008, the U.S. Appeals Court changed the 
District Court decision, confirming that a copyrightsholder has the right to “grant the right to 
make certain modifications, yet retain his right to prevent other modifications [on his work]… 
Indeed,  such  a  goal  is  exactly  the  purpose  of  adding  conditions  to  a  license  grant”.  Lessig 
summarised  the  ruling  encouraging  that  conditions  of  a  liberal  licence  are  enforceable.
48  
According to him, 
 
In non-technical terms, the Court has held that free licenses such as the CC licences set 
conditions (rather than covenants) on the use of copyrighted work. When you violate the 
condition, the license disappears, meaning you are simply a copyright infringer. This is 
the theory of the GPL and all CC licences. Put precisely, whether or not they are also 
contracts, they are copyright licenses which expire if you fail to abide by the terms of the 
license. 
 
 
                                                        
46 Ibid. 
47 See Robert Jacobson v. Matthew Katzer and Kamind Associates, Inc.,No. 06-CV- 01905 JSW, 2007 
WL 2358628 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2007). United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
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Pros and Cons of the CC Licence 
The CC licence is a promising answer to the problem of access to educational materials in the 
digital world, considering its potential to allow authors to give away their rights while limiting 
users  from  abusing  this  altruistic  gift.    With  respect  to  advantages  for  higher  and  further 
education,  freely  and  easily  accessible  research  materials  are  valuable  to  researchers  and 
educators, given that “the benefits of research are derived principally from access to research 
results”
49.  For academic authors, the Creative Commons enables more freedom in publishing by 
“lower[ing] the barriers to publishing [and] providing immediate worldwide e-dissemination at a 
lower cost”.
50 Compared to traditional publishing with delays sometimes amounting to months 
or years, the application of CC licences allows streamlining of the process.  As the traditional 
licensing system works in paper-based publishing environment, so the practice of CC licences 
indicates a possibility that the transformed licensing model can be applied to online publishing 
world.  
 
However, there are concerns with some inconsistencies of the open access licence. For instance, 
Nimmer asserts that self-proliferating licences create “incompatibilities”
51, i.e., “the inability of 
one user to concurrently comply with the terms of two separate licences”
52. A licence musician, 
Larry Rosen, complained, “I'm not bothered as much by ‘too many notes’ as I am by the fact that 
the notes aren't always in the same key. Licence proliferation has become an important problem 
because  software  under  those  different  licences  cannot  always  be  played  consistently  and 
compatibly everywhere. Perhaps ... we should throw out the off-key notes?”
53 As Benjamin 
Mako Hill mentions, the open access licences “set no defined limits and promises, no freedoms, 
                                                        
49 See Wellcome Trust, “Costs and Business Models in Scientific Research Publishing” (April 2005) 
available at, http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/doc_wtd003185.html.  
50 See Jonathan D Wren, “Open Access and Openly Accessible: a study of scientific publications 
shared via the internet”, BMJ, Vol. 330 (2005) at 1128.  
51 See Raymond T. Nimmer, “Open Source License Proliferation, a broader view”, Contemporary 
Intellectual Property, Licensing and Information Law (2005) available at, 
http://www.ipinfoblog.com/archives/licensing-law-issues-open-source-license-proliferation-a-
broader-view.html 
52 Ibid. 
53 Quoted from Nimmer, Open Source License Proliferation, supra note 51.   186 
no rights, and no fixed qualities”
54. The lack of clear standard that all CC licences grant confuses 
and hence confounds the use of OA licences in practice. 
 
Secondly, the terms of CC licence does not provide a clear guidance on the situation where a 
work includes third party rights.  This might include the use of photographs or images generated 
by third parties.  The use of a work created by an employee can also be problematic. In most 
circumstances, the employer owns the rights in the work created by their employees. In such 
instances, academic employees cannot make their works available under a CC licence without 
the permission of the institution or the department.  In addition, publisher rights may also affect 
the application of CC licences. For example, Social Science Research Network (SSRN), as an 
eLibrary supporting the Open Access movement, provides authors with the opportunity to “grant 
reuse rights through a Creative Commons or similar license embedded in an electronic file”.
55 
Nevertheless,  there  is  a  charge  to  download  some  of  the  materials  posted  to  SSRN  if  the 
materials are provided by publishers, “who typically retain copyright to the posted materials”
56. 
In other words, users need to pay for accessing these materials even if their uses are for personal, 
non-commercial, research or educational purposes. 
 
5.2. Evaluating the Voluntary Model: Free as in “Free Beer”
57?  
 
Optimists about Open Access believe that Open Access licensing is “the first time in history, 
human expression by default is subject to regulation”
58, which substantially benefits science and 
                                                        
54 See Benjamin Mako Hill, “Towards a Standard of Freedom: Creative Commons and the Free 
Software Movement” (July 2005) available at, 
http://mako.cc/writing/toward_a_standard_of_freedom.html.  
55See Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Terms of Use, available at, 
http://ssrn.com/update/general/ssrn_faq.html#terms (Access at Nov, 2007). 
56 Ibid. 
57 See, “Free as in beer” refers to things which are available at no monetary cost (like free beer at a 
party). By contrast, the expressions free as in speech, free as in freedom, and free as in rights, refer to 
something which is free of any and all restrictions, as in the freedom of speech. See, Lawrence 
Lessig, “Free, as in Beer”, Wired, Vol.14 (9) (Sep 2006). See also, Darren Wershler Henry, Free as in 
speech and beer: open source, peer-to-peer and the economics of the online revolution, Pearson 
Publications (2002). 
58 See Lawrence Lessig, “Mashups and the Law”, available at, http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTL/?p=2614 
(June 20, 2006). See also, Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the 
Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity, New York: The Penguin Press (2004) 
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society,  maximises  impact,  minimises  redundancy,  speeds  scientific  progress,  makes  content 
easy to access, and gives impetus to an alternative to the “permission culture”
59. Clearly, the OA 
licensing system reflects the thought that rightsholders should grant some of their exclusive 
rights to the public in certain circumstances, such as for the purposes of research and education. 
However, when people are asked to give away something, a common question is “why would we 
want to share it for free?”  In the following section, we will analyse on what basis people might 
wish to share digital content for free, and discuss the benefits and potential disadvantages of the 
OA licensing system. 
 
5.2.1. Advantages of the Voluntary Model 
 
The voluntary contribution model is theoretically justified by two empirical pieces of evidences.  
First of all, not all writers devote themselves fully to pecuniary gain. As Zimmerman describes, 
“artistic  production  is  not  only,  and  perhaps  not  even  primarily,  about  money,[  …]  it  is 
nevertheless unlikely that writers will devote … to authorship as a profession if they cannot 
profit from the value that others place on their work”.
60  Secondly, some users do “cooperate, 
self-sacrifice,  and  provide  charitable  donations,  ….  [as  well  as]  pay  for  products  that  [are] 
available  free-of-charge”.
61  This  is  especially  true  of  educational  or  academic  users.  For 
example,    Lawrence  Lessig  released  his  book  “Free  Culture”
62  under  a  creative  commons 
licence  (CCL)  on  a  website.  Yet,  many  people  still  purchased  the  book.    In  her  article 
“Authorship without Ownership”, Zimmerman states: “people contribute to television and radio, 
non-profit theatre groups, museums, and a wide variety of other cultural activities that could 
probably not survive without their voluntary support, even though in those cases … they cannot 
                                                        
59 “Permission Culture”, as described by Lawrence Lessig, is the modern culture is the one “in which 
creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the past”, and OA 
licenses can lessen traditional content distributors’ monopolies on cultural products. See, Lawrence 
Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 58, at 8. 
60 See Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 58, at 1121. 
61 See Glynn S. Lunney Jr., “The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act”, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 87 (2003) at 813. 
62 See Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 58. (The book was released on the Internet for free 
on March, 2004 under the CC Attribution/Non-commercial license).   188 
exclude those who never pay a cent”.
63  Giving a cultural work away for free can also be a 
successful way to market the product, or associated products, for money. The success of Player 
v.  Player  (PvP)
64  cartoon,  for  example,  demonstrates  the  market  potential  of  the  voluntary 
model. 
 
5.2.1.1. The Voluntary Model Serves the Public Interest 
In practice, the voluntary contribution scheme has potential to preserve a balance between social 
benefits and rightsholders’ interests.  Let us consider the public interest with open access to 
educational and social information.  First of all, the Open Access movement allows access to 
knowledge as an extension of the basic human right principle. International human rights law 
clearly supports greater access to knowledge. Such principles have been embodied in a number 
of declarations, conventions and covenants. For instance, article 17 of the Convention on the 
Rights of a Child (CRC)
65 states that children have access to information and material especially 
aimed at the promotion of the child’s social, spiritual and moral well-being and mental health.  
Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
66 recognises that everyone 
has  the  right  to  education.  Article  27  of  UDHR  also  confirms  everyone’s  right  to  freely 
participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific 
advancement and its benefits
67. With the advent of the Internet, the OA licensing system is 
extending the human rights code even further, to include digital copyright content. 
 
Secondly, open access to scholarly research is beneficial to economic and cultural development. 
Free  online  availability  of  information  will  expand  academic  information  resources  by 
enhancing  academic  communications,  speeding  scientific  processes,  and  promoting  social 
progress.  Given open access to knowledge, researchers and scholars can reach any article on the 
                                                        
63 See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 1150. 
64 “PvP”, known as Player vs Player, is an online comic written and drawn by author Scott Kurtz. By 
August 2005, it had around 100,000 unique visitors per day. As of February 1, 2007, it became the 
subject of its own animated series. 
65 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, General Assembly Resolution 44/25 (20 November, 
1989). 
66 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) (10 
December, 1948). 
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website, rather than just those provided in the particular journal that appears in certain libraries.  
Research funding agencies have long endeavoured to promote open access to the research they 
fund and support.  For instance, the U.S. National Institute of Health’s Public Access Policy
68 
was  enacted  in  2005,  which  requested  medical  researchers  provide  an  open  access  version 
online. In June 2005, the Research Council UK (RCUK) published a statement on Access to 
Research  Outputs  policy,
69  requiring  immediate  self-archiving  through  their  institutional 
repositories.  In April 2006, the Recommendation A1 of European Commission “Study on the 
Economic and Technical Evolution of the Scientific Publication Markets in Europe”
70 suggested 
that “Research funding agencies … should establish a European policy mandating published 
articles arising from EC-funded research to be available after a given time period in open access 
archives”.  
 
This  is  especially  important  for  developing  countries.  According  to  the  World  Bank 
Classification
71, a developing countries’ annual per capita income can range from: US$825 or 
less  (low  income);  US$826–US$3,255  (lower  middle  income)  to  US$3,256  (upper  middle 
income). Lack of funds and space makes it impossible for developing countries’ libraries to 
subscribe to every scientific journal, a situation known as “the series crisis”
72. Open access helps 
researchers  and  scholars  obtain  access  to  articles  or  journals  which  their  libraries  do  not 
subscribe to.  In addition, open access extends the domain of research “beyond academic”
73.  
The readers of an open access article can be anyone: a professional in the field, a student, a 
writer, or anyone who is interested in exploring the topic. For example, one can easily read the 
scholarly literature about meningioma research on open access archives, rather than searching 
                                                        
68 See “The U.S. National Institute of Health’s Public Access Policy” (May 2005) available at, 
http://publicaccess.nih.gov/. (Last accessed at 14/02/2007). 
69 See “Access to Research Outputs”, the Research Council UK (June 2006) available at, 
http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/research/outputs/access/2005.htm. (Last accessed at 14/02/2007). 
70 See “Study on the Economic and Technical Evolution of the Scientific Publication Markets in 
Europe”, European Commission Research Paper, available at, http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-
society/pdf/scientific-publication-study_en.pdf. (Last accessed at 14/02/2007). 
71 See “The World Bank Classification 2006”, available at, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20420458~me
nuPK:64133156~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html.  
72 See Lee C. Van Orsdel and Kathleen Born, “Choosing Sides: Periodical Price Survey 2005”, 
LibraryJournal.com, available at, http://www.libraryjournal.com/article/CA516819.html.  
73 See Catherine Jones, Institutional Repositories: Content and Culture in an Open Access 
Environment, Oxford: Chandos Publishing Ltd. (2007).   190 
thousands of books and articles in a medical library. 
 
5.2.1.2. The Voluntary Model Serves Authors’ Interests 
Open access helps authors to enlarge the audience by their research.  At a personal level, opening 
access  to  copyright  protected  works  can  enhance  an  authors’  academic  reputation.  In  2004, 
Eysenbach compared citations to individual articles published in the journal “Proceedings of the 
National Academy  of Sciences”  (PNAS)  with  those  published  on  open access  archives. The 
research showed that between June 2004 and December 2004, open access articles were three 
times as likely to be cited as non-open access articles.
74  Establishing reputation is an important 
benefit for authors, especially for professional authors, which is indirectly related to the author’s 
pecuniary benefits, such as being promoted or awarded merits.  At an institutional level, open 
access to its research products enhances public funding potential for the institute. Of particular 
attention here is that open access works may be funded by state funds (i.e., by taxpayers). For 
instance, the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE)
75 is “to enable the higher education funding 
bodies to distribute public funds for research selectively on the basis of quality” in the UK. The 
citation rate of articles is a vital element when the RAE accesses the “quality” of research in 
higher education institutions.   
 
5.2.2. Scepticism about the Voluntary Model 
The obvious criticism of the voluntary model is why would authors choose to give away their 
works for free? In other words, an overwhelming concern about the voluntary model is whether 
the rightsholders would wish to share their works for free, namely, the status of the reward 
system for rightsholders. A number of surveys, articles and books
76 have deliberated on the 
                                                        
74 See Gunther Eysenbach, “Citation Advantage of Open Access Articles”, PloS Biology (2006) 
available at, http://biology.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-
document&doi=10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.0040157.  
75 See “What is the RAE? RAE 2001”, HERO, available at, http://www.hero.ac.uk/rae/AboutUs.  
76 See, Flora F. Tien, “To What Degree Does the Desire for Promotion Motivate Faculty to Perform 
Research? Testing the Expectancy Theory”, Research in Higher Education, Vol.41 (6) (Dec 2000). 
See also, Alma Swan and Sheridan Brown, “What Authors Want: the ALPSP Research Study on the 
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factors  authors  take  into  account  when  disseminating  their  works,  such  as  career prospects, 
improved funding, enhanced prestige and financial reward. If rightsholders obtain no reward in 
the voluntary model, they probably will hesitate to effectively donate their work. This problem is 
expanded in detail in Part 5.4.4. below. 
 
5.2 Comparison between the Public, Private and Voluntary Models 
 
Each  of  the  above  models  —  the  public
77,  private
78  and  voluntary  proposals  —  has  its 
advantages and limitations, each targeting different compensation sources for rightsholders. The 
following is a brief illustration of how the four stakeholders — authors, rightsholders/publishers, 
file sharing intermediaries, and users— have benefited or been disadvantaged by the public, 
private and voluntary models. Such an exercise will usefully assist in understanding the role 
each model can play in restoring the balance between public interest and rightsholders’ benefits. 
 
5.3.1 The Four Stakeholders 
Initially it is relevant to consider the definition of the four interest groups in this chart.  
 
According to the definition of the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993), the word 
“author” refers to “the writer of a book, article, or other text”, “one who practices writing as a 
profession”, “one who writes or constructs an electronic document or system, such as a website”, 
and “an originator or creator, as of a theory or plan”.
79  In the sense of copyright law, the author 
of a work means the person who creates the work
80, including individual creators and special 
situations where more than one person is involved in the creation of the work
81.  The term in this 
                                                                                                                                                            
(1999). See also, Michael A. Mabe, “What do Authors Care About: What over 50,000 STM Authors 
Tell Us Each Year”, available at, digital.casalini.it/retreat/2003_docs/Mabe.ppt.   
77 See Chapter 4, Part 4.1, at 133. 
78 See Chapter 4, Part 4.2, at 166. 
79 See New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (NSOED), New York: Oxford Publishing Ltd. (1993) 
at 92. 
80 See, e.g., Section 9(1) of Copyright, Design and Patent Act 1998 (CDPA) states that “author in 
relation to a work means the person who creates it”.  
81 See, e.g., Section 10 of CDPA states that “a work of joint authorship means a work produced by the 
collaboration of two or more authors in which the contribution of each author is not distinct from that 
of the other author or authors”.   192 
chapter denotes the academic author, namely, the person who creates the work for research, 
education or any other academic uses, such as a professor who creates a textbook, a lecturer who 
produces class notes, or a researcher who produces an academic article.  
 
Authorship and ownership have been long intertwined but are separated in copyright reality. The 
1988 CDPA distinguishes the author of a work from the copyrightsholder of a work by declaring 
that “the author of a work is the first owner of copyright”
82. In other words, although the author 
is the first owner of the work, it is possible for him or her to assign the copyright to a third party, 
i.e., the copyrightsholder of the work. As pointed out by Bently and Sherman, the copyright 
owner of a work during a specific period will “depend upon what has happened to the copyright 
since it was first created”
83.   
 
In the context of academic file sharing, the publisher and rightsholders perform the same role as 
a gatekeeper. It is noteworthy to distinguish an academic publisher from a commercial publisher. 
Commercial publisher describes “a corporate body whose function is that of publishing a work 
for profit”
84. Maximising profits is a main priority for commercial publishers. By comparison, 
academic publishers may balance prestige in their role of distributing knowledge and research 
resources with an intention to obtain profits. 
 
The  definition  of  file  sharing  intermediaries  has  changed  in  the  transformation  from  P2P 
entertainment file sharing to academic file sharing. As discussed in Chapter 1, digital file sharing 
includes  web-based  file  sharing  and  Peer-to-Peer  (P2P)  file  sharing.    In  P2P  file  sharing 
networks, digital files are stored in end-users’ personal computers and distributed from peers 
(i.e.,  end-users)  to  other  peers.    The  first  generation  of  P2P  file  sharing  intermediaries,  as 
exemplified  by  Napster,
85  had  a  centralised  file  index.  This  centralised  file  sharing  feature 
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84 See New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (NSOED), New York: Oxford Publishing Ltd. (1993) 
at 92. 
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ultimately  leads  to  Napster’s  failure  as  “contributorily  and  vicariously  liable  for  copyright 
infringement”.
86  In order to avoid the legal complexities encountered by Napster, the second 
P2P-generation,  such  as  Gnutella  model,  adopted  a  decentralised  technical  design.
87  The 
decentralised  file  sharing  infrastructure  separates  file  sharing  intermediaries  from  content 
webhosts,  resulting  in  a  complete  peer-to-peer  file  sharing  network.    By  comparison,  in 
academic file sharing the web-hosted file sharing deserves particular attention.  Considering the 
reliability of contents shared through academic file sharing networks, certain quality control 
systems are expected. As exemplified by the Social Science Research Network (SSRN)
88, a web 
hosting site can be a potential way to guarantee the quality of the materials in meeting academic 
standards.
89  
The users of copyright works are those who access copyright works. Copyright law traditionally 
distinguishes the different purposes of making use of copyright works, and concedes a privileged 
status to research and education.  We should be mindful that, in the context of academic file 
sharing, authors can also be users. Like a researcher, authors have to take a close look at existing 
works during their creative process. As Geiger states, “[B]efore creating his work, an author also 
is a user”
90. The loss of the privilege to legally make use of copyright works for research and 
education may have negative consequences for the creation of future works and thus hinder 
innovation. Some authors claim that it is necessary to provide a counterbalance between the 
interests  of  rightsholders  and  of  users.
91    It  is  interesting  to  note  that  academic  institutes 
especially can be seen as both rightsholders/publishers and users. On the one hand, academic 
                                                        
86 See Napster, 114 F.Supp. 2d, at 919, 920,1021.  
87 See Chapter 1, Part 1.1.2.3.2, at 19. 
88 See Social Science Research Network (SSRN) is “devoted to the rapid worldwide dissemination of 
social science research and is composed of a number of specialised research networks in each of the 
social sciences. The SSRN eLibrary consists of two parts: an Abstract Database containing abstracts 
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Collection currently containing over 162,200 downloadable full text documents in Adobe Acrobat pdf 
format. The eLibrary also includes the research papers of a number of fee based publication partners” 
Available at, http://www.ssrn.com/index.cfm  
89 See, e.g., Although SSRN encourages “the early distribution of research results” by authors, SSEP 
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90 See Christophe Geiger, “Copyright and Free Access to Information: for a Fair Balance of Interests 
in a Globalised World”, E.I.P.R. Vol.28 (78) (2006) at 366-373. 
91 See Thomas Riis, “Users’ Rights: Reconstructing Copyright Policy on Utilitarian Grounds”, 
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institutes may be either rightsholders or academic publishers, since they employ authors (i.e., 
professors, lecturers and research assistants) to create academic works. Meanwhile, academic 
institutes are also users who must purchase copyright works to support their staff and student 
teaching, studying and research. Academic institutes thus indirectly both generate and utilise 
copyright works.  
5.3.2 Analysis 
Let us review how the public, the private and the voluntary model which we considered in the 
previous chapter have influenced the four interest groups.  
5.3.2.1. Authors 
Regarding authors, the primary incentive for their creation is generally taken to be profit.  The 
application  of  both  public  levies  and  private  contract  models  benefits  authors  by  providing 
monetary compensation.  With the use of the public model, money due by levies is collected by 
collecting societies or governments and distributed to authors
92.  In the private model, market 
price collected through contracts or licences is allocated to authors.
93  Compared to the flat rate 
prearranged in the public model, authors may obtain more in reward in the private way by 
controlling market price directly.  In this comparison, the voluntary model requires academic 
authors to give away, in monetary terms, their copyright works. This highlights that authors are 
unable to substantially benefit from the voluntary model.  Although pecuniary compensation is 
an important factor to motivate authors’ creation, it could well be the case that some authors,
94 
especially  academics  and  educational  scholars,  are  not  ultimately  motivated  by  monetary 
earnings but rather by different objectives, such as the author’s desire to share his ideas, the 
expectation to be a personage, or the requirement of his job.
95 In this sense, the voluntary model 
brings authors some non-financial gains, such as being promoted, gaining reputation, obtaining 
awards, or lowering barriers, for example time, to publication. 
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5.3.2.2. Publishers/ Rightsholders 
Regarding potential impacts, publishers and rightsholders benefit monetarily from the public and 
private  models.  In  these  two  cases,  both  publishers  and  rightsholders  receive  the  money 
collected  by  levies  or  contracts/licences.
96  Compared  to  the  flat  rate  in  the  public  model, 
publishers and rightsholders may prefer the private model.  Meantime, legalising private uses of 
copyright works helps to increase audience for the works, in addition to obtaining monetary 
rewards for publishers and rightsholders.  Compared to these two models, the situation in the 
voluntary  model  is  more  complicated.  Releasing  academic  materials  for  free  potentially 
encourages academic publishers by increasing audience.
97 On the other hand, the commercial 
publishers in general are devoted, by their company nature, towards making profits. Authors 
who are willing to give works away for free may come into conflict with publishers who are not. 
The issue whether and how commercial publishers are still necessary in a world of academic file 
sharing will be discussed in the next subpart. 
5.3.2.3. Users 
What users generally desire is cheaper and easier access to copyright works.  In voluntary model 
practice, users of educational materials are enabled easy access to academic information. As 
special groups of users, academic authors and institutes are able to obtain copyright works at a 
lower price or even for free, which helps to decrease educational costs and promotes authors’ 
creation.  The public model offers better access to information by permitting private use of 
copyright protected works. However, academic users may  lose out on “fair use” rights in a 
public levy system. The public levy model requires the payment of a levy on digital media and 
services. In other words, every user of digital equipment is charged for his use of the machine, 
whether the use is “fair” or not, which damages certain users’ existing educational use right.
98  
Likewise, academic users may be compromised with the application of the private model, on the 
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97 Compared to the commercial publisher who is extremely profit-centered, academic publishers are 
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grounds that they have no choice but to pay the market price required by contracts or licenses.
99 
Even though copyright law exceptions provide certain lawful users with an opportunity to fairly 
access to copyright  materials, fair use is not always available because of the application of 
DRM
100 technology and/or restrictive contract terms (as in iTunes)
101. 
5.3.2.4. File Sharing Intermediaries 
The  impact  on  file  sharing  intermediaries  deserves  particular  attention  as  these  technology 
providers  have  been  major  targets  in  the  entertainment  file  sharing  lawsuits  as  discussed 
above
102.  Firstly, in the voluntary model, we assume that file sharing intermediaries are not 
directed  towards  issues  of  collecting  pecuniary  profits  for  themselves,  aiming  to  create  an 
environment enabling enhanced access to academic information.  
 
Secondly, the focus of attention in the private model lies in the transformation from academic 
use  into  a  pay-for-use  system.
103  By  selling  copyright  protected  materials,  rightsholders  are 
entitled  to  derive  pecuniary  compensation  from  usage  of  their  works. Thus  the  compulsory 
payment releases file sharing intermediaries from copyright liability for their users’ conducts. 
 
Thirdly, file sharing intermediary liability issue in the public model is less related to the model 
as a whole, and more to the specific levy policy being deployed.
104  Fisher’s theoretical model is 
an example. Fisher provides a “governmentally administered reward model”
105 to recompense 
rightsholders.  According to this model, a creator wishing to collect revenue for usage of his 
copyright works needs to register the work with the Copyright Office
106. With registration, the 
digital copy of work would be assigned “a unique file name, which would be used to track 
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transmissions of digital copies of the work”
107. Through taxes or levies on purchasing digital 
recordable  audio  or  visual-audio  media,  the  government  would  thus  collect  money  to 
compensate  registrants  for  permitting  the  public  to  access  their  works.  Using  techniques 
pioneered  by  American  and  European  performing  rights  organisations  and  television  rating 
services, a government agency would estimate the frequency with which each song and film was 
heard or watched by consumers. Each registrant would then periodically be paid by the agency a 
share of the tax revenues proportional to the relative popularity of his or her creation
108.  In 
Fisher’s system, he radically advocates the abolition of copyright law “to eliminate most of the 
current prohibitions on unauthorised reproduction, distribution, adaptation, and performance of 
audio and video recordings, [so that] music and movies would thus be readily available, legally, 
for free”
109.  Thus, in this ideal copyright levy world, file sharing intermediaries are not liable for 
copyright infringing activities because everything is “legally for free”.  This is a particularly 
innovative  model  of  the  “voluntary  way”,  showing  how  file  sharing  might  be  encouraged 
without being unfair to rightsholders. Whether and how this theoretical proposal can be put into 
practice needs further analysis.    
 
Compared to Fisher’s scheme, the existing public model as exemplified by the German pre-2008 
public  levy  system
110  demonstrates  that  file  sharing  intermediaries  in  Germany  remain 
potentially  liable  for  the  infringing  activities  of  their  users.  The  German  government 
implemented a levy  system on purchases of recordable media before 2008, in exchange for 
legally  copying  copyright  protected  works.
111  This  policy  was  based on  the notion  that  “an 
individual’s  private  sphere  must  be  free  from  claims  of  copyright  infringement”
112,  which 
excluded file sharing intermediaries as they were not individuals. German national courts had 
repeatedly decided that to manufacture and distribute a device or service with the intention of 
helping  third  parties  access  copyright  protected  works  could  be  considered  as  secondary 
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110 See Chapter 4, Part 4.1.3.2, at 141. 
111 See Chapter 4, Part 4.1.3.2, at 141. 
112 As quoted and translated by Katerina Gaita and Andrew F. Christie, “Principle or Compromise? 
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infringement. For instance, in Firma Teleclub GmbH v. Firma Manfred Haas GmbH,
113 the 
Court held contributorily liable the provider of the means to copy, based upon the premise that 
the device could be used to infringe copyright.   
 
In other existing public levy schemes, such as the U.S. private copying scheme
114, the liability of 
file sharing intermediaries is more determined on a case-to-case basis. The Court will decide 
whether  the  technology  intermediary  should  be  liable  for  his  users  copying  activities.  This 
flexible private copying scheme is relatively unpredictable and incoherent. For instance, time-
shifting, as sought in Sony
115, was held by the U.S. Supreme Court as a fair use. Compared to the 
Sony decision, in Napster
116 the defence of space-shifting was rejected for a P2P intermediary, 
and thus Napster P2P technology was not deemed fair use. 
 
Overall, although not perfect, the voluntary model seems the best-fitting of the models we have 
considered in this Part, if we focus on the interests of the academic user and author as being 
paramount. This leaves, however, the problem of the intermediary or publisher’s interest to be 
further considered below. 
 
5.3.3 Illustration  
 
Figure 1. Summary of advantages and disadvantages of the Public, Private and Voluntary Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
113 See Firma Teleclub GmbH v. Firma Manfred Haas GmbH, Oberlandesgericht Munchen (Court of 
Appeal), 19 March 1992, 29 U 4370/91. (Mentioned in M.Lehmann, German Report, ALAI Study 
Days, June 1996, Otto Cramwinckel, 1997).  
114 See Chapter 4.1.3, at 137-152. 
115 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 480 F. supp 429 (D.D.Cal 1979), rev’d 
659 F 2d 963 (9
th Cir 1981), rev’d 464 US 417 (1984) [Hereinafter, Sony, in brief]. 
116 See Napster, supra note 85, at 4229.   199 
  The Public Model  The Private Model  The Voluntary Model 
 
 
 
 
Authors 
1.  Money  due  by  levies 
(flat rate only) is collected 
by  collecting  societies  or 
governments,  and 
distributed to authors; (see 
4.1.4) 
2.  Increasing  audience. 
(see 4.1.4) 
Market price collected 
through  contracts  or 
licenses  is  distributed 
to authors. (see 4.2) 
 
Authors  obtaining  non-
financial benefits, such as 
being promoted, obtaining 
monetary  awards, 
obtaining  reputation, 
attracting  public  funds, 
and  speeding  publication. 
(see 5.2) 
 
 
 
Rightsholders 
/ Publishers 
1.  Money  due  by  levies 
(flat rate only) is collected 
by  collecting  societies  or 
governments,  and 
distributed  to 
rightsholders / publishers; 
2.  Increasing  audience. 
(see 4.1.4) 
 
Market price collected 
through  contracts  or 
licenses  is  distributed 
to  rightsholders  / 
publishers. (see 4.2) 
 
1.  Academic  publishers 
obtain some other kinds of 
benefits,  e.g.,  increasing 
audience,  improved 
prestige. (see 5.2) 
2.  Commercial  publishers 
derive no benefit from the 
voluntary model. (see 5.2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The File 
sharing 
Intermediary 
Results  varies  according 
to levy models: 
1.  e.g,  in  Fisher’s  levy 
model,  file  sharing 
intermediaries  are  not 
liable  for  any  copyright 
infringement; 
2.  e.g.,  in  German 
private  copying  levy 
system  allows  private 
copying  activities,  but 
technology 
intermediaries  are  still 
liable  for  secondary 
infringement  (see 
4.1.3.2) 
3.  e.g.,  intermediaries’ 
liability  is  applied  on  a 
case-to-case basis in US 
practice.  
Transformation  to  a 
paying  model  makes 
private  copying  legal 
and  thus 
intermediaries  legal. 
(see 4.2) 
File sharing intermediaries 
are not liable for copyright 
infringement;  and 
information-sharing  is 
legalised,  which  can  be  a 
potential  solution  for 
academic file sharing. 
 
 
Users 
1.  Legalised  access  to 
copyright works; 
2.  Academic  users  lose 
certain existing free “fair 
use”  of  academic 
resources. 
Possible  loss  of  fair 
use  for  academic 
users  when  access  to 
information at market 
price is not affordable 
(see 4.2.3) 
Good  access  to 
information,  less  costly, 
faster communication. (see 
5.2) 
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5.4 A Life Design of the Voluntary Model 
As we have seen from the above illustration, users, file sharing intermediaries and most authors 
adopting the voluntary model in academic file sharing would be favourably disposed to this 
strategy  as  it  provides  users  with  easy  access  to  academic  sources,  offers  authors  faster 
publication  opportunities,  and  relieves  file  sharing  intermediaries  from  copyright  infringing 
responsibility.    However,  there  are  some  who  suffer  detriment  in  this  situation,  such  as 
commercial publishers and some authors who would not prefer to give their works away for free. 
Below we will address this issue. 
 
5.4.1. Rough Ideas around the Voluntary Model 
It would seem that the current commercial publishing system, given its profit motivation, is not 
positioned  to  cope  with  the  challenges  of  the  voluntary  model.  Designing  an  effective  and 
efficient voluntary model merits consideration of the following projects: What role would there 
be for commercial publishers in this new environment; and which method is best in order to 
collect and distribute sufficient compensation for authors.  
 
One  might  begin  by  asking  what  need  there  is  for  commercial  publishers  in  the context  of 
academic file sharing?  In the academic authoring community, monetary profit is not usually the 
primary concern as academic endeavours are generally separately funded. Instead, researchers 
and  educators  require  avenues  for  the  reliable  communication  of  research  results.  To  some 
degree, academic resources are similar to “public goods”
117 which need support and protection 
                                                        
117 See “public goods”, is frequently used in the language of economics to mean non-excludable and 
non-rivalrous characteristics in the consumption of the good. It is linked to two features in accessing 
and consuming the good. Firstly, a public good can be supplied to multiple parties without 
diminishing or limiting the utility available to other users; namely, public goods exhibit non-
rivalness. For example, if someone eats an apple, there will be no apple left for others; but breathing 
in air does not significantly prevent others from inhaling fresh air at the same time. Secondly, once a 
public good is produced, it is impossible to exclude any individual from using it. It therefore follows 
that public goods are non-excludable. A prominent example is the free-rider problem inherently 
within the public goods, which means consumers can take advantage of the good without paying for 
it. See, Kezar, Anthony C. Chamber and John C. Burkhardt, Higher Education for the Public Good: 
Emerging Voices form a National Movement, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1
st ed. (2005).  See also, Harold 
Demsetz, “The Private Production of Public Goods”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 13 (1970) 
at 293-306. See, Richard A. Posner, Economics Analysis of Law, 2
nd ed. (1977) at 11-12. See also, 
Markovitz, “The Causes and Policy Significance of Pareto Resource Misallocation: A Checklist for   201 
from  non-profit  organisations.    The  commercial  publisher,  with  incentives  for  maximising 
profits, has the potential to obstruct academic file sharing by diminishing the resources provided 
for academic users, and additionally increasing budget pressure within research and education.  
Maureen Ryan questions the issue of valuing knowledge by market interest.
118 According to her, 
identifying valuable academic works is very important for research and education regarding the 
quality and utility of various works. The market interest consideration of commercial publishers 
could lead a trend of publishing works on the basis of profit-maximisation. Thus, “publication 
choices  may  become  business  decisions  based  on  whether  the  original  work  has  further 
merchandising value”.
119 Hence, commercial publishers seeking the widest consumer base may 
“favour projects that conform to prevailing views of the academic community and depreciate 
more unorthodox projects which challenge received wisdom”
120. Therefore, it follows that such 
publication  decisions  may  distort  the  development  of  research  and  scholarship  by  driving 
academia towards work with “commercial value”, preventing social knowledge from substantial 
development
121.  At the same time, the advent of the Internet and digital technology  makes 
electronic delivery of academic research resources not only possible, but also preferable in many 
aspects.  Digital file sharing is able to provision fast and easy access mechanisms, and de facto 
create a commercial publisher-free area where academic authors may share their own works and 
make use of others’ works freely. 
 
On the issue of compensation, electronic publication may generate extra benefits for scholarly 
authors, for instance, by establishing a citation rank database which allows authors to prove their 
work  is  read  and  used. The  problem  of  how  to  compensate  authors  to  a  level  sufficient  to 
encourage them to “release” their copyright protected works for free will be discussed in detail 
in the next section. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Micro-Economics Policy Analysis”, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 28 (1975) at 1. 
118 See Maureen Ryan, “Fair Use and Academic Expression: Rhetoric, Reality and Restriction on 
Academic Freedom”, Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, Issue 8 (1999) at 541. 
119 See Ryan, supra note 118. See also, Neil Netanel, “Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the 
Enhancement of Author Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation”, Rutgers Law Journal, Vol. 24 (1993) 
at 435-440. 
120 See Ryan, supra note 118. 
121 See Ryan, supra note 118.   202 
From above, we note that the role of the commercial publishers must be evaluated critically, 
perhaps even fundamentally, when establishing an effective voluntary model in practice. Thanks 
to the Internet and digital technology development, academic information may be shared on a 
non-proprietary  platform  between  authors  and  users  directly.  Hence,  it  is  possible  for  the 
commercial publisher to be excluded within the context of academic file sharing. Accordingly, in 
a  basic  outline,  a  voluntary  model  can  be  composed  of  authors,  users  and  file  sharing 
intermediaries.  Such  a  model  allows  for  academic  contents  to  be  uploaded  to  file  sharing 
networks and be maintained independently by authors. Once the scholarly contents are registered 
on the file sharing networks, users will have free access to the contents, while in return they are 
required to connect their works to each paper they cite via a citation database programme, such 
as the Open Citation Linking Project (the OpCit Project)
122. This model also exempts file sharing 
intermediaries from copyright infringing liability, as they create a platform enabling voluntary 
academic  information  sharing,  without  obtaining pecuniary  benefit  from  the  networks.    File 
sharing  technology  is  altering  the  fundamental  structure  of  scholarly  communication.  As 
displayed in Figure 2 below, traditional academic communication may be replaced by a system 
of academic authors, cooperating file sharing intermediaries, and users. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Outline of a Voluntary Model 
 
5.4.2. Scepticism about the Design 
In practice, research and education file sharing is more complex than the simplified outline of 
                                                        
122 See Steve Hitchcock and Donna Bergmark, “Open Citation Linking: The Way Forward”, D-Lib 
Magazine, Vol. 8 (10) (2002) available at, 
http://www.dlib.org/dlib/october02/hitchcock/10hitchcock.html. 
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the voluntary model above. As mentioned in Part 5.2.2, the design of voluntary model presents 
challenges and concerns in the context of research and education. To assuage any scepticism, the 
following  seeks  to  discuss  motivations  of  rightsholders  to  release  their  copyright  protected 
works voluntarily; and the issues behind that which guarantees the reliability of research and 
education materials shared through file sharing networks.  Knowledge of the reasons behind 
these issues will assist our understanding of the necessary process towards effectively promoting 
a feasible voluntary model for academic file sharing.   
 
Initially we can explore cultural issues, i.e., how the development of file sharing results in a 
different societal culture. A considerable amount of literature, ranging from Castells’ “Network 
Information Society”
123 to Bell’s “Post-Industrial Society”
124, has been focused on this issue.  
According  to  Castells,  in  the  information  age  the  networks  fundamentally  changed  the 
hierarchised  and  circumscribed  social  relationships  through  the  setting  up  of  an  interactive 
network system. The co-ordinated interaction within these centralised or decentralised networks 
led  to  a  tendency  of  globalisation  in  societal  culture  and  economy.
125  The  most  distinctive 
feature in this network society was “to be or not to be in the network”.
126  Similarly, Benkler 
proposed  that  there  existed  two  information  societies,  namely,  the  Industrial  Information 
Economy  and  the  Networked  Information  Economy. The  latter  had  engendered  a  social  and 
economic  revolution  by  promoting  the  role  of  non-market  elements  in  the  information  and 
cultural production sector. As a result, the new Networked Information Economy promoted a 
culture of sharing, leading to the recent open access movement.
127 
 
                                                        
123 Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy Society, Culture: The Rise of the Network 
Society, 2
nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell (2000). See also, Manuel Castells, “Information Technology, 
Globalization and Social Development”, UNRISD Discussion Paper, No. 114 (1999). Available at, 
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125 See Castells, supra note 123. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Yochai Benkler, “Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information”, 52 
DUKE L J, at 1245. See also, Yochai Benkler, “Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the 
Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production”, 114 Yale L J, at 273. See also, Yochai 
Benkler, “Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm”, 112 Yale L J, at 369.   204 
Similar arguments also existed in Coombe’s work on collaborative authoring
128 and Bowery’s 
“Network Culture”  theory,
129  indicating  the  impact  of  the  network  society  in  the  context  of 
research  and  education.   Coombe  asserted  that  the  development  of  networks  challenged  the 
conventional  Intellectual  Property  by  the  nature  of  authorship  of  cultural  products  being 
transformed  because  authorship  in  the  context  of  networks  was  created  by  co-operation  of 
people working in networks rather than individuals.
130  In his book “Law and Internet Cultures”, 
Bowery  pointed  out  that  technologies  were  “one  of  the  forms  of  social  and  cultural 
regulation”.
131 The failure of law to recognise and protect the fast, globalised process of cultural 
production would restrain both the business and cultural development, especially collaboration 
within academic networks outside of proprietary interests.
132  As Paliwala stated, in the context 
of research and education “the geography of learning is changing from a situation in which the 
individual academic creates and delivers her course to students to one which is increasingly the 
result of collaboration between groups of teachers, librarians and technologies”.
133   
 
Borrowing Roosendaal and Guerts’s four components of scholarly communication theory
134, we 
will analyse how the network society influences the scholarly communication.  Roosendaal and 
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What over 50,000 STM Authors Tell Us Each Year”, ELSEVIER, at 12. (In his presentation, Mabe 
stated that registration, certification, dissemination, archive and navigation are the fundamental 
elements of scholarly publishing.  See also, David Posser, “Open Access and Open Archives: The 
Future of Scholarly Communication”, Scholarly Publishing and Academic Resources Coalition, 
SPARC Europe (Posser presented that scholarly communication involves four functions, i.e., 
registration, certification, awareness and archiving) available at, 
file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/yueyue/Local%20Settings/Temporary%20Internet%20Files
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ACADEMIC RESOURCES COALITION, SPARC EUROPE. See also, Iva Melinšcak Zlodi and 
Ivana Pažur, “Possible Models of Scholarly Publishing and Library Role”, Rudjer Boskovic Institute 
Library (Zagreb, Croatia) available at, http://eprints.rclis.org/archive/00000582/01/handout.pdf. 
(They argue that scholarly communication comprises four essential components: registration, 
certification, awareness and archiving).   205 
Guerts suggest that the “familiar, linear scientific information chain”
135 is being transformed into 
an “interactive scientific communication network”
136 in response to developments in technology. 
They assert that this development “calls for new ways of knowledge management”, which “in 
turn  have  consequences  for  scientific  communication”.
137  They  emphasise  that  academic 
communication is based on four main forces and their interplay, namely, registration, archive, 
certification and awareness.
138 
 
Registration is a legal formality to establish a public record of the basic facts of a particular 
copyright. The main purpose of registration is to obtain the intellectual priority of research with 
the exception of the intellectual property aspect of integrity of the communication and copyright 
issues. In the EU/UK environment, copyright is secured automatically when the work is created. 
In  other  words,  no  publication  or  registration  or  other  action  is  required  in  order  to  obtain 
copyright.
139  There are, however, certain definite advantages of registration for rightsholders’ 
benefits in U.S copyright law. For instance, US copyright law provides certain inducement to 
encourage rightsholders to register their works, such as registration establishing “a public record 
of the copyright claim”, setting “prima facie evidence in court of the validity of the copyright”, 
and preventing “the importation of infringing protection”.
140   
                                                        
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. 
138 In their article, Rossendaal and Geurts define the four communication elements by example of the 
birth of the first research journals, Le Journal des Sçavans (Paris) and the Philosophical Transactions 
by the Royal Society of London. According to them, “one may assume that the main reason for the 
birth of these journals was the growth of scientific activity in the seventeenth century and the 
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work in the form of a book. As a result relevant readers were not evenly informed and the scientific 
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Europe at that time. Thus one might see the birth of the journal also as technology driven, however 
technology seems more a necessary facilitator than a boundary condition. By organising the editorial 
office by appointing Mr Henry Oldenburg as the journal’s editor and by having the submitted articles 
reviewed by members of the Council of the Society, it was the Royal Society that took charge of the 
registration and certification functions, whereas the journal developed itself quickly as the archive 
per se”. See supra note 123. 
139 See e.g., the US copyright law provides certain inducement to encourage rightsholders to register 
their works, such as registration establishes “a public record of the copyright claim”, sets “prima facie 
evidence in court of the validity of the copyright”, and prevents “the importation of infringing 
protection”. See the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Title 37 Patents, Trademarks and 
Copyright, Subchapter A, Copyright Office and Procedure, § 202.3. 
140 See the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Title 37 Patents, Trademarks and Copyright,   206 
Comparatively, the rightsholders suffer much less in the voluntary  model than in traditional 
circumstances without registration procedure.  In fact, rightsholders who share their academic 
works through file sharing networks have little to lose. One of the most important characteristics 
of  the  voluntary  model  is  that  authors  choose  to  fully  share  their  works  among  academic 
community for free. As rightsholders have no intention of obtaining direct pecuniary interests in 
the voluntary model, registration would not be regarded as a component procedure.  
 
Archive is the “warehouses of information”
141, aiming to preserve the intellectual heritage for 
future use. For academic file sharing archives, one of the practical issues is how to regulate the 
e-content lifetime. To define the period of time the archive conserves access to the full text of 
academic resources, three methods have been used: the archive conserves the e-content for a 
limited period
142; the period is unlimited
143; the e-content is cancelled from the archive after the 
paper-based  edition  is  published
144.    Whatever  method  may  be  deployed  by  file  sharing 
intermediaries, it is not a difficult technical problem to create electronic archives of academic 
contents under their control. 
 
A  key  question  which  remains  unresolved  in  academic  file  sharing  practice  is  whether  the 
content, which provides academic resources to researchers and educators, is reliable; namely, the 
issue  of  content  certification,  also  known  as quality  control.   According  to  Roosendaal  and 
Guerts, certification refers to the way in which the quality and validity of research resources is 
justified. This has been a continuously controversial topic in academic circles. In traditional 
copyright environment, peer-review, known as refereeing in some academic areas, is the most 
common process of subjecting a scholarly work or research result to the scrutiny of others who 
are  experts  in  the  field.  The  fundamental  purpose  of  peer-review  is  to  present  a  reliable 
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certification for academic quality with reference to special expertise or experience, given the 
difficulties for an individual author or research team to spot every mistake or flaw in a complex 
piece of work. Previously, in paper-based media, the task of reviewing an article typically fell to 
an  academic  professional  chosen  by  the  editor,  for  example,  a  scientist  or  a  professor.  The 
authors and reviewers, who work as volunteers, might be located anywhere in the world.  Thus 
an established benefit for the traditional refereeing system was implicit within their credentials 
as professional experts; the referees’ reputation was and is an important element for users to 
determine the validity and hence acceptability of the information.  Conversely, in the context of 
academic  digital  file  sharing,  a  major  obstacle  to  more  widespread  acceptance  of  the  new 
communication method is users’ scepticism about the authenticity and credibility of information 
distributed through the Internet.  This is due to the ease with which material may be accessed, 
interacted with, and published on the Internet, in turn increasing the risk of ingress of inexpert or 
corruptive opinions into academic networks.  Where a student is entitled to share the academic 
contents on a file sharing network freely, he can be expected to express his idea or even publish 
his articles on this network more easily than before.  It then follows that some immature or 
wrong ideas may be disseminated on the file sharing networks, with the potential to mislead 
other users.  According to a report by Amy Friedlander
145, most Internet-based information users 
worry about the accuracy of information: 19% only reference known sources, 14% check with 
alternative sources, 13% trust the author, 9% trust the sponsoring organisation or publisher, 9% 
trust the website provider, and 7% only reference academic sources provided by an accredited 
institution.
146 These figures indicate that the quality of data is a crucial point in developing the 
voluntary model. 
 
The awareness issue also needs to be considered carefully when sharing academic information, 
on the ground that it is the “real engine”
147 in the academic communication process. The users’ 
awareness has a positive impact on academic communication, as it ensures dissemination and 
                                                        
145 See Amy Friedlander, “Dimensions and Use of the Scholarly Information Environment: 
Introduction to a Data Set Assembled by the Digital Library Federation and Outsell, Inc.”, Digital 
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accessibility  of  research,  and  encourages  authors’  incentives  for  creation.    In  traditional 
copyright environment, monetary reward is an important element to quantify users’ awareness of 
the work. For example, the sales performance of a book indicates how popular it is.  In the 
voluntary model, there is the lack of an accepted effective method of benchmarking to test users 
are accessing the “best” materials. Some online ranking systems have been deployed in current 
practice, such as Google Scholar’s ranking system. However, the effect of this ranking system is 
still unclear and probably still in evolution. In Part 5.4.4., the issue of whether, and how to insert 
the ranking method into file sharing practice will be analysed. 
 
As  indicated  above,  Roosendaal  and  Guerts  suggest  that  the  structure  of  academic 
communication consists of four elements: registration, archive, certification, and awareness.
148  
The operation of the system involves interaction between these factors: submission of an article 
starts certification and can be the final registration if the article is published as it is. Revisions 
arising from certification may lead to registration, while rejection leads to lifting the existing 
registration.  Certification  increases  awareness;  in  turn,  awareness  can  increase  the  value  of 
certification.
149    Quality  control  and  calculating  users’  awareness  of  the  contents  are  major 
problems for academic file sharing to be engaged in the digital milieu. 
 
5.4.3 Completing the Design: The Quality Control Issue 
If there has seen to be a need to control the quality and validity of the academic content
150, it is 
relevant to ask whether the file sharing intermediaries are equipped with sufficient capability to 
control the quality control process enabling users to trust the content?  
 
At  least  three  solutions  have  been  adopted  to control  the  quality  of  content  shared  through 
academic file sharing networks.  
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5.4.3.1. Online Journal with Traditional Peer-Review: SCRIPT-ed 
Online journals have existed for a number of years. Could, or should an online journal system be 
instituted to compensate academic authors? Will the content in online journals be reliable?  Such 
a solution constitutes a replica of conventional peer-review system. Similar to the peer-review 
procedure in the context of traditional publishing environment, online journals adopt a process 
of “subjecting an author’s scholarly work or ideas to the scrutiny of others who are experts in the 
field”
151.  As mentioned in Chapter 1.2.2.2.
152, SCRIPT-ed is a typical example of an online 
journal with “traditional” peer review system. 
 
This peer-review solution, as traditionally applied in the offline world, has its own advantages. 
At its best, the quality of the content is reliable. A rationale for peer review is that the higher the 
referee’s academic level, the higher the article’s status; the higher the status and the more reliable 
the information.
153 The long-term trust placed in the journal and referees’ reputations offers users 
the confidence to make use of the information. As Ann Weller points out, editorial peer review 
“can foster innovation without sacrificing quality and can build a body of literature that truly 
makes a contribution to the field”.
154  
 
5.4.3.2. Open Peer Editing and Review: Amazon and Wikipedia 
The idea of open peer review originates from Amazon, which permits users to review articles and 
reviews  online.  The  idea  of  open  peer  review  is  to  converge  a  high  quality  review  with  a 
sufficient number of users and reviewers, leading to detailed rating and high quality data. The 
concept has been used successfully to produce bug-free software.
155 As Raymond states, “given 
                                                        
151 See Susan van Rooyen, Fiona Godlee, Stephen Evans, Nick Black and Richard Smith, “Effect of 
Open Peer Review on Quality of Reviews and on Reviewers’ Recommendations: A Randomised 
Trial”, BMJ Vol.318 (1999) at 23-27. 
152 See Chapter 1, Part 1.2.2.2., at 40. 
153 See. Roosendaal and Geurts, supra note 123. 
154 See Ann C. Weller, “Editorial Peer Review: Its Strengths and Weaknesses”, Assi and T Monograph 
Series, Information Today (2001). 
155 See Jackson Sanders, “Linux, Open Source and Software’s Future”, Software IEEE, Vol. 15(5) 
(1998) at 88-91.   210 
enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow”.
156 The reviewers can be anonymous or named, but the 
distinctive feature of the system is that the reviewers are volunteers rather than being selected by 
editors. This dynamic peer review system offers readers a guide to what they read, and makes it 
easy to identify whether a work is “worthy” in content or not.  The first systematic experiment 
involving open peer review was the Wikipedia
157 project. The aim of Wikipedia is to “see if 
public volunteers, each working for a few minutes here and there can do some routine science 
analysis that would normally be done by a scientist or graduate student working for months on 
end”.
158  Wikipedia  combines  three  main  characteristics:  First,  it  is  an  open,  peer-produced 
model. Anyone is able to contribute and to change any page in the entire project. Second, it is 
based on a self-conscious collaboration. All the content in this project are “governed … by a 
collective informal undertaking to strive for a neutral point of view”.
159 Third, the content is 
released  under  the  GNU  Free  Documentation  License,
160  a  license  designed  for  authors  to 
voluntarily share their creations and documentations. This open, peer-produced strategy proved 
successful. According to a survey by Yochai Benkler, there was enormous growth in both the 
number of contributors and articles between 2001 to 2005 (See Figure 3 below).
161  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
156See Eric S. Raymond, “The Cathedral and the Bazaar” (1999) available at, 
http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/.  
157 See http://www.wikipedia.org.  
158 See “Welcome to the clickworkers’ study: NASA Ames’s Experiment in Voluntary Science”, 
available at, http://clickworkers.arc.nasa.gov/detailed.  
159 See Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and 
Freedom, London: Yale University Press (2006) at 71-73. 
160 “GNU Free Documentation License”, similar to the CC licence, is a copyleft license for free 
documentation, designed by the Free Software Foundation (FSF) for the GNU project. It is the 
counterpart to the GNU GPL that gives readers the same rights to copy, redistribute and modify a 
work and requires all copies and derivatives to be available under the same license. Copies may also 
be sold commercially, but if produced in larger quantities (greater than 100) then the original 
document or source code must be made available to the work's recipient. Available at, 
www.gnu.org/licenses/fdl.html.  
161 See Yochai Benkler, supra note 159.   211 
  Jan 2001  Jan 2002  Jan 2003  Jan 2004  June 2005 
Contributors  10  472  2,188  9,653  48,721 
Active Contributors  9  212  846  3,228  16,945 
Very active contributors  0  31  190  692  3,016 
No. of English language 
articles 
25  16,000  101,000  190,000  630,000 
No. of articles, all languages  25  19,000  138,000  409,000  1,600,000 
         
 Figure 3. Contributors to Wikipedia, January 2001 --- June 2005
162 
 
 
However,  the  content  certification  issue  on  Wikipedia’s  model  deserves  particular  attention. 
Without traditional professional referees’ review, do the Wikepedia voluntary reviewers actually 
get things right each time? Lack of certification of the content may deter some academic users 
from trusting this open peer editing and review system. 
 
5.4.3.3. Dynamic Peer-Review and Aggregated Reputation Indices
163: Slashdot  
Aiming to  improve  the content certification issue on  Wikipedia’s  model, a new  online wiki 
encyclopedia  named  Citizendium
164  was  launched  on  March  2007.  To  become  involved  in 
Citizendium, a user must first register as an author. Authors are entitled to apply to become 
editors.  Editor  applications  must  be  verified  openly,  for  transparency  and  publicly  accepted 
authority.
165 By requiring contributors to register with their real names and adding “gentle expert 
oversight”, Citizendium is the first online wiki-based encyclopedia which intends to lead a new 
“expert-led, not expert-only”
166 project.   
 
                                                        
162 See Yochai Benkler, supra note 159. 
163 “Dynamic peer-review” refers to a content evaluation system which is not just an “adjust/eject” 
decision by the editor, but a mechanism providing users an opportunity to evaluation the articles and 
the reviews. See C.J. Garrison, L.V. Murrow Floating Bridge study, task 4, dynamic analysis: Peer 
review, Arvid Grant Associates (1991). 
164 See http://www.citizendium.org.  
165 See Larry Sanger, “Toward a New Compendium of Knowledge”, Citizendium (Sep 15, 2006) 
available at, http://citizendium.org/essay.html.  
166 Ibid.   212 
Slashdot, also known as /.,
167 is another design featuring user-submitted and editor-evaluated 
scientific information. The content in Slashdot is generally submitted by its users with editors 
accepting or rejecting comment posters.  Of particular attention in Slashdot is its accreditation of 
users’  comments  system.  Slashdot  allows  users  to  submit  comments  which  are  displayed 
together with original posters. An automated moderation system has been implemented to give 
every comment posted a score. As such, the moderation points constitute the users’ “karma”
168 
points. Positive karma increases the rating of a comment and negative karma decreases the 
rating. The idea behind a Karma project has led to an interesting endeavour to encourage users’ 
dynamic peer-review, while preventing abusive comments. 
 
Let us  take Community Patent Review Project in America as an example to explain how a 
dynamic peer review system works in particular areas. The Community Patent Review Project 
has been adopted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office, in order to “improv[e] the 
quality of issued patents by providing patent examiners access to better information through an 
open network for community peer review of patent applications”.
169 The dynamic peer review 
introduced in the project has been carried out in two ways:  Firstly, the system allows users to 
submit  prior  art  and  commentary  in  response  to  published  patent  application,  aiming  at 
collecting information from a variety of sources other than the limited books produced by elite 
few. Secondly, the Community Patent Review project software requires participating reviewers to 
rate and rank the information. By summarising the rating results, the software creates a rank-
ordered list of citations.  
 
Proponents of the community patent review project insist that the dynamic peer-review benefits 
the patent review process. Based on the rationale that “expertise is not centralised but distributed 
                                                        
167 See http://slashdot.org/.  
168 “Karma”, means a number assigned to a user that primarily reflects whether he or she has posted 
good or bad comments. There are certain criteria of moderating a user, such as they must be logged in 
with their real names, they must be regular users, they must have been using the site for a while, they 
must be willing, and they must have positive Karma. See, Yochai Benkler, supra note 159. 
169 See “The Peer to Patent Project: Community Patent Review”, New York Law School Institute for 
Information Law and Policy (Dec 20, 2006) available at, http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent. At 
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in the minds of those with the requisite knowledge”,
170 they argue that the proposal creates a 
new mechanism, potentially enabling groups with the knowledge derived from ordinary people’s 
experience to be a new source of certification beyond those contained in traditional published 
works.  According to them, dynamic peer-review reflects a shift in the authority of knowledge in 
patent review process through identifying ideas and decisions which people work together with 
on the network. Robert Berring refers that “information is in the midst of great change, a change 
not just in formats, but in the authority structure of the materials”
171. In other words, dynamic 
peer-review  changes  refereeing  from  a  closed,  anonymous  system  involving  only  a  few 
appointed  professionals,  to  an  open  process  in  which  many  ordinary  peers  (or  persons) 
participate. Thus, in the context of community patent review, it is “not what experts are actually 
thinking  that  is  sought  and  trusted,  but  what  they  have  thought  and  what  others  have  then 
considered and then preserved”.
172   
 
The dynamic peer-review system may work in particular areas such as the patent review process. 
However, as discussed in Part 5.4.3.4., the feasibility of generalising the dynamic peer-review 
for scholarly content deserves further consideration, given the fact that academic peer review 
significantly differs from patent review for the specific requirement of precise and professional 
knowledge and experiments. 
 
5.4.3.4. Assessment 
Each of these three strategies has its own disadvantages: 
 
The first solution— online journal with traditional peer-review system — as in the conventional 
peer-review system, can be expensive to set up and run, slow, prone to bias, potentially anti-
innovatory,  and  may  fail  to  spot  plagiarism  or  fraud.
173    Inherently,  the  peer-review  system 
                                                        
170 Ibid. 
171 See Robert C. Berring, “Legal Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority”, California 
Law Review, Vol. 88 (2000) at 1673-1675. 
172 See Ethan Katsh and Beth Noveck, “Peer to Peer Meets the World of Legal Information: 
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suffers from low efficiency. In practice, it “typically takes several months or even several years 
in some fields for a submitted paper to appear in print”.
174  Secondly, some argue that traditional 
peer  review  leads  to  bias  and  suppression.  The  referees’  personal  preference  may  suppress 
dissent against “mainstream” theories
175. For example, referees tend to be more critical to the 
articles which contradict their own views, and prefer those which accord with them.  The peer 
review process may also result in the control of publishing by elites. It is generally recognised 
that elite scholars are more likely to be chosen as referees. Thus, as pointed by Sophie Petit-
Zeman, ideas harmonising with the elite’s normally have more chance of being published.
176  
Thirdly, another risk of peer review is that fraud may not be detected during peer review, due to 
the lack of access to raw data for reviewers.   
 
The second strategy — open peer editing and review — leaves the content production and 
evaluation  completely  to  individual  users,  which  immediately  presents  a  concern  about  the 
quality of information in this model.  How can we make sure the content produced by widely 
dispersed individuals is trustworthy?  In practice, Wikipedia has not been broadly accepted in 
academia  as  a  formal  resource.  Some  educational  institutions  have  limited  or  even  blocked 
Wikipedia.
177 
 
For  the  third  system,  i.e.,  dynamic  peer-review,  there  is  a  concern  about  whether  the  open 
dynamic review system can work as efficiently in academic scientific review as it does in patent 
review. Academic  peer  review  is  markedly  different  from  patent  review.    One  of  the  most 
important  elements  of  scientific  review  is  the  requirement  for  professional  knowledge.  A 
scientific article which is not professionally reviewed is either unimaginable or untrustworthy.  
                                                                                                                                                            
Washington Post (June 9, 2005) at A03. 
174 See Richard Smith, “Peer Review: Reform or Revolution?” BMJ, Vol. 315 (2005). 
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Juan Miguel Campanario, “Rejecting Nobel Class Articles and Resisting Nobel Class Discoveries”, 
Nature, Vol.425 (6959) (2003) at 645. See also, Juan Miguel Campanario and Brian Martin, 
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421-438.  
176 See Sophie Petit-Zeman, “Trial by Peers Comes up Short”, The Guardian (Jan 16, 2003). 
177 See Lysa Chen, “Several Colleges Push to Ban Wikipedia as Resource”, The Chronicle Online 
(March 28, 2007) available at, 
http://media.www.dukechronicle.com/media/storage/paper884/news/2007/03/28/News/Several.Colle
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Professional knowledge is established in time and in long-term research in a specific field. All 
the documents and data relating to a proposed article must be examined not only via the referees’ 
professional  knowledge,  but  also  through  experimental  procedure. As  the  relevant  scientific 
information, in most cases, is based on precise and professional experiments, there is neither 
compulsion  nor  opportunity  for  the  public  to  have  access  to  raw  data.    As  far  as  their 
professional abilities are concerned, the public in the main would not be a capable or appropriate 
party to verify research and educational contents. 
 
5.4.3.5. An Alternative Quality Control System 
The insufficiencies of the first three approaches indicate that we should consider a fundamental 
change  in  the  quality  control  system.  Specifically,  this  thesis  proposes  that  we  replace  the 
conventional individual review model with an institutional repository system.  In brief, such a 
system might work as follows:  A scholar who wishes to disseminate his work through academic 
file  sharing  network  would  register  it  with  the  institutional  repository  mechanism,  such  as 
university,  research  organisation  or  scientific  department  repositories.  These  institutional 
repositories  archive  the  professional  works  from  their  scholars,  and  join  the  academic 
communication as a unity.  Each institution is responsible for evaluating the professional works 
in the repository. The work up to academic standards is granted a unique filename, regarded to 
be symbolic of reliable academic contents. 
 
In  the  following,  let  us  examine  Eprints  as  an  existing  example  for  sharing  research  and 
educational  content  to  demonstrate  how  such  an  institutional  repository  system  might  work 
within the voluntary model. 
 
Eprints
178,  also  known  as  GNU  Eprints,  was  originally  developed  by  Paul  Ginsparg  at  Los 
                                                        
178 The term Eprints file has been defined in different ways. Some prefer a broad way that “Eprints 
could be anything from electronic books or theses to digital images”. (For example, see Oxford 
University Library Service about the Eprints Archive, available at, 
http://eprints.ouls.ox.ac.uk/faq.html.) Some others strictly limit the term to “author-self archived 
electronic document”. E.g., Simeon Warner, “Eprints and the Open Archives Initiative”, Library High 
Technology, Vol.21 (2) (2003) at 151-158. In this thesis, I use the general definition of Eprints, which   216 
Alamos  National  Laboratory  in  1991.  Currently,  Eprints  is  a  network  where  peers  are 
institutional repositories (such as universities) which certify that the information hosted in the 
network is constituted from real works from their scholars. Being “a pun on preprint” in its early 
age, Eprints “has been rehabilitated to mean a collection of digital documents either in draft or 
final form self-archived by the author”.
179 At present, there are more than 200 known archives 
running Eprints software worldwide
180, involving almost all academic research fields.  Eprints 
can be regarded as a voluntary model, as it provides authors with a platform to disseminate work 
for free, while avoiding access-restrictions for users.  
 
Current  Eprints  archives  are  managed  by  three  types  of  institutional  repositories:  scientific 
organisations,  research  establishments  and  university  departments.  These  three  repositories 
archive most scholarly and professional works shared in academic Eprints networks. Besides 
general dynamic peer review process, it is noteworthy that Eprints archives use a “branding” 
system to certify the content in their repositories. The branding information includes an icon and 
a link associated with the icon, such as the home page of the originating repository. The linked 
icon can be displayed by the file sharing intermediaries.  For example, as shown in Figure 4, 
Professor Lilian Edwards’s article “Dawn of the Death of Distributed Denial of Service” was 
originally published in Cardozo Art and Entertainment Law Journal (Vol 24, Issue 1). When 
being collected in e-Prints Soton, the article is branded as a work certificated by University of 
Southampton. Thus, certification of the article comes from trusted academic source, such as 
Southampton University in this case. 
  
                                                                                                                                                            
includes digital documents, such as articles, pre-prints, scientific reports, books, theses and 
dissertations, being shared and open access to full-text via Internet. Eprint Archive means the 
repository of digital documents, for example, a digital library or electronic journal.   
179 See Archives of American-Scientist-Open-Access-Forum@Listserver.Sigmaxi.Org, September 
American Scientist Forum, available at, http://amsci-forum.amsci.org/archives/American-Scientist-
Open-Access-Forum.html.  
180 See http://www.edshare.soton.ac.uk/.    217 
 
               Figure 4. Eprints Soton Example 
 
 
As an early stage trial of the institutional repository, the e-Prints Soton brands the works as 
having been created by their employed scholars. Although future work to develop the details of 
this  approach  would  be  required,  there  are  at  least  two  reasons  why  qualified  contents  in 
institutional repositories are promising.  For one thing, compared to Wikipedia in which content 
is produced by wide spectrum of individuals, institutionally administered quality control system 
emphasises that the material is certified by experts in the fields since being employed as they are 
by a reputable institution.  Generally speaking, institutional research output is funded by direct 
or indirect government support and other research grants. That is to highlight that researchers’ 
time and efforts are paid by government. With public financial support, institutions are capable 
of taking effective steps to examine the quality and validity of academic information, especially 
those which require deep scientific, subject-matter expertise. Greater adoption of the academic 
standard may help support the projection of repository identities and increase acceptance of 
qualified information. Consideration of their academic reputation may guarantee the academic 
authors’ works reliable and cogent. 
  
Secondly, sharing academic materials through institutional repositories benefits not only users   218 
but also authors as well as academic institutes. As discussed above
181, in the context of academic 
file sharing authors are also users when relying on existing works during their creative process. 
The role of institutional repositories is to represent the professional researchers’ working results 
with employers’ permission; meanwhile, it encourages academic institutes to support their staffs 
and students access to knowledge in a cheaper and more efficient way. By doing so, it allows 
professionals more freedom to decide whether, when and how to share their creative works while 
benefiting academic institutes. Academic contents would thus be readily available, reliable, and 
free. 
 
5.4.4. Completing the Design: The Awareness/ Recognition Issue 
The  other  important  issue  deserving  of  particular  attention  is  that,  if  it  is  necessary  to 
compensate authors in return for their sharing works for free among research and education 
community, will the file sharing intermediaries be able to provide authors with sufficient non-
monetary compensation? 
 
In  order  to  examine  the  issue  of  rewarding  authors,  we  should  begin  by  examining  the 
expectation of authors.  It is generally recognised that academic authors expect two kinds of 
rewards for their creation: non-profit benefits and monetary compensation.  The former includes 
research  impact,  promotion,  employment,  tenure,  grants  and  prestige.  The  latter  refers  to 
monetary awards, prizes, or funds.  For most academic authors, it is asserted that the non-profit 
benefit is the more important issue. As Harnad’s survey
182 on free online full-text access article 
indicates, not one of the authors, among the 2 million annually who offer articles for free online 
access, seeks royalties or fees in exchange for their text. All they seek is to distribute their works 
as extensively as possible.  Hence, some technical mechanisms may help to measure the usage of 
academic papers or articles disseminated on academic file sharing networks.   
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Information Science, Marcel Dekker, Inc. (2003) available at, 
http://www.www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Temp/eprints.htm.    219 
The “Open Citation Project” is a feasible tool to measure academic use of scholarly papers. The 
Project is a collaboration between Southampton University, Cornell University and arXiv, which 
grew out of an early demonstration of tools “to add links, post-authoring, to references contained 
in scholarly papers in Web-deliverable formats”
183. The basic idea was to link papers on the 
websites  by  requiring  automatic  recognition  and  collection  of  references  contained  in  these 
papers.  Since the Citebase
184 project started up in 1998, the open citation project has progressed 
from early reference linking to a web-based citation and impact-ranking search service. In other 
words, for a given paper, the number of times it has been referenced can be determined, and 
from  this  emerges  the  ability  to  measure  impact.   This  technical  mechanism  has  been  used 
widely  to  support  online  academic  communication,  for  example,  the  Eprints.org  software 
deployed within this project for building Open Archive Initiative (OAI)-compliant archives
185. 
This  proposed  system  has  many  advantages  in  the  pursuit  of  recognising  and  rewarding 
academic authors and institutions. 
 
The Open Citation system helps achieve academic authors’ non-profit benefits in the following 
way.  Author A disseminated his article about a new form of high-speed DVD ROM through an 
academic file sharing network. Author B quoted A’s article and developed the idea of A’s article 
in his new work, producing a substantially advanced mechanism. Author C critically adopted B’s 
theory and created a second, more superior system.  Thus, the Open Citation Project helps to 
link  the  works  of A, B  and  C,  and determines  the  number  of  times  their  works  have  been 
referenced, as a way to measure the impact of their works.   
 
The  Citebase  impact-rank  system  generated  by  this  process  is  assumed  to  be  valid  as  a 
benchmark of the popularity of the work and, it follows, the author’s reputation.  Firstly, Citation 
indices  system  may  measure  quality  of  the  work.  Citation  indices  system  has  been  widely 
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deployed in some disciplinary repositories. For instance, the Social Science Research Network 
(SSRN) repository features papers and abstracts for political science and the humanities. SSRN 
CiteReader is a citation index that tracks not only the abstract but also the download. Since 1994 
there have been deposited “over 15,000 full-text documents from more than 90,000 authors”.
186 
There have been “more than 21 million downloads” and the top author “may boast more than 
300,000 downloads, [while] No. 10 has more than 80,000 and No. 50 has more than 32,000 
downloads”.
187 For the top paper there are “more than 64,000 downloads”, while “No. 10 more 
than 22,000 and No. 50 more than 7,900”.
188 Such a meaningful usage metrics demonstrates that 
citation indices by collective peer process may indicate quality (as on SSRN Top 10 articles by 
downloads).  Secondly, the Citation rate may subsequently influence the author’s other non-
monetary interests, such as being promoted, or enhancing his academic reputation.  Additionally, 
citation rate can also be adopted to measure the research capability of an academic institution. 
According  to  a  report  from  the  New  Zealand  Teritiary  Education  Advisory  Commission 
(TEAC),
189 50% of the available research and educational funding had been allocated on the 
basis of “the results of periodic assessments” by expert panels of the quality of the research 
produced by eligible staff in 2001. As the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE)
190 demonstrates, 
when the higher education funding bodies distribute public funds for research throughout the 
UK, the research paper citation rate is also an important element to be considered. 
 
Some scholars advocate that institutional repository bibliometric evaluation is a promising way 
to evaluate research and education.  Jonathan Adams cites the experience of the Netherlands and 
argues that “[based on the bibliometric evaluation], Dutch researchers responded by improving 
their publication practices and output, and citation rates shot up, placing the Netherlands’ index 
values  among  world  leaders.”
191    It  is  also  proposed  that  institutional  repositories  may  be 
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pursued if a worldwide academic cooperation can be effected. Armbruster suggests that adopting 
the  citation  indices  idea  to  open  access  institutional  repositories  requires  that  institutions 
cooperate together, developing standards for metadata that identify author, item and institution in 
a single way, which impact may be tracked worldwide.
192 
 
5.4.5. Who Will Pay for the Bill? 
 
The institutional repository quality control system involves financial consideration, such as the 
costs  in  creating  and  maintaining  an  institutional  repository,  making  “primary  sources” 
accessible and rewarding authors for their contributions. How will digital information delivery 
through institutional repositories be funded?  
 
Financial  support  to  the  institutional  repository  may  be  regarded  as  similar  to  that  in  the 
traditional education and research area.  Among the possibilities are: 
 
•  Government  financial  support.  Government  funding  on  a  national,  regional  or 
international scale could support research and educational information dissemination. 
For  instance,  the  UK’s  higher  education  funding  councils  and  the  Department  for 
Employment and Learning Northern Ireland are responsible for allocating funding to 
higher  education  institutions  in  line  with  their  own  strategic  objectives.
193  Higher 
Education  Funding  Council  for  England  (HEFCE),
194  Higher  Education  Funding 
Council for Wales (HEFCW)
195 and Scottish Funding Council (SFC)
196 are the bodies 
responsible for distributing public money for higher education in England, Wales and 
Scotland. There are other government funding bodies from many different sources, such 
                                                                                                                                                            
October 2006). 
192 See Armbruster, supra note 186. 
193http://www.hero.ac.uk/uk/inside_he/he_funding_and_support/uk_higher_education_funding_counc
ils.cfm  
194 Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), available at, http://www.hefce.ac.uk/  
195 Higher Education Funding Council for Wales (HEFCW), available at, http://www.hefcw.ac.uk/  
196 Scottish Funding Council (SFC), available at, http://www.sfc.ac.uk/.   222 
as  Joint  Information  Systems  Committee  (JISC),
197  Arts  and  Humanities  Research 
Board (AHRB),
198 the British Academy,
199 the Royal Academy of Engineering,
200 and 
the Wellcome Trust.
201 
 
•  Research grants support. Research foundations are also important sources for research 
and educational activities. For instance, each year the U.K. Research Councils
202 invest 
around £2.8  billion  in  innovative  and  original  research  projects  of high  quality  and 
potential,  covering  the  full  spectrum  of  academic  disciplines  from  the  medical  and 
biological sciences to astronomy, physics, chemistry and engineering, social sciences, 
economics, environmental sciences and the arts and humanities.  
 
•  Institutions pay the costs. Steve Harnad argues that digital publication will be more and 
more  affordable  for  institutions  to  be  enabled  to  support  free  information 
dissemination.
203 Similar to offsite research projects, institutional repositories may be 
treated  as  academic  communication  projects  supported  by  institutional  research  and 
educational funds. 
 
•  Advertising. Although  advertising  has  rarely  seemed  important  in  the  economics  of 
research and education, there is certainly a potential market for Internet advertising. 
According to the latest report from the UK Internet Advertising Bureau, UK marketers 
spent  £1.7  billion  during  first  half  of  2008  on  online  advertising,  which  speed  up 
Internet advertising 21% despite an economic downturn.
204 If online advertising could 
be introduced to the institutional repository effectively, it may constitute a substantial 
part of total institutional repository budgets. The potential advertising in an institutional 
                                                        
197 Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC), available at, http://www.jisc.ac.uk/  
198 Arts and Humanities Research Board (AHRB), available at, 
http://www.ahrc.ac.uk/Pages/default.aspx  
199 The British Academy, available at, http://www.britac.ac.uk/.  
200 The Royal Academy of Engineering, available at, http://www.raeng.org.uk/  
201 The Wellcome Trust, available at, http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/  
202 The U.K. Research Councils, available at, http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/default.htm.  
203 See Steve Harnad, “Online Publication”, available at, 
http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/’harnad/intpub.html.  
204 See the Internet Advertising Bureau UK site (October 7, 2008) available at, 
http://www.iabuk.net/en/1/internetadvertisingspendup21071008.mxs.    223 
repository system may be attractive for traditional donors, such that research grants and 
educational funds could be named for individuals the way sports arenas are named for 
corporations. 
 
Analysis 
 
As an application of new technology in its very early stages, the institutional repository model as 
exemplified by Eprints has to be further developed to reach a stage sufficient to reliably and 
robustly support research and educational file sharing. Potential technical and financial support 
mechanisms to the voluntary model listed above are preliminary and immature. However, there 
are commendable features and potentials as a fair solution to the dissemination of academic, 
research  and  educational  materials.    Most  stakeholders  would  benefit  from  adoption  of  this 
system.  The most direct beneficiaries would be academic users. As outlined in Part 5.2 and 
5.3.2.3
205, the institutional repository system would, in all likelihood, provide users of research 
and  educational  materials  with  a  platform  facilitating  access  to  academic  information, 
specifically making it easier, cheaper and faster.    
 
Academic authors would also benefit in two ways by the new system. First, their work can be 
disseminated to more readers in a shorter term without restriction by their employers.
206 The 
application of institutional repositories allows professional authors to decide whether, when and 
how to share their works, while reducing the chance of being restricted by employers. Second, 
academic authors may obtain non-monetary or indirect pecuniary compensation for sharing their 
works,  enabling  promotional  enhancement,  obtaining  public  funds,  and  improving  their 
academic reputation. 
 
As to the file sharing intermediary (in this case, the repository), they will be released from 
copyright liability, on the ground that all the works being shared on the institutional repositories 
are uploaded by the authors themselves, and that information-sharing through such networks is 
lawful. Therefore, these file sharing intermediaries are lawful. 
                                                        
205 See Part 5.2 and 5.3.2.3., at 186-198. 
206 See Part 5.4.3.4, at 213.   224 
 
Finally, society at large would benefit in various ways from the shift to such a regime. The most 
obvious is that fair users in the context of traditional copyright are able to make use of research 
and educational materials freely and without doubt.  As analysed in Chapter 4, both public and 
private models challenge the application of fair use doctrine in practice, given that they both 
require payment for access to knowledge, no matter  whether the use is fair or  not.   In the 
proposed system, direct monetary payment for accessing academic information would largely 
disappear.   
 
Though not perfect the voluntary model design has gathered valuable support from academic 
authors and institutions.  For instance, the Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences voted in favour 
of a policy on February 12, 2008, under which “each faculty member agrees to grant to Harvard 
a non-exclusive license to make their scholarly articles freely available through the institution’s 
digital repository or otherwise so long as it is not done for profit”.
207 This pre-commitment 
                                                        
207 See, e.g., On Tuesday, February 12, 2008, the Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences came together 
as scholarly authors and collectively agreed that in the age of Internet they have a responsibility to 
manage their copyrights differently than they have been to date. Specifically, they unanimously voted 
in favour of a motion as stated as follows: 
  “The Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University is committed to disseminating the fruits of 
its research and scholarship as widely as possible. In keeping with that commitment, the Faculty 
adopts the following policy: Each Faculty member grants to the President and Fellows of Harvard 
College permission to make available his or her scholarly articles and to exercise the copyright in 
those articles. In legal terms, the permission granted by each Faculty member is a nonexclusive, 
irrevocable, paid-up, worldwide license to exercise any and all rights under copyright relating to 
each of his or her scholarly articles, in any medium, and to authorize others to do the same, provided 
that the articles are not sold for a profit. The policy will apply to all scholarly articles written while 
the person is a member of the Faculty except for any articles completed before the adoption of this 
policy and any articles for which the Faculty member entered into an incompatible licensing or 
assignment agreement before the adoption of this policy. The Dean or the Dean's designate will waive 
application of the policy for a particular article upon written request by a Faculty member explaining 
the need. 
    To assist the University in distributing the articles, each Faculty member will provide an electronic 
copy of the final version of the article at no charge to the appropriate representative of the Provost's 
Office in an appropriate format (such as PDF) specified by the Provost's Office. The Provost's Office 
may make the article available to the public in an open-access repository. 
    The  Office  of  the  Dean  will  be  responsible  for  interpreting  this  policy,  resolving  disputes 
concerning its interpretation and application, and recommending changes to the Faculty from time to 
time. The policy will be reviewed after three years and a report presented to the Faculty.”   225 
strategy  licenses free use of academic  materials prior  to any copyright transfer to a journal 
publisher;  it  also  waives  the  university’s  license  on  an  article-by-article  basis. According  to 
Stevan  Harnad,  “this  is  big  news  because  it  is  a  bottom-up  initiative  driven  by  faculty 
authors”.
208 
 
5.5 Conclusion: Summary of the Voluntary Model Design 
 
Analysis of the comparison between public, private and voluntary models at Figure 1 indicates 
that the voluntary model is the best trade off in the research and educational sphere between 
securing users “fair use” of research and educational materials; compensating academic authors, 
albeit through non-pecuniary benefits rather than monetary returns; and preventing file sharing 
intermediaries from being sued out of existence for contributing to copyright infringement by 
users. 
 
However, difficulties have been identified with this model, including quality control and users’ 
awareness/recognition issues.  The academic file sharing community has adopted a variety of 
approaches  when  assessing  the  quality  of  academic  works.   The  analysis  at  Part  5.4.3.4.
209 
demonstrates that the online journal with “conventional” peer-review system may not be the best 
option to apply in digital file sharing for being expensive, slow and prone to bias.  Moreover, the 
open  peer-review  system  leaves  content  evaluation  completely  to  individual  users,  raising 
concerns  about  the  reliability  and  quality  of  the  information.  In  addition,  many  might  be 
surprised that the dynamic peer-review system as exemplified by the U.S. Community Patent 
Review Project works effectively in patent practice. However, academic peer-review, for being 
based  on  requirements  for  and  dependence  on  professional  knowledge  in  specific  fields,  is 
different and not translatable as a result.    
 
Given the evidence considered and reasoning set out, I propose a fundamental change in the 
quality  control  system,  by  replacing  the  traditional  peer-review  model  with  an  institutional 
                                                        
208 Ibid. 
209 See Part 5.4.3.4, at 213..   226 
repository quality control system.  As demonstrated in Figure 5 below, an institutional repository 
“branding” model, similar to Eprints, would certify quality, especially in association with and 
incorporating the reputation of long-standing academic institutions, at source. 
 
 
 
                   Figure 5. The Voluntary Model Flow Chart 
 
 
As to users’ awareness, the “open citation project” is an example of a project to deliver citation 
information. It is a possible model to quantify the popularity of a work and thus generate an 
objective “research reputation” for the author. Based on the voluntary model design, a potential 
social research and educational material sharing system, which improves users’ fair access to 
materials and protects rightsholders’ interests, can be expected. 
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Conclusion 
 
The  development  of  Internet  technology,  particularly  digital  file  sharing,  has  provoked 
controversy and conflict about whether and how to protect certain lawful uses of the technology, 
such as file sharing in the context of research and education.  Digital file sharing for purposes of 
research and education deserves particular protection as it encourages socially beneficial and 
culturally significant dissemination of knowledge.
1  Early chapters of this thesis examined the 
purpose  of,  and  issues  around,  fair  use/fair  dealing  doctrine  which  is  the  most  important 
exception to copyright that research and educational users can rely on. This thesis also asserts 
that the fair use defence is not functioning adequately in the context of digital file sharing, and 
thereby failing to preserve a healthy Internet access to educational materials for students and 
scholars. If left unaddressed, this issue may lead to unbridled exclusive rights for rightsholders, 
resulting in detriment to exchange of knowledge. 
  
A number of aspects of fair use in the context of file sharing have been challenged in recent legal 
practice.  Firstly, the applicability of a fair use defence to “primary infringers”, i.e., end-users 
who upload, download and distribute copyright works through file sharing networks, has had to 
be  re-assessed  in  the  context  of  file  sharing.    As  demonstrated  in  case  studies  on  UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com
2, Napster,
3 and Grokster
4, the connection between “some end-
users”
5  whose  conducts  fall  within  copyright  exceptions  and  the  fair  use  doctrine  has  been 
negated, as end users rarely if ever have the opportunity to plead or prove fair use in court.   
Secondly, file sharing intermediaries, i.e., file sharing tool providers, have become anecdotally 
                                                        
1 Some scholars argue that sharing is the very core of social lives, such as in information, culture, 
education, computation, and communication sectors. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, “The Logic of 
Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law”, Law, Economics and Public Policy Research Paper. 
No. 281 (2002). See also, Yochai Benkler, “Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence 
of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 114 (2005) at 274-275. 
See also, Gunilla Wilden-Wulff, Challenge of Knowledge Sharing in Practice: A Social Approach, 
Oxford: Chandos Publishing Ltd. (2007).  
2 See, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (SDNY). [Hereinafter, MP3.com, 
in Brief] 
3 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9
th Cir. 2001). [Hereinafter, Napster, in Brief] 
4 See, MGM Inc v. Grokster Ltd 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. April, 2003). MGM Inc. v. Grokster 
Ltd al Supreme Court (04-0480), 545 U.S., 125 s. Ct. 2764 (2005), See also, Grokster, certiorari to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, No. 04-480. (June 27, 2005). [Hereinafter 
Grokster, in Brief]. 
5 See Grokster, supra note 4, at 10.   228 
and provably implicated in copyright infringing activities and thus are seen as undeserving of 
access to the fair use defence.   Hence, if neither the end-user nor the file sharing intermediary 
can apparently benefit from the fair use doctrine in the context of file sharing, this suggests 
another  mechanism  needs  to  be  found  to  reconcile  the  interest  of  rightsholders  in  gaining 
compensation for copies made of their works, with the right of research and educational users to 
access works for study and research.  As things stand, can fair use doctrine avoid extinction 
when no one may practically take advantage of it? 
 
This thesis examines a number of possible ways forward, which fall under the general heading 
of  “fared”  systems.  One  approach  to  reconciling  file  sharing  with  proper  compensation  for 
rightsholders is herein termed “the public model”. This involves the state or an agency such as a 
collecting agency in collecting money for rightsholders via a tax or levy.  In the former German 
private copying levy system, for example,
6 the government imposed a levy on purchases of 
recordable media, in exchange for permission for users to make private non-commercial copies.   
Another example — “the private model” — collects compensation for rightsholders via private 
contracts
7.   However, given the specific characteristics of fair use doctrine, such a rightsholder-
favouring  solution  will  not  work  effectively  to  enable  research  and  educational  file  sharing 
practice.  In such schemes, every individual user of file sharing networks is charged for his use 
of the materials, no matter whether the use is “fair” or not.   The question may be asked, if 
everyone has to pay for any use of copyright works, do we really have “fair” access to research 
and educational materials? 
 
                                                        
6 The first statutory levy scheme was introduced in Germany in 1965, and such scheme had been 
applied in Germany copyright law until January 1
st, 2008.  See, Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht 
and Werken der Literatur und der Tonkunst 1901 (LUG), Reichsgesetz (1. Januar 1902). Article 15 
states,  
“Eine Vervielfältigung ohne Einwilligung des Berechtigten ist unzulässig, gleichviel durch 
welches Verfahren sie bewirkt wird; auch begründet es keinen Unterschied, ob das Werk 
in einem oder in mehreren Exemplaren vervielfältigt wird. 
 Eine Vervielfältigung zum persönlichen Gebrauch ist zulässig, wenn sie nicht den Zweck 
hat, aus dem Werke eine Einnahme zu erzielen”.   
See also, Katerina Gaita and Andrew F. Christie. “Principle or Compromise? Understanding the 
Original Thinking Behind Statutory Licence and Levy Schemes for Private Copying”, Intellectual 
Property Quarterly, Vol. 4 (2004) at 442-447. 
7 See, e.g., the Apple’s iTunes business model was the first service with content from 
copyrightsholders to sell songs with no subscription fees, but iTunes relies upon the contract between 
Apple Company and the consumer effectively reallocating copyright entitlements.   229 
Thus this thesis proposes that we replace the “fared” model with an “un-fared” strategy, i.e., a 
voluntary model.  In brief, this refers to a system where authors release their copyright works 
voluntarily,  merely  in  return  for  non-monetary  or  indirect  monetary  compensation.  In 
comparison with the public and private fared use models, it can be predicted that the voluntary 
model truly provides and protects fair use rights in educational file sharing. The advantages 
include  providing  users  with  easier  access  to  academic  information,  offering  authors  non-
financial or indirect monetary compensation, releasing file sharing intermediaries from copyright 
liability, and encouraging academic publishers by increasing audience.  Problems will remain 
however with recommending such a scheme to commercial publishers. It is possible that they 
have no obvious role in an educational and research file sharing world. 
 
Finally  therefore,  this  thesis  critically  evaluates  the  role  of  the  commercial  publisher  in  the 
research  and  educational  world,  and  puts  forward  a  design  for  a  “voluntary  model”  which 
embraces authors, co-operating file sharing intermediaries, and users.  As demonstrated in the 
graph below, this facilitates and encourages academic contents to be uploaded to file sharing 
networks without the need for intermediary commercial publishers. Users entitled to free access 
to the contents are required in return to connect their works to each paper they cite via a citation 
database programme.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In practice, however, research and educational file sharing is a more complex situation than is 
displayed in  this simplified  model.  Users’ awareness  and quality control issues  need to be 
considered,  in  order  to  complete  the  voluntary  model  design.  Through  lessons  learnt  from 
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examination of the Eprints and Open Citation project this thesis presents a modified “voluntary 
model”, combining an institutional repository quality control system with a citation tracking rate 
scheme. These additions support the premise that this design is workable in practice. 
 
The conclusion reached in this thesis therefore is that the voluntary model, in the particular 
context  of  research  and  education,  is  worthy  of  further  research.  It  has  the  potential  to 
successfully reconcile the struggle between the public interest in access to texts by students and 
researchers, and the interest of rightsholders to receive proper compensation for copies made, or 
non-pecuniary  incentives  to  create  educational  works.  This  model  is  not  intended  to  apply 
generally  to  the  world  of  music,  movie  or  entertainment  file  sharing  where  the  balance  of 
interests is very different. Nor is it intended to be presented as a perfect theory or model for such 
would surely be premature at this stage given the rapidity of advances in file sharing technology.   
 
Overall, this work seeks to contribute to the theoretical understanding of the importance of 
applying fair use doctrine in the context of digital research and educational file sharing; and to 
contribute to a greater understanding of how new technologies as they emerge require a similar 
evolution  of  the  norms  of  statute  and  case  law  which  regulate  connected  areas.   231 
Appendix 1:  iTunes Store TERMS OF SERVICE  
THIS  IS  A  LEGAL  AGREEMENT  BETWEEN  YOU  AND  APPLE  INC.  ("APPLE") 
STATING  THE  TERMS  THAT  GOVERN  YOUR  USE  OF  THE  ITUNES  STORE 
SERVICE. THIS AGREEMENT - TOGETHER WITH ALL UPDATES, ADDITIONAL 
TERMS, SOFTWARE LICENSES, AND ALL OF APPLE'S RULES AND POLICIES - 
COLLECTIVELY CONSTITUTE THE "AGREEMENT" BETWEEN YOU AND APPLE. 
TO  AGREE  TO  THESE  TERMS,  CLICK  "AGREE."  IF  YOU  DO  NOT  AGREE  TO 
THESE TERMS, DO NOT CLICK "AGREE," AND DO NOT USE THE SERVICE. YOU 
MUST  ACCEPT  AND  ABIDE  BY  THESE  TERMS  AS  PRESENTED  TO  YOU: 
CHANGES, ADDITIONS, OR DELETIONS ARE  NOT ACCEPTABLE, AND APPLE 
MAY REFUSE ACCESS TO THE ITUNES STORE FOR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH 
ANY PART OF THIS AGREEMENT.  
1. Definition of the iTunes Store Service. Apple is the provider of the iTunes Store (the 
"Service") that permits you to purchase or rent (as applicable) digital content, such as sound 
recordings and videos (including movies and television shows), games, software, and ring 
tones, under certain terms and conditions as set forth in this Agreement.  
2. Age requirements for use of the Service. This Service is available for individuals aged 13 
years or older. If you are 13 or older but under the age of 18, you should review these terms 
and  conditions  with  your parent  or  guardian to  make  sure  that  you  and  your parent  or 
guardian understand these terms and conditions.  
3. Objectionable Material. You understand that by using the Service, you may encounter 
content that may be deemed offensive, indecent, or objectionable, which content may or 
may not be identified as having explicit language. Nevertheless, you agree to use the Service 
at your sole risk and that Apple shall have no liability to you for content that may be found 
to be offensive, indecent, or objectionable. Content types (including genres, sub-genres and 
Podcast  categories  and  sub-categories  and  the  like)  and  descriptions  are  provided  for 
convenience, and you acknowledge and agree that Apple does not guarantee their accuracy.  
4. IMPORTANT SAFETY INFORMATION. (1) To avoid muscle, joint or eye strain during 
video game play, you should always take frequent breaks from playing, and stop and take a 
longer rest if your eyes, hands, wrists, or arms become tired or sore or you feel any other 
discomfort. (2) A very small percentage of people may experience seizures or blackouts 
when  exposed  to  flashing  lights  or  patterns,  including  while  playing  video  games  or   232 
watching videos. Symptoms may include dizziness, nausea, involuntary movements, loss of 
awareness, altered vision, tingling, numbness, or other discomforts. Consult a doctor before 
playing video games if you have ever suffered these or other symptoms linked to seizures 
and/or epilepsy, and stop playing immediately and see a doctor if these or similar symptoms 
occur during game play. Parents should monitor their children’s video game play for signs 
of symptoms.  
5.  System  Requirements.  Use  of  the  Service  requires  one  or  more  compatible  devices, 
Internet access (fees may apply), and certain software (fees may apply), and may require 
obtaining  updates  or  upgrades  from  time  to  time.  Because  use  of  the  Service  involves 
hardware, software, and Internet access, your ability to use the Service may be affected by 
the performance of these factors. High speed Internet access is strongly recommended (and 
is required for Movie Rentals). You acknowledge and agree that such system requirements, 
which may be changed from time to time, are your responsibility. The Service is not part of 
any other product or offering, and no purchase or rental (as applicable) or obtaining of any 
other product shall be construed to represent or guarantee you access to the Service.  
6. Policies and Rules. Your use of the Service and transactions made through it are subject 
to Apple's Terms of Sale at http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/sales.html, which can be 
readily viewed on the Service, and any end-user agreements or other terms and conditions 
required for use of the Service, all of which are hereby made a part of this Agreement. If 
you have not already read Apple's Terms of Sale, you should do so now. Your purchase of 
software products made through the Service is subject to any end-user agreements or other 
terms and conditions required for use of such products, all of which are hereby made a part 
of this Agreement.  
 
7. Privacy  
a. Apple's Privacy Policy. Except as otherwise expressly provided for in this Agreement, the 
Service is subject to Apple's Privacy Policy at http://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/, which 
is expressly made a part of this Agreement. If you have not already read Apple's Privacy 
Policy, you should do so now.  
b.  Genius.  When  you  opt-in  to  the  Genius  feature,  Apple  will,  from  time  to  time, 
automatically collect information that can be used to identify media in your iTunes library 
on this computer, such as your play history and play lists. This includes media purchased   233 
through iTunes and media obtained from other sources. This information will be stored 
anonymously and not associated with your name or iTunes account. When you use the 
Genius feature, Apple will use this information and the contents of your iTunes library, as 
well as other information, to give personalized recommendations to you.  
Apple may only use this information and combine it with aggregated information from the 
iTunes libraries of other users who also opt-in to this feature, your iTunes Store purchase 
history data, aggregated purchase history data from other iTunes Store users, and other 
information obtained from third parties, to:  
• Create personalized playlists for you from your iTunes library.  
• Provide you with recommendations regarding media and other products and services that 
you may wish to purchase.  
• Provide recommendations regarding products and services to other users.  
At all times your information will be treated in accordance with Apple’s Customer Privacy 
Policy which can be viewed at: www.apple.com/legal/privacy/.  
Once you opt-in to the Genius feature, you will be able to create Genius playlists on Genius-
capable devices. You must sync with your iTunes library after you have opted-in on iTunes 
to enable the Genius feature on a device.  
If you would prefer we not collect and use information from your iTunes library in this 
manner, you should not enable the Genius feature. You can revoke your opt-in choice at any 
time by choosing to turn off the Genius feature from the Store menu. Upon opting-out, 
iTunes will no longer send information about your iTunes library to Apple. If you have 
elected to share your library from multiple computers, you need to turn off the Genius 
feature from each computer.  
By opting-in to the Genius feature, you consent to the use of your information as described 
above and as described in the Apple Customer Privacy Policy.  
8.  Your  Information.  You  agree  to  provide  accurate,  current,  and  complete  information 
required to register with the Service and at other points as may be required in the course of 
using the Service ("Registration Data"). You further agree to maintain and update your 
Registration  Data  as  required  to  keep  it  accurate,  current,  and  complete.  Apple  may 
terminate your rights to any or all of the Service if any information you provide is false,   234 
inaccurate or incomplete. You agree that Apple may store and use the Registration Data you 
provide (including credit card and PayPal account information) for use in maintaining your 
accounts and billing fees to your credit card or PayPal account.  
9. User Account and Security.  
a. Account and Password. As a registered user of the Service, you may receive or establish 
an account ("Account"). You are solely responsible for maintaining the confidentiality and 
security of your Account. You should not reveal your Account information to anyone else or 
use anyone else's Account. You are entirely responsible for all activities that occur on or 
through your Account, and you agree to immediately notify Apple of any unauthorized use 
of your Account or any other breach of security. Apple shall not be responsible for any 
losses arising out of the unauthorized use of your Account.  
b. Security. You understand that the Service, and products transacted through the Service, 
such as sound recordings, videos (including movies and television shows), games, software, 
ring tones, and related artwork ("Products"), include a security framework using technology 
that protects digital information and limits your usage of Products to certain usage rules 
established by Apple and its licensors ("Usage Rules"). You agree to comply with such 
Usage Rules, as further outlined below, and you agree not to violate or attempt to violate 
any  security  components.  You  agree  not  to  attempt  to,  or  assist  another  person  to, 
circumvent, reverse-engineer, decompile, disassemble, or otherwise tamper with any of the 
security components related to such Usage Rules for any reason whatsoever. Usage Rules 
may be controlled and monitored by Apple for compliance purposes, and Apple reserves the 
right to enforce the Usage Rules with or without notice to you. You will not access the 
Service by any means other than through software that is provided by Apple for accessing 
the  Service.  You  shall  not  access  or  attempt  to  access  an  Account  that  you  are  not 
authorized to access. You agree not to modify the software in any manner or form, or to use 
modified versions of the software, for any purposes including obtaining unauthorized access 
to the Service. Violations of system or network security may result in civil or criminal 
liability.  
10. Purchase or Rental of Apple Content  
a. Products Requirements. You acknowledge that use of Products may require the use of 
other  hardware  and  software  products  (e.g.,  the  ability  to  make  copies  of  Products  on 
physical media and render performance of Products on authorized digital player devices), 
and  that  such  hardware  and  software  is  your  responsibility.  Products  may  only  be   235 
downloaded once; after being downloaded, they cannot be replaced if lost for any reason. 
Once a Product is purchased or rented (as applicable) and you receive the Product, it is your 
responsibility  not  to  lose,  destroy,  or  damage  the  Product,  and  Apple  shall  be  without 
liability to you in the event of any loss, destruction, or damage.  
b. Use of Products. You acknowledge that Products (other than the iTunes Plus Products) 
contain security technology that limits your usage of Products to the following applicable 
Usage Rules, and, whether or not Products are limited by security technology, you agree to 
use Products in compliance with the applicable Usage Rules.  
Usage Rules  
(i) Your use of the Products is conditioned upon your prior acceptance of the terms of this 
Agreement.  
(ii) You shall be authorized to use the Products only for personal, noncommercial use.  
(iii) You shall be authorized to use the Products on five Apple-authorized devices at any 
time, except in the case of Movie Rentals, as described below.  
(iv)  You  shall  be  able  to  store  Products  from  up  to  five  different  Accounts  on  certain 
devices, such as an iPod or iPhone, and Apple TV at a time; provided that each iPhone may 
sync ring tone Products with only a single Apple-authorized device at a time, and that 
syncing an iPhone with another Apple-authorized device will cause any ring tone Products 
stored on such iPhone to be erased and, if you so choose, to be replaced with any ring tone 
Products  stored  on  such  other  Apple-authorized  device.  Additional  restrictions  apply  to 
Movies Rentals, as described below.  
(v) You shall be authorized to burn an audio playlist up to seven times.  
(vi) You shall not be entitled to burn video Products or ring tone Products.  
(vii) You shall be entitled to export, burn (if applicable) or copy (if applicable) Products 
solely for personal, noncommercial use.  
(viii) You may use only ring tone Products as a musical “ringer” in connection with phone 
calls.  
(ix) Any burning (if applicable) or exporting capabilities are solely an accommodation to 
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rights of the copyright owners in any audio or video content, sound recording, underlying 
musical composition, or artwork embodied in any Product.  
(x) You agree that you will not attempt to, or encourage or assist any other person to, 
circumvent or modify any security technology or software that is part of the Service or used 
to administer the Usage Rules.  
(xi) The delivery of Products does not transfer to you any commercial or promotional use 
rights in the Products.  
(xii) iTunes Plus Products do not contain security technology that limits your usage of such 
Products, and Usage Rules (iii) – (vi) do not apply to iTunes Plus Products. You may copy, 
store and burn iTunes Plus Products as reasonably necessary for personal, noncommercial 
use.  
(xiii)  Usage  rules  for  software  Products  are  governed  by  the  terms  of  any  end-user 
agreements or other terms and conditions required for use of such Products.  
(xiv)  You  shall  be  able  to  manually  sync a Movie  from  at least one  iTunes-authorized 
device to devices that have manual sync mode, provided that the Movie is associated with 
an Account on the primary iTunes-authorized device, where the primary iTunes-authorized 
device is the one that was first synced with the device, or the one that you subsequently 
designate as primary using iTunes.  
(xv) Movie Rentals:  
(aa) Movies are viewable only on your Mac or Windows computer (using iTunes 7.6 or 
later), iPhone, iPod touch, iPod nano (3rd or 4th generation), iPod classic, or on TVs using 
your Apple TV. Movies in high definition resolution (HD) are viewable only on TVs using 
your Apple TV and must be downloaded directly to your Apple TV. Movies are viewable 
only on one device at a time.  
(bb) You must be connected to the Service when moving or streaming movies. Once a 
movie is moved, it is no longer viewable on the sending device. You may only move movies 
to another device from your Mac or Windows computer. Movies downloaded directly to 
your Apple TV may not be moved.  
(cc) You have thirty (30) days after downloading a movie to begin viewing. Once you begin 
viewing, you have twenty-four (24) hours to view the movie (the “Viewing Period”). You   237 
may view the movie an unlimited number of times during the Viewing Period. Movies are 
not viewable after the thirty (30) day period. Stopping, pausing or restarting a movie does 
not extend the available time for viewing.  
(dd) If you move a movie to an iPod or iPhone and then use the Service to restore the iPod 
or  iPhone  before  you  finish  watching  it,  the  movie  will  be  deleted  and  will  not  be 
recoverable. This also applies to choosing Settings > Reset > Erase all content and settings 
on iPod touch and iPhone. (ee) Broadband Internet connection required.  
(xvi)  HDMI.  An  HDCP  connection  is  required  in  order  to  view  movies  (purchased  or 
rented) and TV shows transmitted over HDMI.  
c.  You  agree  that  your  purchase  or  rental  (as  applicable)  of  Products  constitutes  your 
acceptance of and agreement to use such Products solely in accordance with the Usage 
Rules, and that any other use of the Products may constitute a copyright infringement. The 
security technology, if applicable, is an inseparable part of the Products. The Usage Rules 
shall govern your rights with respect to the Products, in addition to any other terms or rules 
that may have been established between you and another party. Apple reserves the right to 
modify the Usage Rules at any time.  
d. You acknowledge that some aspects of the Service, Products, and administering of the 
Usage Rules entails the ongoing involvement of Apple. Accordingly, in the event that Apple 
changes any part of the Service or discontinues the Service, which Apple may do at its 
election, you acknowledge that you may no longer be able to use Products to the same 
extent as prior to such change or discontinuation, and that Apple shall have no liability to 
you in such case  
e. The Service may offer interactive features that allow you to, among other things, submit 
or  post  information,  materials  or  links  to  third  party  content  on  areas  of  the  Service 
accessible and viewable by other users of the Service and the public. You represent and 
agree that any use by you of such features, including any information, materials or links 
submitted or posted by you, shall be your sole responsibility, shall not infringe or violate the 
rights  of  any  other  party  or  violate  any  laws,  contribute  to  or  encourage  infringing  or 
otherwise unlawful conduct, or otherwise be obscene, objectionable or in poor taste, and that 
you have obtained all necessary rights, licenses or clearances. You further agree to provide 
accurate and complete information in connection with your submission or posting of any 
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royalty-free,  non-exclusive  license  to  use  such  materials  as  part  of  the  Service,  and  in 
relation to Products, without any compensation or obligation to you.  
Apple reserves the right not to post or publish any materials, and to delete, remove or edit 
any material, at any time in its sole discretion without notice or liability.  
Apple  has  the  right,  but  not  the  obligation,  to  monitor  any  information  and  materials 
submitted or posted by you or otherwise available on the Service, to investigate any reported 
or  apparent  violation  of  this  Agreement,  and  to  take  any  action  that  Apple  in  its  sole 
discretion deems appropriate, including, without limitation, under Section 14 below or under 
our Copyright Policy (http://www.apple.com/legal/trademark/claimsofcopyright.html).  
11. Territory. The Service is available to you only in the United States. You agree not to use 
or attempt to use the Service from outside of the available territory, and that Apple may use 
technologies to verify your compliance.  
12. Agreement to Pay.  
a.  Payment  for  Products.  You  agree  to  pay  for  all  Products  you  purchase  or  rent  (as 
applicable) through the Service, and that Apple may charge  your credit card or PayPal 
account  for  any  Products  purchased  or  rented  (as  applicable),  and  for  any  additional 
amounts  (including  any  taxes  and late fees,  as  applicable)  as  may  be  accrued  by  or  in 
connection  with  your  Account.  YOU  ARE  RESPONSIBLE  FOR  THE  TIMELY 
PAYMENT OF ALL FEES AND FOR PROVIDING APPLE WITH A VALID CREDIT 
CARD OR PAYPAL ACCOUNT DETAILS FOR PAYMENT OF ALL FEES. All fees will 
be billed to the credit card, or the PayPal account, you designate during the registration 
process. If you want to designate a different credit card or if there is a change in your credit 
card  or  PayPal  account  status,  you  must  change  your  credit  card  or  PayPal  account 
information online at the Account Info section of the Service. (There may be a temporary 
disruption of your access to the Service until Apple can verify the validity of the new credit 
card or PayPal account information.)  
b.  Right  to  Change  Prices  and  Availability  of  Products.  Prices  and  availability  of  any 
Products are subject to change at any time.  
c. Electronic Signatures and Contracts. Your use of the Service includes the ability to enter 
into agreements and/or to make transactions electronically. YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT 
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INTENT  TO  BE  BOUND  BY  AND  TO  PAY  FOR  SUCH  AGREEMENTS  AND 
TRANSACTIONS.  YOUR  AGREEMENT  AND  INTENT  TO  BE  BOUND  BY 
ELECTRONIC  SUBMISSIONS  APPLIES  TO  ALL  RECORDS  RELATING  TO  ALL 
TRANSACTIONS  YOU  ENTER  INTO  ON  THIS  SITE,  INCLUDING  NOTICES  OF 
CANCELLATION, POLICIES, CONTRACTS, AND APPLICATIONS.  
d. In order to access and retain your electronic records, you may be required to have certain 
hardware and software, which are your sole responsibility.  
13. Delivery of Products.  
a. Interrupted Delivery to iPod or iPhone. If delivery of a Product you purchased or rented 
(as applicable) using Wi-Fi on an iPod or iPhone is interrupted, your transaction will be 
included in your download queue. You may resume the delivery to your Apple-authorized 
device by selecting "Check for Purchases" from the Store menu in the iTunes application.  
b. Technical Problems. On occasion, technical problems may delay or prevent delivery of 
your Product. Your exclusive and sole remedy with respect to Product that is not delivered 
within a reasonable period will be either replacement of such Product, or refund of the price 
paid for such Product, as determined by Apple.  
14. Intellectual Property.  
a. Acknowledgement of Ownership. You agree that the Service, including but not limited to 
Products,  graphics,  audio  clips,  video  clips,  and  editorial  content,  contains  proprietary 
information and material that is owned by Apple and/or its licensors, and is protected by 
applicable intellectual property and other laws, including but not limited to copyright, and 
that  you  will  not  use  such  proprietary  information or  materials  in  any  way  whatsoever 
except for use of the Service in compliance with the terms of this Agreement. No portion of 
the Service may be reproduced in any form or by any means, except as expressly permitted 
hereunder. You agree not to modify, rent, lease, loan, sell, distribute, or create derivative 
works based on the Service, in any manner, and you shall not exploit the Service in any 
unauthorized  way  whatsoever,  including  but  not  limited  to,  by  trespass  or  burdening 
network capacity.  
b. Removal of Apple Content or Other Materials. Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this Agreement, Apple and its licensors reserve the right to change, suspend, remove, or 
disable access to any Products, content, or other materials comprising a part of the Service   240 
at any time without notice. In no event will Apple be liable for the removal of or disabling 
of access to any such Products, content or materials under this Agreement. Apple may also 
impose limits on the use of or access to certain features or portions of the Service, in any 
case and without notice or liability.  
c. Copyrights. All copyrights in and to the Service, including but not limited to, the iTunes 
Store (including the compilation of content, postings, links to other Internet resources, and 
descriptions of those resources), and software, are owned by Apple and/or its licensors, who 
reserve all their rights in law and equity. THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE OR ANY PART 
OF THE SERVICE, EXCEPT FOR USE OF THE SERVICE AS PERMITTED IN THESE 
TERMS  OF  SERVICE,  IS  STRICTLY  PROHIBITED  AND  INFRINGES  ON  THE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF OTHERS AND MAY SUBJECT YOU TO 
CIVIL  AND  CRIMINAL  PENALTIES,  INCLUDING  POSSIBLE  MONETARY 
DAMAGES, FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT.  
d. Trademarks. Apple, the Apple logo, iTunes, and other Apple trademarks, service marks, 
graphics,  and  logos  used  in  connection  with  the  Service  are  trademarks  or  registered 
trademarks  of  Apple  Inc.  in  the  U.S.  and/or  other  countries.  Other  trademarks,  service 
marks, graphics, and logos used in connection with the Service may be the trademarks of 
their respective owners. You are granted no right or license with respect to any of the 
aforesaid trademarks and any use of such trademarks.  
e. Album Cover Art. As an account holder of the Service in good standing, Apple may 
provide you with limited access to download certain album cover art for music stored in the 
iTunes Library of your iTunes application, subject to availability. Such access is provided as 
an accommodation only, and Apple does not warrant or endorse and does not assume and 
will not have any liability or responsibility for such album cover art or your use thereof. 
You may only access album cover art (to the extent available) for music for which you are 
the lawful owner of a legal copy. Album cover art is provided for personal, noncommercial 
use only. You agree that you will not use album cover art in any manner that would infringe 
or violate these Terms of Service or the rights of any other party, and that Apple is not in 
any way responsible for any such use by you.  
15. Termination.  
a. Termination by Apple. If you fail, or Apple suspects that you have failed, to comply with 
any  of  the  provisions  of  this  Agreement,  including  but  not  limited  to  failure  to  make 
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complete Registration Data, failure to safeguard your Account information, violation of the 
Usage  Rules  or  any  license  to the  software,  or  infringement  or  other  violation  of  third 
parties' rights, Apple, at its sole discretion, without notice to you may: (i) terminate this 
Agreement and/or your Account, and you will remain liable for all amounts due under your 
Account up to and including the date of termination; and/or (ii) terminate the license to the 
software; and/or (iii) preclude access to the Service (or any part thereof).  
b. Termination of the Service. Apple reserves the right to modify, suspend, or discontinue 
the Service (or any part or content thereof) at any time with or without notice to you, and 
Apple will not be liable to you or to any third party should it exercise such rights.  
16. General Compliance with Laws. The Service is controlled and operated by Apple from 
its  offices  in the  United States.  You  agree to  comply  with  all  local,  state,  federal,  and 
national laws, statutes, ordinances, and regulations that apply to your use of the Service.  
17. Enforcement of These Terms. Apple reserves the right to takes steps Apple believes are 
reasonably necessary or appropriate to enforce and/or verify compliance with any part of 
this  Agreement  (including  but  not  limited  to  Apple's  right  to  cooperate  with  any  legal 
process relating to your use of the Service and/or Products, and/or a third party claim that 
your  use  of  the  Service  and/or  Products  is  unlawful  and/or  infringes  such  third  party's 
rights).  You  agree  that  Apple  has  the  right,  without  liability  to  you,  to  disclose  any 
Registration Data and/or Account information to law enforcement authorities, government 
officials, and/or a third party, as Apple believes is reasonably necessary or appropriate to 
enforce and/or verify compliance with any part of this Agreement (including but not limited 
to Apple's right to cooperate with any legal process relating to your use of the Service 
and/or Products, and/or a third party claim that your use of the Service and/or Products is 
unlawful and/or infringes such third party's rights).  
18. No Responsibility for Third-Party Materials or Web sites. Certain content, Products, and 
services available via the Service may include materials from third parties. In addition, 
Apple may provide links to certain third-party Web sites. You acknowledge and agree that 
Apple is not responsible for examining or evaluating the content or accuracy of any such 
third-party material or Web sites. Apple does not warrant or endorse and does not assume 
and will not have any liability or responsibility for any third-party materials or Web sites, or 
for any other materials, products, or services of third parties. Links to other Web sites are 
provided solely as a convenience to you. You agree that you will not use any third-party 
materials in a manner that would infringe or violate the rights of any other party, and that 
Apple is not in any way responsible for any such use by you.    242 
19. Disclaimer of Warranties; Liability Limitations.  
a. APPLE DOES NOT GUARANTEE, REPRESENT, OR WARRANT THAT YOUR USE 
OF  THE  SERVICE  WILL  BE  UNINTERRUPTED  OR  ERROR-FREE,  AND  YOU 
AGREE THAT FROM TIME TO TIME APPLE MAY REMOVE THE SERVICE FOR 
INDEFINITE  PERIODS  OF  TIME,  OR  CANCEL  THE  SERVICE  AT  ANY  TIME, 
WITHOUT NOTICE TO YOU.  
b. YOU EXPRESSLY AGREE THAT YOUR USE OF, OR INABILITY TO USE, THE 
SERVICE  IS  AT  YOUR  SOLE  RISK.  THE  SERVICE  AND  ALL  PRODUCTS  AND 
SERVICES  DELIVERED  TO  YOU  THROUGH  THE  SERVICE  ARE  (EXCEPT  AS 
EXPRESSLY STATED BY APPLE) PROVIDED "AS IS" AND "AS AVAILABLE" FOR 
YOUR  USE,  WITHOUT  WARRANTIES  OF  ANY  KIND,  EITHER  EXPRESS  OR 
IMPLIED,  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF  MERCHANTABILITY, 
FITNESS  FOR  A  PARTICULAR  PURPOSE,  TITLE,  AND  NONINFRINGEMENT. 
BECAUSE SOME JURISDICTIONS DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OF IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES, THE ABOVE EXCLUSION OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES MAY NOT 
APPLY TO YOU.  
c.  IN  NO  CASE  SHALL  APPLE,  ITS  DIRECTORS,  OFFICERS,  EMPLOYEES, 
AFFILIATES,  AGENTS,  CONTRACTORS,  OR  LICENSORS  BE  LIABLE  FOR  ANY 
DIRECT,  INDIRECT,  INCIDENTAL,  PUNITIVE,  SPECIAL,  OR  CONSEQUENTIAL 
DAMAGES ARISING FROM YOUR USE OF ANY OF THE SERVICES OR FOR ANY 
OTHER  CLAIM  RELATED  IN  ANY  WAY  TO  YOUR  USE  OF  THE  SERVICES, 
INCLUDING,  BUT  NOT  LIMITED  TO,  ANY  ERRORS  OR  OMISSIONS  IN  ANY 
CONTENT, OR ANY LOSS OR DAMAGE OF ANY KIND INCURRED AS A RESULT 
OF THE USE OF ANY CONTENT (OR PRODUCT) POSTED, TRANSMITTED, OR 
OTHERWISE  MADE  AVAILABLE  VIA  THE  SERVICE,  EVEN  IF  ADVISED  OF 
THEIR  POSSIBILITY.  BECAUSE  SOME  STATES  OR  JURISDICTIONS  DO  NOT 
ALLOW  THE  EXCLUSION  OR  THE  LIMITATION  OF  LIABILITY  FOR 
CONSEQUENTIAL  OR  INCIDENTAL  DAMAGES,  IN  SUCH  STATES  OR 
JURISDICTIONS,  APPLE'S  LIABILITY  SHALL  BE  LIMITED  TO  THE  EXTENT 
PERMITTED BY LAW.  
d.  APPLE  SHALL  USE  REASONABLE  EFFORTS  TO  PROTECT  INFORMATION 
SUBMITTED  BY  YOU  IN  CONNECTION  WITH  THE  SERVICES,  BUT  YOU 
ACKNOWLEDGE  AND  AGREE  THAT  YOUR  SUBMISSION  OF  SUCH 
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AND  ALL  LIABILITY  TO  YOU  FOR  ANY  LOSS  OR  LIABILITY  RELATING  TO 
SUCH INFORMATION IN ANY WAY.  
e. APPLE DOES NOT REPRESENT OR GUARANTEE THAT THE SERVICE WILL BE 
FREE  FROM  LOSS,  CORRUPTION,  ATTACK,  VIRUSES,  INTERFERENCE, 
HACKING,  OR  OTHER  SECURITY  INTRUSION,  AND  APPLE  DISCLAIMS  ANY 
LIABILITY  RELATING  THERETO.  PRODUCTS  CAN  ONLY  BE  DOWNLOADED 
ONCE; AFTER BEING DOWNLOADED, THEY CANNOT BE REPLACED IF LOST 
FOR  ANY  REASON.  YOU  SHALL  BE  RESPONSIBLE  FOR  BACKING  UP  YOUR 
OWN SYSTEM, INCLUDING ANY PRODUCTS PURCHASED OR RENTED FROM 
THE ITUNES STORE THAT ARE STORED IN YOUR SYSTEM.  
20. Waiver and Indemnity. BY USING THE SERVICE, YOU AGREE TO INDEMNIFY 
AND  HOLD  APPLE,  ITS  DIRECTORS,  OFFICERS,  EMPLOYEES,  AFFILIATES, 
AGENTS, CONTRACTORS, AND LICENSORS HARMLESS WITH RESPECT TO ANY 
CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF YOUR BREACH OF THIS AGREEMENT, YOUR USE OF 
THE  SERVICE,  OR  ANY  ACTION  TAKEN  BY  APPLE  AS  PART  OF  ITS 
INVESTIGATION OF A SUSPECTED VIOLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT OR AS A 
RESULT  OF  ITS  FINDING  OR  DECISION  THAT  A  VIOLATION  OF  THIS 
AGREEMENT  HAS  OCCURRED.  THIS  MEANS  THAT  YOU  CANNOT  SUE  OR 
RECOVER  ANY  DAMAGES  FROM  APPLE,  ITS  DIRECTORS,  OFFICERS, 
EMPLOYEES,  AFFILIATES,  AGENTS,  CONTRACTORS,  AND  LICENSORS  AS  A 
RESULT  OF  ITS  DECISION  TO  REMOVE  OR  REFUSE  TO  PROCESS  ANY 
INFORMATION OR CONTENT, TO WARN YOU, TO SUSPEND OR TERMINATE 
YOUR ACCESS TO THE SERVICE, OR TO TAKE ANY OTHER ACTION DURING 
THE  INVESTIGATION  OF  A  SUSPECTED  VIOLATION  OR  AS  A  RESULT  OF 
APPLE'S  CONCLUSION  THAT  A  VIOLATION  OF  THIS  AGREEMENT  HAS 
OCCURRED.  THIS  WAIVER  AND  INDEMNITY  PROVISION  APPLIES  TO  ALL 
VIOLATIONS DESCRIBED IN OR CONTEMPLATED BY THIS AGREEMENT.  
21. Changes. Apple reserves the right, at any time and from time to time, to update, revise, 
supplement, and otherwise modify this Agreement and to impose new or additional rules, 
policies,  terms,  or  conditions  on  your  use  of  the  Service.  Such  updates,  revisions, 
supplements,  modifications,  and  additional  rules,  policies,  terms,  and  conditions 
(collectively  referred  to  in  this  Agreement  as  "Additional  Terms")  will  be  effective 
immediately and incorporated into this Agreement. Your continued use of the iTunes Store   244 
following  will  be  deemed  to constitute  your  acceptance of any  and  all such Additional 
Terms. All Additional Terms are hereby incorporated into this Agreement by this reference.  
22. Notices. Apple may send you notice with respect to the Service by sending an email 
message to the email address listed in your Apple Account contact information, by sending 
a  letter  via  postal  mail  to  the  contact  address  listed  in  your  Apple  Account  contact 
information,  or  by  a  posting  on  the  iTunes  Store.  Notices  shall  become  effective 
immediately.  
23. Governing Law. The laws of the State of California, excluding its conflicts of law rules, 
govern these Terms of Service and your use of the Service. Your use of the Service may 
also be subject to other local, state, national, or international laws. You expressly agree that 
exclusive jurisdiction for any claim or dispute with Apple or relating in any way to your use 
of the Service resides in the courts of the State of California.  
24. Miscellaneous. These Terms of Service constitute the entire agreement between you and 
Apple and govern your use of the Service, superseding any prior agreements between you 
and Apple. You also may be subject to additional terms and conditions that may apply when 
you use affiliate services, third-party content, or third-party software. If any part of these 
Terms  of  Service  is  held  invalid  or  unenforceable, that  portion  shall  be  construed  in  a 
manner  consistent  with  applicable  law  to  reflect,  as  nearly  as  possible,  the  original 
intentions of the parties, and the remaining portions shall remain in full force and effect. 
Apple's  failure  to  enforce  any  right  or  provisions  in  these  Terms  of  Service  will  not 
constitute a waiver of such provision, or any other provision of these Terms of Service. If 
any provision of this Agreement is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, 
the other provisions will remain in full force and effect. Apple will not be responsible for 
failures to fulfill any obligations due to causes beyond its control.  
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Appedix 2: Apple Store TERMS AND CONDITIONS  
THIS  IS  A  LEGAL  AGREEMENT  BETWEEN  YOU  AND  APPLE  INC.  ("APPLE") 
STATING THE TERMS THAT GOVERN YOUR USE OF THE APP STORE SERVICE. 
THIS  AGREEMENT  -  TOGETHER  WITH  ALL  UPDATES,  ADDITIONAL  TERMS, 
SOFTWARE  LICENSES,  AND  ALL  OF  APPLE'S  RULES  AND  POLICIES  - 
COLLECTIVELY CONSTITUTE THE "AGREEMENT" BETWEEN YOU AND APPLE. 
TO  AGREE  TO  THESE  TERMS,  CLICK  "AGREE."  IF  YOU  DO  NOT  AGREE  TO 
THESE TERMS, DO NOT CLICK "AGREE," AND DO NOT USE THE SERVICE. YOU 
MUST  ACCEPT  AND  ABIDE  BY  THESE  TERMS  AS  PRESENTED  TO  YOU: 
CHANGES, ADDITIONS, OR DELETIONS ARE  NOT ACCEPTABLE, AND APPLE 
MAY REFUSE ACCESS TO THE APP STORE FOR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ANY 
PART OF THIS AGREEMENT.  
1. DEFINITION OF THE APP STORE SERVICE. Apple is the provider of the App Store 
(the  "Service")  that  permits  you  to  license  software  products,  such  as  games  and 
applications, under certain terms and conditions as set forth in this Agreement.  
2. AGE REQUIREMENTS FOR USE OF THE SERVICE. This Service is available for 
individuals aged 13 years or older. If you are 13 or older but under the age of 18, you should 
review these terms and conditions with your parent or guardian to make sure that you and 
your parent or guardian understand these terms and conditions.  
3. U.S. ONLY. The Service is available to you only in the United States and is not available 
in any other location. You agree not to use or attempt to use the Service from outside of the 
available territory. Apple may use technologies to verify such compliance.  
4. LICENSE OF PRODUCTS. The software products made available through the Service 
(the “Products”) are licensed, not sold, to you. There are two (2) categories of Products 
offered through the Service, as follows: (i) those Products that have been developed, and are 
licensed to you, by Apple (the “Apple Products”); and (ii) those Products that have been 
developed, and are licensed to you, by a third party developer (the “Third Party Products”). 
The category of any particular Product (i.e., Apple Product or Third Party Product, as the 
case may be) is identified on the Service application.  
Your license to each Product that you obtain through the Service is subject to the Licensed 
Application End User License Agreement set forth below, and you agree that the terms of 
the Licensed Application End User License Agreement will apply to each Apple Product   246 
and to each Third Party Product that you license through the Service, unless the Product is 
covered by a valid end user license agreement entered into between you and the licensor of 
the Product (the “Licensor”), in which case the Licensor’s end user license agreement will 
apply to that Product. The Licensor reserves all rights in and to the Product not expressly 
granted to you.  
You  acknowledge that the  license  you  purchase  to each  Apple  Product that you  obtain 
through the Service is a binding agreement between you and Apple, and that the license you 
purchase to each Third Party Product is a binding agreement between you and the third 
party  licensor  of  that  Third  Party  Product  (“the  Application  Provider”)  only.  The 
Application Provider of each Third Party Product is solely responsible for that Third Party 
Product, the content therein, any warranties to the extent that such warranties have not been 
disclaimed, and any claims that you or any other party may have relating to that Third Party 
Product or your use of that Third Party Product. You acknowledge that you are purchasing 
the license to each Third Party Product from the Application Provider of that Third Party 
Product; Apple is acting as agent for the Application Provider in providing each such Third 
Party Product to you; Apple is not a party to the license between you and the Application 
Provider with respect to that Third Party Product; and Apple is not responsible for that Third 
Party Product, the content therein, or any warranties or claims that you or any other party 
may have relating to that Third Party Product or your use of that Third Party Product.  
You  acknowledge  and  agree  that  Apple,  and  Apple’s  subsidiaries,  are  third  party 
beneficiaries of the Licensed Application End User License Agreement, or the Application 
Provider’s end user license agreement, as the case may be, for each Third Party Product, and 
that, upon your acceptance of the terms and conditions of the license to any such Third Party 
Product,  Apple  will  have  the  right  (and  will  be  deemed  to  have  accepted  the  right)  to 
enforce such license against you as a third party beneficiary thereof.  
All Products made available through the Service are licensed to end user customers only.  
5. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS. Your use of the Service and transactions made through it 
are subject to any end-user agreements or other terms and conditions required for use of the 
software  required  for  use  of  the  Service,  all  of  which  are  hereby  made  a  part  of  this 
Agreement.  
Use  of the  Service  requires  one  or  more  compatible  devices,  Internet  access  (fees  may 
apply),  and  certain  software  (fees  may  apply),  and  may  require  obtaining  updates  or 
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Internet access, your ability to use the Service may be affected by the performance of these 
factors. High speed Internet access is strongly recommended. You acknowledge and agree 
that  such  system  requirements,  which  may  be  changed  from  time  to  time,  are  your 
responsibility. The Service is not part of any other product or offering, and no purchase or 
obtaining of any other product shall be construed to represent or guarantee you access to the 
Service.  
6. PRIVACY  
a.  APPLE'S  PRIVACY  POLICY.  Except  as  otherwise  expressly  provided  for  in  this 
Agreement,  the  Service  is  subject  to  Apple's  Privacy  Policy  at 
http://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/, which is expressly made a part of this Agreement. If 
you have not already read Apple's Privacy Policy, you should do so now.  
b.  GENIUS.  When  you  opt-in  to  the  Genius  feature,  Apple  will,  from  time  to  time, 
automatically collect information that can be used to identify media in your iTunes library 
on this computer, such as your play history and play lists. This includes media purchased 
through iTunes and media obtained from other sources. This information will be stored 
anonymously and not associated with your name or iTunes account. When you use the 
Genius feature, Apple will use this information and the contents of your iTunes library, as 
well as other information, to give personalized recommendations to you.  
Apple may only use this information and combine it with aggregated information from the 
iTunes libraries of other users who also opt-in to this feature, your iTunes Store purchase 
history data, aggregated purchase history data from other iTunes Store users, and other 
information obtained from third parties, to:  
• Create personalized playlists for you from your iTunes library.  
• Provide you with recommendations regarding media and other products and services that 
you may wish to purchase.  
• Provide recommendations regarding products and services to other users.  
At all times your information will be treated in accordance with Apple’s Customer Privacy 
Policy which can be viewed at: www.apple.com/legal/privacy/.    248 
Once you opt-in to the Genius feature, you will be able to create Genius playlists on Genius-
capable devices. You must sync with your iTunes library after you have opted-in on iTunes 
to enable the Genius feature on a device.  
If you would prefer we not collect and use information from your iTunes library in this 
manner, you should not enable the Genius feature. You can revoke your opt-in choice at any 
time by choosing to turn off the Genius feature from the Store menu. Upon opting-out, 
iTunes will no longer send information about your iTunes library to Apple. If you have 
elected to share your library from multiple computers, you need to turn off the Genius 
feature from each computer.  
By opting-in to the Genius feature, you consent to the use of your information as described 
above and as described in the Apple Customer Privacy Policy.  
7.  YOUR  INFORMATION.  You  agree  to  provide  accurate,  current,  and  complete 
information required to register with the Service and at other points as may be required in 
the course of using the Service ("Registration Data"). You further agree to maintain and 
update your Registration Data as required to keep it accurate, current, and complete. Apple 
may terminate your rights to any or all of the Service if any information you provide is false, 
inaccurate or incomplete. You agree that Apple may store and use the Registration Data you 
provide (including credit card and PayPal account information) for use in maintaining your 
accounts and billing fees to your credit card or PayPal account.  
8. USER ACCOUNT AND SECURITY.  
a. Account and Password. As a registered user of the Service, you may receive or establish 
an account ("Account"). You are solely responsible for maintaining the confidentiality and 
security of your Account. You should not reveal your Account information to anyone else or 
use anyone else's Account. You are entirely responsible for all activities that occur on or 
through your Account, and you agree to immediately notify Apple of any unauthorized use 
of your Account or any other breach of security. Apple shall not be responsible for any 
losses arising out of the unauthorized use of your Account.  
b. Security. You understand that the Service, and products transacted through the Service, 
include a security framework using technology that protects digital information and limits 
your  usage  of  Products  to  certain  usage  rules  established  by  Apple  and  its  principals 
("Usage Rules"). You agree to comply with such Usage Rules, as further outlined below, 
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attempt  to,  or  assist  another  person  to,  circumvent,  reverse-engineer,  decompile, 
disassemble, or otherwise tamper with any of the security components related to such Usage 
Rules for any reason whatsoever. Usage Rules may be controlled and monitored by Apple 
for compliance purposes, and Apple reserves the right to enforce the Usage Rules with or 
without notice to you. You will not access the Service by any means other than through 
software that is provided by Apple for accessing the Service. You shall not access or attempt 
to access an Account that you are not authorized to access. You agree not to modify the 
software  in  any  manner  or  form,  or  to  use  modified  versions  of  the  software,  for  any 
purposes including obtaining unauthorized access to the Service. Violations of system or 
network security may result in civil or criminal liability.  
9. USE OF PRODUCTS AND THE SERVICE  
a. Products Requirements. You acknowledge that use of Products may require the use of 
other  hardware  and  software  products  (e.g.,  the  ability  to  make  copies  of  Products  on 
physical media and render performance of Products on authorized devices), and that such 
hardware and software is your responsibility. Products may only be downloaded once; after 
being downloaded, they cannot be replaced if lost for any reason. Once a Product is licensed 
and you receive the Product, it is your responsibility not to lose, destroy, or damage the 
Product, and Apple shall be without liability to you in the event of any loss, destruction, or 
damage.  
b. Use of Products. You acknowledge that Products contain security technology that limits 
your  usage  of  Products  to  the  following  applicable  Usage  Rules,  and,  whether  or  not 
Products are limited by security technology, you agree to use Products in compliance with 
the applicable Usage Rules.  
Usage Rules  
(i) Your use of the Products is conditioned upon your prior acceptance of the terms of this 
Agreement and the applicable end-user license agreement.  
(ii)  You  shall  be  able  to  store  Products  from  up  to  five  different  Accounts  on  certain 
devices, including an iPod touch or iPhone, at a time.  
(iii) You shall be able to store Products on five iTunes-authorized devices at any time.    250 
(iv) You agree that you will not attempt to, or encourage or assist any other person to, 
circumvent or modify any security technology or software that is part of the Service or used 
to administer the Usage Rules.  
(v) The delivery of Products does not transfer to you any promotional use rights in the 
Products.  
(vi) You shall be able to manually sync Products from at least one iTunes-authorized device 
to devices that have manual sync mode, provided that the Product is associated with an 
Account  on the primary  iTunes-authorized  device, where the  primary  iTunes-authorized 
device is the one that was first synced with the device, or the one that you subsequently 
designate as primary using iTunes.  
c. You agree that your license of Products constitutes your acceptance of and agreement to 
use such Products solely in accordance with the Usage Rules, and that any other use of the 
Products may constitute a copyright infringement. The security technology, if applicable, is 
an inseparable part of the Products. The Usage Rules shall govern your rights with respect to 
the Products, in addition to any other terms or rules that may have been established between 
you and another party. Apple reserves the right to modify the Usage Rules at any time.  
d. You acknowledge that some aspects of the Service, Products, and administering of the 
Usage Rules entails the ongoing involvement of Apple. Accordingly, in the event that Apple 
changes any part of the Service or discontinues the Service, which Apple may do at its 
election, you acknowledge that you may no longer be able to use Products to the same 
extent as prior to such change or discontinuation, and that Apple shall have no liability to 
you in such case.  
e. The Service may offer interactive features that allow you to, among other things, submit 
or  post  information,  materials  or  links  to  third  party  content  on  areas  of  the  Service 
accessible and viewable by other users of the Service and the public. You represent and 
agree that any use by you of such features, including any information, materials or links 
submitted or posted by you, shall be your sole responsibility, shall not infringe or violate the 
rights  of  any  other  party  or  violate  any  laws,  contribute  to  or  encourage  infringing  or 
otherwise unlawful conduct, or otherwise be obscene, objectionable or in poor taste, and that 
you have obtained all necessary rights, licenses or clearances. You further agree to provide 
accurate and complete information in connection with your submission or posting of any 
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royalty-free,  non-exclusive  license  to  use  such  materials  as  part  of  the  Service,  and  in 
relation to Products, without any compensation or obligation to you.  
Apple reserves the right not to post or publish any materials, and to delete, remove or edit 
any material, at any time in its sole discretion without notice or liability.  
Apple  has  the  right,  but  not  the  obligation,  to  monitor  any  information  and  materials 
submitted or posted by you or otherwise available on the Service, to investigate any reported 
or  apparent  violation  of  this  Agreement,  and  to  take  any  action  that  Apple  in  its  sole 
discretion deems appropriate, including, without limitation, under Section 23 below or under 
our Copyright Policy (http://www.apple.com/legal/trademark/claimsofcopyright.html).  
10.  PAYMENT  METHODS.  The  Service  accepts  credit  cards,  payment  through  your 
PayPal  account,  and  iTunes  Cards,  iTunes  Store  Gift  Certificates,  Content  Codes,  and 
Allowance Account balances as forms of payment. If a credit card company, or your PayPal 
account, is being used for a transaction, Apple may obtain a pre-approval from the credit 
card company or from PayPal (as the case may be) for an amount up to the amount of the 
order. Billing to your credit card or to your PayPal account occurs at the time of purchase or 
shortly  thereafter.  If  the  balance  from  an  iTunes  Card,  iTunes  Store  Gift  Certificate  or 
Allowance Account is used for an App Store transaction, the amount is deducted from your 
Account or your iTunes Card (as the case may be) at the time of purchase. If the total 
amount of the transaction is greater than the balance available in your iTunes Card, Gift 
Certificate or Allowance Account, your credit card, or PayPal account, will be charged for 
the balance.  
The Service accepts the following credit cards: Visa, MasterCard, American Express, and 
Discover.  
PLEASE NOTE  
We are unable to accept credit cards issued by banks outside of the United States or prepaid 
gift cards issued by credit card companies. Debit cards and check cards have daily spending 
limits that may prevent the processing of your order.  
If a transaction has been declined online due to credit card issues, or issues with your PayPal 
account, please ensure all data is correct and resubmit. If the transaction is not accepted 
online, you will be unable to use that card or your PayPal account (as the case may be) for 
your transaction and should use another credit card.    252 
11. AGREEMENT TO PAY.  
a. Payment for Products. You agree to pay for all Products you license through the Service, 
and that Apple may charge your credit card or PayPal account for any Products licensed, 
and for any additional amounts (including any taxes and late fees, as applicable) as may be 
accrued by or in connection with your Account. YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
TIMELY  PAYMENT  OF  ALL  FEES  AND  FOR  PROVIDING  APPLE  WITH VALID 
CREDIT CARD OR PAYPAL ACCOUNT DETAILS FOR PAYMENT OF ALL FEES. 
All fees will be billed to the credit card, or the PayPal account, you designate during the 
registration process. If you want to designate a different credit card or if there is a change in 
your credit card or PayPal account status, you  must change your credit card or PayPal 
account information online at the Account Info section of the Service. (There may be a 
temporary disruption of your access to the Service until Apple can verify the validity of the 
new credit card or PayPal account information.)  
b.  Right  to  Change  Prices  and  Availability  of  Products.  Prices  and  availability  of  any 
Products are subject to change at any time.  
c. Electronic Signatures and Contracts. Your use of the Service includes the ability to enter 
into agreements and/or to make transactions electronically. YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT 
YOUR  ELECTRONIC  SUBMISSIONS  CONSTITUTE  YOUR  AGREEMENT  AND 
INTENT  TO  BE  BOUND  BY  AND  TO  PAY  FOR  SUCH  AGREEMENTS  AND 
TRANSACTIONS.  YOUR  AGREEMENT  AND  INTENT  TO  BE  BOUND  BY 
ELECTRONIC  SUBMISSIONS  APPLIES  TO  ALL  RECORDS  RELATING  TO  ALL 
TRANSACTIONS  YOU  ENTER  INTO  ON  THIS  SITE,  INCLUDING  NOTICES  OF 
CANCELLATION, POLICIES, CONTRACTS, AND APPLICATIONS.  
d. In order to access and retain your electronic records, you may be required to have certain 
hardware and software, which are your sole responsibility.  
12. DELIVERY OF PRODUCTS; REFUNDS.  
a. Interrupted Delivery to iPod or iPhone. If delivery of a Product you licensed on an iPod or 
iPhone is interrupted, your transaction will be included in your download queue. You may 
resume the delivery to your Apple-authorized device by selecting "Check for Purchases" 
from the Store menu in the iTunes or App Store application.    253 
b. Refund Policy. On occasion, technical problems may delay or prevent delivery of your 
Product. Your exclusive and sole remedy with respect to Product that is not delivered within 
a reasonable period will be either replacement of such Product, or refund of the price paid 
for such Product, as determined by Apple. Otherwise, no refunds are available.  
13.  1-CLICK®.  1-Click  is  a  registered  service  mark  of  Amazon.com,  Inc.,  used  under 
license. All App Store transactions use 1-Click, a convenient feature that allows you to 
license Products from the Service with a single click of your mouse or other input device. 
When  accessing  the  Service  on  your  iPod  or  iPhone,  1-Click  is  activated  for  each 
transaction  by  pressing  the  button  showing  the  price  of  the  product,  which  reveals  the 
"Install" or “Buy” button. When accessing the Service on your computer, clicking the "Buy" 
or “Get” button will start the download immediately and complete your transaction without 
any further steps. Transactions using 1-Click are subject to these Terms and Conditions, 
including the Refund Policy set forth herein.  
14. BILLING. If you are transacting using 1-Click or your PayPal account, your order may 
be authorized and billed in gradual increments during one transaction session as you click 
the "Buy" button. Depending on the size of your order, this may appear as multiple orders 
and billings on your credit card statement.  
15. SALES TAX. Service transactions will include sales tax based on the bill-to address and 
the sales tax rate in effect at the time your transaction is completed. If the sales tax rate for 
the billing address changes before the licensed Product is downloaded, the new tax rate in 
effect at the time of download will apply. We will only charge tax in states where such 
transactions are taxable. No customers are eligible for tax exemptions for transactions made 
on the Service.  
16. iTUNES CARDS. iTunes Cards are for transactions on the iTunes Store and the App 
Store only. iTunes Cards may not be used for transactions on the Apple Online Store or in 
Apple Retail Stores. iTunes Cards are non-refundable. iTunes Cards may not be used to 
purchase Gift Certificates, Allowance Accounts, gifts, or other iTunes Cards.  
17. UPGRADES. The latest version of the iTunes software is recommended to access the 
Service. From time to time, an upgrade to the latest version of the iTunes software may be 
required in order to make transactions from the Service, to download Products previously 
licensed  from  the  Service  (for  example,  Products  in  your  download  queue)  or  to  take 
advantage  of  new  features  of  the  Service.  The  latest  version  of  the  iTunes  software  is 
available for download at no charge, and the minimum system requirements for running it   254 
are provided, at http://www.apple.com/itunes/download/. Use of iTunes software is subject 
to acceptance of its software license agreement presented at the time of installation. For any 
additional  questions  regarding  required  upgrades,  please  contact  iTunes  Store  Customer 
Service (see below).  
18. PRODUCT AVAILABILITY. On occasion, a licensed Product may become unavailable 
following a transaction but prior to download. Your sole remedy in such cases is a refund of 
the price paid for the unavailable licensed Product. Please contact iTunes Store Customer 
Service for assistance in such cases (see below).  
19. FOR ASSISTANCE WITH ORDERS - iTUNES STORE CUSTOMER SERVICE. For 
assistance with billing questions or other order inquiries, please refer to our online support 
page by clicking here: http://www.apple.com/support/itunes/store/. If you cannot find the 
answers you are seeking in our robust knowledge base, you can send us an email by visiting 
the following URL http://www.apple.com/support/itunes/store/email/, and completing the 
email form. Responses to emails will be provided as soon as possible.  
20.  IMPORTANT  SAFETY  INFORMATION:  (1)  To  avoid  muscle,  joint  or  eye  strain 
during video game play, you should always take frequent breaks from playing, and stop and 
take a longer rest if your eyes, hands, wrists or arms become tired or sore or you feel any 
other  discomfort.  (2)  A  very  small  percentage  of  people  may  experience  seizures  or 
blackouts when exposed to flashing lights or patterns, including while playing video games 
or watching videos. Symptoms may include dizziness, nausea, involuntary movements, loss 
of awareness, altered vision, tingling, numbness, or other discomforts. Consult a doctor 
before playing video games if you have ever suffered these or other symptoms linked to 
seizures and/or epilepsy, and stop playing immediately and see a doctor if these or similar 
symptoms occur during game play. Parents should monitor their children's video game play 
for signs of symptoms.  
21. OBJECTIONABLE MATERIAL. You understand that by using the Service, you may 
encounter material that may be deemed offensive, indecent, or objectionable, which content 
may or may not be identified as having explicit material. Nevertheless, you agree to use the 
Service at your sole risk and that Apple shall have no liability to you for content that may be 
found to be offensive, indecent, or objectionable. Application types and descriptions are 
provided for convenience, and you acknowledge and agree that Apple does not guarantee 
their accuracy.  
22. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.    255 
a. Acknowledgement of Ownership. You agree that the Service, including but not limited to 
Products, graphics, audio clips, and editorial content, contains proprietary information and 
material  that  is  owned  by  Apple  and/or  its  principals,  and  is  protected  by  applicable 
intellectual property and other laws, including but not limited to copyright, and that you will 
not use such proprietary information or materials in any way whatsoever except for use of 
the Service in compliance with the terms of this Agreement. No portion of the Service may 
be reproduced in any form or by any means, except as expressly permitted hereunder. You 
agree not to modify, rent, lease, loan, sell, distribute, or create derivative works based on the 
Service, in any manner, and you shall not exploit the Service in any unauthorized way 
whatsoever, including but not limited to, by trespass or burdening network capacity.  
b. Removal of Apple Content or Other Materials. Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this Agreement, Apple and its principals reserve the right to change, suspend, remove, or 
disable access to any Products, content, or other materials comprising a part of the Service 
at any time without notice. In no event will Apple be liable for the removal of or disabling 
of access to any such Products, content or materials under this Agreement. Apple may also 
impose limits on the use of or access to certain features or portions of the Service, in any 
case and without notice or liability.  
c. Copyrights. All copyrights in and to the Service, including but not limited to, the iTunes 
Store, the App Store (including the compilation of content, postings, links to other Internet 
resources, and descriptions of those resources), and software, are owned by Apple and/or its 
principals, who reserve all their rights in law and equity. THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE 
OR  ANY  PART  OF  THE  SERVICE,  EXCEPT  FOR  USE  OF  THE  SERVICE  AS 
PERMITTED  IN  THESE  TERMS  AND  CONDITIONS,  IS  STRICTLY  PROHIBITED 
AND INFRINGES ON THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF OTHERS AND 
MAY  SUBJECT  YOU  TO  CIVIL  AND  CRIMINAL  PENALTIES,  INCLUDING 
POSSIBLE MONETARY DAMAGES, FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT.  
d. Trademarks. Apple, the Apple logo, iTunes, and other Apple trademarks, service marks, 
graphics,  and  logos  used  in  connection  with  the  Service  are  trademarks  or  registered 
trademarks  of  Apple  Inc.  in  the  U.S.  and/or  other  countries.  Other  trademarks,  service 
marks, graphics, and logos used in connection with the Service may be the trademarks of 
their respective owners. You are granted no right or license with respect to any of the 
aforesaid trademarks and any use of such trademarks.  
23. TERMINATION.    256 
a. Termination by Apple. If you fail, or Apple suspects that you have failed, to comply with 
any  of  the  provisions  of  this  Agreement,  including  but  not  limited  to  failure  to  make 
payment of fees due, failure to provide Apple with a valid credit card or with accurate and 
complete Registration Data, failure to safeguard your Account information, violation of the 
Usage  Rules  or  any  license  to the  software,  or  infringement  or  other  violation  of  third 
parties' rights, Apple, at its sole discretion, without notice to you may: (i) terminate this 
Agreement and/or your Account, and you will remain liable for all amounts due under your 
Account up to and including the date of termination; and/or (ii) terminate the license to the 
software; and/or (iii) preclude access to the Service (or any part thereof).  
b. Termination of the Service. Apple reserves the right to modify, suspend, or discontinue 
the Service (or any part or content thereof) at any time with or without notice to you, and 
Apple will not be liable to you or to any third party should it exercise such rights.  
24. GENERAL COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS. The Service is controlled and operated by 
Apple  from  its  offices  in  the  United  States.  You  agree  to  comply  with  all  local,  state, 
federal, and national laws, statutes, ordinances, and regulations that apply to your use of the 
Service.  
25. ENFORCEMENT OF THESE TERMS. Apple reserves the right to take steps Apple 
believes are reasonably necessary or appropriate to enforce and/or verify compliance with 
any part of this Agreement (including but not limited to Apple's right to cooperate with any 
legal process relating to your use of the Service and/or Products, and/or a third party claim 
that your use of the Service and/or Products is unlawful and/or infringes such third party's 
rights).  You  agree  that  Apple  has  the  right,  without  liability  to  you,  to  disclose  any 
Registration Data and/or Account information to law enforcement authorities, government 
officials, and/or a third party, as Apple believes is reasonably necessary or appropriate to 
enforce and/or verify compliance with any part of this Agreement (including but not limited 
to Apple's right to cooperate with any legal process relating to your use of the Service 
and/or Products, and/or a third party claim that your use of the Service and/or Products is 
unlawful and/or infringes such third party's rights).  
26. NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIRD-PARTY MATERIALS OR WEB SITES. Certain 
content, Products, and services available via the Service may include materials from third 
parties.  In  addition,  Apple  may  provide  links  to  certain  third  party  Web  sites.  You 
acknowledge  and  agree  that  Apple  is  not  responsible  for  examining  or  evaluating  the 
content or accuracy of any such third-party material or Web sites. Apple does not warrant or 
endorse and does not assume and will not have any liability or responsibility for any third-  257 
party materials or Web sites, or for any other materials, products, or services of third parties. 
Links to other Web sites are provided solely as a convenience to you. You agree that you 
will not use any third-party materials in a manner that would infringe or violate the rights of 
any other party, and that Apple is not in any way responsible for any such use by you.  
27.  MAINTENANCE  AND  SUPPORT:  Apple  will  be  responsible  for  providing  any 
maintenance and support services with respect to the Apple Products only, as specified in 
the Licensed Application End User License Agreement, or the separate end user license 
agreement,  as  the  case  may  be,  or  as  required  under  applicable  law.  The  Application 
Provider of any Third Party Product will be solely responsible for providing maintenance 
and support services with respect to that Third Party Product, as specified in the Licensed 
Application  End  User  License  Agreement  or  the  Application  Provider  end  user  license 
agreement, as the case may be, or as required under applicable law. You acknowledge and 
agree that Apple will have no obligation whatsoever to provide any maintenance or support 
services with respect to any Third Party Product.  
28. DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES; LIABILITY LIMITATIONS.  
a. APPLE DOES NOT GUARANTEE, REPRESENT, OR WARRANT THAT YOUR USE 
OF  THE  SERVICE  WILL  BE  UNINTERRUPTED  OR  ERROR-FREE,  AND  YOU 
AGREE THAT FROM TIME TO TIME APPLE MAY REMOVE THE SERVICE FOR 
INDEFINITE  PERIODS  OF  TIME,  OR  CANCEL  THE  SERVICE  AT  ANY  TIME, 
WITHOUT NOTICE TO YOU.  
b. YOU EXPRESSLY AGREE THAT YOUR USE OF, OR INABILITY TO USE, THE 
SERVICE  IS  AT  YOUR  SOLE  RISK.  THE  SERVICE  AND  ALL  PRODUCTS  AND 
SERVICES  DELIVERED  TO  YOU  THROUGH  THE  SERVICE  ARE  (EXCEPT  AS 
EXPRESSLY STATED BY APPLE) PROVIDED "AS IS" AND "AS AVAILABLE" FOR 
YOUR  USE,  WITHOUT  WARRANTIES  OF  ANY  KIND,  EITHER  EXPRESS  OR 
IMPLIED,  INCLUDING  ALL  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OF  MERCHANTABILITY, 
FITNESS  FOR  A  PARTICULAR  PURPOSE,  TITLE,  AND  NONINFRINGEMENT. 
BECAUSE SOME JURISDICTIONS DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OF IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES, THE ABOVE EXCLUSION OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES MAY NOT 
APPLY TO YOU.  
c.  IN  NO  CASE  SHALL  APPLE,  ITS  DIRECTORS,  OFFICERS,  EMPLOYEES, 
AFFILIATES, AGENTS, CONTRACTORS, PRINCIPALS, OR LICENSORS BE LIABLE 
FOR  ANY  DIRECT,  INDIRECT,  INCIDENTAL,  PUNITIVE,  SPECIAL,  OR   258 
CONSEQUENTIAL  DAMAGES  ARISING  FROM  YOUR  USE  OF  ANY  OF  THE 
SERVICES OR FOR ANY OTHER CLAIM RELATED IN ANY WAY TO YOUR USE 
OF  THE  SERVICES,  INCLUDING,  BUT  NOT  LIMITED  TO,  ANY  ERRORS  OR 
OMISSIONS  IN  ANY  CONTENT,  OR  ANY  LOSS  OR  DAMAGE  OF  ANY  KIND 
INCURRED  AS  A  RESULT  OF  THE  USE  OF  ANY  CONTENT  (OR  PRODUCT) 
POSTED,  TRANSMITTED,  OR  OTHERWISE  MADE  AVAILABLE  VIA  THE 
SERVICE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THEIR POSSIBILITY. BECAUSE SOME STATES 
OR JURISDICTIONS DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR THE LIMITATION OF 
LIABILITY  FOR  CONSEQUENTIAL  OR  INCIDENTAL  DAMAGES,  IN  SUCH 
STATES OR JURISDICTIONS, APPLE'S LIABILITY SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE 
EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW.  
d.  APPLE  SHALL  USE  REASONABLE  EFFORTS  TO  PROTECT  INFORMATION 
SUBMITTED  BY  YOU  IN  CONNECTION  WITH  THE  SERVICES,  BUT  YOU 
ACKNOWLEDGE  AND  AGREE  THAT  YOUR  SUBMISSION  OF  SUCH 
INFORMATION IS AT YOUR SOLE RISK, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ANY 
AND  ALL  LIABILITY  TO  YOU  FOR  ANY  LOSS  OR  LIABILITY  RELATING  TO 
SUCH INFORMATION IN ANY WAY.  
e. APPLE DOES NOT REPRESENT OR GUARANTEE THAT THE SERVICE WILL BE 
FREE  FROM  LOSS,  CORRUPTION,  ATTACK,  VIRUSES,  INTERFERENCE, 
HACKING,  OR  OTHER  SECURITY  INTRUSION,  AND  APPLE  DISCLAIMS  ANY 
LIABILITY  RELATING  THERETO.  PRODUCTS  CAN  ONLY  BE  DOWNLOADED 
ONCE; AFTER BEING DOWNLOADED, THEY CANNOT BE REPLACED IF LOST 
FOR  ANY  REASON.  YOU  SHALL  BE  RESPONSIBLE  FOR  BACKING  UP  YOUR 
OWN SYSTEM, INCLUDING ANY PRODUCTS PURCHASED FROM THE SERVICE 
THAT ARE STORED IN YOUR SYSTEM.  
29.  WAIVER  AND  INDEMNITY.  BY  USING  THE  SERVICE,  YOU  AGREE  TO 
INDEMNIFY  AND  HOLD  APPLE,  ITS  DIRECTORS,  OFFICERS,  EMPLOYEES, 
AFFILIATES,  AGENTS,  CONTRACTORS,  PRINCIPALS,  AND  LICENSORS 
HARMLESS WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF YOUR BREACH 
OF THIS AGREEMENT, YOUR USE OF THE SERVICE, OR ANY ACTION TAKEN 
BY APPLE AS PART OF ITS INVESTIGATION OF A SUSPECTED VIOLATION OF 
THIS AGREEMENT OR AS A RESULT OF ITS FINDING OR DECISION THAT A 
VIOLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT HAS OCCURRED. THIS MEANS THAT YOU 
CANNOT  SUE  OR  RECOVER  ANY  DAMAGES  FROM  APPLE,  ITS  DIRECTORS,   259 
OFFICERS,  EMPLOYEES,  AFFILIATES,  AGENTS,  CONTRACTORS,  PRINCIPALS, 
AND LICENSORS AS A RESULT OF ITS DECISION TO REMOVE OR REFUSE TO 
PROCESS ANY INFORMATION OR CONTENT, TO WARN YOU, TO SUSPEND OR 
TERMINATE  YOUR  ACCESS  TO  THE  SERVICE,  OR  TO  TAKE  ANY  OTHER 
ACTION DURING THE INVESTIGATION OF A SUSPECTED VIOLATION OR AS A 
RESULT OF APPLE'S CONCLUSION THAT A VIOLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT 
HAS OCCURRED. THIS WAIVER AND INDEMNITY PROVISION APPLIES TO ALL 
VIOLATIONS DESCRIBED IN OR CONTEMPLATED BY THIS AGREEMENT.  
30. CHANGES. Apple reserves the right, at any time and from time to time, to update, 
revise, supplement, and otherwise modify this Agreement and to impose new or additional 
rules, policies, terms, or conditions on your use of the Service. Such updates, revisions, 
supplements,  modifications,  and  additional  rules,  policies,  terms,  and  conditions 
(collectively  referred  to  in  this  Agreement  as  "Additional  Terms")  will  be  effective 
immediately  and  incorporated  into  this  Agreement.  Your  continued  use  of  the  Service 
following  will  be  deemed  to constitute  your  acceptance of any  and  all such Additional 
Terms. All Additional Terms are hereby incorporated into this Agreement by this reference.  
31. NOTICES. Apple may send you notice with respect to the Service by sending an email 
message to the email address listed in your Apple Account contact information, by sending 
a  letter  via  postal  mail  to  the  contact  address  listed  in  your  Apple  Account  contact 
information, or by a posting on the Service. Notices shall become effective immediately.  
32. GOVERNING LAW. The laws of the State of California, excluding its conflicts of law 
rules, govern these Terms of Service and your use of the Service. Your use of the Service 
may also be subject to other local, state, national, or international laws. You expressly agree 
that exclusive jurisdiction for any claim or dispute with Apple or relating in any way to your 
use of the Service resides in the courts of the State of California.  
33.  MISCELLANEOUS.  These  Terms  and  Conditions  constitute  the  entire  agreement 
between  you  and  Apple  and  govern  your  use  of  the  Service,  superseding  any  prior 
agreements  between  you  and  Apple.  You  also  may  be  subject  to  additional  terms  and 
conditions that may apply when you use affiliate services, third-party content, or third-party 
software. If any part of these Terms and Conditions is held invalid or unenforceable, that 
portion shall be construed in a manner consistent with applicable law to reflect, as nearly as 
possible, the original intentions of the parties, and the remaining portions shall remain in full 
force  and  effect.  Apple's  failure  to  enforce  any  right  or  provisions  in  these  Terms  and 
Conditions will not constitute a waiver of such provision, or any other provision of these   260 
Terms and Conditions. If any provision of this Agreement is found by a court of competent 
jurisdiction to be invalid, the other provisions will remain in full force and effect. Apple will 
not be responsible for failures to fulfill any obligations due to causes beyond its control.  
34. OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS  
Apple is not responsible for typographic errors.  
No Apple employee or agent has the authority to vary any of the Service's policies or the 
terms and conditions governing any sale.  
• • • • •  
LICENSED APPLICATION END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT  
The Products made available through the Service are licensed, not sold, to you. Your license 
to each Product that you obtain through the Service is subject to your prior acceptance of 
this Licensed Application End User License Agreement, and you agree that the terms of this 
Licensed Application End User License Agreement will apply to each Product that you 
license through  the  Service,  unless  that  Product  is  covered  by  a  valid  end  user  license 
agreement entered into between you and the Licensor of that Product, in which case the 
terms  of  that  separate  end  user  license  agreement  will  govern,  subject  to  your  prior 
acceptance of that separate end user license agreement. Your license to any Apple Product 
under this Licensed Application End User License Agreement is granted by Apple, and your 
license  to  any  Third  Party  Product  under  this  Licensed  Application  End  User  License 
Agreement is granted by the Licensor of that Third Party Product. Any Product that is 
subject to the license granted under this Licensed Application End User License Agreement 
is referred to herein as the “Licensed Application”. Licensor reserves all rights in and to the 
Licensed Application not expressly granted to you under this Licensed Application End 
User License Agreement.  
a. Scope of License: This license granted to you for the Licensed Application by Licensor is 
limited to a non-transferable license to use the Licensed Application on any iPhone or iPod 
touch that you own or control and as permitted by the Usage Rules set forth in Section 9.b. 
of the App Store Terms and Conditions (the “Usage Rules”). This license does not allow 
you to use the Licensed Application on any iPod touch or iPhone that you do not own or 
control,  and  you  may  not  distribute  or  make  the  Licensed  Application  available  over a 
network where it could be used by multiple devices at the same time. You may not rent,   261 
lease, lend, sell, redistribute or sublicense the Licensed Application. You may not copy 
(except as expressly permitted by this license and the Usage Rules), decompile, reverse 
engineer, disassemble, attempt to derive the source code of, modify, or create derivative 
works of the Licensed Application, any updates, or any part thereof (except as and only to 
the extent any foregoing restriction is prohibited by applicable law or to the extent as may 
be permitted by the licensing terms governing use of any open sourced components included 
with the Licensed Application). Any attempt to do so is a violation of the rights of the 
Licensor and its licensors. If you breach this restriction, You may be subject to prosecution 
and damages.  
The terms of the license will govern any upgrades provided by Licensor that replace and/or 
supplement the original Product, unless such upgrade is accompanied by a separate license 
in which case the terms of that license will govern.  
b. Consent to Use of Data: You agree that Licensor may collect and use technical data and 
related information, including but not limited to technical information about your device, 
system and application software, and peripherals, that is gathered periodically to facilitate 
the provision of software updates, product support and other services to you (if any) related 
to the Licensed Application. Licensor may use this information, as long as it is in a form 
that does not personally identify you, to improve its products or to provide services or 
technologies to you.  
c. Termination. The license is effective until terminated by you or Licensor. Your rights 
under this license will terminate automatically without notice from the Licensor if you fail 
to comply with any term(s) of this license. Upon termination of the license, you shall cease 
all use of the Licensed Application, and destroy all copies, full or partial, of the Licensed 
Application.  
d.  Services;  Third  Party  Materials.  The  Licensed  Application  may  enable  access  to 
Licensor’s and third party services and web sites (collectively and individually, "Services"). 
Use of the Services may require Internet access and that you accept additional terms of 
service.  
You understand that by using any of the Services, you may encounter content that may be 
deemed offensive, indecent, or objectionable, which content may or may not be identified as 
having explicit language, and that the results of any search or entering of a particular URL 
may  automatically  and  unintentionally  generate  links  or  references  to  objectionable 
material. Nevertheless, you agree to use the Services at your sole risk and that the Licensor   262 
shall not have any liability to you for content that may be found to be offensive, indecent, or 
objectionable.  
Certain  Services  may  display,  include  or  make  available  content,  data,  information, 
applications or materials from third parties (“Third Party Materials”) or provide links to 
certain third party web sites. By using the Services, you acknowledge and agree that the 
Licensor is not responsible for examining or evaluating the content, accuracy, completeness, 
timeliness, validity, copyright compliance, legality, decency, quality or any other aspect of 
such Third Party Materials or web sites. The Licensor does not warrant or endorse and does 
not assume and will not have any liability or responsibility to you or any other person for 
any third-party Services, Third Party Materials or web sites, or for any other materials, 
products, or services of third parties. Third Party Materials and links to other web sites are 
provided solely as a convenience to you. Financial information displayed by any Services is 
for general informational purposes only and is not intended to be relied upon as investment 
advice.  Before  executing  any  securities  transaction  based  upon  information  obtained 
through  the  Services,  you  should  consult  with  a  financial  professional.  Location  data 
provided by any Services is for basic navigational purposes only and is not intended to be 
relied upon in situations where precise location information is needed or where erroneous, 
inaccurate  or  incomplete  location  data  may  lead  to  death,  personal  injury,  property  or 
environmental damage. Neither the Licensor, nor any of its content providers, guarantees 
the availability, accuracy, completeness, reliability, or timeliness of stock information or 
location data displayed by any Services.  
You agree that any Services contain proprietary content, information and material that is 
protected by applicable intellectual property and other laws, including but not limited to 
copyright, and that you will not use such proprietary content, information or materials in any 
way whatsoever except for permitted use of the Services. No portion of the Services may be 
reproduced in any form or by any means. You agree not to modify, rent, lease, loan, sell, 
distribute, or create derivative works based on the Services, in any manner, and you shall 
not exploit the Services in any unauthorized way whatsoever, including but not limited to, 
by trespass or burdening network capacity. You further agree not to use the Services in any 
manner to harass, abuse, stalk, threaten, defame or otherwise infringe or violate the rights of 
any other party, and that the Licensor is not in any way responsible for any such use by you, 
nor  for  any  harassing,  threatening,  defamatory,  offensive  or  illegal  messages  or 
transmissions that you may receive as a result of using any of the Services.    263 
In  addition,  third  party  Services  and Third  Party  Materials  that  may  be  accessed  from, 
displayed on or linked to from the iPhone or iPod touch are not available in all languages or 
in all countries. The Licensor makes no representation that such Services and Materials are 
appropriate or available for use in any particular location. To the extent you choose to 
access such Services or Materials, you do so at your own initiative and are responsible for 
compliance with any applicable laws, including but not limited to applicable local laws. The 
Licensor, and its licensors, reserve the right to change, suspend, remove, or disable access to 
any Services at any time without notice. In no event will the Licensor be liable for the 
removal of or disabling of access to any such Services. The Licensor may also impose limits 
on the use of or access to certain Services, in any case and without notice or liability.  
e. NO WARRANTY: YOU EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT USE 
OF  THE  LICENSED  APPLICATION  IS  AT  YOUR  SOLE  RISK  AND  THAT  THE 
ENTIRE  RISK  AS  TO  SATISFACTORY  QUALITY,  PERFORMANCE,  ACCURACY 
AND  EFFORT  IS  WITH  YOU.  TO  THE  MAXIMUM  EXTENT  PERMITTED  BY 
APPLICABLE  LAW,  THE  LICENSED  APPLICATION  AND  ANY  SERVICES 
PERFORMED  OR  PROVIDED  BY  THE  LICENSED  APPLICATION  ("SERVICES") 
ARE  PROVIDED  "AS  IS"  AND  “AS  AVAILABLE”,  WITH  ALL  FAULTS  AND 
WITHOUT  WARRANTY  OF  ANY  KIND,  AND  LICENSOR  HEREBY  DISCLAIMS 
ALL  WARRANTIES  AND  CONDITIONS  WITH  RESPECT  TO  THE  LICENSED 
APPLICATION  AND  ANY  SERVICES,  EITHER  EXPRESS,  IMPLIED  OR 
STATUTORY, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES 
AND/OR CONDITIONS OF MERCHANTABILITY, OF SATISFACTORY QUALITY, 
OF  FITNESS  FOR  A  PARTICULAR  PURPOSE,  OF  ACCURACY,  OF  QUIET 
ENJOYMENT, AND NON-INFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS. LICENSOR 
DOES NOT WARRANT AGAINST INTERFERENCE WITH YOUR ENJOYMENT OF 
THE  LICENSED  APPLICATION,  THAT  THE  FUNCTIONS  CONTAINED  IN,  OR 
SERVICES PERFORMED OR PROVIDED BY, THE LICENSED APPLICATION WILL 
MEET  YOUR  REQUIREMENTS,  THAT  THE  OPERATION  OF  THE  LICENSED 
APPLICATION OR SERVICES WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED OR ERROR-FREE, OR 
THAT  DEFECTS  IN  THE  LICENSED  APPLICATION  OR  SERVICES  WILL  BE 
CORRECTED.  NO  ORAL  OR  WRITTEN  INFORMATION  OR  ADVICE  GIVEN  BY 
LICENSOR  OR  ITS  AUTHORIZED  REPRESENTATIVE  SHALL  CREATE  A 
WARRANTY.  SHOULD  THE  LICENSED  APPLICATION  OR  SERVICES  PROVE 
DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE ENTIRE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, 
REPAIR  OR  CORRECTION.  SOME  JURISDICTIONS  DO  NOT  ALLOW  THE 
EXCLUSION  OF  IMPLIED  WARRANTIES  OR  LIMITATIONS  ON  APPLICABLE   264 
STATUTORY  RIGHTS  OF  A  CONSUMER,  SO  THE  ABOVE  EXCLUSION  AND 
LIMITATIONS MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU.  
f.  Limitation  of  Liability.  TO  THE  EXTENT  NOT  PROHIBITED  BY  LAW,  IN  NO 
EVENT  SHALL  LICENSOR  BE  LIABLE  FOR  PERSONAL  INJURY,  OR  ANY 
INCIDENTAL,  SPECIAL,  INDIRECT  OR  CONSEQUENTIAL  DAMAGES 
WHATSOEVER, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF 
PROFITS,  LOSS  OF  DATA,  BUSINESS  INTERRUPTION  OR  ANY  OTHER 
COMMERCIAL DAMAGES OR LOSSES, ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO YOUR 
USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE LICENSED APPLICATION, HOWEVER CAUSED, 
REGARDLESS  OF  THE  THEORY  OF  LIABILITY  (CONTRACT,  TORT  OR 
OTHERWISE)  AND  EVEN  IF  LICENSOR  HAS  BEEN  ADVISED  OF  THE 
POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. SOME JURISDICTIONS DO NOT ALLOW THE 
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY, OR OF INCIDENTAL OR 
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, SO THIS LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. 
In no event shall Licensor’s total liability to you for all damages (other than as may be 
required by applicable law in cases involving personal injury) exceed the amount of fifty 
dollars ($50.00). The foregoing limitations will apply even if the above stated remedy fails 
of its essential purpose.  
g. You may not use or otherwise export or re-export the Licensed Application except as 
authorized by United States law and the laws of the jurisdiction in which the Licensed 
Application was obtained. In particular, but without limitation, the Licensed Application 
may not be exported or re-exported (a) into any U.S. embargoed countries or (b) to anyone 
on  the  U.S.  Treasury  Department's  list  of  Specially  Designated  Nationals  or  the  U.S. 
Department  of  Commerce  Denied  Person’s  List  or  Entity  List.  By  using  the  Licensed 
Application, you represent and warrant that you are not located in any such country or on 
any  such  list.  You  also  agree  that  you  will  not  use  these  products  for  any  purposes 
prohibited by United States law, including, without limitation, the development, design, 
manufacture or production of nuclear, missiles, or chemical or biological weapons.  
h. The Licensed Application and related documentation are "Commercial Items", as that 
term is defined at 48 C.F.R. §2.101, consisting of "Commercial Computer Software" and 
"Commercial Computer Software Documentation", as such terms are used in 48 C.F.R. 
§12.212 or 48 C.F.R. §227.7202, as applicable. Consistent with 48 C.F.R. §12.212 or 48 
C.F.R. §227.7202-1 through 227.7202-4, as applicable, the Commercial Computer Software 
and Commercial Computer Software Documentation are being licensed to U.S. Government   265 
end users (a) only as Commercial Items and (b) with only those rights as are granted to all 
other end users pursuant to the terms and conditions herein. Unpublished-rights reserved 
under the copyright laws of the United States.  
i. The laws of the State of California, excluding its conflicts of law rules, govern this license 
and your use of the Licensed Application. Your use of the Licensed Application may also be 
subject to other local, state, national, or international laws.  
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